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WHAT KIND
OF ARMY?



NOTES ON THE
SOCIAL PROBLEM.
GENESIS AND
DEVELOPMENTS




EVOLUTION OF
EQUIPMENT AND
TOMORROW'S WARS



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
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
The aim of the Rivista Militare is to broaden and update the technical and vocational training of Army Officers and NCOs. To this end it functions as a vehicle for the dissemination of military thinking and as a forum of study and debate. The Rivista Militare is also intended to be a means of informing the general public about the Army and military matters through the publication of articles of current technical and scientific interest.

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


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What Kind



El. 115590



ISTITUTO DI
S. VALENTI

Without a shadow of a doubt, the challenge which the Army must meet in the second half of the '80s can be defined as critical to its future. The overall framework facing this branch of the armed forces, analogous to that facing all society's institutions, has undergone profound changes as a result of the tremendous social and economic transformations of the last fifty years.

Also subject to change, the rhythm and character of technological evolution are moving ahead at an ever quickening pace. Even the possibilities for long-term planning have become more remote and uncertain.

Though this scenario is definitely not meant to be pessimistic, its growing complexity only adds to the burden of guaranteeing that the military be ready to safeguard the security and assure the defence of the country whenever the need for such action should arise. This task is now more difficult than ever, above all in relation to the very serious organizational and industrial problems which are an integral part of the present-day reality. In view of this situation, top priority must be given to a management strategy combining determination and originality with a pragmatic concern for concrete

results in such a way as to maintain a constant balance between the system's functional complexity and its ability to provide a rapid response.

Though this course is certainly not an easy one, current efforts would seem to be headed in the right direction, even if a good many basic problems remain to be solved, and the optimal system is still nothing more than a distant goal.



OF army?

BASIC PROBLEMS AND SYSTEM STANDARDS



Preceding page.

A self-propelled 109G howitzer of the "Ariete" Armoured Division. Today, the ever-quicken pace of technological evolution makes long-term planning problematic. As a result, the job of guaranteeing that the military be ever ready to assure the country's defense has become all the more difficult.

Above.

Bersaglieri aboard an M113 troop transport.

In order to create an effective coupling of overall financial resources – planning's lone "given" – with the objectives targeted by the proposed 1985 budget, special emphasis has been given to a unification of the planning function for all three branches of the military.

Right.

A "Leopard" vehicle of the "Mantova" Motorized Division. Within the Army, the movement towards more rational methods of operation will involve singling out, reforming and, in extreme cases, eliminating organizational bodies and institutions which consume significant resources without producing truly useful results.





The elaboration of the five fundamental interforce missions, which correspond to the precise political-strategic objectives laid out in the "1985 White Paper", represents a first concrete step towards the **functional interdependence of the three armed forces**, a concept whose importance has always been fully recognized, though up to now a large number of different factors has interfered with its actual implementation.

Furthermore, the proposed budget for 1985 rightly emphasizes the **unification of all planning**, a measure indispensable to the effective coupling of overall financial resources and targeted objectives.

Each "interforce operational mission" is the embodiment of these objectives. This means that a more rational, more accurate system must be developed for the allocation of **available resources, still planning's only fixed "given"**, if one wishes to go about gradually eliminating the discrepancies and imbalances which currently exist

between the operational sectors of the three armed forces.

So much for the topic of interforce relations; but the movement towards more rational methods of operation must also become a reality within the Army itself, singling out, reforming and, in extreme cases, eliminating organizational bodies and institutions which are no longer adequate or relevant to the actual needs of the current situation, and which, in addition, consume significant resources without producing truly useful results.

Action must be taken in this area, and there would appear to be no room for delay. So great is the need for change, that it must override all concerns of a local and social nature. The fact is that these considerations, though they are fully deserving of respect, clash with the goal of injecting vigor and raising operational effectiveness in the military as a whole.

We must work, therefore, in two different areas – one relates to interforce matters, the other

Above left.

Transporter of the "Hawk" anti-aircraft missile system. The modernization and development of the Italian Army has fallen behind the other two Services because of the many social and industrial constraints on the Army on account of its greater complexity, coupled by the technical constraints imposed on it because of financial restrictions.

Above.

Gunners inside a tank. The restructuring carried out in 1975 affected the operational component, but did not solve any of the problems relating to territorial organization and support.

Resource availability, which has made it necessary to implement a cost containment policy, demonstrates the priority of the operational component over all the other components of the instrument.

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
involves the inner workings of the Army itself. In either case, what is at stake is a large part of the Army's future as regards its potential for modernization and trouble-free development.

One must approach this challenge in a professional manner, asking for nothing more than what is judged to be strictly necessary in view of the targeted objectives, and yet aiming right from the start at the elimination of certain handicaps, handicaps which, in the past, have significantly hampered the Army's modernization programs.

Whatever action is to be taken, it must be fully consistent with the goal of improving the country's defense policy. Within the first area – that involving interforce operations – one should emphasize that a firm endorsement of the principle of integrated planning would represent a qualitative leap towards a harmonious, balanced development of the military.

Indeed, the results of studies on the topic highlight the fact that the Army, though it operates in a situation whose overall difficulty can not be denied, **still lags behind the other two services in this respect.**

And the delay cannot be explained away by simplistically blaming it on an inability to bring institutional structures up to the level of available resources – this subject has been addressed in a large number of very reliable studies – but must be understood in terms of a set of social and industrial givens which have an abnormal influence on the Army, an organization far more complex and elaborate than the other two branches of the armed forces. One must also take into consideration a number of substantial technical handicaps. These in-



clude: a steady drop in allocated resources, both in general terms and in relation to the other two armed forces; the methods used for distributing the burden of budgetary cutbacks; the financial erosion caused by VAT; and the absence of funds which were to have been provided by the

programs of the promotional law.

All this has kept the Army from adopting a more functional structure while leading to a series of delays in its programs of supply and reinforcement, programs which represent an indispensable prerequisite to

OF army?

"Alpini" on a training exercise, marching over snowcovered terrain.



maintaining a first-rate military force.

In the meantime, the other services have successfully completed programs of great operational importance thanks to the more streamlined nature of their structures, the continual increase in their available finan-

cial resources, and the presence of well organized, competitive industries in the fields of aeronautics and ship-building, a situation which has only recently been equalled in the field of land-based armaments, thanks to the establishment of an infrastructure able to meet the needs of an

army now capable of carrying out its programs of fundamental growth with all due dispatch.

Once interforce circles have recognized this objective situation, it will become possible for the Army to meet its assigned operational objectives through a full participation in the general context of the nation's defence institutions.


In terms of the second area of concern – the work which needs to be done within the Army – it is equally important that the Army itself be free to modify its structure on the basis of a more streamlined, functional model.

The challenge of "taking on the complexity of both today and tomorrow" (in the words of the Minister of Defense) calls for the urgent elimination of those organizational shortcomings which, though they are both well known and unwanted, continue to represent a stumbling block on the path to an optimal use of both men and matériel.

Though it has led to a tremendous amount of progress in the Army's operational sector, the restructuring program of 1975, an initiative whose potential for qualitative change has yet to be fully realized, has had practically no effect on the enormous problems of the territorial and support organizations.

The reasons for this are many and, on the whole, not unknown. They make sense within the general political context of a nation committed to social assistance, and yet they lead to perplexity when viewed in terms of economic, industrial and social evolution. Whatever the case may be, they have often stood in the way of efforts designed to restructure military institutions along more rational, and less costly, lines.

«CATRIN» SYSTEM




The introduction of the CATRIN System (Computerized Field System for the Transmission of Information) will represent a critical moment in the Army's efforts towards organizational renewal, functional simplification and structural modernization. The figure below illustrates the tools of electronic war.

The inescapable reality of financial resources – which, being what they are, inevitably lead to a policy of strict austerity – once again places the focus on the fact that top **priority must be given to the operational component.** Every other component should assume a subordinate position, dependent on the developments and status of the first.

In this context, the fundamental questions up for discussion become unquestionably pressing, weighty and broad-based.

What is needed, in fact, is a surgically precise effort covering the entire range of government agencies and institutions which have yet to be touched, not even minimally, by the restructuring initiative of 1975. This initiative definitely, and at times drastically, affected the operational area, but not the territorial or support structures.

Further reductions in the operational area, therefore, must wait until the more appropriate modifications have been made in the territorial and support structures.



What is more, any restructuring of the operational sector will have to be made with an eye towards the possible benefits of the new, computerized command and control systems plus the requirements of newly-purchased arms systems. For the most part, therefore, changes will not in-

volve the elimination of existing operational structures but their transformation in accordance with what is needed for the use of new weapons and equipment.

The eventual introduction of the CATRIN System (Computerized Field System for the Transmission of Information) will repre-

Right.

The "Stinger" anti-aircraft missile system. Equipped with a passive infra-red system, the missile has a maximum range of 5 kilometers, weighs 10.5 kilograms and is 152 cm. long.

Below right.



Two views of the Italian-made multiple launch rocket system "Fimos 25". The acquisitions of new armament systems will not necessarily lead to a smaller army. Producing a better army, however, will involve significant qualitative and quantitative transformations.

sent a critical moment in this process of organizational renewal, functional simplification and structural modernization.

With the acquisition of this system, the Army can be said to possess instruments of command and control which both meet operational requirements and reflect the possibilities offered by modern technology. But this is not all. The system may also give rise to a reorganization of the chain of command, leading to the elimination, if necessary, of any redundant links. Such an initiative would have a decidedly positive effect on the overall functional capacity of the Army, producing savings in terms of both financial resources and personnel.

The CATRIN System will not only put our Army on a par with Europe's best military forces in terms of command and control, but it will also aid the armed forces in the carrying out of their peacetime duties. Nor should one forget that the system can prove invaluable in times of civil emergency. With the CATRIN System, those in charge can quickly monitor all operations, directing them with dispatch and effectiveness, and controlling the evolution of the situation whenever the need should arise.

A result of high-level industrial technology, the CATRIN System calls for a significant commitment in terms of research, development and production, a



commitment which should move forward at a healthy pace.

The modernization of the operations sector will also include the acquisition of modern weapons systems such as the MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System), the "Skyguard Aspide", a low-altitude, anti-aircraft system,

the "Stinger", a self-defence, anti-aircraft system, and the self-propelled 25 mm gun, also an anti-aircraft weapon designed for use against low-flying planes.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that a better Army does not necessarily have to be a smaller Army, but that any

The 25 mm anti-aircraft gun.



not at all simple. They must respect delicate domestic and foreign situations whose equilibriums cannot be upset. It should be noted that the guidelines for developing effective solutions already exist, having been laid out in a series of thorough, in-depth studies which the Army High Command has been carrying out for some time now.

The time to take action is at hand, given that all concerned recognize the urgent need to energetically reform the areas only partially affected by the restructuring operation of '75.

This is the objective, the **organizational standard** which must be pursued.

In future issues, "Rivista Militare" will examine the **organizational stages**, or rather, the concrete planning – both current and tentative – needed to meet the proposed model.

Luigi Poli

general improvement will have to involve significant qualitative and quantitative transformations.

A like initiative will also call for a high level of co-ordination if a perfect pragmatic synchronization is to be established between the different areas involved in the transformations, that is to say, the areas of training, regulations and personnel.

Should budgetary constraints necessitate further reductions in the operations sector, all measures will have to be agreed upon in interforce consultation. Failure to do so would cast doubt upon the true value of "Interforce Operational Missions".

On the other hand, efforts to meet current standards and achieve reductions will be more conspicuous in the logistics, territorial and training organizations.

The logistics organization is still too complex. The "Model for the '80s", with its wide-ranging series of plans for bringing the sector up to date, has yet to be fully implemented.

The entire defense industry has reached a standstill, held

back by an anachronistic structure which is inadequate to the actual task of supplying the military's needs.

As for the Army's territorial organization, it is overly complex, burdened by a large number of state agencies and departments which often operate at very low levels of efficiency. The organization is also handicapped by an inadequate use of personnel, the result of outdated policies which no longer correspond to the possibilities of the current situation.

It is indispensable that these areas be approached with forethought and determination. At the same time, the training organization must be restructured – wherever and whenever necessary – and always in the direction of simplification and efficiency.


Only by following such a program can the Army, together with the other branches of the armed forces, stay in step with the times, meeting the country's political and social tasks and expectations.

Clearly, the solutions to these fundamental problems are

What kind of army?



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delle Uniformi**

NOTES ON THE SOCIAL PROBLEM



GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENTS

"... On one side lives a minority that holds as hereditary right, by reason of aristocracy's traditions, all the elements of wealth, land, machines, capital: on the other side bustles the majority, whose only property are their hands and their ability to work, and on whom weighs the need either to supply hands and work on the conditions imposed by the former, or starve.

Now you, reformers of society, throw between these two classes your theory of profit, of the maximum possible prosperity. How will you reconcile the conflicting interests?"

Thus Mazzini, in his "Thoughts on bureaucracy in Europe", admirably summed up the complex contents of the emerging social conflictuality, which developed in the second half of the 19th century, often revealing its dramatic aspects.

Left.

"The banker and his wife" by Marinus Claesz Reymerswaele (XVI cent). The author, considered one of the most renowned artists of the school of Antwerp, expresses in this work a stern condemnation of usury, as an instrument of immorality and social injustice. Note how the hands of the two indeed resemble the talons of birds of prey; the expression of both is tense with greed.

Right.

"The laboratory of alchemy" by Jan Van der Straet (Giovanni Stradano) (1523-1605).

This painting is deservedly well-known, both because it shows in great detail the work and the instruments (presses, retorts, alembics) of an alchemic laboratory of the Renaissance and because it witnesses the changed conditions of researchers who, after the medieval isolation, start scientific researches using experimental methods. This is also proved by the circulation, in the same years, of the treatises on the metallurgical and mineralogical art, by Biringuccio and Agricola, as well as the linking of alchemy with medicine, made by Paracelsus.



Already during the Middle Ages, in the history of the relationship between capital and labour, there had been flashes of modern light.

In the 13th and 14th centuries, numerous organizations were established which, sometimes imitating the ancient Roman corporations, sometimes creating new ones, joined craftsmen

together forming associations for mutual aid, which gained great economic and political power. They carried out a strong action of solidarity and were watched suspiciously by the great lords and by the authorities.

These organizations – from the "Arti" of the Italian free cities to the French "Frairies" and "Confrairies", from the En-

glish "Guilds" to the German "Zunft" – with their actions aimed at obtaining economic improvements – and also political recognitions – sometimes led to gusts of rebellion which, like the Vespers of Bruges of 1302, the uprising of Gand in 1345, the Ciompi's riot of 1370 in Florence, were a foreboding of the dark social picture of future times.

At the dawning of the modern age, the struggle between capital and labour had, therefore, already begun.

At the same time the State and the individuals were taking those initiatives intended to temper the harshness of a conflict which did not always depend on man's will, but often imposed itself over this will.

Later on, between the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, science and the machine invaded and upset the field of industry bringing, at first, innovations and changes. These innovations, that were to cause a real revolution and bring about a new form of social order in the world, went, from England and France where the big mechanical industry had obtained its first and difficult successes in the first half of the 19th century, on to the rest of Europe and the world and charged the social problem with a significance and an importance that would make it one of the most complex aspects of modern history.

The workers' crisis – which inevitably derived from the decisive and imposing development of modern industrialism, which was fostered by various factors – was only a passing event of the last decades of the 18th century and the first decades of the 19th century. The dramatic prophecy of Friedrich Engels, according to which industrialism would render the majority of the proletariat unnecessary, condemning it to death or revolution, was destined to remain the frightening dream of a stormy dawn.

The dreaded event affected only the first generation of workers, the one contemporary with the initial development of industrialism. After that, a more pow-


erful contrary trend started, for the machines, while driving the worker away from a single type of job, improvised around him various other forms of activity.

The working population increased dramatically, as did industry, and crowded around the large industrial plants, producing the phenomenon of urbanism, owing to which new cities – such as Manchester or Essen – developed in a few years.

the struggle between capital and labour can be found in the various forms of workers' associations which – starting from the British

"The forge" by Joseph Wright (1734-1797).

The author, a keen observer of the technical and scientific process and of the English industrial revolution, emphasizes in this work the play of lights and the suggestive atmosphere of the ambient which is, together, a home and a working place.



This process of gigantic development of the working masses, together with their concentration in the industrial centres, caused inevitable, new, and wider conflicts between capital and labour. Conflicts that soon took on unusual proportions and violence.

The first manifestations of this new, more recent phase of

trade-unionism – spread all over Europe.

Marxism, born at the end of 1847, stepped down into reality and became the true force of the workers' movement, gradually replacing Proudhonism, when on September 28, 1864, in London, gave rise to the International Workers' Association, better known as First Internationale

"An experiment with the pneumatic machine" by Joseph Wright (1734-1797). Wright's interest and active participation in the events related to the English industrial revolution and the technical-scientific progress of his time, could not find a more pertinent and direct witness than this intense and passionate work.

The documental importance of the painting appears immediately evident, both for the analytic veracity of all the components of the machine and for the realistic and psychological representation of the expressions and reactions of the onlookers. The adults' attention contrasts very effectually with the

(1864-1876).

The dissolution of the First International did not mean the end for the various European socialist parties which flourished in all countries and became very active.

It was this vigorous presence in the various countries that, in 1889, made possible the creation in Paris of the Second Internationale, which was to be alive and active until the first world war.

derived from the Rights of Man spread by the French Revolution, saw in the coalitions of workers an evocation of Federal corporativism and tried to oppose their success, thus helping more and more the prevalence of capitalism.

Meanwhile, theorists and statesmen were realizing the importance of the working classes' rising tide and were trying to organize their forces, spreading new theories or striving to check




attitude of the little girls, who appear to be more concerned for the fate of the bird in the glass ball – where a vacuum has been produced – than interested in the scientific experiment in itself.

The Christian Churches – Catholic and Protestant of various denominations – tried to take away the monopoly of the workers from Marxism, imparting a radical turn to their doctrine and starting a new era in the history of the relationship between church and society.

The democratic liberalism prevalent in the 19th century,

their drive. Blanc's "Ateliers sociaux", the political and economic acknowledgment of the trade unions are stages of the working classes' progress, in which the extremist theories of Marx and Sorel fermented actively.

They led another important feature of the modern workers' movement to success: the inter-



Left.


"The felling of the trees" by Hubert Robert (1733-1808).

A protagonist of the archeological landscapism, which in the XVIII century attracted many European painters, Robert mainly addressed his work to the description of man's labour, without neglecting – besides the individual activities – its general organization, its equipment and tools.

Below left.

"The foundry" by Adolph Menzel (1815-1905), certainly a major protagonist of realism in Germany. Menzel, besides working in this pictorial perspective – meant above all as a concrete manner to be and to communicate – does not evade the direct political engagement, and participates in the uprising of 1848. After 1870, Menzel remarkably changed his attitude, fully joining in the new technological and productive fervour which invested Kaiser Wilhelm II's Germany, making its industry one of the most advanced and imposing in the world.

Therefore, in 1875, Menzel made this painting in a celebratory spirit, with the intention of praising, more than the workers, the places and protagonists of a new national situation.



nationalist spirit, that pervaded the proletariat, against the passionate nationalism of capitalism. Through internationalism, the thought was spread that the worker's interests were not tied to his nation and that his real world was the workers' internationale.

Such an orientation stemmed from two considerations: the internationalism of production and trade and the levelling of all workers to the common condition of wage earners.

The danger deriving from these conceptions is its tendency to diffuse a brutish materialism apt to repress all spiritual values. This danger provoked the Catholics' intervention. Pope Leo XIII tried to oppose the principles of Karl Marx's Manifest with the ideologies of the Encyclical "Rerum Novarum".

The intervention – vis-à-vis the dominant socialism – had a twofold character: contrasting and competing. Contrasting, in that is proposed to contrast the blind materialism with a social ethic inspired by Christian principles. Competing, because – like

the Workers' International – it tried to find a form of organization with the same international character.

After that, the problem did not acquire other particular innovative aspects, excepting the intervention in the struggle of a large class of civil servants, which aimed at the State – its employer – its polemics and darts. The problem has remained basically unchanged since the dawning of this century, which had certainly witnessed improvements and social progress in the whole world.

The various current political ideologies, from moderate and collaborationist socialism to communism and the most combative syndicalism, all conscious of the political importance of the masses, always set the relationship between capital and labour at the centre of their programs.

There are still many – too many indeed – who try to lever on this century-old conflict for their political ends. And still too many are those who do not seem to understand the words written by the American "Steel King" Andrew Carnegie: "Capital and labour must proceed side by side and he who sows seeds of discord between them is the enemy of both".

THE SOCIAL QUESTION IN ITALY

The first appearance of a social question in Italy dates back to the foundation of the societies for mutual help, the first of which was born among the printers of Turin, in 1738. The relevant problems spread all over Italy, slowly at first and then at a quickened pace, after the ideas of social vindication had become active in every country as a consequence of the French Revolution.

The joining together of people of equal social standing, albeit for reasons of mutual assistance, evidenced the shortcomings in their material and moral conditions and brought new problems to the surface.

One of the first was ignorance and illiteracy, owing to which an interesting phase in the life of the associations of mutual help was marked by the creation of the association for mutual teaching, created by Confalonieri in 1818. This association had a precedent in the *Repubblica Cisalpina*, with the founding of the Society of Public Education in 1797.

From mutuality, which is a form of assistance limited to the cases in which the individual, owing to illness or other reasons, is prevented from working, a further step is made toward a more active phase, i.e. "cooperation" among the various members of a society with the intent of obtaining improvements for the whole category.

Thus, from the workers' associations for mutual help we go on to the craftsmen brotherhoods. The first newspapers for the worker are born ("*L'Operaio*") by Perego, "*L'Emancipazione*" by Bravalle and "*La Politica per il Popolo*").

The first conferences are held in Asti in 1853, at Novi in 1859, in Florence in 1861. Among the economic questions, the political element slowly permeates these meetings, for also the participation of the individual to the political life appears to be a right that ought to be defended.

Thus the social question enters into its political phase at the beginning of our national unification.

Nevertheless this workers' movement, organized into craftsmen brotherhoods, is not an element of disgregation for the newborn Kingdom of Italy. The deep religious sentiment that permeates the masses prevents the first hints of social struggle from degenerating into a materialistic interpretation of life, bound to rouse hates and disturbances.

This without mentioning that Mazzini, as head of the popular Republican Party, had given deep ethic contents to the concept of "elevation of the people", setting the idea of "people" near that of "God" and speaking of rights as compensation for the

duties done. For this reason the first Italian workers' movement remained in a national sphere of balance and moderation. And it was indeed following Mazzini's initiative that in 1871, in Rome, the various associations joined in a pact of brotherhood, which accepted the programme worked out by the International Workers' Congress held in Geneva in 1866.

The first demands for legislative provisions mark the beginning of the third phase of the social question. In the meantime, while the workshop was being replaced by large-scale industry, the workers' movement acquired the more specific character of class struggle.

Mazzini's ideas clash with Marx's and Bakunin's internationalist ones. The first strikes are organized and the peasants also join in the workers' clamourings, especially in the south, where Marxist ideas, confusedly understood, feed the people's exasperation.

A moderate and evolutionist line splits from the extremists: it consists of young, cultivated and enthusiastic people such as Andrea Costa, Bissolati and Turati, who lead the workers in their claims. The Socialist Party of the Italian Workers is thus born in 1892 and the first Trade Unions are established, which in 1893, after the Congress of Genoa, will join in a federation.

A hybrid organization between workers, peasants and noblemen was formed in Sicily (the Sicilian Fasces) and led to disorders. In order to stop them, Prime Minister Crispi deemed it necessary to proclaim martial law and dissolve the leagues and the organizations.

The social problem had by now become a major factor, so much so that, along with the Socialist Workers' Movement, a Catholic movement took shape and, under Pius X, led to the formation of a proper confessional party.

The Italian government, confronted by the workers' claims after Crispi's and Pelloux's stern reaction, followed, with Giolitti, a line of concessions. Thus for about a decade a policy



Above.

"The parquet planers" by Gustave Caillebotte (1848-1894). Although a direct participant and very active supporter of the Impressionist group, Gustave Caillebotte remained close to the parameters of his original realism which was, *inter alia*, very attentive to the figures of the working-man's world.

of social reconciliation was followed; laws were passed regarding work accidents, the work of women and children, weekly rest in the industry and night work. In the political field, the universal suffrage, which was obtained in 1912, increased the number of voters from 3 to 8 million. Nevertheless this conciliatory policy did not reconcile the hearts.

Strikes multiplied; associations sprouted; the weakness shown in facing pressures remarkably diminished the authority of the State. Meanwhile, also within Socialism itself the splits deepened. The party, which had the undeniable merit of having improved the people's education by evidencing their interests and problems, thus enhancing the living standard of the masses, now that it was materially stronger, appeared to be spiritually weaker.

The dissension between reformists and revolutionaries became more marked: the Sorelian syndicalists, who advocated a systematic opposition by means of strikes, split from the latter. The various currents of Socialism were unanimous on a single point: in their opposition, at first, to the Libyan campaign and, afterwards, to Italy's interven-

tion in the first World War.

Nevertheless, after the beginning of the conflict, the Socialist Party's attitude was generally that of non-support, but never of sabotage. Filippo Turati's sound patriotism set an example in this direction, stating that "to fight imperialism at home, we must not help that of others". But the forces withheld during the war period exploded immediately after the war. The sufferings, the reaction against the war profiteers, the difficulty of finding work for the veterans, and lastly the influence of the Russian Revolution, aggravated by demagogic propaganda, produced disorders, unruliness and violence.

Italy was one of the countries most hit by the post-war world crisis.

The new political alignment of the parties, marked by the Socialist Party's maximalism and the birth of the "Partito Popolare Italiano", recorded, after the Congress of Livorno in 1921, the foundation of the Italian Communist Party, which joined the Third Internationale.

The Communist Party was a chip off the Socialist Party's block; from Turin started the race between the preparation of

the proletariat to revolution and the reactionary tide of Fascism that advanced menacingly.

The government found itself unable to contain the turbulent masses and hoped that the Bolshevizing winds would blow over by themselves.

The occupation of factories, which ended in failure, made some people hope in the revolutionaries' incapability to organize but, meanwhile, the Fascist Party was drawing forces from the disorders and from the government's weakness.

Fascism, after prohibiting the strike and lock-out rights, tried to solve the social problem with a corporative organization. Its intent was to substitute the struggle among the classes with cooperation in the ambit of the same activity, with the State's supervision. The system's shortcomings were precisely in its strict centralized character: the worker's interests were entrusted to people appointed "from above", mostly unable to resist the government's pressures. The Trade Unions continued to exist, but only as tools of the dictatorship.

With time the social confrontation has grown significantly, involving huge fields and problems (agrarian reform, the civil servants' question etc.).

Many results have been achieved in the last years, through provisions which guarantee the dignity of work and the welfare of the working class.

The work in this field could be even more rewarding if there were not elements of exploitation, which now and then disturb the development and perform a polluting action in a phenomenon of democratic growth and social

From top.

"The wheat sifters" by Gustave Coubert (1819-1905).

Rather than describing or denouncing situations, Coubert's realistic paintings wanted to assert the principles of concreteness and positivity, typical of the new working class of which he, as a public figure, was in fact to share the cause and the revolutionary action during the experience of the Paris' Commune.

"The hauliers of the Volga" by Ilya Efanov Repin (1844-1930).

This work of strong and expressive realism made its author famous. Repin is rightly considered one of the best known protagonists of both the so-called "Itinerants" (a group of democratic artists counting, among others, Tolstoy and Borodin) and of the entire Russian culture.

"The slaughter of tunny-fish" by Antonino Leto (1844-1913).

In this painting, very intense in its narrative clarity, which fits perfectly in the cultural trend of social and humanitarian engagement, typical of the pictorial and sculptural works of the end of the century, Antonino Leto shows the fishermen's toil as well as the perennial battle between man and nature, imposed by the often ruthless fight for survival.

progress, which is destined to rise more and more towards contents and manifestations of a higher civilization.

The disturbances are nevertheless inevitable in today's impetuous socio-economic dynamics.

Modern reality, stemming from serious human and civil tragedies, concretizes in conflictual dynamics which, though in more developed forms, seem to reach back to the source of the wide set of questions very wisely focused by Mazzini in his "Thoughts about Bureaucracy in Europe".

The Trade Unions are an expression of this, for they are a stimulating and driving force which confronts a Capitalism organized and amalgamated by a strong cohesion of converging interests.

The farmers' conquest of divided property and their ensuing disappointment due to the scantiness of the income derived from the land – consequent to the transformation, in a reductive sense, of the big estate's



"logic" – are the foremost reason of the widespread phenomenon of urbanism, which is matched by the extraordinary growth of industry in the '50s.

Thus, new conditions of social contrast arise, almost in a Hegelian cycle, with the owners of the so-called "work tools" on one side, and, on the other, the vast human reality distinguished between industry workers and workers of the "Third Sector".

There is, as a consequence, a wider circulation of money, which, on the one hand encourages the progressive formation of a pseudo-bourgeoisie, ever more intent on its climb towards a more apparent than real prosperity, on the other it creates the prerequisites for increasingly intense social dialectics.

This tendency becomes sharper in the '60s. In the light of it, the individual's rights are emphasized and amply publicized, but they are not always supported by actual legal principles; and this in evident contrast with an evolution which, to be true to its name, should hold in equal consideration the rights granted by the concrete requirements of a civil and harmonious social life.

The urge to consume and the egalitarianism contribute to a transformation of customs which necessarily leads to a dynamics in the social rise of the working classes not always in line with the necessary balance between just aspirations and an orderly economic development.

Therefore, from the '70s onwards, the defence of the "proletarian" classes often clashes with the principles guiding the enterprise; principles that are perhaps backed by economic theories and models which, although certainly valid, are no longer in line with the changing times.

The brunt is taken mostly by industrial stability, which witnesses the opening of deep fissures under the pressure of politico-social motivations, which have disruptive aftermaths, even if they are justifiable and deserve consideration from the human point of view.



The problem of growing unemployment adds itself to this context; unemployment caused by the developing technologies and, particularly, by automation, which demand very high specialization, reduce the size of human intervention and produce at the same time among the "traditional" workers, a class of castaways who are no more accepted in a "logic" dominated by a sometimes excessive sophistication of means and materials.

The prevalent use of machines, on the other hand, results in an overproduction of goods which often does not find an adequate response by the market, for it surpasses the real demands of consumption.

As a result an absurd contrast of social situations comes about, which sees, on one side, a wide availability of goods – a sign of prosperity – and, on the other, a diminished capability of the less wealthy classes to absorb them.

The consequence is a chain-reaction which distinguishes the present world and influences heavily all manifestations of the physiognomy of modern civilization.

A civilization that is resolutely projected towards the year 2000 despite the hindrances and contradictions that mark its image.

This is today's fundamental motivation, beyond the admittedly positive ideologies and the exciting achievements of the mind.

The dialectics among strong concentrations of equally justifi-

fied positions is desperately trying to find a synthesis on the basis of which the human progress will assert itself and prevail.

We are all responsible for it, on the moral plane and in front of history, which is written in a continuity of spirit, in an epic but silent dimension, built with conscious devotion in the sign of man.

The end of the second millennium is, like the first's, full of exalting expectations.

In the Middle Ages, the world's attention focused on finding the God's truth, which was mainly a search for a more human dimension of existence and a restoration of the essential values, faded after the fall of the Roman Empire of the West.

In the framework of G.B. Vico's theory of the repetition of historical phenomena, today we are living in the hope of the restoration of the disrupted social balances and the reawakening of consciences, shaken by inhuman disorders.

The social reality, which we are now labouriously preparing, cannot and must not be a problematic one, because we cannot accept the "logic" of an exciting scientific development not matched by an equally vivifying moral ascent, in a true ethical vision of civil society and progress.

The medieval tensions ripened, after the first millennium, a wonderful fruit: Francis of Assisi, who embraced all creatures, in a universal conception of existence, to the point of calling even death his "sister".

True as it is that history repeats itself with constant rhythms, in the light of the Franciscan teachings we are allowed to hope that the future will see the triumph of the new man, more conscious of his qualities and devoting all his forces to the accomplishment of an irreplaceable good: the peaceful coexistence of peoples, which is a prerequisite of civilization and a result of the supremacy of the spirit over matter.

Ciro Di Martino

OTO C 13

ARMoured INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES

Weight: 15,000 ÷ 19,000 kg

Road Speed: 70 km/h

Range: ~500 km

Versions: IFVs, APC, Ambulance, Cargo Carrier (payload 6.5 tm)

Armament:

- IFVs: 20, 25, 90 mm gun + 7.62 MG + 6 grenade launchers + firing ports.

4 x 25 mm AA System.

60 mm gun + 7.62 MG + 8 grenade launcher + firing ports.

TUA + 7.62 MG.

- APC: 12.7 MG + 8 grenade launchers + 6 firing ports. Crew 12.

- Cargo: 12.7 MG.



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AFSOUTH

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE



The Southern Region, the largest and most complex of the European regions, includes Italy, Greece, Turkey and the whole Mediterranean basin.

The Supreme Command responsible for the defence of this area is located in Naples. The Allied Forces in Southern Europe are composed of troops from Italy, Greece, Turkey, the US, the UK and Portugal.

Formerly relegated to carrying out minor or ancillary functions, the Southern Region has now become the true centre of gravity of the entire defensive system of the West.

THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ALLIED FORCES IN EUROPE

The military structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe consists of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) which, together with the other two major Commands (ACLANT, Atlantic Command and ACCHAN, Channel Command), comes under the direct control of the Military Committee.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is responsible for the defence of the European members of the Alliance against external attack or threat. In peacetime, this function is carried out through the coordination of the Allied defence plans, by building up the Allied armed forces and making plans for their appropriate deployment in time of war.

The complex of countries belonging to the Alliance constitutes the ACE strategic area.

The SACEUR command function is exerted through the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), located at Casteau, near Mons in Belgium, about sixty kilometres from Brussels.

The conduct of operations in the ACE strategic area is carried out under SACEUR control by:


- three Regional Supreme Headquarters:
 - Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), based at Kolsaas, Norway;
 - Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), based at Brunssum, Netherlands;
 - Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), based at Bagnoli (Naples);
- two functional Headquarters:
 - Headquarters UK Air Forces (UK AIR), based at High Wycombe, Great Britain;
 - ACE Mobile Force (AMF), based at Seckenheim, Germany.

SACEUR also shares with the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and the Commander in Chief Channel (CINCCAN), the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEW), based at SHAPE at Casteau.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE (AFSOUTH)

AFSOUTH is therefore the Headquarters of the Southern Region of NATO. Its Commander in Chief (Commander in Chief Southern Europe CINCSOUTH) is responsible for the defence of the member countries in the Southern Region (Italy, Greece and Turkey) and for controlling the Mediterranean sea lanes. In order to carry out its two-fold task of territorial defence and maritime control, CINCSOUTH avails itself of:

- land, naval and air forces assigned to it in case of emergency by Greece,



Italy, Portugal, Turkey, the UK and the US, the six countries of the Alliance that, either because of their geographical position or through direct or indirect involvement (external reinforcements), sustain the Allied Forces in Southern Europe;

- a functional organization, existing already in peacetime, consisting of HQs AFSOUTH and a chain of dependent area or functional commands. According to their ranking, in NATO terminology, the latter are denoted as:

- Principal Subordinate Commands (PSCs);
- Subordinate Commands (SCs);

The Principal Subordinate Commands of the Southern Region are:

- Headquarters Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (LANDSOUTH), based at Verona;
- Headquarters Allied Land Forces South-Eastern Europe (LANDSOUTH-EAST), based at Izmir, Turkey;
- Headquarters Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (NAVSOUTH), based at Nisida (Naples);
- Headquarters Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (STRIK-FORSOUTH), set up on the US naval vessel "Puget Sound", based at Gaeta;
- Headquarters Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH), based at Naples, at AFSOUTH Headquarters.

The following Headquarters are included in the Southern Region:

- under NAVSOUTH command:
 - Gibraltar Mediterranean Command (GIBMED), based in Gibraltar;
 - Central Mediterranean Command (MEDCENT), based in Rome;

- North-East Mediterranean Command (MEDNOREAST), based in Ankara;
- Eastern Mediterranean Command (MEDEAST), based in Athens;
- Submarines Mediterranean Command (SUBMED), based in Naples;
- Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean Command (MARAIRED), based in Naples;

- under AIRSOUTH command:

- 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (5ATAF), based in Vicenza;
- 6th Allied Tactical Air Force (6ATAF), based in Izmir, Turkey.

This list of subordinate Commands is expected to grow in the near future when negotiations for the full reintegration of the Greek forces have been concluded. (Greece pulled out of the NATO military structure in 1974 and returned to it in 1981). In particular, the setting up of a Principal Subordinate Land Headquarters (LANDSOUTHCENT), as well as a Subordinate Air Headquarters (7ATAF), is envisaged; both Commands will be based in Greece.

According to the Terms of Reference, in time of war CINCSOUTH would take over the command of all land, sea and air operations in its area of responsibility. Internal land defence and that of the territorial waters would remain the responsibility of the national authorities, although in close cooperation with NATO.

In time of peace, NATO Commanders must see to the organization, training and equipping of their forces, as well as to the study, drafting and fine-tuning of defence plans, and to standardizing procedures.

Only the Air Force Commander (COMAIRSOUTH), who is responsible

for air defence, a constant need, retains operational control, also in peacetime, of the national forces "assigned" to him.

GEO-STRATEGIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOUTHERN REGION

The southern strategic region, commonly known as the "Southern Region", is the largest area under the control of the Regional Commanders in Chief. It covers an area of more than 4,000 Km stretching from the Strait of Gibraltar to the eastern border of Turkey, and for about 1,400 Km from the coast of North Africa (excluded) to the Alps. This represents an area of 4,000,000 sq Km, and takes in the whole Mediterranean basin, including the countries of Greece, Italy and Turkey.

Other fundamental geo-strategic features distinguishing it from the other European regions of NATO include the ethnic, social, political and economic heterogeneity of the countries situated in the area and the instability of the local situation in many of them, the fact that it is separated from the Central Region by Switzerland and Austria, two neutral countries, and its inner division into different theatres of operations.

THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

The heterogeneous characteristics of the Mediterranean countries not only differentiate NATO countries from non-NATO countries, but are also extremely apparent among the member countries themselves.

YUGOSLAVIA


Like Austria further to the North, NATO has assigned to Yugoslavia the rôle of "buffer" between the borders of its area of responsibility and those of the Warsaw Pact countries. Despite the serious economic and ethnic problems with which it is plagued, Yugoslavia seems to give sufficient assurances of stability. Its consistent policy of non-alignment affords NATO a very useful "zone of strategic early warning".

GREECE AND TURKEY

Despite the long-standing dispute between them, the fact that both countries belong to NATO is one of the points in favour of the Southern Region, as their job is to guarantee the security of the Dardanelles and the Aegean Sea.

Although formally the same, the politico-military status of Greece and Turkey inside the Alliance is substantially different.

While Turkey belongs both to the Alliance itself and its integrated military structure, Greece has only recently returned to the military organization and negotiations for the full reintegration of its Armed Forces are currently in progress. If successfully concluded, they should lead to a Principal Subordinate Land Command and a Subordinate Air Command being set up on Greek territory.



Until such time as a complete and prompt solution has been found to the Greece/Turkey problem, there is no doubt in the minds of the members of the Southern Region about these two countries' full support of NATO. Although perhaps less conspicuous, there are differences of opinion and interest also among many other member countries. In some ways this is the most obvious, and perhaps the most encouraging feature of an alliance freely formed by sovereign states, in complete respect of national decision-making independence.

The diversification of interests and evaluations is a deep-rooted and positive characteristic of the western world and provides a conscious basis on which the common determination to defend one's conception of society can rest.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE PERSIAN GULF

This is doubtless one of the hottest spots in the world, if not the hottest. This area, the main source of indispensable energy for the industrialized western countries, torn by bloody nationalistic and religious strife which plunge it into sudden, unexpected crises, inhabited by countless peoples, sects and factions whose behaviour often triggers off conflicts, is also of great strategic importance in the world-wide struggle between the two super-powers. Although situated outside the area of responsibility of AFSOUTH Headquarters, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf come within its area of interest owing to the vital importance of the energy resources located there, and to the peculiar relations linking countries in that area to several members of NATO. The Southern Region is thus an excellent vantage point from which NATO can observe this part of the world.

THE NORTH AFRICAN COAST

This, too, is an area that, although lying mainly outside the area of responsibility of AFSOUTH Headquarters, is of extreme interest to NATO. The political situation in this part of the world is characterized by highly differentiated forms of government, often ill-supported by weak internal bases and fragile power structures. The populations of the coastal countries are rapidly outgrowing their economy's capacity to support them, despite the development of the latter. It is particularly apparent that these countries experience great difficulty in providing jobs and social integration for the younger generations.

None of the countries on the North African coast present any direct or immediate threat to NATO security. However, this is an area where sudden and unpredictable changes in political control can occur from one moment to the next and so constant vigilance must be the order of the day. Also in this case the Southern Region provides an excellent forward position from which NATO can observe events.

SPAIN

Ever since 30 May 1982, the Spanish flag has been flying on the flagstaffs of the Allied Headquarters in Europe, together with those of 15 other nations. The present Socialist government, in order to fulfil its electoral commitments, has momentarily suspended negotiations for Spanish entry into the Allied integrated military structure and has announced a referendum to be held on the entire issue of membership. The question will thus be decided directly by the Spanish people. From the standpoint of NATO Spanish membership is a political event of exceptional importance since it is further confirmation of the persistent

vitality of the Alliance after three decades of existence. The position of the present Spanish government was aptly summed up by Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales when he stated that the Spanish Socialist party has never been opposed to NATO, but that Spanish participation must be geared to certain specific political situations. He added that in any case Spain considers itself part of the West.

At this stage it should be noted that, during a recent official visit to Moscow, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando Horan, informed his Soviet opposite number that Spain intended to honour its NATO commitments for as long as it was a member of the Organization.

There is no doubt that the Spanish government is faced with a large number of national problems which naturally affect its behaviour and decisions. As regards foreign policy, NATO represents only one of these problems. The other main ones are connected with relations with Latin American countries, relations with neighbouring countries like France and Portugal, relations with the United States within the framework of the defence accords between the two countries, the question of Gibraltar and relations with the North African countries. With a 14% inflation rate and 17% jobless, a large trade deficit and with exports and domestic investments running very low, and confronted with seasoned terrorism and very strong separatist feelings in certain regions, there is no doubt that the Spanish government has many serious internal problems to contend with. It is a young democracy in full development which, in order to grow hale and hearty, will have to implement moderate and practical programmes.

FRANCE

In 1966 France unilaterally decided to withdraw from the NATO integrated military structure. The French decision led to the withdrawal of French military personnel from the integrated Commands and the transfer of the Supreme Commands outside French territory and the discontinuance of all assignments of French forces to the international Headquarters.

In spite of all this, however, the French commitment to NATO was never in question. At the level of the Southern Region, actual integration of the French forces has been replaced by cooperation. Particularly in the naval and air sectors, France cooperates closely with AFSOUTH. French naval and air forces regularly take part in NATO exercises in the Southern Region, and political and military relations between France and NATO have always been excellent.

Liaison and coordination with AFSOUTH is guaranteed by a French military mission to the Headquarters, led by an admiral. Although not actually having it under its command, CINCSOUTH knows it can rely on the aid of the French air and naval forces stationed in the Mediterranean.

MALTA

Because of its geographical position this small archipelago is of great potential strategic importance. In this perspective, AFSOUTH was particularly interested in and satisfied with the treaty signed by Italy and Malta in 1981 for the purpose of guaranteeing the neutrality of this small nation, at the same time excluding its utilization as a base of operations by either of the superpowers.

ITALY

Italy's rôle in the Mediterranean basin is of primary importance. Its geostrategic position suggested the advisability of belonging to some sort of multinational defensive system and its historical and cultural traditions, together with the common heritage of democratic principles and vital interests, led to the choice falling on NATO.

Loyalty to this pledge has been constantly reiterated by the Italian government in all its legislatures and the governments that have succeeded each other have always materially fulfilled the obligations deriving from it.

Italy's constantly growing politico-military prestige is becoming increas-


Population increase in the Mediterranean countries.

None of the countries on the North African coast (shown in yellow) today represents a concrete or immediate threat to NATO.

The political situation along this coast is characterized by very different forms of government and by rapidly growing populations.

It is particularly difficult to provide for the social integration of the younger generations.

POPULATION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES
ANNUAL INCREASE (%)



ingly perceptible at world level and the country's rôle in peacekeeping initiatives is becoming ever more important. This rôle is closely related to the fact that Italy belongs to the Atlantic Alliance, to the European Community and to the Western European Union.

Italy represents an ideal bridge between the European continent and

Africa. It is against this background that Italian mediation in the East-West and North-South dialogues must be viewed. Italian policy takes this rôle into account and is implemented in the form of a strategy to achieve and maintain stability in the Mediterranean area.

The following examples are all unmistakable signs of the political deter-

mination with which Italy is carrying out its logical rôle in the Mediterranean: the assurance of Malta's neutrality, the contacts and even cooperation with several African countries, the new "defence model" according to which, without detracting from the importance of the North-East Italy theatre, the forces involved are given the mobility they need to operate rapidly anywhere on the peninsula and the contribution given to the multinational peacekeeping forces in the Sinai and Lebanon.

OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA

One of the fundamental characteristics of this theatre of operations is that it has to be divided into different areas. This division is due to the existence of land gaps and the presence of the Mediterranean Sea. From the operational standpoint, the defence planning of the Southern Region involves three land theatres and one maritime theatre.

The land theatres are:

- Italy, with special reference to the Eastern frontier;
- Northern Greece and Western Turkey;
- Eastern Turkey.

The fourth theatre, the maritime one, comprises the Mediterranean and Black Sea system.

The land theatres are characterized by different geo-strategic features. Among other things, the great distances separating them mean that each has to have its own independent operational planning. It is therefore very unlikely that mutual support could be achieved by the rapid deployment of their forces.

It is essential for the land theatres to be held in order to maintain control over the sea lanes, and the Mediterranean sea is indispensable for supplying the theatres. It follows that the sea is exceptionally important since, although it separates the land theatres physically, it is the only geo-strategic factor capable of providing them with any operational continuity.

THE ITALIAN THEATRE

There are two main areas of strategic importance in Italy: the Po Valley, the possession of which would allow the attacker to drive a wedge between the NATO forces of the Southern Region and those of Central Europe, and Central Southern Italy, the occupation of which would open the way to control over the Central Mediterranean.

The North-Eastern theatre is characterized by a rugged terrain and a wide chain of mountains, which could be defended with relatively small forces, and by the Veneto-Friuli corridor, which runs from the Lubiana basin, through the historical Gorizia gap to the Po Valley. The latter is an objective of prime importance, being the main industrial centre not only of Italy, but of the whole Southern Region.

In view of the foregoing, the defence of Italy must be implemented as



far forward as possible. Furthermore, the potential enemy on the Eastern frontier is not in direct contact. The traditional policy followed by Yugoslavia, a non-aligned country jealous of its national independence, militarily organized on the basis of a territorial defence system, considerably reduces the likelihood of any surprise attack.

At this point it is worth repeating what General Cappuzzo said when he addressed the CASD (Center for High Defence Studies) (1): «Examining Soviet grand strategy through Soviet eyes, and thus situating ourselves in the centre of the Soviet Union looking out towards Europe with a view to possibly invading the West, there is no doubt that one

of the most effective options could be what I should term "cutting off the peninsulas", i.e. a medium-range air-land manoeuvre across the Balkans and Italy, combined with a longer-range action across the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. This kind of perspective thus tends to confirm the conceptual approach underlying the Italian "defence model", in which the importance of the North-East theatre is maintained intact and is combined with an increased "strategic vigour" of the forces involved, which would have to be capable of intervening anywhere on the peninsula in optimal operational times".

In this perspective, Italy's plans to enhance the mobility of its units and to

Left.

The Mediterranean theatre of operations. Its peculiarity derives from the division into different zones.

The land theatres (North-Eastern Italy, Northern Greece, Western Turkey and Eastern Turkey) have different geo-strategic characteristics and are separated by large distances which mean that each of them must make different operational plans. The maritime theatre consists of the Mediterranean-Black Sea system.

The Mediterranean must thus be available in order to supply the land theatres.

by amphibious operations in the Black Sea and thrusts against Northern Greece through Yugoslavia.

The flat country in Turkish Thrace makes any defence difficult and favours the attacker. In Northern Greece the defence is initially favoured by the rugged terrain but, once the forward positions have been overrun, the enemy will have plenty of room for manoeuvre.

Eastern Greece is so narrow that in some places there are no more than 20 Km between the Bulgarian border and the sea. Mention has already been made of the fact that another important operational thrust against Greece would pass through Yugoslavia. The direction of this thrust would allow access to the Greek valleys running roughly South and gradually widening as they slope down towards the sea. Also here the political position of Yugoslavia is of exceptional importance for NATO security.

The Warsaw Pact countries have deployed a considerable number of modern armoured units on the Balkan front. In the same area, Greece and



The Balkan theatre.

The main requirement in this area is to maintain control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles in order to deny the enemy access to the Aegean and the Mediterranean. Greece and Turkey have deployed a large number of units in this theatre.

Left.

The Italian theatre.

There are two areas of strategic interest in Italy: the Po Valley, the seizing of which by the enemy would mean the cutting off of the Southern Region NATO forces from those of Central Europe, and Central-Southern Europe, the occupation of which would allow the enemy to control the Central Mediterranean.



set up a rapid deployment force is viewed with great interest by AFSOUTH. On the whole, Italy has the population, the economic strength and the know-how to achieve a sufficiently reliable standard of defence. However, the country must make a constant effort to adjust the quality of its armed forces to the danger of the threat.

THE BALKAN THEATRE

The control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, aimed at preventing access to the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean, is the main objective in this area.

The attack could well start directly from Bulgarian territory, accompanied

Turkey have fielded numerous major units. However, their logistical support is insufficient and several units are lacking in suitable modern equipment and materials. Nor does it seem possible that these shortcomings can be made good by military aid from other countries, at least in the short term.

THE ANATOLIAN THEATRE

Eastern Turkey is certainly the least well known of the potential operational theatres in the Southern Region and perhaps even in the whole NATO strategic area in Europe. This zone is characterized by a land border some 600 Km long with the Soviet Union and 1,700 Km long with Iran, Iraq and Syria.

The number of units the Russians have stationed in the Transcaucasian District vastly exceeds that strictly necessary for defence purposes. Deployed against this threat are substantial Turkish forces, consisting of disciplined and well-trained troops. Unfortunately, these troops would be incapable of sustained operations and the quality and quantity of their equipment and materiel leaves much to be desired. Fortunately, the mountainous terrain, the bitterly cold climate and the lack of roads in the region, favour the defenders. The great depth behind the forward positions also makes it possible to gain time by giving up ground. This is an important factor which is unparalleled in any other zone



The Anatolian theatre.
 Eastern Turkey is a very sensitive area characterized by a 600 Km long border with the Soviet Union and one 1,700 Km long with Iraq, Iran and Syria. The Russians have stationed a number of major units in Transcaucasia which is vastly superior to their actual defence needs.

of the NATO strategic area in Europe. On the South-East borders, comparatively small Turkish forces are deployed against those of the neighbouring countries, whose forces are currently engaged in other operational areas. However, this situation is only temporary and the fact remains that there are gaps in the defence of the Turkish border. Another sensitive area is the maritime border running some 1,600 Km along the Black Sea coastline. However, it is quite conceivable that Turkey, particularly its eastern part, is not viewed by the Soviet Union as one of its main objectives but merely as an obstacle to be overcome or bypassed within the framework of a thrust towards the warm waters of the Persian Gulf.

THE MARITIME THEATRE

This consists mainly of the Mediterranean Sea which, as we have already seen, is also the most important geo-strategic and characteristic factor of the Southern Region.

This sea is the main line of communication for supplies and the flow of reinforcements towards the land theatres, as well as being the operational base of the Allied aeronaval and amphibious forces. It enables the problem of the geographic discontinuity of the land theatres to be overcome.

The control of the Mediterranean is essential for NATO. It is extremely difficult to make a thorough analysis of the situation regarding the respective NATO and Warsaw Pact situations in the Mediterranean. This situation has changed drastically for the worse in recent years. In 1963, the Soviet naval presence was virtually negligible and the Mediterranean could still be considered a "Western lake". Nowadays, there are probably an average of fifty or so Russian vessels operating in the Mediterranean on any given day of the year, at least half of which are warships,

including a dozen submarines. The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean appears in an even more threatening light if one considers that they can bring their strength up even further by bringing in units from the Black Sea.

It is true that the passage through the Turkish straits would serve as a valid strategic early warning. It is equally true, however, that the short distance to be crossed would allow the Mediterranean Fleet to be reinforced very quickly. Furthermore, several hundred constantly present Soviet vessels, registered as merchant ships or fishing craft, are capable of providing support services for the fleet, especially in the sectors of supplies, troop transport, telecommunications, oceanographic research and intelligence.

Basically, the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean consists of a threatening aeronaval force that is well-balanced in all its components - aircraft, surface vessels and submarines, and is composed of modern vessels armed with state-of-the-art weapon systems.

The type of Soviet ships deployed in the Mediterranean, which include light cruisers, aircraft carriers and nuclear and conventional submarines, can give us some idea of their probable tasks: to prevent NATO air, naval and amphibious forces from deploying and to interdict the use of the Mediterranean sea lanes. In this perspective, also the bombers deployed in the Crimea play a vital rôle as they have strike capacity anywhere in the Mediterranean basin.

In contrast, the NATO naval situation has worsened over the years. France's withdrawal from the integrated military structure of the Alliance deprived the Southern Region of one of its strongest naval components. As part of the revision of its political commitments, Great Britain has practically reduced its Mediterranean commitment to zero. The Greek and Turkish fleets are partly

obsolete whereas, thanks to recent measures to boost and modernize it, the Italian fleet seems at last to be on the way to achieving at least some degree of qualitative excellence which will allow it, in the short term, to play a more decisive rôle in the Mediterranean. However, despite this, the net balance is still favourable. Numerically speaking, the NATO fleets still have indisputable numerical superiority, particularly because of the presence of the US aircraft carriers, whose ultramodern airplanes continue to guarantee superiority in the air.

The main aspect of the problem still hinders around the initiative, i.e. the capacity to achieve first strike and thus forestall the enemy's attack. In any confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the Southern Region, much will depend on the result of the first Soviet move against the Allied naval forces. If this move were successful, the situation would become very difficult and problematic. To ensure that this does not happen, the naval commands must keep constantly on the alert and the nations situated in this region must continue to maintain their forces at the required quantitative and qualitative levels and avoid any gaps occurring in their modernization programmes.

CENTRALITY OF THE SOUTHERN REGION

The importance of the Southern Region is a direct function of the growing attention devoted to it by the Warsaw Pact. For many years the problems involving the flanks of Europe were neglected, particularly in the South. Now the political and strategic situation calls for a reappraisal of the priorities.

According to the strategic hypotheses of the time, Western naval supe-

Soviet unit of the "Kresta I" class. NATO naval superiority in the Mediterranean has declined considerably over the past few years as a result of France leaving the integrated military structure of the Alliance and owing to the reduced British commitment.



riority in the Mediterranean was sufficient to guarantee the security of the sea lanes and the support of the land operations. Today the situation has changed because, over the past two decades, the Soviet Union has gradually boosted its operational capabilities. Because of the present world situation, the Southern Region has become one of the focal points and a vital factor in the East-West struggle and the North-South dialogue.

The dynamics of the political and social transformations has an appreciable influence on events in the Mediterranean area and thus on Europe itself. The endemic instability of the Middle Eastern countries and those along the North African coast, the oil problems, the policy of gradual penetration implemented by the Soviet Union and the likelihood of conflicts arising that possibly involve common interests of the Western world as a whole or of single countries, have all boosted the strategic importance of the three countries comprising the Southern Region: Greece, Italy and Turkey. Moreover, the developments in the situation deriving from Soviet expansionism, based on the presence of its fleet in the Mediterranean and exploiting the constant state of strife of the Middle Eastern and North African areas, has been interpreted as an indication that NATO should perhaps review the geographic limits set out in art. 6 of the Treaty.

A good deal of the West's oil requirements come from the Middle East which, for this reason, can be considered as a strategic extension of the Mediterranean area. Much of this oil comes through the Suez Canal and perhaps even more reaches the Mediterranean along the Cape route.

The decisive game is thus being played in the South, in areas lying beyond the southern limit of the Tropic of Cancer, where NATO is not in a

position to react to situations of tension or conflict as an integrated whole.

However, NATO cannot afford to ignore what is happening at the beginning and along the routes taken by this vital flow of energy. In this sense, the Mediterranean basin, in view of its direct links with the areas in which the main energy sources are located, has, once again in its more than millennarian history, become the focal point of the whole world.

Ludovico Lombardi



Major General Ludovico Lombardi graduated from the Military Academy and attended the War Academy, the Interservice Staff Institute, the French Ecole Supérieure de Guerre and the Nato Defense College. A military Alpine instructor, he also graduated from the Italian, French and US parachute jumping courses. He has commanded several units of the "Julia", "Cadore", "Tridentina" and "Orobica" Alpine Brigades. He has held several staff posts at the national and international levels, including: Head of the Training and Manoeuvre Section of Headquarters of Allied Land Forces Southern Europe, Deputy Chief of Staff of the 4th Alpine Army Corps, Head of the Operations Division of the Allied Forces Headquarters Southern Europe and Military Attaché in Paris. Since 1982 Gen. Lombardi has been Deputy Chief of Staff of Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe.

Note:

(1) General Umberto Cappuzzo: "La NATO di fronte alle grandi sfide della nostra epoca. Quale strategia per il futuro?", Rivista Militare, It. Ed., no. 5/1983.

THE FIVE PILLARS OF EFFICIENCY


What is the best way to measure the efficiency of the armed forces? How can this efficiency be improved? What are the factors involved? These are only some of the questions that may be raised in this connection.

In earlier times even the most powerful armies were actually nothing more than simple, comparatively unstructured organizations (1), measured in terms of so many rifles, so many sabres, so many artillery pieces, and so on. The rest was left to iron discipline and the genius of the commander. We have come a long way since then and in the place of those early armies we now have a kaleidoscope of interacting systems of such complexity that it has become very difficult to evaluate their overall effectiveness. However, some way of doing this must be found. It is far too important a matter to be ignored or to be "played by ear", as can be done with easy music. We shall thus try to analyse it, first by examining the overall situation and then by identifying the main criteria involved and the more relevant links between them, without laying any claim to making a systematic or detailed analysis. By treating the problem globally and focusing only on certain fundamental aspects, the aim is to find a key for interpreting modern military experience and conditions.

Let us begin our examination by defining the fundamental parameters, the "pillars of efficiency" on which the qualitative level of the whole structure rests. These parameters consist of the following:

- the **human factor** and **materiel**, which make up the fabric of the organization;
- the **structure**, consisting of static relations, links and interdependence between the various single elements;
- the **training level**, consisting of the capacity to optimize the achievement of the dynamic relations prescribed by tactical doctrine.

Having thus outlined a general reference framework, let us now examine the single factors in detail.



THE HUMAN FACTOR

The men in the structure are called upon to show:

- high moral qualities, the result of character and motivation;
- high professional competence consisting of:
 - fully assimilated knowledge;
 - assured capacity;
 - open-mindedness and common sense;
- strong physical and mental constitution.

Even in an age of rapid technological development like the present one, man remains the key factor of the armed forces, of which he is both the leader and an operative member.

He is called upon to display three quite distinct types of qualities: moral, cultural and psycho-physical.

MORAL QUALITIES


Moral qualities are based essentially on character and motivation. There is no need here to discuss at length what is meant by character as this aspect has been dealt with exhaustively ever since the beginning of military studies. We shall merely point out in passing that it consists of a mixture of many qualities, the most important of which are: determination, tenacity, loyalty and courage.

These qualities are mainly the result of one's upbringing and education. However, in order to be effective, they must also be related to a deeply felt aim. Therefore, through upbringing and education, character building is thus also related to motivation.

In all circumstances, it is motivation that directs and influences the will. It is the prime mover of all human activity. No action is possible, or can even be rationally postulated, in the absence of

suitable motivation; there are no exceptions to the rule that these two terms must be causally linked. Transposed to the military field, the rule is expressed by the need for motivation which has to be at least as strong as the exceptionally tough and difficult obstacles that will have to be overcome. In other words, it must be very strong and take the form of total dedication to the Institution and to one's country. Without heartfelt, authentic motivation, a military organization may be able to get by in time of peace but would be very unlikely to survive in time of war.

Also the minor weaknesses of human nature, unless adequately compensated for by a strong and deep-rooted spirit of service, tend to develop a destructive potential capable of undermining the very foundations of the structure. However, in the modern democracies, the Army is not a separate body, cut off from and independent of society. It is an integral part of society,



perhaps the most genuine and immediate part. The more determined a society is to defend its right to exist and to be free, the greater the endurance and resistance of its Army will be.

Basically, motivation originates in the Nation itself, in the very core of its social structures; from here it extends out as far as the military component,

[1] At Waterloo, both the Allies and the French were deployed over a 5 Km front astride the PLANCENOIT-MONT SAINT JEAN axis. The battle developed over a total area of not more than 15 sq Km.

linking the latter to the collective will of the country. In this field, the military structure is dependent on the people of whom it is the expression, although much can be done within the structure itself to enhance and direct motivation.

The appeal to tradition, the cohesiveness of its members, its character-building potential, professional pride and the setting of examples are the main means at the Army's disposal. However, even these means must have a solid basis of conviction and determination.

CULTURAL BACKGROUND

From this outline of the moral aspects of the human factor, let us now go on to the problem of cultural background and, more specifically, of professional and technical competence.

For the sake of convenience, this aspect will be viewed globally, without making any distinction of degree or function, which would perhaps be necessary in a more detailed and analytical treatment of the subject. This overall treatment has one advantage: every man in a modern army, from the commander-in-chief down to the rawest recruit, has his own sphere of responsibility and decision-making autonomy.

Although enormously different at the quantitative level, these spheres are qualitatively almost identical, with each man bearing full responsibility for his actions.

Professional competence is thus something highly differentiated, which nevertheless must be acquired without fail by all and sundry, from the highest rank to the lowest, because it is only in this way that decisions can be put into action.

This competence is formed by three different elements: knowledge, skill and mentality.

That of knowledge is a very vast area: it can range from a knowledge of materiel to psychology, from that of international conventions to the rules of deployment, from the natural environment to the logistics services and so on. It is practically impossible to have a complete knowledge of every aspect of this field. A selective approach must therefore be adopted, based on the criterion of the maximum possible specialization at the lower levels; this will be followed by greater generalization with increasing rank, and thus by a consequent reduction in depth. There are no realistic alternatives to this solution.

The second element – skill – is cer-

tainly as important as the first. It entails ability to operate, i.e. to apply knowledge to practical cases.

If one lacks the discernment to decide how and when rules and regulations are to be applied, theory and practice will remain separate and it will consequently be impossible to solve concrete problems. Knowledge which has been acquired after much labour will thus be of no use, except perhaps for learned debate of a theoretical nature.

However, this "discernment" cannot be taught by means of other rules or formulae. It can only be assimilated and refined by practice (provided, of course, that the necessary intellectual premises exist). If this activity is not performed, even the sharpest intelligence is dulled and knowledge itself becomes worthless. The result is incompetence, which may be erudite, but which is yet incompetence.

In conclusion, technical and professional competence is initially acquired by learning the theory, but must as far as possible be completed by practical experience. This is the only way through which intelligence can measure itself against real problems and shake off the inevitable schematicism of "dry theory".



MENTAL ATTITUDE

This brings us to the last element involved in technical and professional competence-mentality.

This issue would seem to have been fully dealt with by the preceding considerations, particularly those referring to moral qualities. However, this is in actual facts only partly true. While it is true that character and motivation play a large part in forming mental attitude, the latter requires more than this, i.e. a breadth of mind capable of grasping changing reality; a simplifying and concrete attitude capable of concentrating on the essence of the matter, neglecting all irrelevant or secondary issues; a mental flexibility capable of coping with any situation; a presence of mind that will enable everyone never to be caught napping by events.

While all these characteristics may well be inborn, there is no doubt that they can also be developed by training and that they must be kept up to scratch by continual practice. This continual training must become a part of military life as a whole, at all stages of its development and in every activity.

The last aspect of the human factor to be examined is the one denoted as psycho-physical efficiency. Without going

into too much detail, it is sufficient to mention that the Army as a whole, i.e. both men and materiel, must be tempered to cope with its ultimate task – war, which is anything but a pleasure trip.

The endurance this demands and the wear and tear that it involves have not diminished with respect to the past. If anything, the balance between the physical aspects and the psychological aspects has been partially restored, although the sum total has remained almost the same, if anything slightly greater.

The development and maintenance of psycho-physical qualities through constant practice thus represents a fundamental need for everyone to be able to express his potential capacity to the highest possible degree.

EQUIPMENT

The materiel is of fundamental importance.

Its effectiveness is dependent also on having clear ideas as to how to use it.

It is possible to offset a slight imbalance, but not a large one.

Together with the human factor, this factor represents the basic component of the military structure. For more than one century, the materiel has had a decisive effect on both the operational and the structural aspects of modern armies and the decisions to be made in this regard are always very difficult.

This is to be expected, not only in view of the importance of the problem, but also because of its complexity. The latter is influenced, among other things, by the speed of technological progress, the objective difficulty of conducting experiments and the anything but unlimited resources available. Although of fundamental importance, this is not the only problem. There are numerous others involving, to a greater or lesser degree, all sectors of military organization. The following are but a few of the possible examples:

- the heavy logistic and training implications of acquiring new materiel;
- the impossibility of transferring other people's experience en bloc, in view of the possible incompatibility with one's own specific needs;
- the need to bear constantly in mind the specific "vulnerability" of all materiel and equipment (i.e. possible errors





and failures, sensitivity to enemy countermeasures, incidence of environmental factors, etc.).

Finally, one is often tempted to try and change what one already has, even when perfectly well suited to the task, for something better. However, waiting until a 100% effective solution of the problem is found will lead to disappointment.

One further criterion to keep constantly in mind is the fact that the effectiveness of all equipment is directly dependent on the technical and professional skill of the person using it. This is true both for the most primitive equipment and for state-of-the-art integrated systems. The future capability of the latter was impossible to be predicted even in the recent past, particularly as far as speed, range and degree of automation are concerned; this capability

enables them not only to replace earlier generations of equipment in a more than satisfactory way but some of the human functions involved in using them as well. They still cannot be used on their own, despite the label of "smart" that has been so hastily applied to them. The intelligence by means of which they become instruments of certain victory actually does not stem from them but from the men using them.

This brings us to the last issue: what to do when the materiel is insufficient or inferior to the enemy's? There is only one possible answer: to exploit one's superiority in other domains. Better quality human resources, a more efficient structure, a more sophisticated doctrine, a higher level of training can offset to some extent the enemy's superiority in materiel, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Also in this case,

great importance attaches to making an intelligent use of all the means available, even the most rudimentary. However, above a certain limit, the enemy's superiority becomes overwhelming and no effort can possibly avoid ultimate defeat: the most dogged resistance and the greatest courage will never be enough to offset a manifest and substantial material inferiority.

THE STRUCTURE

One factor which is essential to the structure's functionality is the chain of command, which must be:

- continuous;
- balanced;

- linear;
- stable.

Bureaucratic tendencies are a serious threat to the efficiency of the structure.

Proper disciplinary relationships are essential for the structure to be operational.

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

We have seen how armies have become increasingly more complex, particularly as far as the amount of materiel and the number of functions are concerned. However, "complex" must not be considered a synonym of "complicated", because any complex organization can be brought back to the required simplicity by eliminating all the superstructures and the habits that have grown superfluous or even detrimental in the course of its growth.

This is particularly true of the chain of command, whose functionality is the first, essential factor of efficiency.

The chain of command is a strong thread running through the whole structure and has the task of ensuring sure control of the situation and the regular flow of orders. Since any malfunction in it will have negative effects of incalculable importance which can even lead to the complete paralysis of the organization, its functioning must be straightforward, simple and rapid, and everything must be done in such a way as to avoid any failures, something that is always in the offing, particularly in wartime.

What, then, are the best conditions in order to ensure maximum functional efficiency of the chain of command?

Without trying to set up an artificial scale of priorities, we can start with "spatial continuity", i.e. the absence of gaps or overlapping. Every soldier, whatever his rank, must have one commander, and never more than one. However obvious this may seem, it can be conveniently clarified by means of an example.

If, for example, a superior skips the next lowest level and directly addresses a subordinate rank, his action overlaps that of his subordinate and sets up a temporary dual chain of command. This is an inevitable cause of confusion and disturbance, particularly in the case of inconsistencies between the orders given at the two levels, which is what happens as a rule.

Let us assume that a commander, e.g. a company commander, has to command a large number of subordinates, say a hundred or so, without a sufficient number of efficient intermediate ranks. His command activity will necessarily be deficient; the large number of men involved rules out the direct and constant relationship essential for any fully effective action; there will be a gap in the chain of command. This leads to a very dangerous situation which is hard to control and objectively favours the setting up of hidden, individual and group hierarchies whose aims and methods are normally in unreconcilable

contrast with the organization as a whole.

The second condition definitely consists of the balanced sharing of tasks and responsibilities among the various command levels. Any change in this balance, usually caused by an accumulation of tasks as you move up the ladder, results in two different types of problem: congestion at the upper levels (where, however competent and numerous the staff officers are, they cannot change the fact that there is only one commander and he alone can make the decisions) and the alienation of the lower levels which, caught between the "hammer" of the superior and the "anvil" of the subordinate, have their function reduced to that of "playing postman". The stage above this consists of the linearity and essential nature of the whole chain of command. Multiple dependence, purely nominal controls and all unnecessary steps must be eliminated immediately. They are, in any case, definitely detrimental since, even if they do not actually obstruct the chain of command, they lead to the wasting of time, i.e. of a particularly precious resource in time of war where the difference between victory and defeat can often be measured in minutes.

This brings us to the last item: stability. Command relationships represent much more complex links than are suggested by the simple line drawn on the organization charts. The blocks with which these links are built consist of very important human factors, e.g. knowledge, respect, habit, shared experiences. Each time these slender links are broken, no matter how quickly they are mended, precious time is lost. This should be made perfectly clear.

RED TAPE

This aspect is worth examining as it is related to a very important problem involving all types of large organizations. Let us first examine the nature of this problem.

From the time of their creation, all organizational structures have always adopted rules and regulations for the purpose of unifying methods, working systems and behaviour, in order to achieve their statutory aims in the best possible way.

Under optimal conditions, therefore, there is a substantial equilibrium between the ends (objectives) and the means (rules of behaviour). As long as this equilibrium is maintained, the structure remains fundamentally sound and efficient. The trouble begins when this equilibrium is shifted in one direction or the other.

In the first case (i.e. shortage of means vis-a-vis the ends to achieve) there is a tendency towards the chaotic development, even if vigorous, typical of growing but unplanned structures; in the second case (i.e. when the means prevail over the ends) the opposite occurs, i.e. we have a growth of red tape. A structure affected by the latter disease has "lowered its sights", i.e. it

no longer pursues its institutional aims, but limits itself to preserving the means that it should be using to pursue those aims. Completely withdrawn into itself, it is concerned solely with ensuring its own survival, even if in a completely routine and unproductive way. With all its decisions now being influenced by its obsession with ritual orthodoxy, the structure inevitably becomes slow, short-sighted, indecisive and obtuse in the pursuit of its statutory aims. Crushed under the weight of the very rules it has adopted in order to govern itself, it is now incapable of freeing itself, also because the disintegrating effect of the process now brings out the less noble aspects of the human personality and the pressure groups it now gives rise to are usually unwilling to abandon the field without a fight. If this is the disease, how can it be cured? There is no easy solution. The possible antidotes are slow and hard to apply. Action must be taken both at the level of the structure and procedures, eliminating the dead wood and useless ritual, as well as at that of mentality, which is much more difficult. However, an effort must be made to halt the tendency towards intellectual conformism, formal bigotry and the fear of taking responsibility, of which the red tape degeneration is both the cause and the effect.

An appeal must be made to the nobler aspects involved in the human factor, e.g. motivation, professional competence, confidence and courage.

In conclusion, the operation is a long-term one. However, it is certainly possible, provided that one acts continuously and in a firmly constructive way, with the courage to work in depth, fairly, without any special regard for outdated regulations, consolidated habits or pseudo acquired rights.

DISCIPLINARY RELATIONSHIPS

All that now remains to be done is to examine that part of the military structure which regulates all interactions, i.e. disciplinary relationships.

Discipline is essential. There can be no objections to or doubts about this. The real problem is, however, to know what form of discipline we have to take in order to actually enhance efficiency. What kind of discipline is required?

The first observation is that the only possible kind of discipline in a modern army is conscious discipline: brutish, purely mechanical discipline is no longer compatible with the mentality of modern man and with the military structure of our times.

In the battlefield, where each soldier must make his personal contribution in terms of active cooperation and intelligent initiative, the formless and purely passive executor of orders is more harm than he is worth. Overwhelmed by events beyond his control, he is bound to be irretrievably swept away within hours.

But what does conscious discipline really mean?



A simple answer is that it is composed of the following characteristic elements:

- a certain sharing of aims and a solid internal cohesion of the whole structure;
- a simple and essential set of disciplinary rules, in which detailed and special prescriptions are kept to a minimum and the fundamental duties of each individual vis-a-vis the organization are clearly and unequivocally stated;
- the inviolability, at all levels, of a definite field of individual responsibility.

But this is still not enough. Also behaviour must be consistent with these principles. To this end, as fundamental rules:

- command, conceived exclusively as a service, must be exerted by means of example, competently and with proper moral courage, with no unacceptable, purely personal traits. Only in this way discipline can be accepted as an obvi-

ous necessity and not as a harsh imposition;

- everyone must do his duty; no shortcomings regarding fundamental tasks can be tolerated without the very basis of discipline being undermined;
- the respect of dignity, fairness and truth are to be considered inalienable rights. Other rights are subordinated to the pursuit of the Institution's fundamental aims;
- orders that cannot be materially executed should be rigorously banned, not only because they do not lead to concrete results, but above all because they destroy confidence, which is the cornerstone of conscious discipline;
- control must be carried out mainly on the results, since the way orders are carried out must remain within the sphere of responsibility of each executor.

That is all, and it is quite a lot. A correct approach to disciplinary relationships is not only essential for the operational efficiency of the whole structure,

but it is also a sure antidote against all kinds of red tape.

OPERATING CRITERIA

Both the doctrine and the operating philosophy must enable even the most unpredictable situations to be coped with.

The forces must be large enough to cope with their tasks and all the factors must be consistently used in a modern conception of operational conditions.

This issue is closely related to structural problems, since no gaps can be allowed between structure and operating criteria in an organization that pursues the objective of efficiency.

There will therefore be some repetitions and, unfortunately, also some omissions, caused by the attempt to make



the overall situation as clear as possible.

The operating criteria are dependent on the *scenario* and on the *available forces*.

THE SCENARIO

After the *scenario*, or at least the most probable of a large number of hypothetical scenarios, has been identified, two courses of action are open to us. The first course is rigid, and is planned minutely on the basis of the chosen hypothesis; the second is extremely flexible and can readily be adapted to any scenario.

The first solution provides a theoretically perfect solution, but in only one case; the second gives us imperfect and incomplete solutions, which are valid over a wide range of possibilities.

It is equally clear that the first solution is highly attractive to the human mind, above all because it makes us feel that we are prepared for the event. However, this is a temptation that must be resisted. Only too often in the past the situation has evolved in a radically different way to the forecasts on which the plans and programmes were based. There is an overwhelming amount of historical evidence to support this conclusion. One of the most obvious and convincing cases is that of the "Schlieffen" plan drafted by the German High Command, which envisaged a battle on two fronts. This plan was based on the assumption that the time made available by the slow mobilization and mustering of the Russian army could be used to first bring France to its knees before turning the full force of the army against the Russians. However, the early mobilization of the Russian forces in August 1914, which was brought to completion in an unexpectedly short time, changed the assumptions on which the plan was based, making it obsolete. The German High Command, realizing that the plan was no longer realistic, decided to adapt reality to the plan and played the only trump card it held - surprise. The overhasty declaration of war, made under the worst possible political and strategic conditions, was the natural outcome of that decision. The consequences for Germany and for the rest of Europe are only too well known.

This, as we have seen, is only one of the numerous possible examples. Many other High Commands, in many different countries and periods, have had to pay the price of over-rigid planning when faced with new and completely unexpected situations. Flexibility, therefore, is what is needed, but how much? All-purpose solutions have often been found to be too rough and ready.

In conclusion, it may be said that the most probable scenario(s) must not be ignored and needs must be satisfied according to a logical order of priority. What must be avoided at all costs is to plan down to too low a doctrinal and structural level, for instance, concerning the number of ammunition chargers needed. Planning must be kept looser so as to leave adequate scope for deal-

ing with the unexpected. This is true at both the strategic and the tactical levels. Here, flexibility is also and mainly the fruit of moral courage and of the decision-making skill of commanders at all levels, in other words, of their mentality. This last consideration brings us to another conclusion: doctrinal and structural flexibility have no meaning unless accompanied by the mental flexibility of the commanders.

THE FORCES AVAILABLE

Having completed our examination of the threat, let us now look into the problem of the forces available.

This issue must be approached from two different angles. The first approach involves the size and type of the available forces and the relative possibility of supplying and supporting them. There exist minimum indispensable requirements at both the quantitative and the qualitative levels below which one cannot drop without it becoming materially impossible to do the job. There must be no doubt on this point.

The second approach revolves around deployment; we must ensure that the forces available are used in such a way as to maximize the chances of success. It is on this latter point that we shall now focus our attention.

It is a commonplace to think that soldiers tend to begin the next war at the point in which they left off in the previous one. Although obviously an exaggeration, there is some truth in this statement. This is due to the overwhelming force of circumstances: the last war always represents the only completely reliable testing ground. Even other people's experience are regarded with understandable suspicion, because it is often related to far-off battlefields and peculiar conditions, and it is difficult to make adequate allowance for specific or contingent factors. As a result, our recent direct experience, although repressed, continues to colour all our ideas regarding the future.

Also here the solution does not lie in applying some simple recipe. At best one can establish a number of criteria which may be summed up as follows: think, discuss and test in a continuous cycle, as part of a never-ending process.

To think, i.e. to use one's intelligence, to exploit one's previous experience to the full, to stimulate one's creative imagination in a continual search for new ideas for coping with reality.

To discuss, because ideas must be expounded, criticized and compared, without regard for taboos, prejudices or commonplaces.

To test, as objectively as possible, because, although 100% simulation of the real conditions cannot always be achieved, it is possible to come fairly close to doing so.

This is the only way to exploit, with any chance of success, the factors of advantage that every army possesses. From Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar down to Napoleon, Montecuccoli and

Moltke, the history of the great military victories has simply been the history of how the classical criteria entailed in the conduct of operations were "thought through" in a new way.

TRAINING LEVEL

The training level attained can never be considered satisfactory.

It is necessary to improve, and to go on improving.

The essential conditions for effective training are:

- realism;
- availability of suitable instructors, equipment and training grounds;
- quality and global nature of the training process.

Training is the means by which the operational capability of the structure as a whole can be improved. Acting as a kind of link between theory and practice, it represents a fundamental and conclusive stage in the preparation of the armed forces.

In its turn, the training level reached, the end result of the whole process, is the most reliable test of efficiency in peacetime.

Before we go any further, however, it is necessary to settle two preliminary matters, which are essential to a correct approach to the problem:

- the training standard reached in the preparatory phase is bound to decline during actual operations. This is because it is not possible, during peacetime training, to include all the disturbing factors caused by enemy reaction;
- it is not enough to attain a generically high level of training; it is necessary to establish a degree of superiority over the possible enemy. The greater this superiority, the greater the chances of victory.

These two premises enable us to lay down guidelines for all the training activities. Constant efforts must be made to go beyond the limits reached on the previous occasion. The time will never come when we can say to ourselves: "That's it. We've finished" because the need for further preparation and improvement will always lie ahead of us. Numerous different factors are involved in achieving this progressive development; the following are the most important:

— *realism*: this is the primary condition for obtaining effective results. The problem is to develop training methods aimed at reproducing situations and at producing reactions as similar as possible to real ones (in terms of time, space, forces involved and deployment conditions), including the possibility of making mistakes, which is an indispensable source of learning and experience.

In this sense, no indulgence should be shown towards preconstructed schemes or to ready-made scripts, not only because of the consequent distortion of ideas, but also because the partici-





pant's efforts would thus be concentrated on objectives that are diametrically opposed to those of effective and realistic training;

— *the availability of instructors*: this is an essential factor, in the absence of which it is wishful thinking to attempt to solve the training problem. It follows that instructor training is the first step in any activity. On the other hand, any prolonged fall-off in one sector will not only have a detrimental effect on the present training level but could also have repercussions in the future, when the effects of the shortcomings, due to the interruption of normal and refresher training of the instructor cadres, are felt;

— *the availability of equipment and training grounds*: this issue is so obviously essential that very little need be said about it. Of course, the early training stages can be split up, concentrated in a short time span and carried out using simulators: however, from the next stage on, real equipment will be required, together with sufficiently large areas in which to try it out. If this is impossible, the training process is likely to break down and become unproductive;

— *the quality of training*: this is achieved mainly by concentrating efforts on the individual and through the intensity of the training. Each unit is nothing more than the sum of its individual component parts. It is therefore on the latter that the maximum efforts must be concentrated in order to raise the operational effectiveness to a level where everything can virtually be done automatically.

By doing this, not only will we be making our units efficient, but we shall also be reducing the inevitable toll to be paid in terms of losses. If these facts are disregarded it will not be possible to speak of a trained army and we will have to be prepared to pay a very high, and perhaps useless, tribute in blood;

— *the global nature of the training*, which must involve absolutely everyone, without regard for service branch, rank or function. War is not a private matter concerning the lesser army units; it is a massive collective effort in which everyone must be able to give his best.

On closer examination, the factors we have been examining are seen to have also an ultimate psychological aspect. A unit hardened by tough and purposeful training will almost automatically tend to amalgamate and become a community linked by solid bonds of comradeship.

Men will learn to know each other and respect the better qualities that are inevitably brought out by shared hardships. A solid bond of mutual confidence and respect will be created naturally between the commander and those under his command.

Conscious discipline will tend to be accepted without resistance. Self-confidence, built up out of the satisfaction at having passed the various tests, will strengthen the men's endurance and make them unlikely to break down

under the psychological pressure of the battlefield.

In the end, motivation will also be strengthened and enhanced, and an autonomous microcosm, a reflection of the outside world, of one's country and of one's family, will thus have been set up in each unit.

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis of training brings to a close this short outline of the parameters relating to efficiency. What remains to be said? Although I do not claim to have dealt with everything, I think at least the main factors have all been touched upon.


One final consideration might be made: efficiency is a goal that must be attained well in advance, and fully consolidated during the years of peace, particularly because it is a difficult objective demanding total awareness and rocklike determination, not only from the Armed Forces but also from the Nation as a whole. It is a long-term goal which can be attained and maintained only after years of hard work, in which there can be no short cuts or half measures. To think that it can be attained when the chips are down is a dangerous illusion. When this time comes one reaps only what one has sown in the preceding years. There will be no time for second thoughts and backtracking: only the tool that one has forged will be available for use. It will be too late to do anything else.

Giuseppe Caccamo



Major General Giuseppe Caccamo attended staff training courses at the Civitavecchia War College and at the West German Army Staff College in Hamburg. He commanded the "L'Aquila" Alpini battalion, and was Deputy Commander of the "Cadore" Brigade. From 1980 to 1982 he commanded the "Julia" Brigade. General Caccamo has also held numerous staff posts: Staff Officer, Regulations Branch, Army General Staff; Chief of Staff, "Julia" Brigade; Military Attaché in Vienna and Military Advisor, Italian delegation to the MBFR talks. Gen. Caccamo has also commanded the staff training courses at the War College of Civitavecchia.

THE FIVE PILLARS OF EFFICIENCY



EVOLUTION OF EQUIPMENT AND TOMORROW'S WARS



FOREWORD

Even though the myriad of minor wars characterizing the aspect of today's conflictuality reveal a military reality that we could describe as "limited", the efforts of the alliances and the most important military powers in the fields of economics, technology, doctrine and industry still tend toward the acquisition of an instrument to be employed according to more and more sophisticated and technologically advanced conceptions.

To a great extent, everything is left to imagination rather than to practical facts which neither Vietnam and the Falklands – in the past – nor Afghanistan and the Iraqi-Iranian war – at present – have produced.

It is perhaps easier to find a reference to the hypothetical aspect of a future war in some movies, rather than in the war reports of the papers.

And though efforts are more and more frequently made, towards the revolution of the rôle of light infantry or the simplification of its equipments, the development and the sophistication of matériels and doctrine is still in progress.

In this framework, in spite of very serious national and international studies showing the main features of a possible war in which the industrialized world could get involved, there is still space for some considerations – collaterally to the situation of the development of the weapon systems – in order to try to imagine the battlefield of tomorrow.

129 "Mangusta" attack helicopter, armed with two 19-cell launchers for 70 mm rockets and 8 anti-tank "TOW" missiles.

Very advanced in its conception, the 2-seat "Mangusta" has a maximum speed of 270 km/h, and is equipped with a composite armour, capable of withstanding high caliber hits.

THE TANK

This formidable weapon, which represents on land what a light cruiser is at sea or a fighter-bomber is in the sky, must be still considered the hinge of every tactical conception as far as land maneuver is concerned.

Even if technology seems to have completely developed all its basic characteristics, it is still possible to improve the performance of tanks.

First of all, let us consider the aspect of *protection*, which is perhaps the most fascinating among the three main characteristics of tanks, giving them that quasi-invulnerability always pursued by the protagonists of the battlefield, either through Achilles' propitiatory baths or the German belt buckle with the "Gott mit uns".

Technology, with the principles of the spaced armour, the ceramic compound and the exploding plates, will consent further improvements in what has been done till now, with the mere utilization of very thick passive screens.

These improvements will permit a more effective protection of tanks from shells or hollow-charge missiles.

Tanks will then have to continue to be wary above all, of kinetic energy shells (which nevertheless will only be fired by other tanks or by tank-hunters), of "bomblets", small mines or terminal-guide laser shells – all with a hollow charge – fired by artillery or delivered by missiles.

In particular, "bomblets" and small mines will be in some way a forced solution in the attempt to hit the tanks in their "soft" points, that is to say, the belly and the upper part, that are still vulnerable to the hollow charges.

The tank's *fire power* is the parameter on which the possibility to destroy the adversary equivalent equipment depends. Due to the above considerations, it is indispensable to produce a high initial velocity to obtain the necessary thrust for the high kinetic energy shells to penetrate through the enemy armour.

Right.

On the battlefield, a primary requirement is that of eluding the enemy's information activity, in order to ensure the survival of one's own units. The picture shows a Leopard 2 combat tank of the German Federal Army with the new three-colour camouflage, instead of the traditional olive green.

Below.

The improvements in the protection of modern tanks have reduced the destructive capability of the hollow charges.

The rôle of tank-hunters has therefore been reappraised, since they can also employ kinetic-energy armour-piercing ammunition.

The photo shows the prototype of the new Swedish UDES "XX-20" tank-hunter.

The main armament of this two-chassis system is located externally and loaded automatically; the UDES, therefore, can, fire from completely defiladed positions.



It is possible to improve all the factors concurring to the aforesaid parameter. They are: the caliber of the gun, the propellant, the metal alloy of the shell, the resilience of the shock-absorbers and the sufficient weight of the tank.

Finally, it is possible to improve the tank's *mobility*, which is already very good: thanks to the progress in motorization, it will be rather easy to absorb the increase in weight, caused by a thicker armour or a heavier main armament.

Tanks will continue to be highly feared due to the further improvements in the automatic firing systems, in the devices for the production of anti-IR or anti-radar chaff, as well as in electronic measures and counter-measures, such as jammers against guided antitank missiles.

THE ANTITANK WEAPONS


The improvements in tanks, even if not so great, are the factor that, at least temporarily, will probably bring about the revision of the present rules of the anti-tank combat.

Two of the aforesaid factors will have influence on this type of fight.

The first is due to the diminished effectiveness of the hollow charges, resulting from the tanks' better protection. This fact will have repercussions on the operativeness of the missiles – guided or not – as well as on all kinds of HEAT shells.

If the ability of the hollow-charge missiles to hit and destroy decreases, the defence will have to re-estimate the rôle of the tank-hunters, it being understood that the still precious tank will continue to be employed as an element for counter manoeuvre and in reserve.

Another conditioning factor is connected with the electronic countermeasures against guided missiles. We can foresee – even if it is not yet possible to say to what extent – that in a short time these electronic measures



will permit to neutralize – proportionally to their flying-time – a part of the antitank missiles, giving a better advantage to the attacker. It is therefore possible to imagine that the battle between the tank's electronic countermeasures and the missiles' electronic guide will be added – as a corollary – to the gun-armour or missile-armour fight of today.

If up to now it was possible to employ many missiles from distances that were longer than the range of the tank guns, perhaps tomorrow the antitank fight will again depend on the courage of the infantryman and on the possibility of entrapping the armoured formations in urban areas, which will be trans-

In the immediate future, tanks will also have to be wary – in addition to hollow-charge and kinetic energy shells and missiles – of laser- infrared- or microwave-guided bomblets, small mines and projectiles, all of them hollow-charge or self-forging warheads, launched by artillery or dropped by missiles.

The drawing describes the different phases of an attack with SADARM (Sense And Destroy Armour) munitions, consisting of shells capable of delivering on the objective a certain number of independent self-forging warheads, each with an infrared-guided identification system.

formed in obstacle knots, pre-arranged in the areas and avenues of approach and covered by fire from permanent fortifications.

In order to counterbalance these difficulties, the armed helicopters will enter the scene: they are real flying platforms equipped with antitank weapons. Their mobility, flexibility, rapidity of intervention and reliability will give the Commanders, in some cases, an exceptional instrument for decisive interventions.

THE ARTILLERY

Before discussing the artillery, we must consider the sectors of target acquisition and surveillance of the battlefield. As regards the fields of electronics, both of them can have very interesting developments.

The first results will be obtained at the Headquarters of the Major Units with the availability of easily acquired information given by "ad hoc" satellites deployed in space.

At the centres for analysis and distribution of information operating at the Headquarters, it will be possible to have data concerning enemy elements located at any distance.

It will be possible to see and hit anything moving in formation. First of all, the air forces and the longer range missiles will hit, and then the artillery – at a distance of more than 30 km.

The longest range artillery fire will be a saturation fire, based on the use of "bomblets" and small mines, against the approaching formations of tanks and artillery.

At shorter distances, the "direct support" artillery will enter into action. It will have a more marked antitank function, through the employment of laser terminal-guided shells or other special ammunition.

The employment of artillery against personnel and for the dissociation of tanks from the mechanized elements will become secondary; this rôle will

be left mainly to the mortars of the infantry and the support weapons of the combat vehicles.

In theory, the combat could be a distance-fight, made with the numerous weapon-systems of the artillery, without any contact between the opposed formations of the combat units.


This will not happen, in practice, because the tanks on one hand and the foot soldiers in the holes, on the other, will be able to survive, and this will permit the former to get through any obstacle, and the latter to resist any concentration of fire, so that the direct confrontation between foot soldiers and tanks will inevitably occur.

The fact is that the artillery will cause the highest rate of

The combination of massive impact and rapid penetration, typical of the enemy armoured formations – together with the action of small special force units in the rear lines – puts the defence forces in front of situations that can be controlled only with very high mobility and very close coordination. The employment of helicopters is essential to face such emergency situations. Here a partial view of an AB-205 helicopter and the ammunition for its machine guns.



damage to the enemy and it could acquire, in the perspective that has been illustrated, a pre-eminent rôle over the other arms, particularly in defence.



AIR DEFENCE AND AIR COOPERATION

In the general framework of combat, it will be more useful to give airplanes the task of distant interdiction rather than that of Close Air Support. The ever-growing effectiveness of the anti-aircraft self defence systems of the land units will also lead to this choice, for they will considerably increase the risks for the aircraft, which are too expensive not to be employed for more profitable missions.

Even the control of the lower airspace, where airplanes can act more freely, will be improved by the automatic command and control procedures. This will help further to divert the aircraft

towards other targets outside the combat zone.

These considerations are more valid for the defender – who necessarily will have to ration his resources very strictly – than for the attacker, who has more resources at his disposal. Consequently, the importance of air defence will remain unchanged, for, if it is inadequate, it will give the attacker the possibility to take great advantage from the utilization of his air forces in support of the armoured units.

WHAT ATTACK AND, ABOVE ALL, WHAT DEFENCE?

From what has been said till now, it is evident that tanks,

In the very near future, the attacker will tend to achieve his penetration into the advanced enemy deployment by making a number of breaches, through which a great number of tanks will enter and rapidly spread in depth.

Infrared-or microwave-guided air-to-ground missiles are now being tested in the U.S. Launched by fighter aircraft or attack helicopters, these missiles head autonomously for their targets, hitting the armoured formations timely and effectively.

The drawing shows the sequence of an anti-tank attack, conducted with "Wasp" ammunition.

heavily supported by artillery and, as far as possible, by air force, will be the strong point of the attacker.

His line of action will tend to break and penetrate the advanced deployment, even if only in a few points. It will not be, then, a general breakthrough, but the opening of small breaches through which the greatest number of tanks will get through in the shortest possible time, in order to spread in depth.

The advanced forces of the defender, mostly subject to fixing actions and necessarily anchored to the ground, will find it difficult to change rapidly their array and gravitation.

The adversary will try to take advantage of this situation, disregarding the advanced defence array, and trying hard to eliminate the defender's armoured reserves – called in to countermaneuver – and to destroy the artillery units, chasing them, relentlessly, as far as the rear lines.

Together with the main attack, a great number of small

actions will be started. Saboteurs, special units, paratroops or helicopter-borne teams will neutralize nodal centres, control and data centres, and elements for the surveillance of the battlefield and the acquisition of targets.

The aim of this action will be that of upsetting the defence organization, hitting its most sensitive elements, tactically very important but intrinsically vulnerable.

The massive attack and the rapid penetration of the armoured units, together with the action of the small units in the rear line, will be a threat not easy to counteract.

The forces of defence, already limited in number, will have to face situations that can only be controlled by high mobility and close coordination.

But let us proceed in an orderly manner, and try to imagine a line of action for the defence. The best defence is one that can avail itself of wide space, is able to gradually absorb the enemy thrust, learning to know the enemy in order to detect his vulnerabilities, wearing him down, stopping at natural

obstacles, counter-maneuvering on the flanks, hitting the most sensitive elements with special forces, in order to reach a defence position in which to employ all the available forces to stop the enemy once and for all.

Unfortunately, this space does not exist in our national situation – unless we want to give up much of our territory; the fight will therefore become immediately a violent clash between the adversary who arrives in a rush, and the defender who standing still, awaits him, leaving him free to act by surprise – as regards the points of application of the effort – and free to amass and concentrate his forces at the place and at the time of his choice.

There will be an accurate location or "marking" – as it is wrongly said today – of the static deployment of forces, be it optical, electronic or with fire, multiplying their vulnerability.

From this derives the basic and primary requirement to escape the informative action of the adversary, in order to guarantee the survival of the units, command posts, reserves and artillery; this will occur through the implementation of a plan of deception aimed at disguising in several ways the defender's deployment.

First of all, masking and camouflage, realized by every-



one perfectly and with adequate equipment. Then, false transmissions on the one hand and radio-silence of the real nets on the other. Finally, the multiplication of the sources of electronic transmission, so as to render it difficult for the enemy to determine the ones really connected with radars or with other essential equipment for the control of the battlefield.

As accurate as this attentive defence against the adversary's surveillance and acquisition equipment may be, missiles and artillery will soon follow the aircraft in hitting the located objectives. While the attacking tanks are still many kilometres away, the defender's and the attacker's conventional and missiles artilleries will try to destroy each other and hit – respectively – the approaching armoured units and the vital structures of the defence organization. The defence position will have to be organized as a continuous and wide barrier, through the integration of rivers, canals and urban areas with minefields, antitank alignments and strongholds. If the front line becomes indented, it will have to absorb the enemy, but never break. The battle will have to gradually change the arrangement of the units facing each other along a certain line – tending to go

backwards, to the detriment of the defender – but it will instead develop into an areal fight. The tanks will operate at a shorter distance, their maneuvering spaces will get narrow; it will be possible to take advantage of the tanks' impossibility to move in numerous and compact units, due to the structure of the battlefield, fragmented by the obstacles described above.

In this situation the infantry, after a classic and systematic action on the front, will make, in the areal battle, dynamic and small tactical actions, letting the enemy advance, hitting him on the flanks and countermaneuvering in order to regain the lost ground.

Combat vehicles will help the infantry to do this. They will be used for displacements on the battlefield and to integrate the fire of the infantry weapons – antitank or others. The intervention of reserve tanks will also be helpful.

The utilization of the latter will be offensive, dynamic and possibly massive. The choice of the proper time and place for their action must be planned with care. Their intervention will preferably be carried out according to consolidated hypotheses. If an unexpected penetration occurs, formations of attack helicopters will guarantee greater

timeliness and effectiveness, since their characteristics and possibilities of employment are well suited to face emergency situations.

Armed multirole helicopters will play an important part also in counteracting the dangerous threat of the special forces in the rear lines and in case of air landings. The intervention of helicopter-borne forces, taken from the motorized units assigned to the defence of the rear lines, will guarantee the necessary timeliness of reaction to such actions, and reduce the possibility that the enemy units, penetrated in the rear lines will reiterate their attacks.

CONCLUSIONS

The availability of adequate technological equipment, an efficient command and control system, well-trained units and accurate defensive arrangements, will permit to face the threat of a "major conflict" thus hypothesized.

The reality of today's minor wars makes us sometimes think that there could be another way of defending ourselves, different both in its procedures and in the equipment to be employed.

But the reality of today's world does not appear to give us many alternatives. The industrial society gives us – as raw material for defence – highly sophisticated equipment and systems, as well as men who are more apt to operate on a technical basis, according to their mentality and habits.

As far as we are concerned, it is very unlikely that our civilization of "prosperity" and "social demands" will give birth to motivated and determined guerrillas ready to fight with cold steel, while it is possible that our citizen-soldier, during the period of his conscription, will learn to press the right buttons of the weapon-system put at his disposal by progress for the defence of the Fatherland.


Carlo Cabigiosu



The progress made in the field of munitions enables the artillery to carry out a saturation fire, from very long distances, against approaching tanks. Shown here, a "Palmaria" 155 mm self-propelled howitzer which, in addition to semi self-propelling munitions with a 30 km range, can employ laser-guided shells.

THE WORK OF QUINTO CENNI

ARMATA SARDA



"He was never a soldier, but loved soldiers. He never held a rifle in his hands and loved the profession of arms. He never mounted a horse and loved horses. And he became the most important historiographic painter of soldiers".

These words about Quinto Cenni were written by Arnaldo Fraccaroli, who acknowledged that the painter persisted — among


difficulties and incomprehensions, with tenacity and courage — in his attempt to make the Italian soldier known and loved.

Actually, the Italian Army, through Quinto Cenni's work, could avail itself — and, in a sense, still does — of an effective tool for the popularization of the military traditions of our Country.

"Rivista Militare" has published a series of volumes with the watercolours by this great painter, in which he represented scenes of wars fought not only in Italy, but also in the most faraway battlefields.

These publications are important documents for those who are keen on "uniformology" and for students of the Italian military customs.

In his drawings Cenni notes — emphasizing them by China ink or watercolour — the particulars which are most interesting to him, the changes — albeit insignificant — in the uniforms and materials of the Italian Army, as well as in the armies of other countries. With patient care, Cenni collected an enormous quantity of drawing of uniforms of every Army and Nation from



and realized that in the rest of Europe the military questions were followed with great attention and that history and traditions of the various units were considered with great care. Cenni, in his representation of uniforms, was also an innovator: in his portrayals one can find a vivacity and a spirit which make them really captivating. The Risorgimento's volunteers are

ARMATA FRANCESE



1650 onwards; already in 1891 he estimated to have more than twenty thousand drawings, whose number was progressively and constantly increasing.

It is an imposing collection, a really priceless historical and artistic patrimony, obtained with an initiative never undertaken before in Italy, and never again accomplished in such a large scale. In order to portray his

uniforms true to the original ones, Cenni interviewed veterans and survivors, to have first-hand information on details lacking a reliable documentation. He had free access to the barracks, the commanders received him and invited him to attend parades and manoeuvres, which he never missed.

He made the acquaintance of experts from other countries,

represented with their youthful boldness and candid enthusiasm; the "Garibaldini" have never been depicted so well; sometimes

— specially as regards the troops of the First War of Independence — we see an almost dreamy view of those who fought for their freedom. They are small sketches of actual life which

— even today — give us a real



and genuine image of military life in all its aspects.

More and more fond of this particular field, Cenni published at his own expense the historic-artistic-military album "Custoza 1848-1866". It is a really exceptional work, where scrupulous precision and patience emerge in the numerous sketches, portraits, drawings, war scenes and topographic plans. Cenni contributed to several reviews such as "L'Illustrazione Italiana", "Epoca" and "Spirito Folletto", specializing in the research on uniforms from every country. Another very important album of drawings was published on June 18, 1886, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Corps of Bersaglieri, the "Number One" with the title "I Bersaglieri". The volume was republished in 1896 for the sixtieth anniversary of the Bersaglieri, with the purpose of retracing the history of the Corps' uniforms from 1836 to 1886, represented in a colour plate which earned Cenni the Cross of Knight of the Crown of Italy, bestowed on him by King Umberto I.

In 1887 Cenni, on his own initiative, began to publish the magazine "L'Illustrazione Militare Italiana" — which still today remains unexcelled — extremely rich in drawings and colour plates, made with the skill and scruple which are his most typical qualities.

Quinto Cenni bade the last farewell to his Country and to his art with a watercolour painted twenty minutes before his death, on August 13, 1917.

After him, no one equalled his stature; his collection went to his son Italo, a worthy continuator of his work for a short time, since he also died. The collection, divided among several amateurs, has lost the homogeneity and insuperable com-

pleteness which were its fundamental qualities and its great value.

Cenni contributed greatly to the diffusion of the uniforms of the past, which continue to attract and fascinate not only the experts but also those who appreciate all which is really

beautiful and — at the same time — deeply humane.


This is what emerges from the publications on Quinto Cenni, published by "Rivista Militare" with the idea of recalling the history of the Italian Army through the works of this great artisan of the image.



EDITORI E. BEHARDI & C. - MILANO

THE WORK OF QUINTO CENNI

TAV. 2





Le uniformi del Regio Esercito Italiano

1898-1902

Rivista Militare

Every uniform reflects the spirit of the army in a specific historical moment, and the relationship between military traditions and civilian customs is very closely connected with the succession of fashions, which are preceded or followed by the uniforms, in a surprising flourishing of styles and modes.

Convinced of this — continuing its programme of research, which has already enabled "Rivista Militare" to publish the volume "The Italian Armies from the pre-unitarian States to the national unification" — the magazine has started, in 1985, a study of the Italian Army's uniforms. They are of remarkable aesthetic interest and, above all, have moral contents concurring with the ideals that motivate the soldier.

The series reproduced in this book, which is in possession of Rome's National Museum of Castel Sant'Angelo, consists of 67 photographic plates, retouched and hand-painted with the watercolour technique, in the absolute respect of the original colours. Made by the Lavazzano photographic studio of Rome, the set was delivered to the Museum of the War Ministry in 1932; it is not known whether the photographer was also the author of the subsequent colouring or whether this exceptional operation was carried out by somebody else.

The photographs represent officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men — of all corps, services and institutes of the army — wearing the uniforms established by the Regulation of 1880 and modified by Act n. 101 of May 16, 1895, in force until 1902.

An aspect of these photographs, increasing their rarity and importance — not only for those who are especially interested in this specific field, but also for all students of that particular period — is the great difficulty in finding original material representing single individuals and not groups. At the end of the century, in fact, photography was a valid "message" sent by the soldiers to their families, a witness of their service in uniform; the photographs still existing are therefore widely spread and scattered in private collections.


The work of filing the photographs and the individuation of the various Corps has been carried out, for the first time, during the preparation of this volume which, as a whole, is an absolute novelty.

It has the merit of bringing back to light real images of our military tradition.

Non-subscribers will be able to purchase the book either at full price, or with a 20% discount if they send this form together with a request for subscription to "Rivista Militare" and a remittance of Lit. 24,000 (or U.S. \$ 12 - D.M. 36 - F.F. 100), by cheque or international money order, addressed to: Stato Maggiore Esercito - Rivista Militare - Sezione di Amministrazione - Via XX Settembre 123/A - 00187 Roma (Italy).

IL SOLDATO ITALIANO DELL'OTTOCENTO


NELL'OPERA DI QUINTO CENNI



Quinto Cenni's watercolours revive the conscripts of the just unified Italy, the officers and non-commissioned officers, veterans of the battles of the Risorgimento, fought also on the side of the losers, but always with sense of duty and spirit of sacrifice.

With skillful strokes, the painter brings back to light the everyday life of an army which had been entrusted with the difficult task of combining very different cultures and distant traditions, held together by a single unifying cement: the tongue of Dante and Mazzini.

Quinto Cenni, who was born in Romagna but lived in Milan, a "bourgeois" artist who was never a soldier, spent all his life depicting the military customs. From this point of view, he is the best witness of the affection for the Armed Forces felt from at least a part of the "Third Italy".



Affrancatura a carico del
destinatario da addebi-
tarsi sul conto di credito
n. 681, presso l'Ufficio
di Roma Centro Corr.
(autorizzazione Direzio-
ne Provinciale di Roma
n. B/75858/RAP/22 del
10 ottobre 1974).

To
RIVISTA MILITARE
Via di S. Marco, 8


(Italy)

00186 Roma

Others could have doubts or show hostility: Cenni always saw, crystal-clear and unequivocal, the continuity between the armies of the Risorgimento and the Italian Army, custodian of the unity and freedom conquered on the battlefield.

The initiative to recall the history of the Italian Army, through the work of this artisan of the image, was not taken at random by "Rivista Militare" and the Director of the Museum of Castel S. Angelo. "Rivista Militare", of which, in my capacity of Minister of Defence, I am — let us say — the publisher, has had, from the beginning, the purpose to keep alive the relations between military and civilian society; the Castel Sant'Angelo Museum from the time of its first director, General Borgatti, has been the scene of an active cooperation between military and civilians aimed at the enhancement of a common heritage of history and traditions.

I am happy to sponsor this project and I hope above all



that the new generations will rediscover, through it, an important — and up to now neglected — aspect of our history: the contribution to the moral and civil growth of our country given by the Armed Forces. Our Armed Forces as

an essential factor of a moral conscience on the making.

Sen. Giovanni Spadolini
Ministro della Difesa

Dear Reader,

we plan to publish in the very near future the volume "Il soldato italiano dell'Ottocento" (The Italian Soldier in the 19th Century) illustrated by Quinto Cenni's watercolours, with captions in Italian and English and high quality binding.

By returning this form, the subscribers of "Rivista Militare" will obtain a discount of 20% on the book's cover price of Lit. 100,000.

Non-subscribers will be able to purchase the book either at full price, or with a 20% discount if they send this form together with a request for subscription to "Rivista Militare" and a remittance of Lit. 24,000 (or U.S. \$ 12 - D.M. 36 - F.F. 100), by cheque or international money order, addressed to: Stato Maggiore Esercito - Rivista Militare - Sezione di Amministrazione - Via X Settembre 123/4 - 00187 Roma (Italy).

For subscribers.

I wish to reserve the volume "Il soldato italiano dell'Ottocento" at the price of Lit. 80,000 (20% discount on the cover price) - Mailing expenses: Lit. 20,000.

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For non-subscribers.

I have subscribed to "Rivista Militare" on
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THE ROYAL ITALIAN ARMY

1934 - 1939

The official foreign policy in these years demonstrates clear signs of incoherence and a lack of seriousness which though masked by unexpected decisions causes upset and surprise both abroad and at home. The diplomatic improvisations of the Prime Minister – and this is perhaps one of the most serious aspects – result in negative repercussions on the strategic planning and on the preparation of the Armed Forces. In fact, the Armed Forces are unable to prearrange an acceptable plan from the point of view of validity and of completeness as each time they have to follow the government's area of interest, now the lower Alps area, now the Balkans, or even in the colonies. Thus, the readiness of the national war apparatus which should be the logical consequence of the objectives to be reached, proceeds disjointedly and without fixed terms, accentuating still further the division between the Armed Forces to the point where they are planning practically separately, even though the Prime Minister is the head of the three respective ministries. In such a situation it is hardly surprising that events in East Africa, in Spain and in Albania occur in a climate of total surprise even on the part of the General Staffs, who should have been responsible for the technical solution of the operational problems. Still more, the signature of the "Iron Pact" in Berlin in May 1939 takes place without even one military chief being consulted and while operational plans and troops are in a complete state of unpreparedness.

That this method of handling the wide powers concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister is contrary to national interests can be clearly seen in the following months during the now inevitable conflict.

As regards the organization of the Army, the years immediately preceding the Second World War are characterized

by a series of steps, sometimes radical, which change the balance of the previous decade. One can note a steady increase in the number of units through the setting up of new corps or groups, particularly to meet overseas requirements. In 1938 the overall total is impressive although events later on show up serious basic gaps: 5 Armies, 17 Army Corps, 1 Armed Army Corps, 1 "Celere" (fast) Army Corps, 1 Senior Headquarters of Alpine troops, 51 Infantry divisions, 2 Motorized divisions, 2 Armoured divisions, 5 "Alpini" divisions, 3 "Celere" divisions, 1 Carabiniers, 13 Territorial Defence commands and 28 militari districts. In all some 22 Carabiniers Regiments, 9 Grenadiers re-

giments, 100 infantry regiments, 4 Motorized infantry regiments, 12 Bersaglieri regiments, 10 Alpini regiments, 6 Armoured infantry regiments, 12 Cavalry regiments, 51 Regiments of Artillery assigned to the infantry divisions, 2 Motorized artillery regiments assigned to the infantry divisions, 2 Artillery regiments assigned to armoured divisions, 5 Alpine artillery regiments, 3 "Celere" divisions, 6 G.A.F. ("Guardia alla Frontiera"), 16 Army corps artillery regiments, 5 Artillery regiments, 5 Antiaircraft artillery regiments, 16 Engineers regiments, 2 Miners, 2 Engineers (bridges), 1 Railway technicians, 1 Chemical warfare unit and 100 military districts.

The problem of insufficient quality and quantity of armaments, especially for artillery and armoured troops, in addition to a serious delay in the programme for the strengthening of motorized units remains unsolved, however. In fact, the situation becomes even worse during this difficult period when one considers the enormous quantities of materials and troops sent to Africa and to Spain. The overall figure in 1938 is a total of 300,593 men under arms with a conscription period of 18 months.

Between September 1933 and May 1934 five "addition and amendments" are issued to the 1931 regulations on uniforms. Contrary to expectations these are not a series of partial modifications but a total and important new change which plays an important rôle for the Italian Army. In fact, in 1934 soldiers completely alter their appearance, their dress becoming much more modern and practical. The results are not entirely satisfactory: certain traditions are continued and in some cases details from the 18th century are even reinstated.

On the other hand, the attempt at reform includes radical changes such as, for example, the disuse of the centuries-old distinction of gold and silver metal according to corps, special unit

ITALIAN

MILITARY

UNIFORMS

or group and the subsequent adoption of gold colour for use by all. But the three most important and remarkable new measures are: the final abolition of the "stove pipe" headwear, which particularly for officers had become of disproportionate and unacceptable patterns; the open collar, as had been decided during the World War for assault troops, and the subsequent adoption of a turn-down collared shirt with a civilian style tie; and the application of a new system of rank insignia for officers which, as can be seen from the illustration, is now worn above the cuffs. As regards rank insignia mention must be made of the establishment in 1938 of the rank of First Marshal of the Empire, rank to be held by the King and by the Prime Minister, the insignia consisting of a double zigzag pattern braid; and of the transfer in 1937 of the rank insignia for sergeants and corporals from the cuff to the sleeve, with appropriate reduction in size.

The new series of uniforms basically includes: for officers grey-green uniforms for use as full uniform, marching uniform and ordinary uniform; of black uniforms for use as full dress or evening dress or formal dress; and of white uniforms for full or ordinary dress; for warrant-officers a grey-green series, including full dress, marching and ordinary dress and a grey fatigue dress.


The ceremonial dress for officers which includes a white shirt and black tie (or tie of the special colour for units which are so privileged) maintains the wearing of special headwear, the blue sash, the sword belt (now gilt colour for all ranks), and of the sword with gilt sword-knot. Dress worn when on the march and ordinary dress are very similar except that for the first a grey-green tie is worn with the shirt and a pistol carried on a brown belt. The other two newly established series – the black and the white – are particularly interesting. The pattern and type of the first brings to mind the uniforms worn during the King Humbert period. Rich in adaptations for the various occasions, it is certainly distinguishable on account of the lavishness of the ornaments and of the colours which are to be found on the collars, on the cuffs and on the trouser stripes. An unusual detail is that contrary to the centuries-old tradition, the double stripes are now worn by foot corps, while the simple stripe is worn by Service Corps only.

The second series, that is the white uniforms, is highly original and new, although perhaps hardly practical. With this series, the full uniform is considerably simplified. In fact, the use of special headwear, of sword-belts, plumes and metal epaulettes is strictly forbidden. As from 1937 permission is given to the wearing of the white jacket with the grey-green riding uniform during the summer months.

As regards warrant officers, the uniforms in use are very similar to those of officers both as regards quality and manufacture and they appear


1934 - Sergeant, "Savoia Cavalleria" Regiment, in ordinary dress.

The helmet and the red tie, together with the black collar badges, are the characteristic details of this Dragoon Regiment. The progressive improvement in the appearance of the NCO's uniforms can be noted. Rank badges on the cuffs are in use until 1937.



1934 - Soldier of 73rd "Lombardia" Infantry Regiment, on armed duty.

The 1931 model helmet, on trial, is distinguished by the crest attached at the top. For full uniform this dress is completed by attaching metal badges to the shoulder straps and by the use of white cotton gloves.




1936 - Lieutenant Colonel of the Armoured Infantry, in service dress. As from 24 June a ministerial order changes the black velvet collar to a blue cloth collar; the red collar badges remain the same.





1935 - Colonel commanding the 55th "Marche" Infantry Regiment, in full uniform.

This officer, who on parades has the privilege to mount, wears a white aigrette on the mod. 1933 helmet; the rank insignia on dark red cloth denotes a regimental commander.



Rank insignia established by the 1933-1934 Regulation





Marshal of Italy
General
Lieut. General (Army Cdr.)
Lieut. General
Major General
Brigadier General





Colonel
Lieut. Colonel
Major



1st Captain
Captain
Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
Aspirant



Battle Adjutant
Chief Warrant Officer
Warrant Officer 1st class
Warrant Officer 2nd class



Sergeant Major

Sergeant

Corporal

Lance Corporal

completely satisfactory. The situation of corporals and other ranks is rather different. It is true that the new series allow wider variations and, therefore, more practical solutions to the various needs for operations and seasons. However, it is also true that the quality of the materials used and the manufacture are rarely acceptable. Also the cut of the various models is consistently inelegant and complicated with the net result that even the most careful sol-

dier appears untidy and far from smart. In fact, that the final result was not satisfactory even at that time is proved by the fact that within a short period of time numerous and even radical modifications are made.

The years following the reform of uniforms are characterized also by an extraordinary efflorescence of new colour combinations (one can cite the series of badges worn by mechanized troops and motorized troops on the

blue collar; the wearing by the divisional artillery regiments of characteristic items of the infantry and artillery; the badges of the chemical warfare units, of the Frontier Guard, ecc.) and by the appearance of new items such as the 1933 model helmet – still in use – which is an improved version of the 1931 helmet.

Numerous details belonging to single units are maintained and improved (such as the red and blue ties proud-


1938 - Soldier, "Cavalleggeri di Lodi" Regiment, in full uniform.

The plume and cords on the busby, as well as the metal badges on the shoulder straps denote the full uniform worn by enlisted men.



1936 - Lieutenant of Ordnance Corps, in summer full uniform.

In summertime the full uniform, the same for all officers, is simplified as compared to winter dress: in fact, the sword-belt and the metal epaulettes are not worn.



1937 - Grenadiers' Major, in formal dress.

This impressive black uniform is also used as full uniform with the addition of the blue sash, the sword-belt, the gilt fringed epaulettes, medals, and in addition the black sword-knots are replaced by gilt sword-knots.



1938 - Captain, Field Artillery, in summer riding uniform.

The elegant combination of white with grey-green clothing makes this uniform particularly elegant.


1936 - Corporal, bugler of the Horse Artillery Regiment, in full dress.

The white horsetail attached to the kepi – the characteristic headwear of the regiment, still in use today – denotes that the corporal is a bandsman. In fact, all the other troops wear a black horsetail in accordance with the uninterrupted tradition of the Piedmontese horse artillery.



1938 - Sapper of the Frontier Guard, in service dress.

The G.A.F. ("Guardia alla Frontiera") which are set up in 1934, are distinguished by the Alpine hat, worn however without the typical feather, and by their green collar. Infantry wear red piping on the green collar, artillery yellow and engineers maroon. The typical arm badge bears the number of the frontier sector.



1939 - Corporal of the Motorized Transport Corps, in service dress.

As from 1937 enlisted men wear a jacket with cloth belt. Rank insignia for sergeants and corporals are now worn, in reduced size, on the forearm and no longer on the cuffs. The forage cap, in use since 1935, is worn by all troops except "Alpini" and "Bersaglieri".

ly worn by the infantry, cavalry and artillery; small pin badges, awarded to some units for meritorious action during fighting) or even created (such as the divisional badges worn on the sleeve).

Oddly enough, however, despite all the modernizations no studies are made nor action taken to free soldiers from puttees, nor towards their wellbeing particularly regarding field dress which is too hot in the summer and insufficient in the winter.

Valerio Gibellini

**THE ROYAL
ITALIAN ARMY**

1934-1939

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GIAT TR 155

The GIAT TR 155 is operated by a 7-man crew, can be put in firing position in about 90 seconds and has a rate of fire of 6 rpm. It can use munitions made by the manufacturer, U.S. made 155 mm shells and all standard-NATO ammunition, with a maximum range of 34 km.

The TR 155 is powered by a 65 hp engine which enables it to move autonomously, at a maximum speed of 8 km/h; its maximum gradient is 60%, it can cross watercourses 1 m deep without preparation, 1.20 m after preparation.

Positioning and firing operations are performed with the assistance of a hydraulic servosystem fed by the engine; if this system proves inefficient, an external hydraulic-energy unit can be used, e.g. that of the towing vehicle or that of another gun. Towed by an artillery tractor, the TR 155 can reach a roadspeed of approximately 90 km/h.



FOX-MILAN RECONNAISSANCE ARMoured VEHICLE

A new high-mobility armoured vehicle has recently been realized, according to the specifications issued by the British Army; it has been named "FOX-MILAN" and will perform reconnaissance duties.

A Milan turret is installed on the Fox, equipped with two components of the anti-tank system used by infantry and a machine gun. The vehicle is powered by a 190 hp Jaguar engine, is manned by a 2-man crew, can be transported by air (a Hercules C130 can carry three), air-dropped, and can operate at temperatures from -25° to $+50^{\circ}$ C.

SPECIFICATIONS

Weight	6,136	kg
Length	4.22	m
Height	2.4	m
Width	2.12	m
Max speed	105	km/h
Range	434	km
Max gradient	58%	
Traction	4-wheel drive	
Ammunition	2 Milan, ready to fire,	
	4 stored,	
	2600 rounds, 7.62 cal.	






A NEW U.S. COMPASS

An American firm is producing for the U.S. Army and Air Force a new series of compasses which can be used at night without the help of a light source, since they contain tritium-permeated crystals. The crystals block the passage of radiations that could be dangerous to the users.

The compass, placed in an olive green container, is not immersed in shock-absorbing liquid, which could cause the classic air bubbles and make the instrument completely useless. After six seconds the needle stops on the North. The compass is equipped with a graduated plate divided into grades and mils, is impermeable, shockproof and can be used at temperatures from -50° to $+160^{\circ}$ F.



HUGHES MG "DEFENDER" HELICOPTER

The American industry has presented the "Defender", a new helicopter made with the cooperation of a team of specialized firms. The "Defender" is a third-generation light helicopter, whose philosophy is to optimize and redefine the relationship vehicle-crew.

The "Defender" is equipped with a multi-function display (MFD) which continuously shows data on navigation, engines, armament and other information, alerting the crew about possible malfunctions. The VID (Virtual Image Display) enables the copilot to follow the operations performed by the pilot and to employ the craft's armament in accordance with the information acquired. The aircraft carries a cassette for the pre-programming of the mission and the pre-selection of radio frequencies, reference points for navigation, and data on the targets; a flight-control system is also available. Therefore the pilot, without leaving the controls, can switch radio frequencies, insert and disconnect the automatic pilot, and operate the armament. The helicopter is equipped with a modular Mission Computer, functioning as general servo-assistance for the aircraft and as connection between controls and equipment, ensuring the storage of all operational data as well as the information for the helicopter's maintenance on the ground.

The "Defender" can use modular



weapon systems as anti-aircraft TOW missiles, air-to-air missiles, 7 to 12-cell multiple rocket launchers, two-barrel

7.62 cal. machine guns, and .50 cal. guns, which can be installed on the aircraft in a few minutes.

"BILL" ANTITANK MISSILE

The British industry has perfected a long-range wire-guided anti-tank missile system, whose warhead hits the target from above, with an inclination of 30° (fig. 1).

The application of this new concept permits to hit the enemy tank where its armour is thinner and – at any rate – to pierce armours remarkably less thick than those normally hit by the traditional hollow charges (fig. 2).

The missile flies above the line of sight – avoiding many of the natural obstacles found by the traditional missiles along their trajectory – and has a much wider target area. The explosion of the warhead is controlled by a proximity fuze. The weapon system can be put in firing position in 20 seconds, is rechargeable in 7 seconds and can be employed against moving targets from 300 to 2000 m.

The "Bill" consists of three loads: launcher, 27 kg; missile in the container, 17 kg; sighting device, 11 kg.




Figure 1




Figure 2

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tilos an integrated logistic system designed and manufactured by Tangram to suit all your needs when operating in tactical area.

tilos a really mobile system made up by an intelligent, multipurpose wide body (4x4) towing vehicle and a towed unit convertible to all logistic function you may

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

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


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G. Rocca: "Cadorna", Mondadori, Milan, 1985, pp. 341, L. 22,000.

Until only recently, no one had managed to write an adequate biography of the man who led the Italian Army during the first three years of the Great War. What was needed was a work able to address the latest advances in a field which has become a subject of major studies only with the end of the Second World War, the first example being the official version of the controversial events at Caporetto (not published until 1967), an episode which, in truth, has left too great a mark on Cadorna's legacy, obscuring the broad overview and the highly relevant comparisons with other European armies which are necessary to a proper judgement of such a military career.

Gianni Rocca's work is meant to fill this gap; it does so with a wealth of details, some previously unpublished and little known. These enrich an overall picture which is notable, above all, for its presentation of the character defects and darker aspects of one of the major figures – if not the major figure – in twentieth-century Italian military history. Indeed, the entire book revolves around a very simple central thesis: that Cadorna should be held responsible not only for the defeat at Caporetto, but also for the bloody, yet ineffectual, offensives along the Isonzo River.

This is certainly not a new thesis. In the thirties, for example, certain voices within the military itself – such as that of General Zoppi – blamed the failures of the First World War, or rather, its unrealized successes, on a lack of leadership. Others – such as General Grazioli or Lieutenant Colonel Canevari – held the "war of attrition" theory to be responsible, going so far

as to use the anti-militarist works of Remarque to support their argument. In any case, the western front saw the greatest loss of life and limb, especially within the French and English armies, while the bloodshed on the Italian front, viewed in a European context, remained relatively modest; as we see it, this is a matter of no small importance.

The entire field of investigation is still a delicate one. Multi-dimensional and complex, it should not be subjected to categorical, absolute judgements meant to construct a pat formula from the reality of a total war. In this clash of peoples, the factors which came into play – and they were not always predominantly military – are very hard to single out, fathom and place within an investigative framework which would rise above the level of journalism, maintaining as high a standard of objectivity as possible.

In terms of the general picture, the very concept of total war would seem to argue against holding any one man responsible for failures or victories: is war a question of leaders or of peoples? In the case of the First World War, in particular, the answer would appear to be obvious. For this reason, the biographical format, though today very much in style, would seem the least suited to a study of events which must be understood in a European context, a context that will certainly not emerge from a mere detail of the grand tapestry whose thousands of settings and figures depict the twilight that settled over Europe following a war which, in hindsight, produced no real victors.

The four very interesting questions posed by Rocca (Why did Cadorna believe in an easy victory? Why did he "risk disaster" on the plateau in 1916? Why did he remain on the offensive rather than switching to the defensive? Why was he not able to prevent Caporetto from happening?) call for a much more thorough treatment than that contained in a biography meant for the general public. What is missing, above all, is an examination of the period between 1900 and 1914. In preparing an army, there is no room for improvisation: both victories and defeats are a long time in the making.

In this sense, the works of Marazzi and de Chaurand – neither of them cited in the book – and, on the subject of Caporetto, of Giuseppe Prezzolini, along with General Stefani's recently-published volume on the operational regulations of the Italian Army as they existed both before and during the conflict, could have helped the author to do a better job of outlining the overall situation and the enormous difficulties which faced Cadorna, a military man who frequently found himself in a position of isolation, lacking a consistent line of

political direction – all circumstances which did nothing to help soften the less pleasant aspects of his character.

Did Cadorna really believe in a short war? Given that no military leader has ever declared himself to be pessimistic or unsure of victory when speaking of operations under his own command, and allowing for the slight rhetorical bent which is a natural consequence of such a situation, Cadorna did believe in a short war: but only at the start, as did all military commanders and analysts in the period before the war, beginning with Von Schlieffen, second only to Moltke among Germany's military minds. In 1909, he forecast a quick war which would be fought by armies of no more than a million men, maintaining that the nations of the world could not endure a lengthy war.

Furthermore, one must also take into account the manipulative, "political" element in Cadorna's initial conviction, remembering that it was the conviction of an interventionist supreme commander whose tasks included the heightening of his army's never too brilliant offensive spirit.

Did Cadorna fail to understand the way in which the art of war was changing? It seems unlikely, given that – as Rocca himself demonstrates with a quotation on page 108 – he was able to provide a telling summary of its chief characteristics as early as January of 1916: "I know that people say I am throwing the troops against an insurmountable wall. Before they criticize, let them come to a precise understanding of this war. Two elements dominate: the one, passive, is composed of trenches and barbed wire; the other, the active element, is represented by artillery ... war has become a matter of brute force: if Napoleon were to rise from his tomb, he would go back and hide ... Advances are only gained gradually, through attrition; a war of attrition requires a tremendous quantity of supplies, not only ammunition, but also weapons, for weapons wear out and must be replaced". Did Cadorna really fail to understand the war, or (and this is something entirely different) was he simply taking what he thought to be the best, or rather, the least harmful, course of action, given the political-military situation at that point in time and considering the means at his disposal? We would opt for the second hypothesis.

The war of attrition (a phenomenon frequently "revived" during the Second World War, and still with us today) had been accepted by the different army high commands, but against their will. They made vain attempts to overcome the practice, seeing it, and rightly so, as the negation of the art of war. The war of attrition was born of a hundred fathers, not all of them military in



nature, for it was a product of technology (the machine-gun, barbed wire) rather than strategy; in any event, it was not created by General Cadorna on the Italian front.

The German Army (besides being responsible for the slaughter at Verdun, a battle where attrition, the stated objective of the operation, reached its highest form of expression) was the only one of the opposing forces which could boast of successes such as the breakthroughs at Riga and Caporetto. These were not gained by employing the usual tactic of the mass assault, but by relying on the traditional initiative of the German lower ranks, starting with the large number of very able non-commissioned officers who led highly motivated units in which the problem of illiteracy had long disappeared. But how would this have been possible for the Italian Army, with its inferior, habitually undertrained officer corps, its non-commissioned officers, whose qualifications fell far below the German "standard", and its troops, often poorly armed and poorly trained peasants, many of whom were illiterate and undoubtedly felt little enthusiasm for the war, though they fought it with a spirit of sacrifice and a hardness in the face of discomfort which will ever be a merit of our people? And what can one say about the shortages, especially at the beginning of the conflict, of artillery, machine-guns, airplanes and other equipment? This was certainly not a question of regulations.

In 1914, Italian operational regulations stressed autonomy and self-initiative, to the point where they were certainly to be preferred to French policy (overly concerned with offensive actions) and could even be favourably compared to the German version. But (as Bastico contends in his work on the subject) the theory had not been well assimilated, and, on the whole, it corresponded poorly to the realities of a force which, for that matter, represented nothing more or less than what the nation had to offer at that particular moment in time.

As for Cadorna's refusal to abandon the offensive, was it simply the outward manifestation of one man's stubbornness? Once we have noted that the almost continuous defensive posture of the Austrian Army along the Italian front was a matter of strategic necessity rather than choice, and once we have seen that even beyond the borders of Italy, and outside that particular time frame, the dominant theory of war has always held that decisive results can be won only by launching offensives, then what can we say of the First World War – on all its fronts – except that it was a back and forth series of offensives, none of which produced decisive strategic results: not

even the Austro-German success at Caporetto, which, it must be remembered, eventually stalled at the Piave River. And to what extent were Cadorna's actions influenced by political considerations and decisions, on both the national and international levels, which, in the eyes of Paris and London, at times made Italy's offensive efforts actually seem insufficient?

Examined attentively, the issue of the unusually rigorous disciplinary measures introduced by Cadorna also turns out to be more complicated than it may appear at first sight.

Each different type of war has its own generals and requires its own particular brand of discipline (not the contrary). There can be no doubt that, given the nature of the conflict at hand – a bloody, inconclusive example of trench warfare fought by a largely improvised army drawn from the general population coercion was inevitably to be chosen over consensus: and at this point, we can only judge Cadorna's actions by confronting them with the policies of other Entente armies. But the French mutinies of 1917, put down by Pétain, though not without difficulty, and the presence, also in France, of a large group of officers who were "limogés" (dismissed from their posts: the term refers to Limoges, the locality where many of them were quartered) should lead us, at the very least, to use caution before we make any judgements; nor should it be forgotten that during the first few months of the war, the ill-conceived theory of the "jeune école" left the French Army with a number of dead and wounded equal to the Italian total for the entire war.

As for the Caporetto episode, Rocca provides an abundance of references and quotations meant to demonstrate Cadorna's responsibility. If leaders are to be given the lion's share of credit in victory, then it would seem inevitable, for consistency's sake, that they receive most of the blame for defeat, at least along general lines; and, in fact, one of the points to emerge from the long list of military factors leading to Caporetto – as reported in the aforementioned 1967 publication of the Army Historical Bureau – is the unquestionable responsibility of General Cadorna for a number of specific errors.

But, given that the General wrote a great deal in his own defense, why not allow his theses a proper hearing, rather than limiting the discussion to a quotation of the famous telegram in which units of the Second Army were crudely condemned for their failure to hold the line? This makes all the more sense in that one is dealing not with a history of the war, but with a history of Cadorna, meaning that the voice of the man himself, that is to say, the

motivations on which he based his actions, should be given absolute priority.

In conclusion, the book under review takes a subject which often causes the general public a great deal of difficulty and presents it in a manner that is clear, uncomplicated and effective. It demonstrates a significant capacity for synthesis, while placing the necessary emphasis on the military-technical side of the question, a feat all the more remarkable for having been accomplished by an author who is not an "insider".

But too much of a shadow is left on the undeniable historical accomplishments of one of the last of the old Piedmontese school of soldiers. The harmony of the entire work is damaged by this lack of light, which does not even permit a proper identification and evaluation of the shadows.

Beyond the errors he committed in a set of exceptional circumstances, something to which nobody has ever been immune, there is no doubt that Cadorna deserves credit for the major accomplishment of having formed a grand army capable of emerging victorious from the bloody test of a long and difficult war. He constructed this force in a brief period of time, despite the handicaps of a divided nation, an unstable social-political framework, a lack of national spirit, a modest industrial capacity and a first-class enemy who could boast of a grand military tradition.

Along with all this, we should not forget his foresight in constructing the Mount Grappa fortification, the left flank of the Piave stronghold. And, finally, the weaving of the Piave defensive line itself: Cadorna's last achievement in chronological terms, this marked the true prelude to a victory which demonstrated the spirit of sacrifice, the breath-taking, unexpected recuperative capacity, and the attachment to their native land, which not only the Army, but the entire Italian nation demonstrated at that moment in history. The brilliance of these noble sentiments simply grows that much stronger in the unsparing light of Rocca's tightly-focused analysis, given that only a firm spirit of resistance could have overcome so many reversals, difficulties, discomforts and inefficiencies.

Ferruccio Botti

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N. Marselli: "La Vita del Reggimento", ("The Life of the Regiment"), Historical Office of the Army General Staff, Rome, 1984, pp. 244, L. 7,500.

Nicola Marselli's *The Life of the Regiment* is one of the series of noted military works being reissued in modern editions by the Historical Office of the Italian Army General Staff. Formerly a teacher at the Advanced Institute for the Study of War, Marselli was one of the most versatile of the "uniformed" essayists to come out of the last half of the eighteenth century. The most important of his many books is without a doubt *War and its History*. Nevertheless, *The Life of the Regiment* is also a major work, noteworthy for its nostalgic, psychological and didactic qualities. The text offers much more than a mere description of a military environment. Drawing on experiences and memories from his years as a regimental commander, the author has turned a simple account into a tour de force of theoretical thought. Not content to simply examine the behaviour of different individuals, he goes on to provide solutions for some of the more pressing, fundamental issues of military life in general.

We can see as much in the very organization of the book, divided into four parts, it begins with a *first section* dedicated to the High Command and the life of the regiment. The *second part* addresses the intellectual life of the regiment. The *third* discusses the moral life of the regiment and the *fourth* covers a number of topics. Some are merely technical (for example, the promotion system for officers), while others are spiritual (the story of Enrico di Beauregard and Alessandro Poerio, two symbolic figures whose lives exemplified high moral values).

The text is preceded by Vincenzo Gallinari's biography of the author.

As noted above, the book's strength is the way in which it manages to weave a set of highly convincing lessons into an overall narrative scheme.

Silvio Saccarelli

"Memorie Storiche Militari 1983", ("Historical Military Memoires 1983"), Historical Office of the Army General Staff, Rome, 1984, 858 pages plus a 31-page supplement, illustrations and charts in the appendices, L. 20,000.

This is the latest book in a series published by the Historical Office of



the Army General Staff. Created in 1977, the initiative has already produced six anthologies of scholarly articles. As was the case with each of the previous editions, this seventh book addresses a wide variety of topics, though all fall under the same general category of military historiography.

Organized according to the now traditional format, the articles are divided into distinct categories.

The *first part* includes eight essays: Franco Andreis discusses the "Military Characteristics of Venetian Verona"; Giulia Moratti Arcieri has contributed her "Essay on Historical Criticism during the Renaissance Period"; Renato Artesi describes the "Battle of Luzzara and the War of the Spanish Succession" and "The Battle of Guastalla (1734)"; a penetrating analysis of the Italian Army's participation in the Tunisian Campaign (1943) is provided by Vincenzo Gallinari, a scholar whose recent death deprived this review of one of its most perceptive, valued collaborators; Salvatore Loi has researched the period of the Salonicco Front (1915-1918), producing an account of the diplomatic and political events which took place behind the scenes; Raimondo Luraghi has created a profile of Raimondo Montecuccoli, soldier, statesman, and military thinker; Arturo Marcheggiano tells the story of the Venetian Revolution of 1848-1849; Fortunato Minniti examines the military policy of Luigi Mezzacapo.

The *second part* features two biographical sketches: in the first, Antonello Biagini describes the life of General Giovanni Rossi Longhena; General Giovanni Di Breganze is the subject of

the second, written by Marziano Brignoli.

The *third part* is set aside for student dissertations. The efforts of Giuseppe La Bua and Manlio Manganaro deserve particular attention.

Finally: the *fourth part* offers five research papers. Their authors are: Aldo Giambartolomei, Edoardo Castellano, Fernando Frattolillo, Virgilio Iari, Luigi Polo Friz and Ambrogio Viviani.

We have provided nothing more than an abbreviated summary of the book, but the reader should still come away with a fair idea of the volume's importance, not to mention the excitement which such a work is sure to generate among specialists and other lovers of military literature.

Nicola della Volpe

A. Angelini: "L'Arte Militare di Flavio Renato Vegezio", ("The Art of War according to Flavius Renatus Vegetius"), original text translated by the editor, Historical Office of the Army General Staff, Rome, 1984, pp. VII-301, illustrated, L. 15,000.

Flavius Renatus Vegetius was an Imperial Roman official who lived either in the last half of the fourth century or the beginning of the fifth. Information on his life is sketchy at best, but one thing is certain: when he died, he left the world with a treatise on the art of war.

His text qualifies as a major work thanks to the broad range of its topics and their intellectual depth.

Its five books touch on nearly every aspect of the art of war. The tone is pragmatic, reflecting the mentality of the ancient Romans, but much of the thinking is surprisingly modern. The issues discussed include recruiting and training soldiers, constructing field fortifications, establishing and maintaining security, the principles of supply, logistical problems, the waging of both offensive and defensive campaigns, military arms and machines, and combat at sea.

An equal amount of attention is given to spiritual factors. These are depicted as playing a crucial rôle in the health of an army. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the Roman Empire fell at a time when such values were on the wane.

The first translations of Vegetius' treatise date from the late Middle Ages. From the fifteenth century on, a number of others were produced, including one by Temistocle Mariotti in the 1800's.



In 1937, this volume was republished in Rome by Andrea Maggiorotti.

Angelini has given us yet another version, this one based on the original as found in Schwabellius' *lection* (published in Paris in 1878).

The book is structured as follows: a preface written by General Ciro Di Martino is followed by the editor's introductory notes. The translation includes an extensive set of footnotes, the original text, a Latin glossary of military terms and a bibliography.

General Di Martino, the second-ranking officer at the Army General Staff, privileged to be both the guardian and heir to a past whose lessons he has always followed with the utmost attention, decided to commission a modern translation of Vegezio's treatise. There can be no doubt as to the need for this rediscovery of a most important text.

This book is truly a significant work: one which invites the reader to reflect upon a number of pressing issues.

Salvatore Loi



Gianni Oliva: "Storia degli Alpini. Dal 1872 alla vigilia del 2000", ("A History of the Alpine Troops. From 1872 to the Eve of the Year 2000"), Rizzoli, Milan, 1985, L. 18,000.

That new generations should wish to rewrite history according to their own particular impressions and judgments of past events would seem a foregone conclusion. But in his "History of the Alpine Troops" the young historian Gianni Oliva (born in 1952, he has produced numerous articles on dif-

ferent military topics) simply presents us with the traditional legends of the Alpine troops, stories which already fill volume after volume of military literature. Let no-one misunderstand me: these invaluable legends are imbued with an unquestionable moral and spiritual greatness which can only enrich the heritage of the Italian Army. All the same, one naturally approaches a book released by a major publishing house in the year 1985 with the expectation of something new, something beyond a set of subjects which has already been drawn upon in hundreds of books.

For example, one feels justified in looking for new information on the origins of the Alpine Corps; this, along with a consideration of the contribution made by Agostino Ricci, an historical figure who, as shown by the latest research, deserves no less credit for the birth of the Alpine troops than Giuseppe Perrucchetti. This area of study calls for additional investigation: in particular, an open, courageous debate of the type to which Rivista Militare has already dedicated ample space.

To return to the book, one finds very little discussion of the operations carried out by Alpine troops during the 1960's campaign against terrorism in the Alto Adige. This, despite the fact that thousands of Alpine troops saw duty on the very difficult terrain of those high-altitude zones. Charged with guaranteeing the integrity of the border against terrorists operating out of Austria, the Alpine troops made exceptional sacrifices during this campaign, as is testified by the number of their dead and wounded. In truth, this operation has never been fully appreciated: patrolling day and night in an environment which, at 3,000 meters above sea-level, was often extremely hostile, our Alpine soldiers spent years guarding the border. Faced with the discomfort and total isolation of life at high altitude, they more often than not had to supply themselves through small, local grocery stores, rather than by army helicopters.

At the end of his work, the author presents a broad overview which deals with the "dual capability" and "versatility" of the Alpine troops. Using phrases extrapolated from Rivista Militare, he neglects to provide a convincing analysis of his own, concerning the Corps' potential rôle in future operations.

Instead he comments on songs, barracks life and ANA programmes. He also lists the names of the officers in command of the Army Corps, the Brigades and the Alpine Military School, along with the presidents of the ANA.

On the whole, this is a book which can be added to the list of those already written in praise of the Alpine units' cohesiveness, the valor they have shown whenever called to war, and their

system of regional recruiting, which has always represented an element of unity and strength.

Pier Giorgio Franzosi



E. Borra: "Amedeo di Savoia, terzo duca d'Aosta e viceré di Etiopia", ("Amedeo di Savoia, third Duke of Aosta and Viceroy of Ethiopia"), Mursia Publications, Milan, 1985, L. 25,000.

Edoardo Borra, former personal physician to the Duke of Aosta, has produced a biography of the man whose health he attended to and cared for over a number of years. More than just the profile of an historic figure, his book succeeds in providing the reader with a vivid, penetrating description of Italian society as the Duke's generation knew it. Indeed, it would be wrong to approach the figure of the Duke of Aosta with a modern-day mentality, ignoring the reality of those years. One would miss the full import of the undercurrents and deeply-rooted motivations which inspired the life of this commander, honoured by the British with a full military funeral.

Amedeo di Savoia, the third Duke of Aosta, led an exceptionally adventurous life. Having been a student in England, he began the Great War as a private, rising to the rank of Captain by the end of the conflict. He was a laborer in the Congo, an official in Libya and an explorer. As Viceroy of East Africa, he undertook a series of peace initiatives, dealing with the Ethiopian liberation movement in a manner that was firm, but just. He won the esteem of his opponents, to the point where one of the best known guerilla



commanders labelled him Ethiopia's greatest enemy, "for he has succeeded in winning over the souls of the Abyssinians, and this has robbed them of their love for independence".

As a man of peace involved in a world conflict, the Duke left a set of positive, lasting memories, above all for the dignified way in which he suffered through the sad events surrounding the defeat in East Africa. Opposed to the war, he had done everything in his power to prevent it. But when his country needed him, he fought with honor and integrity. On account of his

poor health, he was given permission to return home, but he refused to do so, staying on in Ethiopia to share in the danger and suffering of his soldiers. He was present right through to the final defeat, a moment he faced with the utmost dignity. Later, he was to die in a prison camp.

The longings, hopes and fears of so many Italians of that period seem to find expression in the figure of Amedeo di Aosta. He personified the deception of an entire generation of young people, who, though sent off to fight in a far-away, at times incomprehensible, war,

carried on nonetheless, right to the "final ruin", with honour and dignity.

Borra's book is a simple, linear work, free of rhetoric and sentimentalism. The author's intent was not to construct a myth, but simply to demonstrate that, within certain limits, and given a certain cultural pre-conditioning - all of which is objectively noted - the Duke of Aosta's life and actions were always characterized by honor, honesty and steadfastness of purpose. Though it may be for no other reason than this, the man deserves to be remembered.


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
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
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


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
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EUROPE— RELATIONS



UNITED STATES



History has shown the soundness and vitality of Italy's post-war decision to become a member of both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. The significance and implications of these decisions, however, have to be carefully sought at every stage in our history, if they are to acquire momentum.

The conclusion of the arduous and over-extended negotiations for the accession of Spain and Portugal to the Com-

munity has made it essential to discuss the revitalization of the Community, or at least the changes that should be made to it in the light of experience and the new duties expected of it. Even though the answers to the questions being raised are, and must be, dialectical, no-one can deny that the problem exists.

But it is no longer just Europe, but the West as a whole that has to take decisions of fundamental importance on ac-

count of the West's rôle and the fact that we share a common perception of how to ensure freedom in democratic systems that are not only on the move, but continually attentive and sensitive to the values of the individual and the demands of advanced societies. It is therefore incumbent on us today to take a new careful and responsible look at the relationship between Europe and America, and the place of the European

countries within the Atlantic Alliance. What is happening in other continents makes this necessary: developments in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European societies, whose immobilism we consider absolute at our peril; the extraordinary prospects that scientific progress is opening up in the civilian and military fields, and lastly, the pressing needs arising from the management of an economy that is becoming increasingly international, and which is being sometimes dramatically confronted by the problem of development which is a major constraint for the majority of the world's nations.

The few years that remain between now to the end of the century are not likely to be easy. Countries, like Italy, with an ancient culture and such great possibilities, cannot deceive themselves into thinking that they are doing their duty and looking after their own interests simply by managing, or even improving, their own domestic situation. This has to be done, of course, but not in isolation.

The reader might retort that Italy's politicians are almost unanimous in their Europeanism. He may also add that our Europeanist convictions have long included the axiom that there can be no contradiction between our Europeanism and our Atlanticism.

This is all very true. But the fundamental European policy we have followed, and the implications of this choice, only remain valid so long as the decisions we take subsequently are consistent with it.

In Milan last June, the European Council opened the way up to developments that might prove to be interesting for a revival of the Community. This was not the unanimous outcome of the meeting, however, because of the reluctance shown by the United Kingdom, Greece and Denmark. But even these three dissenters have not dissociated themselves from the next stage in the process decided on there. In December, the revival of Europe will be discussed at a specially convened intergovernmental Conference, and every-

thing indicates that the debate is bound to be lively.

It is important for the community to break out of this long period of getting bogged down in free-trade haggling and Byzantine negotiations which public opinion simply cannot understand. The construction of Europe must be given a new lease of political life and bold decisions must be taken, looking to our long-term common interests without being hamstrung by playing around with vetoes, using them to prop up too short-sighted and individual interests.

The European Parliament and its draft Treaty for European Union advocate this course. Now that the European Parliament is directly elected by all the people in the Community, it is only right for it to have the acknowledged rôle of watchdog and stimulus,

Right.

Belgian military police at a NATO installation.

Below.

US soldiers during a break in exercises.





cogently with the most outstanding democratic traditions of our Continent, beginning with the British. A frank exchange of ideas on this topic is necessary. But I do not believe that anyone who really wants European union can go along with the more extreme positions. The construction process that the Community has embarked upon is based on consensus, and must inevitably be a gradual process. Clearly, there must be a consensus about the major decisions and choices, about which the rule of majority support must be applied. Yet a Europe which throws down challenges and fails to win the support of ancient cultural and national traditions would slip out of the great pragmatic and non-ideological furrow of European and Western solidarity in which the achievements and equilibria have been able to mature since the war, and which are the bases on which the present generations are able to enjoy the present peace and progress.

It is therefore necessary to gradually build up the European Union at a pace which is not so slow as to appear to be stand-

ing still, but which reaches concrete goals without creating insuperable difficulties for the fundamental cultural and political components of our Continent. This progressive unification of Europe must, as I see it, take account of the broader Western context to which it belongs. The idea of Europe becoming the third power is senseless, and would lead the whole of the democratic world into an even more difficult situation. A fruitful relationship between Europe and the United States has to be carefully nurtured in every phase, so that the inevitable difficulties and misunderstandings can be settled as they arise.

Once again, this relationship is going to be put to the test in the coming months by the complex defence problems facing the Atlantic Alliance. One of the most difficult and delicate questions is which is the best way of safely reaching nuclear disarmament, as every man of goodwill desires. And I do not think it can be done using propaganda. A frank debate in the appropriate fora, where Americans and Europeans each contribute their


respective sensitivities and demands is, yet again, the best way of reaching the best conclusions.

Establishing closer Euro-American relations in no way implies a worsening of the dialogue with the East: on the contrary, if we manage to put paid to any illusions the East might harbour about the possibility of any division occurring in the West, our dialogue will be more realistic and productive. This, I feel, is the response we should make to Comecon's overtures to the EEC (even though these are a tardy response to previous overtures from Brussels) and to Gorbachev's overtures with regard to European political cooperation which he announced in Spring to the Italian Prime Minister. The path of reconciliation between industrialized societies will not be short, by any means, nor without its difficulties; the rightful expectations of the Third World are such, however, that the path must be embarked upon with decision and good will.

Emilio Colombo



ITALIAN INDUSTRY
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS
WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES



Let us examine the problems in our relations with the Third World, that is, the rôle that Italian industry plays, and, above all, the rôle that it could play, in relations with countries that are either not industrialized at all or are in the process of becoming industrialized.

It seems to me an extremely important subject, for in the last few years we have ignored what I might call foreign industrial policy, due to our internal crisis. It is as though we have become so wrapped up in ourselves as to have lost interest in the Third World, and indeed, in the world in general.

We are increasingly witnessing a strategy of economic expansion: not only as regards sectors relevant to defence, but as a national strategy. The national strategy is more important than the strategies of individual companies in foreign investment policy. It is affected by the capacity to provide credit and insurance for exports. The country's image is also very important.

Let me ask a provocative question: why is it that out of forty-two or forty-three direct investments in Europe by the Japanese electronics industry, not one is in Italy, whereas there are twelve in France and fourteen in Germany?

When one discusses the issue openly and frankly with the Japanese ambassador or Japanese university professors, one gets a simple reply (perhaps couched in diplomatic language): they have a foreign policy, particularly towards distant countries; it is a group strategy, and there are problems and uncertainties regarding Italy.

Taking everything into consideration, it is seen to be a country-related problem: not so much an IRI problem, or a Fiat problem, or an Olivetti problem, but a problem regarding Italy as a whole.

Economic foreign policy has grown in importance, so that we can no longer expect companies to act alone. In this respect a negative influence is exerted by the otherwise fascinating and

Left.

No. 5 kiln at the Guidonia cement factory.

Below.

Mobil Chimica Italiana's Naples plant.

miraculous story of "Made in Italy", in other words, the great inventiveness of our small firms, of those who "create".

And this is something of which we should be proud. It must not, however, make us close our eyes to another aspect of foreign economic policy, that of a whole country that must advance, not just a few firms capable of making their mark on the world market.

In describing the situation, I should like to make certain points. The first regards the world economic situation and the various ways in which it is evolving; the second, the situation in the developing countries; and the third, the situation in Italy in particular.

General situation: the world economic recovery is not as strong as many people hoped. The U.S. economy is doing well, even though its rate of development will be lower than last year. However, this is only to be expected because expansion in 1984 was too strong to be long-lived.

The European economy, unfortunately, shows no signs of expansion. The latest forecasts, in fact, suggest a further fall in the already modest rate of development predicted for this year. Europe is still going through a phase of uncertainty. This is rather strange, for with such a strong dollar, one might have expected Europe to have regained momentum through its exports to the USA.

This is more true of Europe than Italy, since Italy is faced with a thorny, objectively difficult, exchange problem, given that its exchange rate against other European currencies is not such as to facilitate exports. Europe is in a situation clearly characterised by indecisive in-





dustrial policy and internal conflicts. It is making a very hesitant recovery, which has meant unemployment levels constantly above 10%. All the larger European countries have over 10% unemployment, which is terrible. Only Sweden and Austria are doing better, and they need to be analysed as special cases. It is extremely difficult to say how all this comes about.

It could be attributed to various factors which characterize those countries. One might start by saying that they are small, strategically-placed countries with a very high level of culture and technology, and are therefore able to take advantage of the present situation.

Sweden's case is typical. When the new government took office two years ago, it devalued the Krona by 16%. Nobody reacted. Being a small country, it was able to devalue and consequently conquer new markets, without provoking a reaction on the part of any other country.

Something which France, Italy or Germany evidently could not do, because of the chain reaction that this would set off, their volume of trade being so large that it involved many countries.

Another explanation might be linked to the fact that Austria and Sweden are the only countries to have adopted a certain type of social policy, which some experts might define as "neo-corporative": that is, one of consultation and negotiation between Government, Unions and employers.

Let us return to the advantages of being small. The four largest European countries, those with about 60 million inhabitants each, are moving towards unemployment levels of over ten per cent. Their industrial policy is more one of defence than of attack.

The Third World is in a rather curious situation. The very difficult years which followed the oil crisis meant balance of payments situations involving

chronic indebtedness in many parts of the world. In the last few years, then, we have been able to see clearly that the possible outcome is not only economic development, but also economic recession. For example, in certain Latin American countries, income has fallen, and, as a result, people's living conditions have worsened.

Our generation has had the fortunate experience of living through a country's passage from underdevelopment to development. But in human history, as we are witnessing at the present moment, movement in the opposite direction, i.e. from development to underdevelopment, is also possible.

I say this because I believe it is necessary to explain, above all to the young, that present levels cannot be guaranteed. In order to maintain the levels it has achieved, either in relative or in absolute terms, a country must have a number of capabilities: above all, a sound economic policy, and then, objectives. It is interesting to note that the countries that have gone into "reverse development" are precisely those which suffer from grave internal political problems.

This leads us back to a distinction between "virtuous" countries, which have succeeded in developing because they are highly cohesive, and those whose system, in contrast, has broken down for internal political reasons.

Latin America is a case in point, but many African countries provide an even clearer example. In many cases, the decolonization process, instead of bringing a new cohesion, broke the only unifying bond, and so led to retrocession instead of development.

Mozambique, for one, has followed this path. Yet it is a country with tremendous potential, and has close links with Italy.

The Third World, then, has had years of very serious crisis. The fear of a series of bankruptcies has now ended, but only because Latin America, where it was most acute, has, for two or three years now, boosted its exports to the USA and thereby acquired enough dollars at least to service its debts.

I should like to stress the way in which basic economic problems are linked to basic political problems.

The world is currently divided into very different parts. Asia is still undergoing a phase of great dynamism. Latin America and Africa are undergoing a phase of great crisis.

It is incredible that Africa, a continent with potentially the best possible relationship between resources and population, is in fact the only one with problems of actual lack of food. In other cases, the problem of hunger is mainly a problem of distribution. Let us not forget that India and China are exporting food, while in Africa there is a net deficit, even though, as I said, the relationship between population, resources and land area is one of the most satisfactory. The problem, quite evidently, is one of economic policy. It is certainly not one of resources.

We ought, then, above all, to revise our previous way of thinking, in which so much importance was attached to physical resources as opposed to human resources which are relatively unimportant compared with technological resources and, above all, a country's political and organizational resources. I think this is interesting to note, in that it overturns our political predictions of ten years ago.

Who still considers the oil-producing countries as possible world dominators? Who still speaks of the power of an Iran, or even of Saudi Arabia? The scenario has transformed them from potential world powers into regional ones precisely because humanity's global economic perspective has changed considerably. Within this perspective, we should not be amazed if a nucleus of countries, which we might call developing, becomes an important pivot in the future world economy. The concept of "developing countries" has to be extremely elastic.

I maintain that within a generation, the Asian network will become the centre of the world economy. Let us call it the "Pacific network", as there is also California, on the other side of the Ocean. We are dealing, however, with an Asian world

which has Japan at its epicentre and includes Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Korea and, if our reading of events is correct, China too.

In my opinion, the most significant real economic event of these past few years has been China's change of policy.

China has not yet transformed her economy: to do so will take more than two years. But her economic policy is absolutely unrecognisable, astonishing, market-oriented: it includes profit incentives, industrial development areas, liberalisation of the so-called consumer goods policy, purchasing power.

The Chinese Economic Under-Secretary, whom I spoke to a few weeks ago, explained to me the capitalist-type incentives being tried out in eight small experimental areas, which, however, encompass 120 million people. For experimental areas, that's not bad!

This leads us to another argument: we are facing a new world; it is wrong to hold on to our traditional image of it, including the idea of the typical structure of developing countries.

This structure is like a fast-moving train: these countries will be partners of ours (taking off under the effect of high technology) with whom we must do business on the basis of the situations most likely to arise within a generation.

It will indeed take a generation, but those who do not think now in terms of a generation will be in trouble: thirty years pass quickly.

What is now being prepared will change the face of the world and marginalize Europe. I deliberately portrayed Europe as not reacting, just to set it off against these new facts arising in the world. As a result of this, we might find ourselves in the uncomfortable position — we and our children — of being part



API's plant at Falconara.

Ingenious water systems, thousands of years old, still being used today to exploit the waters of the Nile.

of what is undoubtedly a great civilization, but has a very limited rôle in the world of the future.

A Europe united as consumers, as industrial producers, with a self-sufficient food capacity, could potentially play a rôle like that of the USA, or an even bigger one, because it has very strong possibilities of attraction. But a Europe structured as it is at present could very easily be marginalized by the changes I have described.

There is also another subject about which it is useless to pontificate and make predictions (for modesty's sake, I no longer make them): the "Superdollar", that is to say an over-strong dollar that alternates between rises and falls.

What effect has the dollar had on what we were discussing? It has destroyed the possibility of making long term investment decisions. It is becoming ever more difficult to make precise investment or export plans, because the main variable, the monetary factor, is uncertain.

Long term economic operations, typical of industrial foreign policy, have become, as I said, uncertain. This explains why the upturn in investment has been so modest, in spite of technological evolution and of all the predictions. For in order to invest, you have to have your scenarios clear. I believe that this has been a very grave problem, even though it cannot be proved so by statistics. It emerges from an analysis of the motivations of economic agents.

My judgement of the evolution of the monetary situation from 1971 onwards, that is, since the dollar was declared non-convertible, is extremely negative.

In theory, the present, flexible monetary system is much more sensible than the previous, fixed monetary system. It is fine



for the professors, but in practice it does not work.

This is because nobody can maintain stable expectations, because with the world suffering from enormous speculative fluctuations, the least psychological change, or even a single speech, is enough to completely alter the exchange rate. And if a single speech is enough to alter the dollar's exchange rate, the businessman can never feel at ease, because he does not know if and when the speech will be made, nor what Reagan or Volcker will say.

With scenarios, therefore, so hard to predict, we are led to another characteristic of relations with developing countries: the various protectionist tendencies.

When money is no longer a viable means of exchange, there are two alternatives: either you fence yourself in with protectionism, or else you barter instead of trading with money. And this is precisely what is happening.

On the one hand, a move towards barter (now accounting for 10% of international trade according to some, 30% according to others, though I do not know where they get these figures from) which is rising rapidly precisely to offset the uncertainty caused by the "nervousness" of the exchange markets; and on the other hand, the temptation towards protectionism.

This temptation became so strong that a kind of lobby was formed in the US Senate for the introduction of a 20% Customs duty on imports into the USA. (Naturally, this measure was shelved, because it made no sense politically). Only a few years ago, it would have been unthinkable even to begin to discuss such things. On the other hand, it is obvious that with the dollar rising to such heights, the USA is at present unable to export goods other than those on which it has a monopoly.

The USA exports aeroplanes, certain kinds of sophisticated,



New housing developments in Riyadh, capital of Saudi Arabia, built by Western companies.

high technology equipment, grain and Treasury bonds. In the euphoria of "deregulation" and 7% growth, all the imperfections were absorbed. However, as soon as development slows down slightly, as is happening at present, the same problems re-emerge and the protectionist temptation reappears.

In this situation, international economic relations become delicate. This can be seen from the fact that international dealings are no longer based on the free market. There are some exceptions, but these run counter to the protectionist current that is becoming the norm.

There are attempts, for example, to liberalise the fibres market or the automobile market, both of which are self-regulated. We thus have prerogatives that are the reverse of those foreseen by the immediate post-war generation.

The new scenario in which we have to act is no longer a "virtuous" one, but one which we

might call "vicious", in which we have to guard against the world economy's turning in on itself.

After discussing the negative aspects of the changes, that affect Italian industry as well, let us now turn to the positive aspects. Many manufacturing industries have moved from the so-called highly-developed countries to developing countries.

The developing countries at present produce 11% of world manufactured goods, and it is predicted that if they maintain their growth rate, this will rise to 15-16% in the next decade.

This constitutes a significant change for manufacturing industry, one which accompanies an enormous productivity increase in all industrial systems.

This means that if the industrialized countries lose even a small portion to developing countries, direct industrial employment in the developed countries is likely to fall sharply, unless we are able to inject significant growth into the world economic system as a whole. Only in this way can we manage the transfer of production to the developing countries. But we have to accept that this transfer is inevitable. If, to any extent, it

does not come about, we shall be unable to sell those sophisticated products which we have been trying to develop recently on the world market, because there will be no buyers with sufficient purchasing power. We cannot follow a policy that contradicts itself.

There are two alternatives. Either we decide to opt for the highest, most refined end of the market (this might include high fashion, but usually it is technology), in which case we have to find outlets all over the world, and therefore buyers with sufficient purchasing power in the Third World; or, if we decide instead to fence ourselves in, we can clearly protect ourselves better in the short term, but we cannot hope to have a market.

This is the contradiction experienced in Latin America in recent years, where a certain type of policy produced cut-backs in purchasing power, with opposite results to those intended.

Given this scenario, Italian policy must also be wary of such contradictions. This means, for example, that every naval dockyard that experiences a crisis, or that closes, is clearly a tragedy

(unfortunately, many of such tragedies have been taking place within the I.R.I. group), but it must be borne firmly in mind that this is an inevitable process that has to be gone through if we are to have a part in the general picture.

We cannot hope to export sophisticated ships or radars to a country if we do not, in return, open our doors to some of its products. Italy's problem, therefore, is this: as our level of technology is below the European average, we are the first to be damaged by the open-door policy.

Since we are, at least in principle, the biggest textile producers in Europe, we will obviously be the ones who suffer most if this sector is opened up. Those at the bottom of the class always have the worst problems.

Italian industrial policy cannot limit itself to defending the status quo. It must facilitate productive structural development and allow accelerated technological development. These are necessary conditions for our becoming protagonists in international commerce, which is essential to our industrial development. This is at present threatened, but can still be expanded.

It is therefore of the greatest importance to link our commercial relations with developing countries to an industrial policy capable of raising our levels of production.

This might seem a banal and obvious statement, but it is just not happening at all. We do not have an export policy linked to an industrial policy of selective help and other types of initiative, we have a completely hit-or-miss export policy. That is, we export whatever we can.

Here, then, is the first decision that needs to be taken: to forge a very strong link between

industrial policy and export policy, that should also, in my view, involve the whole question of Italian aid to the Third World. A question which three or four years ago was very prone to be overlooked, but which today has assumed enormous proportions, since Italy has now taken it up (rightly, in my opinion) with considerable energy.

The fact of having allocated 3,600-4,000 billion lire a year to Third World aid projects does not mean that we are ignoring the needs of our own industry. On the contrary, it should imply the opposite. Indeed, there is no ban on linking Third World aid to our own industrial development.

Here again the problem is having an industrial policy suitable or adaptable to the countries which request and receive aid. It should not, however, be aimed so much at pushing the export of what there is (as happens at present), but at stimulating our industry to make a selective contribution in developing countries. Certain goods are much sought-after, and very often an unbalanced export relationship exists, of the kind in which developing countries end up buying low technology goods from us and high technology products from Germany and Japan.

If we analyse the deficit in our balance of payments with the


Soviet Union (very topical in recent weeks), we see that we have a large deficit with this country, which, in its turn, is in deficit with Japan, with Germany, and with other states. In brief, that is, the Soviet Union sells us oil and uses the proceeds to buy high technology products from Germany and Japan.

This is a "vicious" triangle rather than a "virtuous" circle, the opposite of what the relation between industrial policy and foreign trade should be. Here, then, is our problem: we must increase our presence in developing countries, whilst improving the quality of this presence. Otherwise, the coming transformations will only harm us and leave us without a rôle.

We cannot be content with defensive industrial policies, based on Customs tariffs, on government subsidies to keep industries at home alive. We must have "aggressive", and therefore innovatory, industrial policies, so as to stake a claim in overseas markets with ever-increasing standards of quality.

With this perspective, certain sectors assume particular interest, since we cannot think of acting haphazardly.

There is a whole series of specific goods worth concentrating on. In this context, let us take defence systems as an example. Think for a moment of



Europetrol's refinery at Barrancabermeja, Colombia.



Technicians at work on the oil refinery at Bilaiyin on the Suez Canal.

the success that complete software packaging might have, including instruction in its use and, above all, in its maintenance. Or think of spare part production, of a whole range of technical assistance, of Training Centres to encourage the spread of new developments, etc.

If we do not enter the field with certain types of goods, there is no way that we will find the door open to us. And this is already happening, in the case of both defence systems and certain industrial plants.

For example, we are bidding for plant contracts in some countries, even in the Soviet Union, in which the contractor has to commit himself for the next ten years, because building

the plant, starting it up, training personnel, and the whole series of steps required to guarantee its subsequent technological evolution all take time.

The answer, then, is to act as a system, and not just as individual companies. Certain large enterprises, evidently including the I.R.I., have an important rôle here, because they are responsible for guaranteeing the entry of many small, medium and large firms into a more demanding market. For example, a firm that produces parts for continuous casting, or automatic weapon mechanisms, will have enormous difficulties in exporting if it does not become part of a system including all those who produce the steelmaking facilities

or entire weapon systems.

This approach to exporting is of great interest, because, in many cases, the high technology involved leads to further, unforeseen exports.

The construction of a plant involves a whole range of Italian goods and services, including maintenance and other simpler and more commonplace things which could not possibly be placed on the world market except as part of an entire system.

This is why the "focussing" rôle played by certain major protagonists on the industrial scene is of the greatest importance.

We would all agree that our small exporters, people who set off with a suitcase to conquer world markets, deserve to have a monument erected in their honour. However, given current events and the predictions we made earlier concerning world developments, their rôle is negligible. We can certainly achieve something with the old methods, but not the objective of a stable presence, given the way the markets are changing. In view of this, it becomes essential for our exports that our internal systems function efficiently.

Here we are treading on very delicate ground. Indeed, I would say that certain weaknesses in the structure of our internal administrative systems, or even transport and communications, act as a brake on the entire economy and effectively block a whole series of very important exports. It is not just a matter of credit and insurance, of financial strength, but also of our image. More and more, what is sold is a country's "system".

It is a problem that will increase as our presence in the world increases. The specific rôle of large firms, or of Groups like I.R.I., in meeting the difficult challenges that it involves, is increasingly that of acting as a

sort of executive agent of the government or of the Italian industrial system.

We must therefore be in a position to take the initiative more and more frequently. It might be Fiat or a similar large company, but what is needed is a well-structured network increasingly able to take such initiatives. Naturally, such a rôle must be carried out with sufficient capacity and intelligence, and indeed humility, to understand the responsibilities that are involved in terms of the whole system. Having such "terminals", executive agents with a convincing image, is becoming an essential condition for acquiring a stable rôle in relation to developing countries.

One final point: there is no need to be afraid of specialization. Entire sectors need to be abandoned and others need enormous energies invested in them. This is not easy, because both social pressures and our own (conservative) mentality make us tend to defend the existing system.

I always cite the following as an example. In the last ten years, about 60 billion lire have been spent on public subsidies of various kinds to the European steel industry: financial support, easy terms of payment on supplies and equipment, government and regional subsidies, special credit facilities, etc.

An entire continent has been wasting its energies on one sector (although one with a glorious past), defending certain interests beyond all reasonable bounds. As a result, not enough resources are available for new initiatives. This is the situation we find ourselves in.

Being present in the world economy means making a choice. It also means giving up certain things, without gaining anything new.

What is needed is to speed up change, not slow it down. Otherwise we will merely lose what we have, without gaining anything new.

In theory, the idea is so obvious that everyone should agree with it. In practice, it is one of our country's daily dramas, for it is clear that reactions to the threatened sacrifice of any particular area, however tiny, are always very strong. Above all when it implies a fall, in absolute terms, in the number of workers employed in industry. If we were able to create jobs in new sectors to replace those lost, change would be easy.

At the present time, however, with unemployment running at 10%, the question is more complicated than ever. This is why, at the beginning, I was not very optimistic about Europe's capacity to meet the challenge of the changing world economic situation. The unemployment situation pressurises governments towards policies of slowing down change. And this is basically what has been done — because inside a country, the forces for stability are stronger than those for change. Such action is belatedly regretted when it is seen how meagre the results are.

It is a problem that must be faced courageously, otherwise Europe's marginalization will become a fact and not just an academic issue. All that is needed for this to happen is for the changes of the last ten years to continue, in the same direction, for the next ten years.

I still believe in our capacity for recovery, though only in relative terms, for we went into the crisis in the following order: USA - Europe - Japan, and we are coming out of it in a different order: USA - Japan - Europe.

Whichever indicators we take, from income to exports, to technological development, to academic qualifications, we come third, not second as before.

It is also a question of working empirically, of jettisoning entire pages of doctrine consolidated over forty to fifty years, or at best conserving them but

interpreting them in a completely different way, one which allows us to absorb technological progress, together with its unforeseen consequences.

We are faced, therefore, with an enormous responsibility, which we must meet firmly and squarely, otherwise we shall find ourselves well and truly on the sidelines.

Romano Prodi



Romano Prodi was born in Scandiano (Reggio Emilia) in 1939. After graduating in Law from the Catholic University of Milan in 1961, he did research at the London School of Economics and was Visiting Professor at Harvard University. From November 1978 to March 1979, he was Minister of Industry and Commerce. He is Professor of Economics and Industrial Policy at the Political Science Faculty of Bologna University, and chairman of the science committee of "Nomisma", an organisation for economic studies founded by the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. Since 20th October 1982, he has been chairman of the I.R.I. (Institute for Industrial Reconstruction). A scholar of economics and industrial policy, in addition to his teaching activity, he has carried out intensive research into the fundamental problems of the Italian industrial economy. Author of numerous scientific published works, especially on European industrial policies, Italian public companies, and energy issues, he is currently editor of: "Energia", a quarterly magazine on energy issues; "L'industria", a quarterly magazine on economics and industrial policy. This article is the unabridged text of a lecture given at the Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa on 20th March 1985.



THE Fo.P.I. (Ready Intervention Force) AND NATIONAL DISASTERS



In 1983, the Defence Chiefs of Staff issued a specific directive for the setting up of an emergency task force ("Forza di Pronto Intervento", hereafter referred to as Fo.P.I.). This was to be a combined-forces organization of great flexibility with the task of providing specialized assistance in the event of a national disaster in any part of the country.

This measure was intended by the Armed Forces as a further step — perhaps the maximum effort possible given the situation — towards carrying out the task laid down by Law n. 382, 11/07/78. These "norms of principle for military discipline" included that of "co-operation for the collective good of the nation in cases of national disaster".

The experience gained in previous disasters and the many exercises carried out had revealed that the Armed Forces — given their present structure — could deal with small or medium intensity disasters. A specific and specialised organisation was necessary in cases of earthquake or large-scale flooding, to integrate, with the minimum delay, such immediate action as might be undertaken on the initiative of the Military Command responsible for the territory concerned.

The Fo.P.I. was set up by the Defence Chiefs of Staff for this purpose. The directive specified the following basic points regarding its structure:

- duties to be specifically concerned with emergencies brought about by large-scale seismic disasters or flooding;
- a flexible and functional combined-forces command to be set up in the "Acqui" Motorised Brigade and linked directly to the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces;
- forces to be mobilised from a large number of different specialised units and trained to cope with an emergency for a limited period of time (5-7 days) (1), with the possibility of employing these forces as whole units or as sub-units;

- capability to move by land, sea or air with transport provided by the 3 Services.

MODULAR COMPONENTS

In accordance with the mission assigned to them and the guidelines laid down by the Chiefs of Staff, the Command of the "Acqui" Brigade began by carrying out an analysis of the structure (2) to be given to the Fo.P.I. in the event of the most probable and most damaging of catastrophes: seismic disaster.

This resulted in the formation of a corps divided up into "functional modules", which were to carry out activities of:

- command, control and co-ordination of the operations to be performed in the hours immediately subsequent to the earthquake and, in any case, able to set up an organizational framework to ensure the correct running of the rescue and aid

apparatus being set up in the meantime;

- the search for survivors and help in extracting them from the debris. The latter activity would of course require adequate equipment and highly qualified and trained personnel. The activity of the Fo.P.I. must, therefore, be seen — at least for now — as co-operation in terms of men and means with the institutions set up specifically for this type of operation, for example the Fire Brigade;

- treatment of casualties. The operation as a whole gains more credibility from this than from any other activity, especially in view of the possibility that local health services may no longer be functioning;


- providing accommodation for the homeless, either under canvas or in caravans, in camps complete with lavatory facilities and ablutions, emergency lighting and other services (reception

and information centres, post office, first aid posts, etc.);

- distribution of indispensable articles, to be obtained from available stores at the very beginning of the emergency and subsequently from the supply of provisions to be set up once the normal logistic chain of functions is in operation;
- preparation for the large-scale operations to follow, aimed at preparing the ground for further activities (organisation of assembly areas for personnel, landing zones for helicopters, amplification of the radio communication system, etc.).

The aim was to create a multi-functional corps, which would be self-sufficient and productive right from the outset of the emergency. This required a great effort of detailed planning as regards the procedures to be adopted, the action to be taken according to the different situations of weather and place the

Fo.P.I. COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANISATION



event might occur in, the specific tasks and the qualitative and quantitative grading of each of the modular components. Two exercises — "Solidarietà '83" and "Calabria '84", respectively in Sicily and Calabria — were carried out to ascertain the practical validity of this planning and to operate in geographical areas which have suffered great earthquakes in the past.

EXPERIMENTATION AND RESULTS

The exercises "Solidarietà '83" and "Calabria '84" were given extensive national coverage by the mass media, which were almost unanimous in passing flattering judgements on this new military corps.


However, this praise was kept firmly in perspective. The awareness that any model — even though the result of painstaking study on the part of


highly qualified professionals — can be improved upon, led to less weight being given to what had worked and more to the need for improvement, for taking corrective measures and for enhancing operational efficiency that inevitably arises when planning is put to the test.

On the one hand, the exercises outlined above demonstrated the adequacy of the organisation so far as rapidity of intervention was concerned, a capability that could, in any case, be taken for granted, as the speed with which units can be alerted, got ready and transferred is a basic feature of the military structure. On the other hand, they also showed up some flaws in the essential co-ordination of the measures to be taken by the civilian and military bodies.

We refer, in particular, to the excessive inertia of the flow of information from the different civilian rescue and aid orga-

nizations, whether official or unofficial. Greater operational speed in the communications field is to be hoped for on the part of the Prefectures, Town Councils, Fire Brigade and so on. They must enhance the information and liaison system set up by the Fo.P.I. so as to arrive at a rapid clarification of the situation and thus facilitate and direct operations where most needed, according to an established scale of priorities. This calls for prior co-ordination and understanding of the respective capacities in order to exploit the means available to the full, by standardizing procedures, integrating communication systems and, where necessary, supplying more modern and functional equipment. Some doubt arose as to the effective capacity of military personnel with regard to searching for and extracting casualties from the debris. Rapidity counts for little if not backed up by adequate training





in the techniques for rescuing human lives.

The "module" that acts in direct contact with the debris must be able to carry out independently a series of operations with the primary aim of keeping the casualty alive and then extracting him with suitable procedures to avoid making matters worse. At present, in the military sphere, there is no methodical and generalized training scheme for this purpose. However, both field and permanent



A Fo.P.I. tactical vehicle, Fiat-Iveco 40-10-WM, disembarking from a ship during an exercise. The Fo.P.I. was set up in 1983 to provide specialized aid in carrying out the specific task of "co-operation for the collective good of the nation in cases of national disaster".

military medical centres and structures have proved sufficient for the tasks of administering first aid and directing those in immediate need of operations towards specialised territorial units.


The work units set up to provide shelter for the homeless have also proved their capacity to meet the specific demands made upon them. Pitching tents, installing suitable electrical systems, digging drains and setting up field sanitary facilities are all part of the normal activities of the Armed Forces, whether in the barracks or out in the field.

The problem is, therefore, only one of training for the specific task and speeding up operations by increasing the amount of light modern equipment available. It will also be of use to make some mention of the activities of the "food, clothing and first-aid distribution modules" and "preparatory activities for large-scale operations".

With regard to the former task, every unit employed is able to meet all its own living and work requirements independently. The aid to be given to the disaster victims presents some logistic problems with regard to the preparation of provisions and transport of indispensable articles (camping materials, victuals, bedding, protective clothing and so on). In fact, neither the mobile kitchens issued to the units of the Fo.P.I. nor the means of transport at the disposal of the respective Logistic Centre are sufficient to guarantee the complete satisfaction of the projected average demand (5,000 homeless).

Reinforcement prior to the event would have the effect of weighing down the units, restricting their mobility and, thus, compromising the rapidity with which they could act. This problem could easily be overcome by providing for on the spot reinforcements from territorial bodies.


As for the preparatory activities for large-scale operations, the problems are related to those mentioned previously in connection with command and con-



trol. This preparation entails gathering information to be transmitted to headquarters, avoiding hold-ups and breakdowns in the flow of aid, and comparative evaluation of the disaster areas to decide where aid should be channelled. This requires a flexible liaison network, stripped

down to the bare essentials and operational, if required, down to the level of individual men. This is a part of the Fo.P.I. "machine" that still requires some adjustment, especially as regards the purchase of more sophisticated, light and functional means of transmission.

MAP OF THE SITUATION IN CASE OF SEISMIC EVENT



CONCLUSIONS

The need to re-shape and develop the various components of the Fo.P.I. is a problem that can be solved automatically in that it is catered for by routine procedures implemented by means of successive approximations (a typical feature of cyclical planning) carried out on the basis of the experience acquired in concrete cases.

However, the gaining of complete credibility on the part of the Fo.P.I. depends essentially on the specific training and qualifications to be given to the Cadres and Troops of the units to be mobilized. Neither good intentions alone nor the mere availability of material and means which one does not know how

to use are enough when it is a matter of rescuing people trapped beneath slabs of reinforced concrete. In addition to particular equipment, what is required is professional experience and a tried and tested ability to identify the approach least likely to cause collapses in which the rescuers themselves could be involved or bring about the death of those buried beneath the rubble. This is a responsibility that cannot be taken on without having the necessary competence to do so.

It is of interest to read what Gen. Rambaldi had to say on this subject at the Conference on Civil Defence, 20th February 1981 (ISTRID, Rome 1981):

"...The first task is that of extracting survivors from the

debris. It is the most important and the most urgent task because you can go without food for three days but you cannot survive for two or three days with a roof-beam crushing your neck.

This task — and I state this with mathematical certainty and it would be well for public opinion to know it — can only be entrusted to professionals, apart from some exceptions. It is impossible for a national serviceman — however highly trained he may be in driving a tank and even in civil defence exercises — to be of any use".

Therefore, in order "to be of any use", the military work unit must be guided by an expert — a fireman, for example — capable of leading the attack on

the reinforced concrete in such a way that every stroke of the pick and every manoeuvre of the excavating machine are directed to the point of least risk.

However, co-operation at the moment of emergency is not enough. The terminology and techniques need to have been assimilated long before, at least on the theoretical level. This can be accomplished through joint training schemes, which could be included in the planning of activities to be carried out during military service.

Likewise, it would be better for all the units of the Fo.P.I. Command to contain personnel familiar with the problems of the force, both from the point of view of planning operations and as regards action procedures. This can be achieved by having those selected participate in exercises, conferences, studies and so on, i.e. in the conceptual and organisational phase of the Fo.P.I. Otherwise, in view of the expected duration of operations (5/7 days), the reserves would not have the time to make any contribution of their own, even by following the technique of "imitation".

It does not appear a good idea to take commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the Major Unit HQs away from their normal duties so as to insert them in the Command Post of the Fo.P.I. This would upset the functions of the brigade-size unit which — if called upon to act in an emergency in its own sphere of operations — would then lack the personnel to carry out its operational duties.

A solution to this problem could be found by detaching the Fo.P.I. Command from the Major Operational Unit and providing for it to be composed of personnel selected from the three Services. Such personnel would be specifically qualified and concerned solely with the sector of national disasters. This solution, which would appear the most acceptable once the principle of utilising the quotas of Cadres exclusively in cases of national disaster were established, gives rise to many ques-

Gazzetta del Sud

QUOTIDIANO DELLA CALABRIA
CATANZARO

INTERNO

Il battesimo della neonata forza operativa di pronto intervento

Terremoto simulato sull'appennino calabro centinaia di morti e migliaia di feriti

Gli esiti dell'esercitazione nel Crotonese e nel Lametino (soccorsi, vittime, senz'altro, ricoveri d'emergenza, impiego di militari e volontari riassunti in una mappa nella sala comando di Napoli)

di Paolo Canizzaro

CATANZARO — Si concludono questo pomeriggio — è prevista la presenza del ministro Zamboni alla cerimonia di "battesimo" della neonata forza operativa di pronto intervento, il "Fo.P.I.", creata dal ministero della Difesa. La situazione dei soccorsi è riassunta nelle grandi mappe appese ai pareti della sala operativa del comando della regione militare meridionale a Napoli. Il comandante generale di corpo d'armata Repole illustrando ai giornalisti le modalità dell'esercitazione ha fornito le cifre di morti, feriti e soccorsi (naturalmente ipotetici), ma che vengono aggiornate mano a mano che le pattuglie terrestri e aeree raggiungono i vari centri battuti dalla zona.

Per la simulazione, venivano forniti dettagli sui danni riportati da uomini e cose. Nelle prefetture è stata disposta l'attuazione dei "Piani provinciali di protezione civile", che prevedono l'attuazione di determinati meccanismi di intervento all'entità della calamità che deve essere fronteggiata. Tramite il Comando militare di Cosenza si è provveduto alla richiesta dei necessari rinforzi non appena le segnalazioni hanno dato un quadro abbastanza preciso delle dimensioni dell'evento studiato a tavolino.

Le prefetture, dove hanno sede i Centri di coordinamento dei soccorsi (Ccs), hanno da tempo previsto il decentramento sul territorio dei punti di raccolta dei dati, attraverso i Centri operativi misti (Com). In entrambi gli organismi sono presenti rappresentanti di tutti gli enti che, in caso di pubbliche calamità, possono e devono essere mobilitati per le emergenze.

I prefetti delle tre province calabresi, che presiedono i Centri di coordinamento dei quali fanno parte rappresentanti dei carabinieri, della questura, delle forze armate, della Regione, dell'Anas, dell'Enel, della Sip, del Genio Civile, delle Ferrovie, della Mobilità civile e degli altri enti interessati, hanno così dato disposizioni per gli interventi man mano che dal Centro operativo misti subito attivati giungevano le prime notizie.

Per "Calabria '84", si è cominciato con due movimenti: l'urto e si è continuato con l'affrontare tutti i problemi che possono derivare dai primi soccorsi d'emergenza al lavoro per l'apprendimento delle procedure per gli aiuti. Circa 30 mila in tutta la regione quelli previsti alla requisizione degli alberghi, sino all'allestimento degli ospedali. Tutti da affrontare sul mo-

tions, also on the constitutional level. The answers will have to come from the higher echelons. However, these questions should at least be discussed.

Andrea Lusa



Brigadier General Andrea M. Lusa studied at the Military Academy and attended both the 92nd Course at the War College and the XXXIV Session of the General Staff Advanced Course. He has served with pioneer units, the armoured pioneer corps, pontooner and railway corps. He commanded the 104th battalion of pontooner engineers, "Torre", and the Engineers' School. He was a Section Commander and assistant instructor in electrical engineering at the Service Branch School. He served as Staff Officer in the 6th Army Corps in charge of the Training Section. He served as officer attached to Army Staff, as Section Leader in the Office of Military Regulations and in charge of the Office of Transport and Movement. He commanded the "Aqui" Motorized Brigade and the Fo.P.I. and is, at present, Chief of Staff of the North-East Military Region Command.

(1) In this period, the Fo.P.I. sets up the most favourable conditions possible for the subsequent large-scale operations.

(2) This structure, based on special units, can also act in case of flooding.

OTO C 13

ARMoured INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES

Weight: 15,000 ÷ 19,000 kg

Road Speed: 70 km/h

Range: ~500 km

Versions: IFVs, APC, Ambulance, Cargo Carrier (payload 6.5 tm)

Armament:

- IFVs: 20, 25, 90 mm gun + 7.62 MG + 6 grenade launchers + firing ports.

4 x 25 mm AA System.

60 mm gun + 7.62 MG +

8 grenade launcher + firing ports.

TUA + 7.62 MG.

- APC: 12.7 MG + 8 grenade launchers + 6 firing ports. Crew 12.

- Cargo: 12.7 MG.



OTO MELARA SpA

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THE PLAIN

HAS BECOME

IMPERVIOUS



The fact that this thesis is upheld by two "Alpini" does not necessarily mean that the authors are maniacally bound to see mountains everywhere.

It is our intention to examine the progressive transformations brought about by man in the "flat" natural environment. A transformation which, from the operational viewpoint, increasingly renders this geographical

area — sometimes in a rather disconcerting way — conceptually comparable to a mountain.

We are in fact led to ask ourselves whether the wide lines of attack can still be located or, perhaps, they have become by now winding tactical ways, dotted with strong points; whether the spaces for the manoeuvre of massive armoured formations

still exist or everything has been transformed into a broken and uneven landscape, good only for infantry.

These are questions that can rightfully be posed, also in the light of the studies made on the urbanization of the Veneto-Friuli Plain. The answers to these questions can suggest interesting considerations.

A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS

In a **mountain** landscape, the elements of interest for comparison reasons are:

- the **valley floors**, as main penetration axes followed by the attacker for overcoming the defensive apparatus; almost all tactical logistic movements are linked to them, and, even though they can be avoided for short stretches and periods, at the end one is compelled to return anyway, when the alternative directions become too onerous;
- the **high positions** which control the valley bottoms constitute the strong points of the defense. Their progressive dismantling is a necessary prerequisite for the attacker who wants to pursue his action in depth; they permit the tactical control of the valleys and facilitate surveillance and direct fire;

- the **points of forced passage** along the bottom of the valley: these are elements in favour of the defender, on which the attacker focuses his attention, because holding them means having the availability of the tactical way which they pursue;
- the **impervious areas**: these are one of the mountains' uncertainties. Nobody wants to engage in direct actions there, but, if necessary, they can become real sanctuaries for the defender and a source of great troubles for the attacker if he has, or intends, to get hold of them.

The **plains**, once flat and monotonous, during the last 20 or 30 years have become a rugged environment, in which the countryside bears the heavy mark of man's constructions.

Among these, the urban centre is certainly the most significant from the tactical point of view. As a matter of fact, it is not that new towns have been

Under the title.


In the plain, the most significant elements, from a tactical viewpoint, are the urban centres, surrounded by industrial compounds, close nets of roads, and works of water canalization. These elements can be exploited by the defender to slow down the attacker's movement, and to channel his axes of penetration towards points of forced passage.

Below.

The high positions controlling the valley floors are the strong points of the defensive instrument and, for the attacker, their progressive dismantling is often a prerequisite for the continuation of his action in depth. These high points facilitate observation and direct fire.

Right.

In the mountains, the main axes of penetration followed by the attacker in order to overcome the defense are on the valley floors; almost all tactical and logistical movements depend on them.



created, but the preexisting ones have become noticeably larger. Around the smaller centres there is almost always an industrial area with concrete buildings of generally large dimensions; watercourses have been canalized between steep, sometimes superelevated embankments, and the number of roads, highways and other reliefs has also increased; most railway and road crossings have become overpasses and, around farmhouses, high silos and water tanks have multiplied.

Also vineyards have changed, and the mulberry trees that once supported the vine branches have been replaced by cement poles. Electricity wires criss-cross the country; its pylons, in some areas, form real artificial forests.

These changes have given a new operational character to a terrain we used to consider "easy", "with a high flowing

index", "lacking substantial obstacles", "a large tactical way", and so on. This new aspect leads to a few considerations about the **organization of the manoeuvre**, the **employment of forces** and the **use of weapon systems**.

Let us consider, first of all, the significance of the alterations in the natural environment (fig. 1).

It goes without saying that the terrain, being the stage of the battle drama, influences the "show" decisively.

A greater number of natural and artificial obstacles favours the defender and hinders the attacker, especially if the latter faithfully follows his doctrine of employment, making a massive use of armoured means.

It will not be easy for him to advance rapidly, even if he employs a more open-minded tactic, different from the one he was expected to use in the past. Nevertheless, the difficulties of

progression must not stem only from the passive presence of obstacles, there must also be the defender's firm will to take the best advantage of them.

It is therefore necessary to acknowledge the battlefield's new characteristics and to opportunely adapt one's own training and employment techniques.


The tactical ways, first of all. They have ceased to be general indications of directions that lead to a series of objectives, following the shortest way. They have, on the contrary, their own logic development, aimed at locating the stretches of land that permit the maximum operational speed, avoiding inhabited places, industrial centres, river barriers, etc., using good roads, possibly having no points of forced passage.

These are exactly the characteristics of a valley's floor in the mountains, that cannot be chosen by the attacker but



COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS

Fig. 1



forced on him by the conditions of the terrain.

To continue the comparison we must now find out what can be considered similar to the high points that control the valleys.

Let us say immediately that surely these are not so evident as the flanks of a steep valley, but, in reality, what we are trying to find out are the positions, a series of points seen as a whole, which permit to control the way that develops along a tactical line.

In fact, this control can be obtained through the exploitation of the small urban centres, the overpasses and all the constructions that, rising above the ground and the vegetation level, offer a good vision and firing field, especially for antitank weapons and, not to be overlooked, a fair protection for the gunners.

And it is precisely by taking advantage of the small inhabited

centres as sheltered points of departure located on the flanks, that the small armoured units could "descend towards the valley", in order to cut or eliminate the enemy penetration.

Most probably, in this environment "Ivan" will start to have doubts about his capability to advance at the expected pace, realizing that the steppe is one thing and "Po country" is quite another.

The advance, made more difficult by its canalization along a foreseeable route and by the action of contrast carried out from properly positioned — and not necessarily armoured — elements, is further hindered by the points of forced passage.

In the mountains, these points are represented by passes, gorges, thresholds and dells, while on the plains there are rivers and bridges, "gorges" between the inhabited centres through which one has to go,

Comparison between the two natural environments.

The plain, during the last 30 years, has changed from a flat and monotonous environment to a rugged one, strewn with man-made constructions.

An attacker who has to advance in a territory of this kind shall have to select his tactical ways on stretches of land that permit a maximum operational speed, avoiding inhabited centres, industrial compounds and watercourses, which — as obstacles to movement — can be considered similar to the impervious areas in the mountains. The defender, on his part, will have the possibility to use the urban centres as protected bases of departure for his armoured units, which will be able to move to cut or eliminate the enemy penetrations. The figure shows the validity of the opinion that also the plain can become impervious.

highway viaducts, etc.

To overcome them, a number of "ad hoc", perhaps airborne, operations will have to be organized, with unavoidable uncertainties and delays, exactly like in a mountain area.

And what about the impervious areas? These are represented by the cities, and in the region considered there is no lack of them. They greatly influence the course of the tactical ways and, furthermore, it is from the cities that dangerous actions can be launched against the enemy flanks.

Unlike the impervious areas, the city offers many advantages to the defender. More resources, first of all, for in a city of average dimensions, as are those in the area under survey, one can find a logistic support absolutely lacking in a mountain area.

A city offers protection and can be, if necessary, an effective

shelter for the troops waiting for better times, or between actions.

The importance a city can have in the economy of a battle is nothing new, and this is why it must not be overlooked.

The reference picture is thus completed: we have matched each element which is part of the whole operational environment of a mountain area with a similar one in the plains.

OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES

Manoeuvre organization

What we have just analyzed has its first fundamental effect on the defence apparatus (fig. 2).

Once the elements that characterize the ground have been located, we can go on outlining its various features according to their importance,

deciding beforehand the ones that need garrisoning, exactly as in a mountain area one tries to close a valley with structures on its floor and flanks.

Therefore, the almost uniform deployments along the whole front will be replaced by a deployment focused in correspondence with the entrance of the located tactical ways.

A lesser number of forces will be assigned to the defence of impervious zones, i.e. cities, and more forces distributed at the strong points which control


Organization of the manoeuvre.

Just as in the mountains the aim is to block a valley with structures on its floor and flanks, in the plain it is necessary to achieve a deployment which does not run all along the front, but rather gravitates on the tactical ways previously located.

The figure shows the possible organization of a defensive deployment on a flat area.

ORGANIZATION OF THE MANOEUVRE

Fig. 2



A point of forced passage in the plain can be defended with the same criteria used for an Alpine pass.

the tactical ways and concentrated at the points of forced passage.


The most significant deduction concerning defence, stems from the realization that the tactical control here — unlike a mountain region — is given by points rather than positions. This suggests a more fragmented deployment of forces, with immediate effects on the size and shape of the stationary structures.

The company stronghold will probably still be unitarily employed in order to block a tactical way frontally, but on the flanks it will be more profitable to employ platoon strongholds which, unlike today, will probably outnumber the company ones. Precisely as is the case for a mountain region, and without it being a strain in any way. Suffice it to consider the characteristics of our antitank weapons with a 2000-3000 m range. Is it really profitable to gather all of them in a company stronghold or in an equivalent antitank deployment? Would it not be better to form a grid along the front and in depth, thus ensuring the continuity of its fire and functions in the area, with less structure vulnerability, thanks to a diminished concentration and better dispersion?

And the concept of "critical zone" of battalion level — which so greatly facilitates the organization of the defence in the mountains — does it not also apply to a plain? And the employment of artificial obstacles does it not require different placements and a different proportion of types (antitank and antipersonnel)?

Force employment

The mechanized units are the most suitable to represent the fulcrum of the defence. Protected, and capable of moving



about the battlefield, they rapidly transport men and weapon systems to the points controlling the direction followed by the adversary.

These units, equipped with antitank and antipersonnel weapons, with devices for launching mines at short distances, flanked by units of engineers tasked with making demolitions and interruptions, play the main rôle in the battle.

Their greatest enemy: the tank units speeding towards objectives in depth.

Their greatest ally: the artillery, to which they point out the objectives, which are slowed down by their own action, and are, therefore, more vulnerable.

The mechanized units are joined by tanks, which can accomplish a twofold task: together with the mechanized units, they can complement with their weapon systems the infantry's guided missiles and provide protection during the disengagement phases; on their own, they can carry out offensive raids which, starting from bases located in the protected outskirts of the inhabited centres, and moving along appropriate routes, will reach the enemy on the flanks and rear.

What about motorized infantry?

Their best employment will be in highly specialized actions, such as fighting in the inhabited centres, just as the "alpiéri" of the "Alpini" units control the impervious areas, thanks mainly to their superior psychophysical training.

The infantrymen could also be employed in airborne operations, with the purpose of establishing antitank alignments precisely in those points of forced passage, where they could slow down those armoured units that had advanced too rapidly to be confronted in any other manner.

Doubts can arise about the actual effectiveness of the offensive air support. The necessary dispersion of the adversary armoured formations will render the aircraft's intervention increasingly unprofitable, while the increased efficiency of the anti-aircraft weapons will constitute a greater risk for the airplanes.

This scarce pliability of the aircraft as regards the land actions, and its increased vulnerability, will perhaps suggest to assign helicopters and artillery part of the functions of fire support.

The helicopter, owing to its maneuverability, can adapt itself to the terrain with remarkable plasticity and make elusive manoeuvres when under missiles' fire.

In short, from the employment of forces thus outlined, a concept of areal battle emerges which will certainly find a more realistic application than the one suggested at present by a probably conformist view of the natural environment.

Therefore it will be possible to accept a less strict demarcation of the terrain, one's own and the adversary's, and as a consequence a penetration will not inevitably result in a total withdrawal.

A more comprehensive combat, we must say, in which all have a rôle to play and, what is more important, all will feel they are fighting on "friendly" terrain.

This extremely important factor has been acknowledged day by day by the "Alpini", who know, with reason, that they can count on their perfect knowledge of the terrain and use it against the "invader" of the mountain.

Employment of Weapon Systems

The main enemy we want to destroy is always the adversary tank; therefore we focus our attention first of all on the anti-tank weapon systems.

Among the ones used today, in the framework of the combat described, the short and long range weapons acquire a particular importance.

The medium range ones are bound to have a direct confrontation with the tank guns, which, under the same conditions could have the better of them.

The long-range systems, such as the TOW, for example, are advantaged by the fact that they can shoot from out of range positions, if they can find elements from which they can dominate the ground.

The short range systems, on the other hand, although they are forced to enter the battle when the tanks are already upon them, must, and can, draw advantage from all the obstacles that hinder the tanks and, on the contrary, help their own ambush and disengagement actions. Luckily, in our operational area there is no lack of such obstacles.

One can remark that these considerations on antitank systems stem from considerations concerning conditions that apply also to the mountain areas.

Still with the intent of supporting our thesis, we shall survey now the weapon systems for indirect fire.

The characteristics of the natural environment and those

of the combat we have outlined here, require timely and short fire actions, as well as the possibility of making swift changes in the deployment.

All self-propelled artilleries, which can use the "fire and run" technique, can be deemed excellent and, among them, mortars above all. In a rugged landscape, like the one described, mortars can fight in the inhabited places and carry out brilliant actions, by dislodging the enemies who are hiding behind the various obstacles.

Also this employment can be compared to the fighting conditions in a mountain area.

We could continue the comparison examining the modes of employment of all types of weapons, but believe that our considerations will suffice to help understand our thesis.

CONCLUSIONS

It is certainly not easy to completely change a way of conceiving, of imagining, or — to say it with one word — of "seeing" — a plain.

This derives also from the fact that our units have almost no possibility of training "on the spot", so that the Commanders at all levels can get the true feeling of the battlefield; our firing ranges are "natural parks", oases in a reality of intensive urbanization and widespread human settlements, such as the Veneto-Friuli plain.

It is therefore impossible to gain the necessary experience in order to adapt the combat technique to the terrain's requirements.

"Mental" exercises could nevertheless be organized, in view of a "psychological" updating for the cadres, and for a verification of the tactical procedures and the modes of employment of units and weapon systems.

One could try to transpose to the plain the following criteria, which are normally applied to combat in the mountains:

- develop an areal defence, in a sufficiently solid framework, offering support points to the more dynamic actions. The support points can be identified with the fundamental positions



In the plain, also observation and fire fields have become very reduced and impose a review of the weapons most suitable for employment.

at the anterior margin of the Resistance, the Hardening and the Containment Positions, and are represented by the strong points set up to close the main tactical ways;

- give great liberty of action to the minor units within a general task, which can be the protection of a combat group's critical zone;
- organize agile stationary structures, mostly at platoon level, based on strong positions, or points that can provide a field of visibility and fire such as to permit the best exploitation of the weapon systems available;
- conduct dynamic contrasting actions with mechanized and/or armoured units, in the spaces between the "obstacle zones" (interlinked small inhabited centres, farmland with tall trees, canalized watercourses, etc.);
- launch dynamic reactions against the flanks of the enemy deployment, starting from the periphery of urbanized zones, where tank units can be concealed;
- relay on helicopters for the development of sudden antitank fire actions or for carrying out airborne actions;
- keep the ratio between the deployed and the reserve forces as low as possible;
- constantly seek the surprise factor.

These criteria can perhaps induce a way of fighting which tends to prevent the enemy from advancing with the certainty of having left behind a completely conquered terrain. Meanwhile, the defender should start considering that the enemy is not necessarily only in front of him, and he can still do his duty even if the adversary penetrates from the rear.

Furthermore, the defender shall have to avoid regarding himself as the motionless element and the attacker as the



THE PLAIN HAS BECOME *IMPERVIOUS*

dynamic component of the battle. He will be able to reason in terms of tactical parity, freeing his mind from the psychological subjection of the man hidden in a foxhole, motionless, awaiting for an enemy who advances, almost invulnerable, in his tank, with great clangour and power, on a terrain devoid of obstacles, on which he can arrive from unexpected directions that cannot be detected in advance.

If these concepts, which have always characterized the mountain operations, allowing

the "Alpini" to fight and "foresee" the enemy action with sufficient accuracy, have always been the strength of the defence, why not try to adopt them also for the flatland, which today is not really "flat" anymore?

Col. Gianfranco Zaro
Col. Carlo Cabigiosu



SOCIMI

Defence Division


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ITALIAN AIRBORNE TROOPS

Past, Present and Prospects

FOREWORD

Twenty-three years have gone by since the foundation of the Paratroop Brigade (January 1, 1963) and the Italian airborne troops are still lacking a well defined operational position within the vast and complex mosaic of our national defence.

And it was certainly not a period of immobility.


The creative vitality of the General Staff of the Brigade has constantly explored — also considering the experiences made in other Western countries — every possible alternative area of employment to replace the traditional forms inherited from the second world conflict.

But these have actually been cognitive surveys and experiments in organization and management imposed by the existing scarcity of carriers rather than by variants introduced by new trends or changes in planning; the moves have been induced by the need to obtain maximum efficiency out of the distinctive operational features of the paratrooper units, adapting standards and modes of employment to the existing reality. In this constant innovative process they have been motivated only by a trustworthy concreteness of thought and by a pragmatic evaluation of the difficulties and constraints of the moment.

The development of a skillful and diversified "tactical research" has permitted to verify on the field the lines of other forms of intervention, which have produced a remarkable amount of data, information and lessons, painstakingly gathered in notes or other technical and tactical documents, in the intent of sharing the results with every level of the Brigade and with the other military organizations.

Left.

An Italian paratrooper ready to jump from a Lockheed "Hercules" C-130 medium transport aircraft.



Now the time has come for reviewing and reexamining the work done until now and — on the basis of the parameters typical of the national strategic situation, the formulas adopted by other Armies, and the constants implicit in all airtroops operations — for devising the most appropriate ways of employment and structuring.

The following considerations are part of this prospect. They have already been discussed within the Brigade and are now submitted to the close examination of the outside observers convinced that the military thought draws its vitality and innovative force from the frank confrontation of ideas and opinions.

A LOOK AT THE RECENT PAST

With the sole intent of better envisaging and explaining the operational reality of the Italian airborne troops of 1985, we summarize the most significant moments of their evolutionary process, starting from the establishment of the Major Unit.

1963-1970

This period is marked by a substantial availability of transport airplanes and the prevalent application of the doctrine and standards inherited from the

second world conflict, based on mass airdrops, either independent, or coordinated with the land units.

This trend was practically expressed in the exercises closing the annual training courses:

- Apulian Vedette (1965);
- Winged Gladius (1966);
- Red Eagle (1967).

1970-1975

The helicopter's emergence, favoured also by the continued and progressive dwindling of the nation's air transport potential, seemed to influence the operation of the paratroop units, to the point of rendering them independent of the conventional airplane, which was exclusively assigned to the accomplishment of integrative and complementary missions.

The exercises with the Cadres, carried out in those years, have analyzed all the various aspects of the intervention of helicopterborne troops on the whole national territory.

From this in-depth study it clearly emerged that the versatility of the rotorcraft and the many advantages of its employment in the air-actions (on-the-spot landing, personnel safety, immediate operative capability of the landed units, etc.) had in fact produced new and different operational conditions but, at the same time, it was acknowledged that the transport airplane gave a better performance, as regarded long-distance strategic interventions, range and payload. The helicopter had a wider range of action, opened new prospects, worked along with the airplane but did not replace it, confirming that each vehicle has its limits and well delimited operational capabilities.

1975-1981

The limited resources in both wing and rotor aircraft were assigned to the maintenance and survival of the Corps; therefore only training airdrops were made.

The airtransport's critical situation induced the General

Staff of the Brigade to consider the transfer to the zone of employment by normal means and to experiment more economic forms of fighting, such as interdiction, counter-interdiction and the fighting in inhabited areas.

These forms are considered more paying because they are little influenced by aircraft availability, by air superiority, by the ratio of forces, by logistic support, by the linking with other forces... without renouncing, on the other hand, the paratrooper's peculiarities: aggressiveness, initiative, courage, ability to operate in a difficult environment.

The summary conclusions that can be drawn from the intense and diversified activities carried out in the last twenty years, evidence the following points:

- the absolute lack of a joint operative concept;
- the experimentation of themes and procedures according not to the scenario's variations but to the existent capabilities of the available means;
- the prevalence, for the accomplishment of the wide range of foreseeable tasks, of structures typical of the light infantry, with special requirements for medium and long range antitank capabilities;
- the confirmation that the combat groups at battalion and company level are the fundamental elements of the paratrooper's combat;
- the difficulty of reaching a complete development of the assumed and desired polyvalence of employment, owing to the limited length of the conscription;
- the lack of a supplies policy regarding means and material specifically pertaining to the air-troops.

Initiative and aggressiveness are the typical characteristics of the paratroop units, capable to operate in isolation over large areas.

The photo shows some paratroopers engaged in an areal counterinterdiction exercise.



THE PRESENT REALITY

An objective analysis of the Brigade's present reality — pre-scinding from the existing level of operative efficiency — leads to conceive an instrument still looking for a well defined identity, as far as mode of employment and organic structure are concerned.

The current regulation is still anchored to the conventional landing operations, that is, to a partial aspect of the employment, related more to the modes of battle intervention than to the conduct of the battle itself. It has not developed specific procedures for the airborne troops, in conformity with the concrete operational needs and able to represent a reference parameter for the configuration of the Major Unit. It must be added that the operational choices that concern the Brigade, the actual availability of aircraft vis-à-vis the concrete needs, and the level of the units that could realistically be involved in the employment, after a landing, render the

accomplishment of substantial landing operations rather problematic. As a consequence the mentioned regulation appears incapable to meet the actual needs.

This vagueness of conceptual formulation as regards employment is reflected by the establishment, practically similar to those of the comparable motorized infantry units, excepting the fire support and protected mobility which are penalized by the need to ensure the Major Unit's air mobility.

When we mention the organic structure, we do not refer to the various elements that constitute the units, but rather to the features of these elements in connection with the weapon systems and the means that are at the base of their strength, for their choices and operational capabilities stem directly from it.

The atypical tasks, emphasized by the doctrine in force and by the personnel's selection, are not matched by equally atypical equipment and means, owing to which, continuous con-

tingent adjustments become necessary for the employment after a landing by airplane or helicopter, and, at the same time, the surface operational possibilities appear limited.

To correct at least in part this contradiction, the Brigade has tried to find its own modes of employment through training methods which would permit the best utilization of the available material resources and men, in order to shape an instrument capable of accomplishing atypical tasks in the framework of our national defence.

To this end the following reference parameters have been adopted:

- a mechanized and armoured potential adversary, with ample capability of vertical, tactical or strategic, outflankings and the possibility to employ raid forces;
- the configuration of the natural "average" environment, generally marked by a hilly landscape,

with marked urbanization near the ways of communication;

- the tasks that the Brigade, as a reserve Major Unit, may have to accomplish, in order to produce delays, through the concentration of forces, or perform a wearing action, through the repeated employment of small units dispersed over the area.

Following this line of thought, doctrinal elements have been worked out regarding three training models:

- the employment of combat groups in order to acquire and maintain positions in the framework of a containment of landings from the air and sea, and in cooperation with other surface units. Considering the operational assumptions, on which this intervention is based, on-alert preparation and rush to the zone of employment — using the types of transport realistically available and adapted to the successive occurrences — are

an integrant part of training;

- the conduct of counterinterdiction and areal interdiction; the former to prevent the possible employment of enemy raiders, and the latter as an alternative or integration of wearing or hindering actions carried out with conventional procedures;
- the combat in urbanized areas, as these represent the environment more appropriate for troops trained for episodic fighting

Paratroop units can be employed to keep positions in the containment of landings — from the air as well as from the sea — in cooperation with surface units, to conduct counterinterdiction and areal interdiction, and to fight in urban areas.



and furthermore they are a constant in the scenarios of both the Combat Zone and the Communication Zone.

In all three models a particular stress has been put on the employment of the minor units, in the intent of enhancing the personnel's spirit of initiative and aggressiveness, which has been concretized in training procedures for small, operationally autonomous teams that can be employed in wide areas, in conditions of marked isolation and often resorting to infiltration on the flanks and rear of the enemy.

A particular attention has been given to the operational capability of the tactical teams which are introduced in the battle from the air. The Brigade's units are in a position to use the "third dimension" to the full; nevertheless, considering the

current availability of airplanes and helicopters, we can employ, at most, an airborne, helicopter-borne or airdropped combat group at battalion level. But this fact is made difficult by the almost exclusive availability of vehicles with a high weight/payload ratio — not especially conceived for air-landing operations — which heavily limit the global transport capabilities: the ensuing need to limit their number to the essential remarkably influences the land mobility of the tactical group, which, in practice, appears suitable only for stationary tasks.

The possible tasks of the Brigade, derived from the above training methods are in substance, the following:

- interdiction, deep into the enemy deployment, as a complement or replacement of the air forces or, with the same

procedures, for enhancement or integration of the restraining action exerted by mechanized and armoured units;

- intervention, upon alert, for the occupation and defence of positions, also in close cooperation with other units, in fluid situations, marked by considerable operational dynamics;

- counter guerrilla warfare, although this employment belittles the airborne troops' global training and permits to employ them only in some sectors of their fighting skills.

The Brigade, which has been able to solve on its own the

Paratrooper-ranger NCO of the "Col Moschin" 9th Assault Battalion in action with a precision rifle H.K. G3 F.C.1, cal. 7.62 NATO.



problems concerning the modes of employment, owing to the fact that they regard conceptual and organization activities, has not been able to do so as regards the organizational structure, for the latter is linked with the availability of materials and, therefore, of financial resources.

SOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES

It is a survey aimed mainly at evidencing the "operational policy" informing the adopted solutions, as well as the relationship between tasks to be accomplished and structures.

Federal Republic of Germany

In a prevalingly flat operational environment, in which the development of the defensive manoeuvre is hindered by the scarcity of depth and by the considerable extension of the national territory, the priority goes to the forward gravitation of the available forces and the tendency to adopt a timely, differentiated and sectorial employment of highly mobile forces.

The organization of the airborne troops of the Federal Republic of Germany follows these criteria:

- organization: three Brigades, homogeneously constituted by light infantry units with high anti-tank capability;
- operational employment subordination: to the Army Corps;
- tasks: all aimed at facing the occurring emerging situations with immediacy, as antitank reinforcement in threatened sectors, for the temporary arrest of penetrations, for protection of exposed flanks and control of adversary forces, landed either by airplanes or helicopters;
- airmobility: essentially based on helicopters.

In our country the "average" natural environment is normally characterized by hills and vegetation, with a remarkable urbanization along the roads.

The photo shows a paratrooper in training.



The Brigades can count on:

- helicopter transport capability, which allows the simultaneous transfer in the intervention area of a combat group of battalion level;
- land mobility, entrusted to wheeled vehicles, transportable by airplanes or helicopters; they are, at the same time, transport and towing vehicles, as well as shooting platforms for antitank launchers.

France

The pacts of direct and indirect military assistance which bind France to its numerous former colonies, on the organizational plane have been translated in the establishment of an elementary Major Unit, suitable for operations far away from the metropolitan territory, with a large tactical and logistical autonomy.

Thus the 11th Paratroop Division was established as follows:

- airtransportable and airdropable strategic reserve;
- about 13,000 men and 2,850 vehicles strong;
- mainly designed for conducting overseas actions, independently, or in cooperation with the Armed Forces of the assisted countries;
- capable of being organized into combat groups of different level and constitution;
- distinguished by the prevalence of light infantry, with a high capability of antipersonnel fire.

In short, it is a credible instrument, capable of ensuring the actual control of the foreseeable situations of intervention, just as it has shown in the rather recent past.

Great Britain

Also the United Kingdom has opted for a capability of strategic intervention, outside NATO's

Antitank squad on a FIAT AR 59TC reconnaissance car, ready to employ their 106 mm recoilless gun. The camouflage of both personnel and vehicle is very effective.



area of responsibility and under national control, in order to defend its interests and/or those of its allies.

This task has been committed mainly to the 5th Infantry Brigade.

The Major Unit, organized with three paratroop battalions, one artillery battalion, units of engineers and logistic support, keeps on constant alert a battalion combat group, capable of being air-dropped in the area of intervention.

The United States

The geopolitical rôle of the United States in the international scene entails a worldwide expression of power, that matches the assumed entity of the destabilizations to be confronted.

The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is in fact organized in order to "support the security of regional areas through the projection of a military force"; the instrument's credibility is ensured by the congruous com-

bination of real power of strategic decision-making with an actual swiftness of deployment of units and logistical support means.

The 82nd Paratrooper Division is one of its land components, organized with three combat groups (each formed by a paratroop regiment, an artillery battalion, a battalion of engineers and logistic support units) with a force of approximately 16,500 men. As regards personnel, armament and vehicles, the Division has all the qualities necessary to an airborne strategic unit:

to the goals pursued by the geopolitical situations, deriving from them the tasks, the organization, the procedures of action and the training programmes.

NATIONAL PROSPECTS

Given and acknowledged the fact that, also according to the national model, the airborne troops have the function of "élite reserve force" under the command of the Highest Defence Authorities, the matter now is to

decisions of our foreign policy — Atlantic and European — which have, also in the medium-long term, a character of substantial continuity.

On the mere military plane, such a "stability" sees in the "Soviet expansionism", the continuing threat to our national security, following two possible lines of development: the more traditional one, the threat at the Northeastern border and, more recently, that to Mediterranean stability.

In the northeastern area,



great power, high mobility and flexibility of employment, as well as a considerable operational capability.

In short, all countries have molded the characteristics of employment of their airborne troops, equivalent in their theoretical formulation (distinctly offensive reserves, able to form — instantly and unsuspectedly — high concentrations of power, structurally limited in their autonomy and tactical land mobility)

focus their operational features, making a logical close survey which, starting from the goals, proceeds towards the means and then examines the procedures through which the goal can be achieved.

The parameters, according to which the choices of employment and structure are made, are numerous and sometimes discordant.

First of all, the international scenario and the fundamental

U.S. paratroopers of the 82nd Division, armed with Italian-made FAL BM-59, cal. 7.62 NATO rifles, engaged in an exercise on Italian territory. Bilateral activities, besides contributing to the Allied Armed Forces' amalgamation, provide knowledge and experience about the equipment employed by other armies.

where the operations can exclusively be of the air-land type, since the Italian Army cannot provide other appropriate specialized units, the paratroop reserves can be effectively employed both in the tactical field and for the conduct of heliborne actions, as well as for reducing the attacker's mobility through the exploitation of the difficult natural environment (mountain and covered areas, urban areas, etc.).

In the Mediterranean theatre, on the other hand, the deterioration of the existing hotbeds of tension could demand the employment of a task force in any area of the insular or peninsular national territory — which would otherwise be indefensible — and perhaps also overseas, both for dissuasive missions (in order to avoid a spiralling growth of the crisis) and for guaranteeing the freedom of trade and the access to the raw materials and energy sources necessary for our survival as industrialized nation.

We can reasonably affirm that, under the circumstances, a determinat rôle could be assigned to the paratrooper units, appropriately amalgamated in interforce, multinational or combined units.

In short, the threats to our national integrity require that the paratroopers perform two rôles:

- a tactical, distinctly "Service" rôle, for the reinforcement of the northeastern area;



Above.

Paratroopers of the 185th "Viterbo" Field Artillery Battalion in action with a 105 mm howitzer at a maximum depression configuration, in which the gun appears to be squatting on the ground. A position particularly suited for direct and antitank firing, up to a distance of 1,200 m.

Right.

Paratroopers on a VCC1-M113 armoured combat vehicle.


- a strategic, "joint" rôle, as component of a task force, to meet requirements inside and/or outside the national territory.

For both lines of employment, the structural and organizational goals to be pursued are: light infantry character and operational autonomy of combat groups of battalion level. In fact, only light infantry units not exceeding battalion size, capable of using the intrinsic force of the terrain as incremental factor of their power, and employing simple procedures of action — can be entrusted, in the North-eastern region, with the task to operate in depth in the adversary deployment, in order to hit the sensitive objectives within its logistic organization and its system of command and control, to fight in the expanding urban areas, or to constitute an airborne reserve for prompt intervention in critical situations.

Also in the "wide range" operations, where the power of dissuasion seems largely determined more by the timeliness of inflow and the ability to move around, than by the capability to perform complicated manoeuvred actions or to sustain protracted fighting on open terrain, a light, battalion-centred structure appears to be the most appropriate.

As regards quality and size of the armaments, it goes without saying that they must be proportionate to and competitive with the presumed enemy's mechanized or armoured weapons, and in harmony with the selected modes of employment and the operational environment.

The antitank fire, rightly considered the airborne troops' main offensive tool, will be produced, considering the hindering qualities of the areas of action and the consequent visibility and firing ranges, by medium and short range weapon systems conveniently combined with a



Paratroopers climbing over a wall during an exercise in inhabited areas.

well prepared self-defence capability.

For the support fire, the high logistic costs imposed by the weapon employed, the 105 mm howitzer, are neither counter-balanced by the range nor by the effectiveness of the single round, and appear to lack the requisites of lightness and mobility required in the foreseeable circumstances.

Therefore it would be advisable to find alternative solutions, centred on the employment of a command and control capable of managing the fire delivering sources as they become available.

The systems that would be assigned to the anti-aircraft defence would just guarantee the protection of joint-objectives from very low air attacks, considering that normally the airborne troops can avail themselves of the cover provided by higher Agencies or Commands.

Furthermore, the time parameter acquires a particular significance as concerns the organizational planning of the airborne troops, both as regards the considerable distances to be overcome and the need to operate with maximum speed, thus preceding the adversary to the area or positions that must be controlled.

The timeliness of intervention is linked to the availability of:

- at strategic and regional level (areas of employment located in any case farther than 500 km from the departure bases): aircraft — fixed wing and/or rotor — to be assigned according to the needs evidenced by the joint mission's planning;
- at national and tactical level (for ranges of operation within 500 km): land vehicles sufficient for the autonomous transfer of the units from the deployment areas to those of employment, and qualitatively able to participate in and provide support for the light infantry's fighting.

The objectives pursued in this sector are not so near at hand (light armoured cars, AR/90 and MV/90)... but they are cer-



tainly not unattainable...

Another determinant feature for the operative efficiency and credibility of the instrument is the units' degree of preparation, which is obtained only through an intensive and protracted training activity.

The conscription period, the frequency of the draft, the availability of firing ranges and training areas are as many constraints that influence not only the versatility but also the qualitative and quantitative composition of the employable complexes.

As regards the airborne troops, the sum of the limitations implicit in these factors, on the operational plane does not allow to go beyond the company level,

Above.

German paratroopers jumping from a CH-47C helicopter during an exercise on our territory, using the Italian-made CMP-55 parachute.


Opposite.

Rifleman ready to open fire with an MG 42-59 machine gun.

with a sufficient but not optimal capability of intervention in the whole range of possible options.

More valid goals could be attained working on the variable components:

- the length of the term of service, to be protracted through appropriate forms of volunteering, characterizing the units' framework with a high percentage of long-term personnel;
- the training should purpose the formation of "univalent" battalions, i.e., mainly suited for fighting only in one of the possible operational scenarios: either in the classical, traditional scenario or in atypical difficult natural environments.



ITALIAN AIRBORNE TROOPS

CONCLUSION

Although the characteristics of employment of the paratrooper units remain unchanged — to the point of assuming the value of traditional constants of the war philosophies — each country has adapted the modalities of application to its local — internal and international — needs.


The study of our national situation, certainly wanting more corroboration and further probing, has evidenced, within the possible joint task of the Italian airborne troops, two fundamental operational requirements — a conventional one and an atypical one which, to be fulfilled, require:

- an interforce organization of command and control;
- an organization structure of the light infantry type;
- employment of units of battalion level;
- a diversified mobility (strategic, regional, tactical);

- an organic high-angle fire support, to be integrated with tactical air forces;
- a marked medium and short range antitank capability;
- an antiaircraft defence limited to very low altitude;
- a permanent operational readiness in the assigned sectors of intervention, to be implemented through "univalent" units and the increment of long-term personnel.


These are in prospect the determinant modifications that the airtroops' organization structures must undergo, as a logical development of the political choices and the ensuing operational hypotheses.

In fact, at the base of any defensive preparation and at the root of all efforts to maintain peace and security, there is the need to understand the rôle that each military component plays in the context of the joint missions assigned to the Armed Forces.



Gen. Antonio Milani
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THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF THE WELFARE STATE



The military institutions and the problems that they have to solve in order to become effective instruments of government policy can only be examined in a general context, in terms of international relations, relations between the Armed Forces and their societies, and the Armed Forces' internal structures.

These three aspects are closely linked. Firstly, the purposes of the military institution act as constraints on their internal structures and their relations with society, and secondly, the features of that society determine the rôle and functions of the Armed Forces, as well as the degree of their legitimacy, acceptability and internal and external consensus (1).

It is evidently necessary to detect in good time the changes in the "environment" in its broadest sense — the environment in the military structure, in individual countries and international society — if we wish to stimulate the military institutions and gear them up to meet the new situations and challenges that they have to face.

It is also evident that we are going through a period of far-reaching changes, and that in this period, Italy's and Europe's futures are being played out. The global postwar socio-systemic arrangement is changing. The two-pole system is in crisis. The system of international and supranational integration — known as the UN model — is in crisis.

The very principle of the Welfare State is being increasingly challenged: its lax, permissive, help-all policy has proven to be wholly inadequate to put Italy and Europe in a position to beat the new technological challenge.

Without reindustrialization, Europe will inevitably be downgraded internationally, and there will be social disintegration at home. Little by little we shall be alienated, and pushed onto the side-lines of the systems that have managed to adapt to the future in good time.

The formation of standing armies, and relations between the Armed Forces and society

The formation of standing armies is quite a recent phenomenon, connected with the formation of the modern European nation-states. This led to the demilitarization of society, while the State took over the monopoly of force. Greater citizen participation in the exercise of political power as a result of the French Revolution, which led to the adoption of compulsory conscription and the creation of mass armies, did not basically alter things. Military force was still concentrated in the hands of an institution or, if you prefer, a state techno-structure whose features were determined by the permanent officer and NCO corps.

With the establishment of standing armies, and the later constitution of democratic governments, the sensitive problem arose of how to manage relations between the Armed Forces and society. It was not so much a question of subordinating military power to civilian power, which every country whether democratic or totalitarian already accepted in principle at least, but had to do with the multifaceted complexity of relations between the military institutions and the society which they stood for and had to defend.

On the one hand, there are differences between the Armed Forces and society which are due to the peculiar features of the Armed Forces themselves, which in turn stem from the operational functions they are required to perform. Even in the most democratic societies, the Armed Forces cannot be anything other than an authoritarian organization, whose cohesion is based on discipline and the hierarchical principle that flows from that. Without these, they could never operate properly, since in the ultimate analysis their operations are based on the habitual and immediate — and hence acritical — obedience to orders, and a particular ethical code that justifies the subordina-

tion of individual interests to those of the community as a whole. This is why emphasis is placed on certain symbolic values — honour, duty, esprit de corps etc. — which can mobilize the psychological energies of the members of the Armed Forces, and confer cohesion on the units.

On the other hand, the differences between the Armed Forces and society must not be allowed to separate them, and alienate the Services from the rest of society. If this were to happen, the substantial legitimacy of the Armed Forces would be reduced and perhaps even lost altogether, and the burden of financing and manning the Services would gradually become less acceptable to the citizens. It is vital for the public to understand the Services and their needs, and to realize that the service they pay to society is indefeasible. This service is pointless unless there is an object — values and interests to defend — and a threat, or to be more accurate, the perception of the existence of a threat, against which the services have to defend society. And unless the system used for defence is itself plausible and acceptable. The main problem, then, is a question of culture and knowledge (2). Unless this problem is solved satisfactorily the misunderstanding will grow increasingly worse, and society will be unable to accept the gap or lack of consistency between its values and those of the Armed Forces. Military institutions are the expression of the national community. Community consensus and support are essential to their efficiency. The Armed Forces have an instrumental value. They do not have a value per se. The motivations of their members cannot stem from within the military institution, but only from outside of it. The social service supplied by the military only has any meaning in terms of the community as a whole. If it is to constitute a source of motivation, it has to be appreciated by its "consumers", namely the State, society and the citizens.



All the rhetoric about the "sense of mission" which should justify the fact that they should not act in the hope of obtaining gratification, or even psychological satisfaction, has its limitations. Military men cannot and must not be priests of a dead god, or faithful followers of a flame that has ceased to burn. No-one, however disinterested or highly attached to the institutions, can play Don Quixote or the "knight errant". Everything has its limits. Accepting the impositions of military life, particularly the sacrifice of discipline, is only possible if there exists a higher interest that can be used as a yardstick for action. The desire to carve out a career for oneself — however justifiable, understandable and even useful for the institution — is not sufficient, at least for the stronger characters. It is necessary to perceive something useful to society, whose value has to be fully appreciated.

Basically speaking, the army's strength is not rooted in

the army itself but in the nation and the State. As Tocqueville said in his essay on democracy in America, "It is not in the army but in society that we have to find the remedies to make up the shortcomings in the army". Without a sense of national identity, community interest, patriotism and a sense of the State, and without the presence of a political ruling class that is capable of transforming these factors into an active ideology that runs throughout the whole of society and reflects on the Armed Forces, the latter will never be efficient and well-motivated. The will to defend a nation can not be inculcated by the army. At most it can help to consolidate it. But it is only if the nation is proud of its own Armed Forces, which are nothing more than one of the most genuine expressions of that nation, can the soldiers be motivated and proud of what they are doing.

Like any other institution, the Army can only be justified in

Military institutions are such highly sophisticated instruments today that the personnel requires the highest professional and managerial skills. In the photo, officers are consulting books in a military reference library.

terms of its functions, and can only be appreciated if it is capable of performing them. Everything else, any attempt to claim that the army is sacrosanct in itself, is mere claptrap and is only used, normally speaking, as whitewash to cover up ineptitude, partisan interests and to give its bureaucratic structures an easy ride (3). Its efficiency and the plausibility of the way it performs its duties are therefore crucial to its acceptability and legitimacy.

The "revolutions" in the wake of WW2

After WW2, Europe's military institutions had to face up to a totally different situation, and take up serious challenges connected with the newly arisen

strategic, psychological, social and technological situations (4). These stemmed mainly from the following factors that have changed the public's attitudes to the Armed Forces:

- the change in geopolitical, geostrategic as well as geoeconomic and geotechnological magnitudes, which make it impossible to guarantee security solely on a national basis. The very concept of national sovereignty, which was the ethical-spiritual landmark of the 19th and early 20th century armies, has lost ground to the idea of membership of broader types of communities, such as the Atlantic and European groupings. But Europe has not managed to create its own defence policies and institutions, and has entrusted its security essentially to the United States. The national dimension has not been replaced by a European dimension, and the Atlantic ideology is too vague and remote to be a solid landmark;
- the appearance of nuclear weapons, which, even though they have not changed the "political" nature of military institutions, have had an effect on the relationships between strategy and policy and on the perception of the usefulness and acceptability of military force, not only to affirm but also to simply defend one's interests, independence and territorial integrity;
- changes in Western societies, which have secularized and altered their value systems, taking on those of the Welfare State and throwing the concept of authority and the sense of community interest and the State into disarray. Military institutions have been subjected to strong ideological, psychological, social and economic tensions, widening the gap between the system of values on which they are based, where duty prevails over rights, and the system of values of society at large, where individual rights have pride of place, with a degeneration towards unbridled permissiveness and laxity.

Since the mid-Seventies the situation has been gradually undergoing a U-turn:

- the possibility of eliminating force from international relations, replacing it with a new international order, has been belied by reality. The ideology that lay behind the creation of the UN has proven to be Utopian;
- the American military guarantee can no longer be total because of the changes that have occurred in the force relationship between the two super-powers and the economic and military recovery of Europe, and also because Europe is becoming increasingly aware that her interests differ from those of the United States. A sense of European identity and the national community has re-surfaced (5);
- the reappraisal of conventional forces in European defence, and the reappraisal of the value of limited force use to protect national interests (the Falklands, Chad, Lebanon etc.) has sharpened the perception of the usefulness of the military organization as an instrument of politics;
- the crisis in the Welfare State and the general feeling that it is necessary to establish a degree of order in society to pave the way for economic and social development have brought back into favour some of the values that had been challenged by the 1968 protest movement. The "live and let live" permissive mentality and the system of State hand-outs has been shown to open the way to under-development and fragmentation. In every Western European country, more dynamic and determined ruling classes are emerging. Some of the values that brought about the development of Europe and her world domination are now coming back into vogue.

It is against this national and international backdrop that we have to examine the problem of the legitimacy and acceptability of the Armed Forces in Western European societies in the Eighties, and the internal measures to be adopted to improve them.

The response of the Armed Forces to society's challenges

In the past, the Armed Forces used to respond to attacks and criticisms in two, exactly opposite ways.

First there was the defensive attitude, closing ranks against the critics to isolate the Forces from external influences. As always, this created internal rigidity, blocking the flow of communications, creating an atmosphere of conformism, formal obedience and empty rhetoric, with a degradation of military culture, and so on. The system became extremely rigid and vulnerable because of the loss of internal support, vitality and drive.

In other cases, the military leaders did the exact opposite. To cushion the criticisms and to "placate" public opinion, the Armed Forces tried to camouflage their real nature. They introduced values and practices that were incompatible with their function, wiping out the differences that have to exist between them and civilian society. They masked their real functions — namely, waging war or at least being capable of waging war — in the guise of others that were more palatable to the public at large. They incorporated some of the worst aspects of permissiveness and laxity borrowed from civilian society. The military system threw its borders wide open and the structures became completely fluid and unable to carry out their duties and to psychologically mobilize their members. In other words, the Armed Forces were demilitarized, losing much of their fighting spirit.

Restoring public support

Apart from these degenerative phenomena that could always be redressed by external or internal stimuli, there is no doubt that unless appropriate changes are made to the "environment" and without the enlistment of public support, many Western countries are

going to find it impossible to keep up an adequate defence instrument to meet the threat over the next ten years (6). To get this public support, the Armed Forces' efficiency and military culture in the broad sense of the term have to be renewed, which involves the spiritual, ideological and intellectual dimensions. This cultural revival has to take place in the Armed Forces and in the civilian society which expresses, maintains and conditions them. Restoring public support for the military institutions is essential if the European countries are to exist as a people and as a civilization in a world that is becoming increasingly competitive and threatening (7).

The recovery of this support relates to two aspects that are in many ways interconnected. Firstly, the substantial legitimacy of the Armed Forces — namely, enlisting the support of the members of the Forces and the public for the purposes of the military apparatus. Secondly, the perception of the efficacy — namely, plausibility — of the social service supplied by the Armed Forces. In other words, their ability to carry out the duties assigned to them in an acceptable manner. What society has to do is once again to become aware of the need for defence and of defence needs. And the military institution has to provide convincing replies that are not only sound but also capable of attracting the support of the national community.

The problems I have referred to here are broadly shared by every Western army, even though they vary from country to country according to local conditions. The steps that have to be taken are not the responsibility of the Forces themselves, but of the governments. Obviously, any concrete measures that are taken can only be defined after a detailed analysis has been carried out into the various societies and Armed Forces, and in the latter instance, it is the officer corps in particular that constitutes the backbone and which has a decisive effect on the features

of the Forces from the senior levels to the smallest units. I shall therefore restrict this essay to a number of common problems and trends that emerge from the copious literature that exists on the subject, mainly in the English-speaking world and which contains considerations that, duly qualified, seem to describe the Italian situation fairly well.

External legitimacy

In the past, the external legitimacy of the Armed Forces was taken for granted (8). War was considered to be normal instrument of a country's foreign policy. Every nation was clearly aware of the threat. Military force paid off in terms of new markets and raw materials, and served the colonial service. Kinship and social ties existed between the military elites and the political elites. The social structures of the European agricultural and pre-industrial societies functioned perfectly in tune with the authoritarian structures of the army. There was no clash between the value system of society and the value system required by an authoritarian structure like the army — a structure which has to be authoritarian not only to ensure that orders are obeyed immediately in operations, but also to make sure that the military institutions are loyal and obedient to the government. The Armed Forces were considered to be an institution with a highly sacred character, almost as if they predated the very legal system (9) which formed the basis of the State, which was bound to defend the State not only from external attack but also against its own citizens. The level of consensus and acceptance that the military institutions enjoyed was therefore very high indeed.

But now things have changed. The medium powers are no longer able to carry through an independent policy beyond the bounds allowed them in the area of influence of whichever of the two super-

powers to which they belong. Even when France intervened in Zaire it had to use American strategic air transport facilities. France and Britain had to pull out of Suez in 1956, mainly because of the United States. Perhaps the equilibrium that has been established between the two blocs and the relative decline in American power in comparison with Russia's that occurred in the Seventies and that cannot be redressed completely by the military efforts of the Reagan Administration, will make it necessary for Europe's military policies to be more wideranging than they have been in the past two decades. However, there is no doubt that efforts have to focus on keeping the balance of forces in Europe to prevent a situation from arising which would make a Soviet military initiative worthwhile. Whereas in the past, war could be seen, today it is impossible to "see" détente. It is therefore hard for people to understand the whole point of keeping a military apparatus at all. This is also partly due to the existence of nuclear weapons and an Alliance, such as NATO, based on the existence of an American military guarantee to protect Europe not only from a direct Warsaw Pact attack, but also to defend the other vital interests of the West, namely, to keep the raw materials and energy sources shipping lanes open and free. There is a widespread belief — which is naturally founded on fact — that this guarantee is the key to the solution of all our security problems. Individual European countries' Armed Forces do not therefore have direct and independent duties because they represent an instrument that is barely adequate to guarantee the strategic linkage between Europe and America. There may be a lurking feeling that if they were to be given an autonomous defence capability, this would have a decoupling effect and jeopardize the solidity of America's commitment. For many people, the efficiency levels have to be kept to what is strictly necessary to enable the US

government to justify the maintenance of its guarantee to Europe in the eyes of the US public, and taxpayers. Obviously, if this were to be explicitly admitted and the logical conclusions fully drawn, it could very easily be sufficient to guarantee the legitimacy of Europe's Armed Forces. But the weight of the past, and the state of the global strategic situation, which prevent the US from doing everything on its own, make it impossible for the United States to make this admission explicitly. The

result is an ambivalence which only generates confusion, about the function that the individual Armed Forces actually perform, and the functions of the whole system of European security.

There is also a reduced perception of the threat, which in the past made the polarization of the Armed Forces possible and produced a clear perception of their utility (10). The whole concept of the Nation-State has lost ground, even though it is fast recuperating. National dimensions have been partly re-

placed by an internationalist approach, which has cut across the strategic scene horizontally, breaking the unitary nature of individual States. In particular, the process of détente — which according to the 1967 Hammel Report was defined as being compatible with the maintenance of the deterrent — has weakened the perception of the immanence of a Soviet threat to Europe, and has virtually become an end in itself nowadays: détente for détente's sake, whatever the cost, for most people in Europe. Proof of this is the difference between Europe's and the United States' conception of détente, which underlies the present crisis in the Atlantic Alliance. Obviously, this is also partly the result of the natural tendency of European countries to broaden their room for manoeuvre and to use détente not only to lessen the threat, but also to gain trade advantages with the East, operate more freely in the Third World, make the division of the German nation into two States more humanly acceptable, and, in countries with a strong communist party, to weaken the domestic political tension. But while détente is being practised at least formally by everyone together, and at all events agreed upon within the Alliance, it is being handled by individual European countries often in totally different ways, and in each country, by individual political forces, as we have seen from what happened in West Germany after Schmidt's resignation. All this is creating a potentially very dangerous situation: the decisions taken by the West to guarantee its security could be wholly



The education and training of commanders hinges round two main points: consensus, in the sense of awareness of the rights and duties from which young men draw their motivation, and discipline, as the willing acceptance of the regulations that are vital for the life of any community. In the photo, paratroopers free-falling over Pisa.



subordinated to negotiations, and hence more or less implicitly to obtaining the consent of the Soviet Union, against whose threat the decisions are taken. Things have not reached this point yet, of course, but there is a dangerous reversal of the relationship that ought to exist between détente and deterrence. Détente should depend on deterrence. But when this is reversed, the outcome is inevitably "self-deterrence" on the part of Europe. The Soviet Union could hope to broaden its area of influence without risking direct conflict, creating a new Soviet European security system from the Ural to the Atlantic. Large sections of public opinion are already more worried about the West's defence effort than about the way the Soviets are stepping up their military apparatus. Some even feel that the Euro-missiles are a greater threat than the SS 20s.

At least subconsciously, the West's military instruments have no legitimacy or justifiable purpose for large sections of the public in the Alliance. Indeed,

they feel that they might make détente with the Soviet bloc even more difficult. One factor weighing heavily here is that in order to justify the financial and social cost of defence, governments have sometimes overstated their case and magnified the threat. There is therefore a widespread conviction that Europe cannot be adequately defended at all, whatever military effort may be made. This weakens the legitimacy of the Western military institutions, because public opinion doubts whether they could guarantee an effective response to the threat. It is therefore all the more necessary to take farsighted action and tell the public exactly what the situation is, to make Western public opinion and governments (and even military circles in some cases) aware of the real strategic situation, the possibility of adopting effective defence systems at an acceptable cost, and to prevent the West's material strength from being emptied from within by a lack of will to defend itself. We have to avoid both being carried along by

enthusiasm and cheating, and losing heart. The sense of bewilderment caused by all the official and differing information from so many different sources (think of the discrepancies between the NATO, Pentagon and WEU documents on Soviet force strength statistics, for example) is much more dangerous than realistically spelling out the situation and Soviet potential as it is. Even though the Soviet potential is worrying and threatening, steps can be taken to offset it, at a cost that Europe can afford. In other words, it does not seem that the Soviets are either dwarfs or giants.

Another reason for the weakened legitimacy of the West's military institutions is the changed value system. Individualism and pessimism prevail today, and they have upset the balance between individual rights and community duty, which is the base on which every democratic system is built. In particular, the concept of authority has been watered down, and any attempt to rationalize is seen as undue meddling, and

even an outrage. In political terms, this is causing the breakdown of society because of a corporatist conflict which is being continually fuelled by sections of society that have the strongest bargaining hand, and who control the vital areas of an economic system which is becoming increasingly organized and hence more vulnerable. In military terms, the watering down or rejection of the concept of authority is leading to a decline in the discipline needed for the functioning of the Armed Forces and, consequently, a decline in the internal cohesion of the Services. Then there is the fact that the values of the welfare state, designed to bring social justice and hence create greater social cohesion, have ceased to be means and have become ends in themselves. The only justification for the existence of these values seems to be that they offer immediate material welfare, regardless of the repercussions on the future. Keynesian theories for the production of greater wealth have degenerated, often serving solely as an alibi for high inflation levels, and are only able to give an illusory, temporary sensation of greater well-being. So long as the economy thrived it was possible to meet everyone's needs adequately. With zero growth, however, a far-reaching rethink becomes necessary sooner or later. Western European countries are now going through a transitional phase. The most irrational expectations have now become acquired rights, and these acquired rights have become ends in themselves. But in peacetime,

the utility of military institutions is not very evident. Taking away financial resources from other "social" uses is therefore becoming increasingly less acceptable, and the Welfare State is being set off against the Warfare State.

This leads to tensions that will inevitably have repercussions on the political possibility of meeting Europe's security requirements.

External legitimacy can be increased only by general political action. This process takes a long time, particularly in countries like Italy, where there are not any strong military traditions, and where the process of creating the sense of nationhood among the masses is still not fully complete.

It should be noted in this regard that there are encouraging signs of the emergence of a sense of national identity. This is the reaction of a hardworking

race, as Italians are, to the threat of falling into a state of underdevelopment, and to the crisis which the country is going through — a crisis that is not only economic, but also cultural, spiritual and institutional — and a reaction to the degradation of civil society in which there is a real risk of a fragmentation of society itself and of its ruling elites. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the only way out of the present difficulties is to create greater national cohesion, and from this stems the enhanced legitimacy of the rôle of the Armed Forces. Indeed, this increases the perception of the interests to be defended, and their importance. It is obvious that national values are not, and cannot be, the exclusive property of the army. No-one has asked the army to take them into trust. But strengthened national values give the Armed Forces greater


Left.

The duties of the Armed Forces are: to defend their country, to protect its institutions, and to come to the aid of the civilian people in times of serious disasters.

In the photo: an NCO checks a voter's electoral certificate.

Right.

Soldiers helping the police at a road-block.





support, stimulus and legitimacy. Like any other State institution, the Forces have their own rôle to play to develop and enhance the sense of State and nationhood.

Internal legitimacy

The members of the Armed Forces are also citizens, with certain constraints on their freedom; they are also taxpayers, without any constraints on their duties. Evidently, the motives that affect external legitimacy also affect internal legitimacy, which constitutes the basis of the disciplinary and spiritual cohesion of the military instrument. The military profession is not autonomous. It is wholly subordinate to the political branch, which establishes its goals, decides whether it is to be used, and lays down the general guidelines to which its structure must conform, as well as its system of values and strategic doctrine.

After WW2, the emergence of expert civilian strategists has

taken away the military's exclusive right to professional know-how. As the strategic dimensions have grown and the global strategy — of which the military strategy is only one component part, and often a less important part than the economic, psychological strategy, etc. — has become established, the military profession has lost some of its specificity. Servicemen no longer have the only say on military matters as they used to have in the past. The natural temptation to dig in their heels in reaction to this has led many military men to broaden their horizons and to broaden their own specific strategy to encompass the global strategy. (Clearly, they have to realize the political, economic and social implications of the problems they have to deal with, and the spin-offs of their technical decisions in the same sectors). Very often, this has given rise to very unusual results. The military tend to occupy themselves with global strategy, namely, general State security policy, sometimes neglecting the aspects that have

An AB 205 multirole tactical helicopter, fitted with a 7.62 mm machine gun and 7-cell 50 mm rocket launcher. The AB 205 can carry 13 soldiers plus the crew, at a maximum cruising speed of 222 km/h, and has a range of 580 kms.

traditionally been within their sphere of competence. Some civilians on the other hand — not so much in Italy, where there is a traditional separation between culture and "politics" and also because the Italian intellectuals have a certain aversion to dealing with military problems other than in such general and ideological terms, that they are completely useless — tend to occupy themselves with the details regarding orders and tactical regulations, as they have done in the United States, particularly in the Sixties and Seventies.

At the heart of these intellectual exercises there is undoubtedly a subconscious tendency on the part of the military to seek to justify themselves in the eyes of public opinion now that war has lost its former character as the normal and

recurrent means of solving disputes between States. Although this attitude is in itself fairly harmless, it does give a further boost to the demilitarization of the army and robs the members of the Forces of part of the only ideological force that can really give them legitimacy: the ability to train seriously, running risks where necessary, to develop to the full their ability to fight when, where and how the politicians decide — which is the whole *raison d'être* of the military institution. If the military can do anything at all to ensure peace, it is to prepare seriously to wage war. If they do not subsequently wage war, because the politicians have so decided, all the better. It is only the sense of their rôle and social function that can make the military efficient, functional and motivated.

But in this way, they run another huge risk, which was illustrated with a masterful paradox by Gen. Le Borgne, the former director of the Institut de Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale (11). The risk, according to him, is that the military might end up by thinking that they are intelligent and act accordingly, which would jeopardize the cohesion of the army, the solidity of the hierarchy and the subordination of the military to the politicians. The military institution can only be genuinely efficient and function properly by intelligently using a given level of "stupidity". The military must obviously be aware of the need for this, because they will otherwise mistake stupidity (ie. conformism, yes-manism, perfecting routine, ceremonial and symbolism) for intelligence (particularly if it enables the less bright members to carve out a career for themselves, which is another big temptation). Obviously he was speaking paradoxically, and the careful reader will certainly construe the spirit of this, and not take it literally. But I think that joking about serious things is one of the best ways of stressing their fundamental importance.

The idea of finding alternative uses for the army — Civil

Defence, policing or to instil a sense of civic duty into the citizens — is often paraded around with great show to attract greater support for it. But these are too secondary in importance to constitute a justification for the sacrifice that military life entails. No-one doubts the social utility of these duties, and the politicians and public are entitled to expect the army to perform them. But they are alternatives, and in themselves, they are inadequate to restore internal legitimacy to the military organization, and cannot bring about the cohesion of such a particular kind of social entity.

It is the quality of the hierarchy and the possibility for subordinates to look up to their superiors as models of moral behaviour that gives legitimacy to the institution in the eyes of the members. Only in this way can support be forested, discipline maintained and active participation stimulated.

Many things have changed today, of course. Technical and managerial skills are becoming increasingly indispensable as equipment and procedures grow in sophistication. But "management" is no substitute for "leadership". In units operating complex weapons, individual technicians possess professional skills that are certainly superior to the commander's; but it is only the human capability to command which is the real basis of the cohesion and motivation of the individual members, and this alone. It is not individual, professional skill in particular specialisms.

Neglect of this played a large part in creating the difficulties that the Americans faced in Vietnam (12). A military unit can never be changed into a corporation, or an army into a holding company. If they did, they would never be able to do battle. This does not mean that the army has to become an organization of "warrior monks". It only means that the army has a specific character, and ethical and symbolic values which cannot be ignored. The army cannot be "civilianized" — ie.

demilitarized — beyond a certain limit, in an attempt to become cogent with the values of civilian society, particularly if the latter is almost completely secularized. That would be to betray its functions and instead of increasing its legitimacy it would diminish it, not only internally but externally, too.

It is in this light that one has to view the problem of relations between the military and the politicians, or to be more precise, between the senior military authorities and the political authorities. This is a problem of substance, particularly in democratic societies, where the military and political elites come from different social and cultural backgrounds and where external political pluralism stands in contrast to the army's internal monolithism.

The main point is the political control of the Armed Forces (13). External and internal subjective control would destroy the cohesion of the Armed Forces and give rise to the risk of political activism on the part of the military. External objective control is basically ineffective beyond a certain stage. The only really workable solution is internal objective control, or "self-control", where the military's dependence on the politicians is obtained by sublimating professional skills and extolling the military ethos, namely the moral obligation incumbent on the military to be obedient and efficient servants of the State. The problem is very similar to the problem of the intelligent and conscientious use of military "stupidity" that I referred to earlier.

Evidently, this imposes serious responsibilities on the chain of command, which must not mistake means for ends and become an end in itself, viewing command as a privilege instead of as a service the national community, and to its own subordinates (14). The essence of command is not authority, but responsibility. Byzantine-style vainglorying, settling for second best for a quiet life or career advancement or indulging in time-consuming and resource-



A VCC-2 in action. Note the lateral gun slits and the main armament - a 12.7 mm machine gun.

consuming trifles are particularly destructive of the military institution's internal legitimacy. Even though they may not exactly provoke a reaction on the part of subordinates, they nevertheless create passive resistance, malaise and resignation. The same effects are also caused by permissiveness and laxism, or the failure to punish failings and omissions, and this demoralizes the best, and the most enthusiastic and skilled men.

Efficacy

An institution of any kind is only acceptable if it is able to perform the duties entrusted to it. The Armed Forces, as an institution, have to guarantee defence; but they can only prevent aggression if they have a credible operational capability. Their efficacy is also the basis of their internal and external legitimacy. Efficacy, in this connec-

tion, is the way in which the members of the Armed Forces achieve a sense of self-fulfilment, and justifies the burden of conscription in the eyes of the younger generation. Quite clearly, efficacy cannot be considered in an absolute sense; it is a relative value. The Armed Forces must guarantee adequate defence in accordance with the importance of what they have to defend, and at acceptable costs and risks. This is a key issue in the defence strategy of the individual Western countries and those belonging to the Atlantic Alliance, particularly after the emergence of weapons of mass destruction which would have effects far outweighing any political objective if used indiscriminately. The basic problem is how to integrate tactical nuclear weapons and conventional forces, and how far it is possible to design a deterrence strategy which is also a plausible defence strategy, to be implemented if deterrence were to fail.

In this article, it is clearly impossible to examine in detail the complex problems involved. Suffice it to have mentioned them. There is, however, no doubt that the nation-State is still the

basic element in which the cohesion expressed by the Armed Forces is realized (despite the impossibility of solving the security issues in purely national terms, and the need to fit them into an Alliance, like NATO). The efficacy and plausibility of the military institution must be appraised essentially at national level. The more "nationalized" the strategy, the greater the cohesion and consensus enjoyed by the Armed Forces by both the individual national communities and their own members. As far as the air/land defence of Italy's NE frontier is concerned, this aspect is particularly appropriate for emphasis because the frontier is held by the forces of one single nation, unlike the Central Region where the defence system is markedly multinational. It is only if the Armed Forces are sound that one can have a community defence capacity, with effective public participation.

The enlightening words that Giolitti addressed to the Chamber in 1909, during the debate on the provision of supplementary appropriations to enable the army to renew the artillery, are still as relevant today: "In foreign policy relations, whether the country remains neutral or relies solely on friends or whether we intend to set up alliances, it is absolutely necessary to ensure that our strength is commensurate with our country's importance ... Friendships have a value according to their strength, and the friendship of a weak country is not held in esteem. An alliance is then impossible, because no-one wants a weak ally, and any such alliance would have to guarantee the existence of the weak ally without any contribution of force in exchange. So whatever policy we follow, the country must have the force that is cogent with its means, its population, its territory, and consistent with its political aims" (15). Not to have an adequate military force in an alliance often means paying for the guarantees supplied by others in political and economic terms,

costing far more in the end than a reasonable military capability would cost.

Final remarks

The ideology of the welfare society, the change in the value systems of modern societies, the economic crisis and the world political-strategic situation have thrown down challenges and caused problems for the Armed Forces in the West. The response that they make will determine Western Europe's chances of surviving as an autonomous political entity.

These challenges have to do with both the legitimacy and the efficacy of the military institutions. The only responses that are reasonably possible would seem to be to proceed to "remilitarize" the Armed Forces, in the face of certain opposing tendencies that threaten to rob them of any combat capability and to transform them into inanimate technological bodies. While we are on this subject, it is necessary for strategy to recover its operational and historical dimensions and give up the analytical, technological and managerial deviations that we can see in various quarters. Military culture has to be revived, and the military security system has to recover its national dimension, reversing the denationalizing trends that prevailed immediately after the war. In a country like Italy, moreover, a greater "nationalization" of defence could facilitate the process of participation in the masses' sense of being one — a sense that has never fully caught on since the Unification of Italy, and which seems to be increasingly necessary not only to backstop defence but also for the nation's civic and economic recovery and to consolidate the State against every degenerative and divisive tendency. Only by so doing can the Armed Forces reacquire their efficiency and credibility, become a dynamic component of the nation, and overcome the present crisis situation.

As from now, we have to work to create the conditions within the Forces that will enable them to carry out this rôle, enhancing the degree of participation of their members in the life of the institution, pruning the dead branches, doing away with some of the "pen-pushing", and creating an active, dynamic atmosphere full of idealism, where professional skills are properly appreciated.


As far as relations with society are concerned, the Armed Forces must maintain their specificity and hence diversity, even though they must minimize the differences in order to attract support and consensus. Being different does not mean being separate, or autonomous, with the danger of being set off against civilian society, cut off from the outside world and with poor internal communications.

Gen. Carlo Jean

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- (5) R. Aron, "Plaidoyer pour l'Europe décadente", Laffont, Paris, 1977.
- (6) M. Howard, "Western Defence in the 1980s - Conditions for Consensus", paper delivered to the 24th annual II.SS. conference, The Hague, 9-12 September 1982.
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- (8) G. Harries-Jenkins, "Armed Forces and the Welfare State" in M. Janowitz (ed.), "Civil-Military Relations", Sage Publications, London, 1981.
- (9) In 1861, while the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy was adopted by Parliament, the constitution of the Italian Army was simply decreed by a circular of the Minister of War (see Bachelet, "Disciplina militare e ordinamento giuridico statale", Giuffrè, Milan, 1962, p. 68).
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THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF THE WELFARE STATE



IL SOLDATO ITALIANO DELL'OTTOCENTO

NELL'OPERA DI QUINTO CENNI

PRESENTATION BY GIOVANNI SPADOLINI

After the book on "Uniforms" we have here this "Italian Soldier in the Nineteenth Century" as seen by a single artist. An unpretentious and passionate artist, an artist who never worked for a public, an artist unknown to most Italians: Quinto Cenni. A contribution of scientific value to historical interpretation and evaluation. These are — also in Benedetto Croce's words — a veritable problem, for the Italian soldier of the Nineteenth Cen-

tury belongs to history, to our civil and military history, which is the object — both in Quinto Cenni's watercolours and Edmondo De Amicis' writings — of the same cult: the civil religion of the Third Italy.

Quinto Cenni: a Milanese born in Romagna, who was never a soldier and nevertheless spent his life portraying the military customs. Just like Salgari: never a sailor and never a corsair, but endowed with the spirit that also animates the writings of De Amicis' a Piedmontese who had been an infantry officer and served assisting those stricken with cholera.


The book "Cuore", the sketches on military life, the

books describing the travels of this "Savoyard Socialist" — as De Amicis was often called — are, along the ascending path of the initiation and formation of our unitary conscience, almost the beginning of a lay catechism, where the patriotic systicism conceives sacrifice as the highest moment for the strengthening of a moral character.

It is not surprising that "Cuore" was a moral code for at least two generations of Italians, after Italy's unification.

Italy — or "Italiotta" as it was derogatorily called — a nation constantly confronted with its own limits and inadequacies, which, nevertheless, after many mistakes and decep-





tions, formed the conviction that, without a considerable amount of valour and sacrifice, it would never become a nation with a modern mentality and modern habits.

The valuable conquests, which were its goals, had not been attained yet: they were an objective, a process in the making, an ideal pointed at and pursued, not firmly established. Precisely as in D'Azeglio's motto.

The army becomes the political and spiritual symbol of this love for the Fatherland, a sign of unity and independence, a powerful unifying cement, and also an example of virility. In "Cuore" the two major protagonists are the army and the schoolteachers, the military class and the teaching class, which

were the regular clergy and the lay clergy of the new Italian nation.

Through its most qualified representative, the national society is reflected by De Amicis' pages, surrounded by a fairy tale aura, in a poetic atmosphere which magnifies its dimensions and meaning.

The balance between the bourgeoisie and the working class, between the children of the rich and the children of the poor, between the young, living in a comfortable home and those living in a garret, is perfectly preserved throughout the book; the little chimney sweeper and the school's best pupil, the child-mason and the boy copyst, the man injured on his job and the sick teacher, the worker receiv-

ing a reward and the rickety child, they all alternate and mix, almost representing a new mutual understanding, a new social harmony.

Without stating a paradox, we would say that at the foundation of "Cuore" there is a veritable philosophy, a conscious conception of life seen from an enlightened lay point of view: help replaces charity, teachers replace priests, the school takes the place of the seminar, the hospital confronts the hospice, the military service substitutes for the religious culture, and the physical exercises assume the importance of the old "spiritual exercises".

The national problems find in that singular book their mirror, their reflection, their pedagogic


and lyric transfiguration: emigration in the story "From the Apennines to the Andes"; the problems of the South in the "Boy from Calabria"; the social achievements in the pages about the "Workers Friends" and the apotheosis of the "Workshop", the myth of the Monarchy in the evocation of "Victor Emmanuel II's funeral". Love of books, love of one's country, love for mankind (the three great forces of the lay pedagogy, where Mazzini's thought intertwined with the liberal tradition) attained in De Amicis' writing a degree of tension and vibration never reached again.

Through the books various scenes and characters, from the home of the injured man to Stardi's library, we see the fundamental components of the liturgy of the Country, the myth of the State based on civil — rather than religious-solidarity, on a bourgeois — rather than clerical — brotherhood. It is not by chance that this memorable book ends with the glorification of the day of the Statute, the great celebration of the *Nativity* of the Country.

The "Little Lombard Vedette", taken by itself, is more touching than all the stories on the Risorgimento, all the jubilees, all monuments and statues. The posthumous encounter between Victor Emmanuel II and Mazzini, Monarchy and revolution, was largely the work of Edmondo De Amicis, the Alfonso de' Liguri of the national education, the Calasanzio of the Kingdom, the lay missionary of the young Italy.

A nation where the public school — the State school — is on an equal standing with the Armed Forces, a strong cement in the construction of the national conscience. With the national conscription, the new generations, especially those from the poorest areas, come into contact with the new realities of a nation which is living its first experiences as a unitary state.

And we see in the illustrations of the Italian soldier of the XIX century an image of this Italy, civil and modest, shy and



proud, which had been through many a sorrow and nurtured many hopes, unbalanced in its social structures and in its regional differences, but attracted by this new model of unitary organization, yet to be realized on the extremely thin thread of the Risorgimento's conquests.

Italy, despite everything, despite delays and contradictions, was changing so much, that Gladstone — an observer

neither generous nor naive — compared it with France and its transformations between 1789 and Napoleon's Empire.

Also in the uniforms portrayed by Quinto Cenni there are evident signs of these transformations.

The Italian Army — this was the name it was given after the disbandment of the Sardinian Army, on May 4, 1861 — does not wear the showy uniforms of the



Risorgimento's wars: it is the time of sober colours, brightened only by corps or rank badges and some accessories (the feathers of the Bersaglieri, the cap of the Alpini, the generals' helmet which, in imitation of Kaiser Wilhelm's Army, is adorned with an eagle and white plumes).

It is the Army where the conscripts, having overcome the first impact with the barracks, feel they are part of an institu-

tion which gives them their primary education, in a country still marked by a diffuse illiteracy.

Quinto Cenni brush catches every detail in the uniforms of the new Italian army; there is the accuracy and precision of someone who has a feeling for what he draws and paints.

In the three hundred water-colours presented by "Rivista Militare" in this enlightening and revealing book, there is the

artistic message of a patriot who sees in the soldier an irreplaceable reference for the new Italy, collective work of a moral action, erected with the contribution of the Armed Forces, with their secular devotion.

A moral and political construction that our memory relives as a process of awareness of civil growth, in the light of an inspiring example which is always living history.



Le uniformi del Regio Esercito Italiano

1898-1902

Rivista Militare

Every uniform reflects the spirit of the army in a specific historical moment, and the relationship between military traditions and civilian customs is very closely connected with the succession of fashions, which are preceded or followed by the uniforms, in a surprising flourishing of styles and modes.

Convinced of this — continuing its programme of research, which has already enabled "Rivista Militare" to publish the volume "The Italian Armies from the pre-unitarian States to the national unification" — the magazine has started, in 1985, a study of the Italian Army's uniforms. They are of remarkable aesthetic interest and, above all, have moral contents concurring with the ideals that motivate the soldier.

The series reproduced in this book, which is in possession of Rome's National Museum of Castel Sant'Angelo, consists of 67 photographic plates, retouched and hand-painted with the watercolour technique, in the absolute respect of the original colours. Made by the Lavazzano photographic studio of Rome, the set was delivered to the Museum of the War Ministry in 1932; it is not known whether the photographer was also the author of the subsequent colouring or whether this exceptional operation was carried out by somebody else.


The photographs represent officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men — of all corps, services and institutes of the army — wearing the uniforms established by the Regulation of 1880 and modified by Act n. 101 of May 16, 1895, in force until 1902.

An aspect of these photographs, increasing their rarity and importance — not only for those who are especially interested in this specific field, but also for all students of that particular period — is the great difficulty in finding original material representing single individuals and not groups. At the end of the century, in fact, photography was a valid "message" sent by the soldiers to their families, a witness of their service in uniform; the photographs still existing are therefore widely spread and scattered in private collections.

The work of filing the photographs and the individuation of the various Corps has been carried out, for the first time, during the preparation of this volume which, as a whole, is an absolute novelty.

It has the merit of bringing back to light real images of our military tradition.

Non-subscribers will be able to purchase the book either at full price, or with a 20% discount if they send this form together with a request for subscription to "Rivista Militare" and a remittance of Lit. 24,000 (or U.S. \$ 12 - D.M. 36 - F.F. 100), by cheque or international money order, addressed to: Stato Maggiore Esercito - Rivista Militare - Sezione di Amministrazione - Via XX Settembre 123/A - 00187 Roma (Italy).



THE ROYAL ITALIAN ARMY

1940 - 1943

The announcement made on 10 June 1940 that Italy has entered the war against Great Britain and France is received with enthusiasm and at the same time some embarrassment. The vague and rather unclear motives given — the need to solve the problem of the so-called maritime frontiers and free access to the oceans — awkwardly try to hide the real reasons which made the Prime Minister decide to allow the country to slide into a conflict which is obviously going to be both long and all-involving. Not a few perceive that mere futile motives of prestige in connection with the German ally and an erroneous evaluation of the adversaries' potential are acting as detonators to a terrible explosion. Also and particularly in military circles, which are well aware of the true situation, the incorrect evaluation of the situation for such an arduous task appears immediately evident.

The truth is that the General Staff, instead of being the directing and deciding body, is forced to accept the rôle of coordinator and rationalist of the improvisations of the Prime Minister who as head of the government is Supreme Commander, representing the King. With sudden and unexpected decisions the Prime Minister orders attacks in succession and in a short period of time on France, Greece and Yugoslavia, in addition to proceeding with the offensive in North Africa and East Africa. Such an undertaking is far from easy since practically no previous plans exist and the deployment of the large units is rendered particularly difficult by the dispersion of and distance between the operational areas, by an insecure and insufficient communications system and by the extremely limited resources. Thus, as the conflict develops and the number of enemies increases, the loss of direction and the awareness of powerlessness make themselves felt more and

more as it is by now evident that the lack of a clearly defined strategy is inexorably accelerating the process of wearing down the Italian war machine.

The unfortunate campaigns in Africa and in Russia demonstrate without doubt, already in the second year of the war, that any hope of victory is no longer realistic.

Soldiers, with the admirable intuition which characterizes them, understand the situation but do not give up the struggle. They realize that they can only hope to fight for their honour and they continue to sacrifice themselves in desperate conditions in the desire to follow to the bitter end the fate of the old and glorious regiments.

ITALIAN

MILITARY

UNIFORMS

In September 1943 Italy is united in an irrepressible desire for freedom and peace and thus decides to cease the fight against the allied powers and recognize her defeat.

As set out in the law dated 9 May 1940 the Italian Army which fights the Second World War is organized as follows: six army commands, eighteen army corps, one motorized army corps, one armoured army corps, one corps of "Celere" (swift) and one senior command of "alpini" troops, 54 infantry divisions, 2 motorized divisions, 3 armoured divisions, 5 "alpini" divisions, 3 "Celere" divisions, 3 carabinieri divisions, 16 territorial defence divisions and 28 military zones comprising 7 carabinieri brigades, 29 carabinieri "legions", 3 grenadier regiments, 106 infantry regiments, 12 "bersaglieri" regiments, 10 "alpini" regiments, 6 tank regiments, 13 cavalry regiments, 54 artillery regiments attached to infantry divisions, 2 artillery regiments attached to motorized divisions, 3 artillery regiments attached to armoured divisions, 5 artillery regiments attached to "alpini" divisions, 3 attached to "Celere" divisions, 9 attached to the G.A.F. ("Guardia alla Frontiera" - Frontier Guard), 18 regiments for each army corps, 5 for each army and 5 anti-aircraft regiments, 18 engineers regiments, 2 miners, 2 pontoniers, 1 railway engineers regiment and 1 chemical warfare regiment, 116 districts and 3 inspectorates (infantry-artillery-engineers).

During the war the quantity and type of large and small units varies considerably with large increases, at least from a merely numerical point of view, in the case of paratroop divisions and of the 25 coastal divisions and decreases, often rather considerable, due to the losses in combat.

The wartime uniform worn by officers of the Army are dealt with by

the regulations included in a detailed circular, dated August 1940, which sets out the measures to be followed to simplify dress by the removal of or reduction in ornamentation and at the same time specifies the uniforms to be worn by the troops. In particular, cap badges are embroidered in black thread, tunic collars are all in grey-green cloth (either in "castorino" material or velvet but always grey-green), since the use of velvet and cloth in the colour of the various corps is abolished. In addition, badges worn on lapels are considerably reduced in size and sometimes of a new shape while at the same time maintaining old traditions.


Rank insignia are also reduced in size and are made of yellow thread (white for generals and for carabinieri) on field caps repeating the use of the five-pointed star already adopted, and on sleeves, where rank insignia are now located on the cuff and reduced proportionally in size. Divisional or area badges are definitely abolished and medal ribbons continue to be worn but of a smaller size. Grey-green bakelite buttons

replace all metal buttons; the stripes and piping worn on the trousers of officers and warrant officers respectively are eliminated as is the piping on shoulder-straps and on cuffs.

However, the circular accepts the use of pre-war uniform until worn out, as long as the changes regarding collars and buttons are made. Thus, the previous rank insignia, trouser stripes and piping are kept in use in these cases. In this connection, one cannot help but note that these regulations, as issued, result in continuous differences even between officers belonging to the same unit. If to this is added the fact

1940 - Corporal of the 73rd "Lombardia" infantry regiment in wartime uniform.

At the time of mobilization the traditional blue tie is discarded and in its place, a woollen tassel of the same colour is attached to the small hole at the top of the closed zip.



1940 - Private, mountain artillery, in wartime uniform.


During the war years there is a tendency on the part of the mountain artillery to wear special collar badges. In fact, some batteries unofficially adopt the green "flames" of the "alpini" troops but with a yellow background; others wear the standard flame on a green rectangular background, sometimes with yellow piping.



1940 - Lieutenant-colonel of the General Staff, in wartime full uniform.

During the war years, officers continue to wear the blue sash and decorations while NCOs and troops wear decorations only.

1941 - Officer cadet of the Infantry reserve, in winter walking-out uniform.
The uniforms in use before the outbreak of war are mostly confirmed for teaching institutes and academies.



1941 Engineers captain, in wartime uniform.

During the war, officers often replace their boots with shoes and grey-green woollen socks.



1942 - Private, Tank Corps, in duty wartime summer dress.

The personnel on armoured vehicles receive in distribution special clothing more appropriate for their particular needs. The helmet and jacket are in black leather while the overalls, usually in metal-blue cotton, can also be grey or grey-green.



1942 - Sergeant, 1st Field Artillery Regiment, in wartime uniform.

Since the unit has been attached to the 51st and 52nd Infantry Regiments ("Cacciatori delle Alpi" division - Alps' Riflemen Division), the green collar badges and red tie worn by infantry are used.

1942 - 3rd Regiment "Bersaglieri", in uniform.


During the hot months troops deployed in operational zones wear practical and functional dress, although not altogether according to regulations.



1941 - Officer and private of the
5th Regiment "Lancieri di Novara", in
wartime uniform.

*As a result of the 1940 regulation, for
the first time in their history the lancers
wear the three-pointed "flames" and
discard the traditional plain collar in
the regimental colour previously worn.
On mobilization the lances are handed
in and kept in the unit depots.*





1942 - "Alpino", in winter wartime dress.

The "alpini" operating in snow-covered areas receive in distribution special overalls and helmet covers in white coarse cloth. However, owing to the restricted availability of these items the distribution is almost always limited to ski units of the "alpini" regiments.

1943 - Paratrooper, in normal uniform.

The practical and smart uniform foreseen for paratroop units is remarkably different from the regulations in force and is perhaps the only example of effective modernization in this field. The parachute, embroidered in yellow thread, attached to the left arm denotes that the soldier recently gained his jumping brevet.

that at least during the years 1940 and 1941 depots continued to distribute to the mobilized troops peacetime uniforms which had not been altered, it is easy to imagine the disorderly appearance of the units.

Collar badges foreseen at the time of mobilization for all ranks are as follows: embroidery for carabinieri, embroidery for grenadiers, divisional badges for the infantry, badges on a blue cloth rectangle for motorized infantry and machine-gun units, two-pointed "flames" for bersaglieri and alpini, two-pointed scarlet "flames" on a blue rectangle for tank troops, three-pointed "flames" (with or without the cloth rectangle in the regimental colour) for regiments and training schools and for cavalry depots, two-pointed "flames" on blue cloth rectangle for light tank battalions, one-pointed "flames" for artillery (placed on the distinctive badge for regiments attached to infantry divisions, on a green cloth rectangle for special mountain troops and a blue cloth rectangle for motorized and armoured troops), one-pointed "flames" for engineers (with the same variations as for the artillery), one-pointed "flames" in green cloth backed by the colour of the corps (infantry, artillery and engineers) for the "Guardia alla Frontiera", badges for the chemical warfare unit (on blue cloth rectangle for motorized divisions), two-pointed black "flames" on blue cloth rectangle for motor transport corps, one-pointed "flames" for the medical service (on green or blue or divisional rectangle according to the unit) and for the ordnance corps (with cloth rectangles in colour as for the medical corps), rectangular badge for infantry not incorporated in the regiments and for districts personnel and, finally, one-pointed "flames" for the territorials and local garrison troops.

Insufficiencies in reinforcements and in supplies appear at an early stage, also as regards clothing and equipment, and the situation becomes unbearable. Shoes are a further problem and the different series of clothing according to the various climates of the differing operational areas, varying from extreme heat to extreme cold. These obstacles prove practically unsurmountable for the supply organization on account of the serious scarcity of the necessary raw materials as well as owing to the unexpectedness of certain requirements as a result of sudden and untimely political decisions.

Only a careful, patient and generous soldier such as the Italian fighting man could struggle honourably for long years with so many difficulties of a practical order and despite the painful realization of the inferiority of means when compared against the large quantities of goods available to the German allies and to the enemies. Similar bitter statements can be made as regards armament, both light and heavy, often so inadequate as to arouse unbelieving surprise on the part of foreigners.

Gen. Valerio Gibellini

RIVISTA MILITARE EUROPEA



Each issue of Rivista Militare Europea consists of:

- a booklet with drawings portraying the uniforms of one of the EMPA (European Military Press Association) countries;
- two loose pages with 9 figures each, enclosed in the booklet, printed on adhesive paper for collection in a special album.

The booklets can be bound into an elegant volume titled "Il soldato europeo dell'Ottocento" (The European soldier of the 19th century); binders of the volume will be on sale shortly.

The figures can be collected in the "Album delle Uniformi", titled "Gli eserciti tedeschi dal 1838 al 1843" (The German armies from 1838 to 1843) which is on sale at the price of Lit. 5,000.

Purpose of the "Rivista Militare Europea" is to make the European Armed Forces and their traditions better known.

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The coming issues will be on the uniforms of Germany, Great Britain, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland.

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
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MARINE ADVANCED SENSOR BUOY


A new system, the "Marine Advanced Sensor Buoy" has been presented lately.

The unit uses a special platform and can operate both in day and night time conditions, for the control of surface and underwater traffic, as well as for the protection of oil bases, ports, coasts and all types of shore installations.

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
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
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G. Stefanon: "White Men against Red Men". The wars for the conquest of the Great American West (1830-1890)", U. Mursia Ed., Milano, 1985, pp. 512, Lit. 30,000.

The book pursues two aims which, in a sense, are new: outlining an overall picture of the political, strategic and military aspects of the conflicts which, in the 60 years under examination, have bathed the Great West in blood, and reconstructing the peak event of those wars, the "tip of the iceberg" of which everybody has heard, and which everybody thinks to know: the battle of Little Big Horn between the Sioux and Cheyenne braves led by Sitting Bull, and the squadrons of the 7th Cavalry Regiment of the United States, under the Command of Lt. Col. George A. Custer.

After a brief sketch of the environment, of the opposing societies and cultures and of the characters involved, the Author outlines the causes of the long and harsh conflicts between whites and redskins in the years from 1830 to 1890, and locates the first spark in the Sand Creek massacre, a treacherous attack launched by Col. John M. Chivington, a former Methodist minister, against a Cheyenne village, where tens of defenceless people were savagely murdered.

This tragic episode was the beginning of a long series of chain reactions, which spread over the immense territories of the West with the devastating force of an apocalyptic fire, destroying an incalculable amount of human lives, goods and wealth.

Then, the Author recounts the fights engaged by the American Army in the three large geographical sectors where the conquest of the West took place: in the north against the Sioux, Cheyenne and Pierced Nose nations; in the

center-south against the five southern tribes: Kiowa, Comanche, Arapaho, Southern Cheyenne and Prairie Apache and on the south-west against the Apache, Modoc and Klamath tribes. We must mention that the ways and purpose of the military actions and how these were conducted in immense, very different and distant geographical areas, are things that perhaps the Italian reader will find hard to understand in full.

In the North, the whites' thrust was initially aimed at acquiring gold and other precious metals, abundant in those territories; in the center-south, the motivation was the wish to get hold of the extremely rich virgin land which the whites wanted to cultivate, and the need to build the first railways from the Atlantic to the Pacific; in the south-west, after the inebriation of the gold rush in California, the purpose was to strengthen the settlements established many years before, on a land that also the whites considered their own, since they rightly considered themselves Americans in America.

Many aspects underlined by the Author are little known to the readers at large. The fact that the American Army has never been able to defeat on the field the proud, brave and very skilled warriors of the north-western tribes; the planned and deliberate fragmentation of the Great Prairies — where the center-southern tribes lived — which culminated in the extermination of the bison, carried out in order to subdue the red-skin enemies, reducing them to hunger and starvation; the "extermination policy", carried out against the tribes of the south-west, which went on with discontinuous results and ended with the mass deportation of the indomitable Apaches to faraway Florida.

The book ends with short notes on the life of the Indian populations in the America of the 20th century, linking the past with the present. At the centre of all these events there is the campaign of 1876, described very clearly in its causes, development and results, and a figure stands out, that of George Armstrong Custer, perhaps "the most overvalued character in the history of the United States". Availing himself of ample documentary sources — mostly unpublished in Italy — the Author describes the peculiar vicissitudes of Custer's military career, outlines the salient aspects of his character, his ambitions and impulses, his weaknesses and virtues, and introduces the man in the war events which brought him, carried by a fatal destiny, to that 25th June 1876 and to the fight against the Sioux, near the Little Big Horn river.

The book has a significant merit also from the documentary viewpoint: it has 20 appendixes with the reproductions of documents, for the most part unpublished in Italy, taken from the libraries and National Archives of the United States; 30 maps and topographic

sketches of the ground where the battle took place, which help the reader find his way in the vastness of the North American continent and keep the indispensable connection between facts and places; more than hundred photographs, which support our imagination in the reconstruction of places, faces and feelings and help us to participate, with a better understanding, in the fantastic saga of the mythical and unforgettable Great American West.

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FRED KAPLAN

"The Wizards of Armageddon". By Fred Kaplan. 452 pages. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1983, \$ 21.95 (paperback, 1984, \$ 9.95).

"For thirty years, a small group inside the U.S. strategic community has devised the plans and shaped the policies on how to use the bomb. This is their untold story".

These words, very effectively written astride the title on the front cover of the book, are themselves a brilliant summary and an appealing introduction to "The Wizards of Armageddon"; but yet, they don't pay the book all the tribute it deserves.

First of all, the book covers more than thirty years, as it starts with Bernard Brodie being struck — the morning of 7 August 1945 — by the news of the "first atomic bomb dropped on Japan". Then the book continues, almost as a chronicle — very accurate, detailed, and documented but at the same time very readable and captivating — in telling the evolution of the nuclear problem: from the significance of the weapons themselves and the concept on their value in avoiding conflicts, to the doctrines on an effective use of the weaponry in case of a nuclear war, and to the consequent measures and policies for building and structuring the forces



both as a credible deterrent and as effective means to fight and terminate a nuclear war. In doing so, especially in explaining some theoretical or environmental backgrounds, a few remarks date back to before 1945; while, on the other hand, the evolution of the "nuclear strategy", is updated to our times, as in the last chapter where reference is made to Secretary Weinberger's "Defense Guidance" of 1982.

Secondly, it is not just "a small group" who is depicted in the book as affected by or affecting the "nuclear strategy". Maybe small is the group of the major thinkers on the subjects, like Brodie, Shelling, Von Neumann, Wohlschlag, Kahn, Kaufmann; but in fact Mr. Kaplan involves in his story quite a crowd of scientists, analysts, strategists, and leaders, including the Presidents of the United States from Truman to Reagan and their main advisers, Secretaries and collaborators in the administration.

Hence, the book is also an account of one of the most powerful elites of our time: it discloses the events those people were involved in — and often responsible for, the bureaucratic mechanism and the sometimes harsh rivalry of their environment, the pressure for decisions they had to sustain, the outcome they provided in terms of studies, briefings, reports, policies, and strat-

egies; but also it describes the personalities of the major players, the intellectual, moral, psychological, professional, political biases which affected their thought process, the development of their own theories and the merging of the several individual approaches into the national posture.

The book consists of twenty-six chapters, an extensive series of endnotes (the reference system could be improved: it works only backwards, from the endnotes to the text), and a significant list of interviews, plus index, etc. All chapters are for some reason very interesting and, being mostly chronologically arranged, they are rather closely interconnected. The initial chapters set the main problems ("how many bombs are necessary?") in the era of American superiority. Then the 1950's overstretched mathematical theories are depicted and their consequences of an overestimated American vulnerability; thus the main concepts for the theory of nuclear war are presented: the bombers versus the ballistic missiles, the massive retaliation, the counterforce response, then the "no-cities targeting" as opposed to "all out destruction", and "controlled escalation", "flexible response", "finite deterrence", "assured destruction", "graduated reprisals" etc., the cost of civil defense, the first strike validity as op-


posed to a more cost-effective second strike, the ABM defense etc.. The last chapters deal with the 70's and early 80's; the basic questions still are: "how can a nuclear war be avoided?" and "how does one fight a nuclear war?"

Many other sources, far more authoritative than this review, have already decreed and assessed the value of "The Wizards"; its success is basically due to the facts that, because of being so understandable and absorbing, the book addresses the large public, thus spreading interest for such a vital issue of our times; but because of its technical details and accurate information, the book also addresses a knowledgeable and professional audience.

As such, and especially because of the comprehensive account on the evolution of the nuclear strategy, "the Wizards of Armageddon" should be regarded as a must for all those approaching strategic studies: they will find the book an indispensable guide on how to "think about the unthinkable", a useful reference for more detailed studies on "nuclear deterrence", "nuclear warfare", "advanced strategy", and a powerful source of reflection on the need to hopefully avoid, possibly delay, and eventually be prepared to, and survive Armageddon.

Alberto Ficuciello

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“THE STRATEGIC THOUGHT,”

Franco Angeli Editore, Milano.

INTRODUCTION BY CARLO JEAN

After WWII, especially in Western Europe, there has been a split between politico-military culture and strategic decision-making, and a separation between strategic theory and strategic praxis.

From the historic and political standpoint, the employment of a military force as regulating factor in the international relations, from which its instrumentality vis-à-vis politics derives, was considered less legitimate and acceptable or, more pragmatically, less expedient and feasible. Moreover, the European countries' frail conditions and their geo-strategic vulnerability seemed to render the planning of a security policy and an ensuing national strategy of defence quite unsuitable. Both were replaced by conceptions of collective and international security. A consistent acknowledgement of this new situation should have led to the establishment of “international” armies, under the command of the United Nations, or to “supernational” armies, such as that provided for by CED, with the ensuing transfer of the politico-military sovereignty to a level superior to that of the country-state. Once the choice was made in favour of international alliances such as NATO, a lesser variant of “collective security”, there still remained the problem of the asymmetry between the country-states' formal possession of a politico-military sovereignty and the formulation of a collective strategic thought and doctrine. In particular it was, and often still is, unduly taken for granted that the supernational alliances had the capability to formulate their own strategic decisions. Such decisions should in theory be unitary and answer a well defined overall collective interest, which should be univocal and capable of being determined separately from each individual member's interest. In reality, the decisions are influenced by the difference of perceptions, of geostrategic situations and by the involvement, also regarding the internal policy, of each partner in the Alliance. The “weight” that the visions of the individual state have in the formulation of the collective decisions is determined by the liberty of action and constraints of each nation: in sum, it depends on its strength and its weaknesses. It ensues that some of the assumptions which conferred autonomy and specificity to the strategic

thought of the preceding period loose their power. On one side, the “normality” of war in the international relations, cornerstone of the strategic thought's legitimacy; on the other, the national specificity of the military culture and consequently its close connection with the formulation of finalities and strategic plans.

From the technical-military point of view, the fracture between strategic thought and strategic praxis was also emphasized by the failure to integrate nuclear strategy — which is substantially grounded on a presupposed perfect bipolarism and on an assumed normativeness of the nuclear weapon — with the actual area of global strategy (in its geographical meaning). The latter is indeed larger and more flexible and is experiencing an ungovernable explosion of multipolarity. Among other things, the question has been influenced by: the tensions arisen inside the two blocs; the strategic instability deriving from the technological progress in the conventional and nuclear weapons; the vigorous reemergence of national realities; the Third World conflictuality; the global consequences of the recent decisions concerning the strengthening of Western security. The very stability of the bipolar system is endangered. The balances have changed. The technological progress in both conventional and nuclear weapons challenges some of our past certainties. The space-time dimensions of strategy have undergone a radical change. The advent of nuclear missiles has deeply affected the principles of the preceding strategic thought and has caused a dissociation between defence and deterrence. Before the nuclear era, defence and deterrence were both entrusted to the same weapons. Now, on the contrary, until we cannot avail ourselves of effective anti-missile defences, deterrence will be based mainly on the possibility to carry out retaliations with arms different from those actually employed for our defence. Defence itself is subordinated to retaliation. This situation, taken for granted until the '70s, is now being questioned: first of all by the prospects of a possible deployment of effective active strategic defences; second, by the development of new conventional weapons and finally, by the emergence of new strategic conceptions (the so-called

“alternative defences”), which aim at linking deterrence with real defensive power rather than with a simple retaliation against the aggressor.

As regards the scientific aspect proper, the strategic thought has been hurt by the failure to establish its own epistemology. Until the second world conflict the formulation of the strategic thought took place practically only within the military “corporation”. There was therefore a natural connection between theory and praxis, between cultural production and results, which, in a way, permitted one to ignore the question. Now the problem must be tackled, because the present strategic thought has to absorb a series of extraneous cultural contents which, clearly, it cannot control yet.

The result has been a cultural subordination of the “military corporation”, pragmatically resolved with the dissociation of concrete strategic decisions — which are traditionally developed within the military sphere — from the internal strategic culture. The latter, for its part, lacks unity and synthesis. Not only did the contributions coming from the most different doctrines fail to mix with the cultural production of the military world, but they did not even find an element of convergence and agreement among themselves. Each one of these “sectorial” approaches — from the sphere of political sciences and international relations to the field of social, historical, economic, technological sciences, etc. — has its own language, its own methodological and descriptive structure, its own epistemology, and stems from foundations and assumptions that are often different when they are not completely in contrast. Fragmentariness, disparity, misunderstandings and misconceptions are the result. They have further deviated the development of the strategic thought from the concrete strategic praxis, which cannot find in it its references and support. It ensues that pragmatism reigns, often reduced to simple empiricism or uncritical acceptance of doctrines developed in other ambits. The decisive strategic process escapes all intellectual control. The statement that an interdisciplinary approach must be used is often only an easy alibi, in which consciously or not, one seeks refuge, given the impossibility to obtain a convergence of the var-



ious disciplinary contributions, that is, to unify them and accomplish an operative synthesis supporting the actual strategic decisions. Within this picture, any reductive approach can emerge, in which the limits between rhetoric and logic, between the simply affirmative aims and those actually operative, remain uncertain. Moreover, there are no cultural tools for controlling the results of the decisions taken, and this owing also to the impossibility to check the theoretic formulations with their practical application. In the past, the recurrence and normality of war allowed the connection of cultural production with practical experience.

As regards the methodological aspects, it appears that the strategic culture should avail itself of dynamic approaches, which should incorporate the indeterminacy of the involved factors and adequately consider their complexity, and should also take into account the integration of the various disciplines, through conceptual implements that promote convergence and settle disparities. This is the only way of attaining theoretic conceptualizations which can be used as support for operative decisions and for the definition of concrete strategic decisions. What seems to be lacking is an adequate methodological base, which should be the attractor, the catalyst and compounder of various doctrines. In this regard, the meaning of strategy and its field of interest is a most crucial problem. The appearance, on one side, of a global strategy and, on the other, of a "peace research", which confines strategy to the merely preventive task of avoiding a conflict, preserving the balances defined after the second world war, have helped to make strategic epistemology and methodology even more uncertain. One can indeed question himself about the real existence of a field that could be called strategic, placed between the political and technical — or tactical, if you want — fields, or whether it would not be better to assume that strategy in itself does not exist, but coincides with the methodology of the action restricted to the conflictual environment; a methodology which evidently has enough power to compose into a whole the complexities of the various disciplines concerned.

These considerations have suggested the title of the book being reviewed. It could have been called "Strategy and Metastrategy". In fact, it represents an attempt at detecting an epistemological "status" in strategy, starting from the assumption that the determination of the goals precedes the actual strategic sphere, and involves the political and ethic fields, requiring after all a particular vision of the world, of mankind and of the state. Its title could also have been "Strategic Culture", taking for granted the possibility

to define a well delimited strategic field and the ability to ponder over strategy "in re ipsa", as an autonomous science that begets a variety of its own. The preference has been given to the title "Strategic Thought", possibly because it seemed more ambiguous and shadowy, a bigger and more flexible container, capable of setting in motion contributions unforeseeable in advance but which could be brought to light as the survey went on. To be more precise: the reasons for choosing this title are that the subject surveyed appears uncertain. The term "strategy" does not occupy a rigorously delimited semantic field, not even within the politico-military literature, thus it must be preceded by an explanation of the language. There have been repeated attempts in this direction, but none of the definitions suggested has really been able to emerge. This is a sign that the language's indeterminacy answers actual historical and cultural necessities and it is not the simple result of the reciprocal ignorance displayed by the various cultural contributors to this sector of studies.

In tackling this question one needed obviously a starting point. The only unquestionable one is the vast literature on the subject — rather heterogeneous as regards sources, literary kind and motivations — a literature that should be retraced to a unified reading-key. The approach followed is therefore the historical philological one, which is perhaps also idealistic, in that it identifies the concrete problem — i.e. what strategy is and how to work out an effective strategy — with literature, i.e. with the existing concept of it. This approach seemed nevertheless necessary, not only for the proven inconclusiveness of the objective approach ("entity in itself approach") but also in order to explain the reasons of the strategic language's indeterminacy. In reality the various contributions have no intention of explaining the "mystery" of strategy, indeed they intend to explore the complexity of the various doctrinal contributions and methodological approaches to the strategic thought. It is therefore an extremely limited objective, due to the feeling of vagueness, when not of total confusion, that one has when confronted with the heterogeneity, complexity and multiplicity of the relevant literature. It seemed nevertheless a preliminary, necessary step in any attempt at a unified reading of the contributions coming from the various disciplines. It is not really a matter of wanting to reestablish a unitary strategic science, but rather to provide a critical basis and a methodological contribution in order to make the strategic thought more clear. In this regard, it was deemed necessary to research and examine critically all contributions stemming from different contexts, visions

and disciplinary fields, asking each contributor to state his cultural foundations and language, without taking them for granted or assuming them as objective data, but seeing them instead as products — often non univocal and always complicated — of a given reality, of a precise sectorial vision of the world, of the strategic problems and of the military reality.

The book is divided in four sections.

The first section considers the literature specific to the strategic field, the problems being debated and the evolutive trends. Virgilio Ilari studies in detail how the term "strategy" was introduced into the language and the various meanings that have been attributed to it at different times. He probes in particular the contents of the so-called global strategy and its connections with politics, with philological, historical and philosophical approaches, paying particular attention to the "political action" theories and the creation of strategic goals. It clearly emerges from it the impossibility to objectively define a precise strategic field. The various acceptations of the term and its different meanings prove the existing link between the language employed and the historical conditions and concrete interests that generated it.

Carlo Jean studies the problems of military strategy itself, and those regarding the distinction between policy and strategy and the difference between strategic theory, doctrine and praxis. He especially states that strategy does not exist by nature but is found only in literature and the definition of the strategic ambit is closely connected with the position of the military institutions in society, with the rôle of force in the international relations, and with the relationship between politics and the military. The strategic thought is outlined in its evolution and in the modifications occurred in the nuclear and planetary era. Luciano Bozzo examines the various theories of deterrence, their arising and evolution. Starting from the assumption of a distinct solution of continuity from the pre-nuclear epoch, the "strategy of deterrence" shows now clear symptoms of convergence towards certain assumptions of the "classical" strategic thought. It is not a simple return to the past, it nothing else because there has been a deep change not only in the geostrategic and technological conditions but also in the political, psychological and social situations. The classical strategic thought must be re-read with historical and philological rigour; as a lesson, not as a dogma.

Franco A. Casadio completes the first section evidencing the correlations between strategy and armaments control, as well as the contents of the "peace research" and the influence that the conceptions of international security,



based on it, have had on the strategic thought. He points out how the deterrent and defensive strategies and the control of armaments are convergent and complementary and, second, how the practical validity of the assumptions of the "peace research" presupposes a substantial change in the present political system and in that of international relations.

The second section is conceived with the intention of clarifying certain sociological and economic dimensions of strategy, which in literature constitute, with some noticeable exceptions, a not yet well explored field.

Raimondo Strassoldo suggests a reading of the strategic themes in a particular sociological view, oriented by a (geo)spatial approach. An ample survey of the doctrinary evolution introduces a detailed description of the variety of disciplines that study the war phenomena. In this context, the discussion singles out the fields of research that assume central prominence in the formulation of the strategic thought. The main contribution emerging from within this essay is the suggestion that the strategic thought should enter the space era ("spatialization").

Sergio Rossi tackles the re-emerging problem of the connection between strategy, economy and technology. The argumentation is shaped as a thematic map of the variety of factors that specify the essential points of such interdependence: the problem of "burden sharing", the connection between the processes of technological innovation and the decisions of the politico-military authorities, the "East-West" and "North-South" technological relations, the arms trade, the disarmament policies, the relation between military and civil research. The main contribution of this essay is the description of the economic dimension's influence on the formulation of the strategic doctrines.

The third section is devoted to the gnoseological and epistemological aspects of the strategic conduct.

Massimo Negrotti singles out the discrimination between "datum", "information" and "knowledge" as main problem of the strategic method. The analysis, by essential and general points, of knowledge's limitations, which characterize the current (techno)methodologies for processing information, ends in the conceptualization of the state of uncertainty as strategic resource.

Carlo Pelanda proposes the epistemological regulation of "decisionism" as a problem of the strategic world. The argument, used as starting point, affirms that the procedures of science and those of an aimed cognitive and accomplishing action are substantially on an equal epistemological standing, i.e., that of being both decisions that tend to interrupt a condition of inability to decide. In this sense, knowledge is

a decision. Having found a general scenario in which the reality-truth is considered as having such enormous flexibility as to be produced on the basis of decisions valid only in themselves (position of "self-referential realism"), the author illustrates the criterion of "perfect self-reference" as main requisite in the process creating the levels of reality. Such criterion is seen as epistemological regulation of "decisionism", outside the traditional schemes of both scientific rationalism and conventionalist pragmatism, and is then applied to the methodological problems of the politico-military strategic action.

The final section regards the connection between the strategic thought and the political and juridical-constitutional theory of defence and is obviously devoted especially to the problem of national defence as significant component of sovereignty.

Roberto Toniatti's essay discusses the problem of specific responsibility for strategic decisions and for the shaping of a defence policy, going through an analysis of comparative constitutional law, with reference to the major Western democracies. Having delimited the sphere of research within the boundaries of "the constitutional law of defence", the analysis underlines the historical development and the contents of precise functional profiles typical of a government (the political direction, the high Command, the global and the military strategies), which assume an autonomous significance vis-à-vis the parliamentary control and the presidential command of the Armed Forces (where this function is separate from the leadership of the Executive). Of particular interest is the comparative analysis of the operation of the bodies entrusted with the ultimate decisions regarding security and defence, such as the U.S. National Security Council.

Gianfranco Miglio considers the question of national sovereignty with an essentially political approach, through which one can understand, beyond the juridical theorization of the concept, the historic reality of "limited sovereignty", placing the principle of "equality" against that of "balance". The essay is a history of the principle of "balance", political foundation of the "Jus Publicum Europaeum", from the Treaty of Utrecht to the United Nations, considered a "revanche" of the principle of "balance" against the principle of "intervention" established by the Congress of Vienna. Particular attention is given to some juridical-political instruments limiting sovereignty, such as the military alliances ("equal" and "hegemonic") and to the principle of "limited sovereignty" as theorized by the Marxist doctrine of "Imperialism". The essay shows how the sovereignty of the Western democracies is being challenged

by the tendency of the "hegemonic" alliances to turn into "empires".

The other two essays have a more distinct political character. The one by Gianni Baget-Bozzo sets out the connection between strategy and national question. The bipolar system was born with the demand of Germany's unconditional surrender and not with the Accord of Yalta. Deep inside, Europe has accepted the end of its system of nation-states and its ensuing inclusion in the empires. New historic realities replace Europe on the political stage: that of an imperial system grounded on an eschatological messianism, alive not only in the Soviet Union but also in the United States, and that of the religion-peoples, represented today by Israel and Iran. Pacifism, military tradition, nuclear balance are the new dimensions of the European politico-strategic culture, without any reference to nation and State, but also unfit to be linked — for the moment, at least — to a convincing supranational aggregation.

Antonio Lombardo examines the political conditions that in a democracy promote or hinder the formulation and the realization of a military policy and the ensuing strategy. These conditions are connected with the quality of the decisional political system and of the administrative-executive system. The first must be able to define and adopt choices over long-term objectives, the second must be able to transform them into concrete measures. The contribution given by political science is determinant in order to understand the problem. To every typology of a party and government system and to every qualitative level of a high administrative leadership correspond well defined capacities of strategic choice and management. In a democracy, a determinant influence is still exerted by a mass culture, provided that it does not contrast the efficacy of the public structures and the national strategic objectives. The political system, the quality of administration and the mass cultures are the prerequisites for the effectiveness of any strategy.

The volume has an introductory character and essentially intends to be an initial exploration of the strategic questions. It is the beginning of a basic research that will be followed by an examination of the structures of the international system, the conceptions of war as developed by the main political cultures and ideologies, as well as theories of war, specifically relevant to the political, juridical, social and economic approaches.

This initial analysis should serve as a base for applied research over systems and models of security and defence, for the evaluation of the strategic picture of the world in general and of Italy in particular, and for analyzing the contingent problems of security.

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
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
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
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
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
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THE EASTERN

QUESTION

SINCE 1878

The problem known as the "Eastern Question", comprises a whole set of political, ethnic, economic and religious problems connected with the regions that used to form the territorial base of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th centuries. It therefore encompasses the following areas: in Europe, the whole of the Balkan peninsula; in Asia, Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia; in Africa, Egypt and the Mediterranean coast as far as Tunis.

Our historical review begins in 1878, the year of the Congress of Berlin and the end of the 1875-1878 Balkan crisis, marking one of the most important turning points in the intricate story of the Eastern Question that had been dragging on for over a century, and which was to constitute the focal point of European politics until 1914.

The Congress of Berlin prevented Russia from attracting the Slavic nations of the Balkans into its orbit, and using diplomatic means, it took away from Russia most of what it had earlier seized by force of arms. However, it left behind a smoldering war, not merely a Balkan war, but a European war in Macedonia.

It supported Austria's thrust eastwards, now that it had become Europe's bulwark against Pan-Slavism, and helped Britain to push Russia out of the Mediterranean and retain a dominant position there. In addition to Russia, France and Italy felt let down: France, because the British occupation of Cyprus and the British control over the Suez Canal jeopardized France's aspirations over Syria and Egypt; and Italy, because Austria had strengthened its hold over the eastern Adriatic coast without yielding anything in exchange.

Thanks to the diplomatic skill which Bismarck displayed immediately afterwards, a number of agreements were made and a compromise solution was reached under which peace was ensured in a situation of unstable equilibrium. But this did not solve the problem, and it allowed the major powers to conduct



an intense economic propaganda exercise throughout all the Turkish territories.

Austria persevered with its railway-building policy in the Balkans, and had set its sights on reaching Salonika. France lent heavily to Turkey in exchange for monopolies and other economic favours; Britain set out from Egypt to begin exploiting Turkish Asia. Even Germany embarked on a policy to penetrate Asian Turkey with the Anatolia Railway. This, coupled with the German occupation of Kiaochow in the Far East, marked the transition between Bismarck's essentially European policy to Wilhelm's world policy.

To have a free hand in this field, Germany encouraged Russia to move towards the Far East, and urged France on to the large-scale colonization of Africa and Asia, leaving Britain with East Africa.

Title page

Lebanon
(26 August - 11 September 1982).
Bersaglieri troops of the Italian peace-keeping contingent landing in Beirut for "Lebanon 1".

Above

Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878). The battle of Shipka in a painting in Sofia Museum. The fighting lasted for six days, and the Russo-Bulgarian forces managed to keep their hold on the Shipka Pass.

While all this economic activity designed to seek out new raw material sources and new trade outlets was going on, the reorganization of the Turkish countries was ignored, and this led to new internal crises that were later to cause the crisis in the Turkish Empire — the sick man of European diplomacy — to snowball.

The situation was aggravated by the Armenian crisis, the Crete question and above all the

perennial turmoil in Turkish-controlled Macedonia, where the Serbs, Turks and Greeks were in continual conflict amongst themselves and against the domination of Turkey, encouraged by the attitude of Bulgaria.

Concerned about its Far East policy, Russia envisaged a rapprochement with Austria, for peaceful cooperation over the reforms in Macedonia which, at the Murzsteg Conference, turned out to be a new affirmation of Austrian supremacy in the Balkans.

Amid the chaos of nationalities and religions, compounded with diplomatic intrigues, the weak Turkish policy increasingly showed signs of cracking.

In 1908, the constitutional revolution of the "Young Turks" for the reform of Turkey along the lines of the Western States, failed to regenerate the decrepit empire, and had very serious repercussions abroad.

Bulgaria and Montenegro declared independence; Austria, with German support, proceeded with the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Russia, still smarting from its defeat at the hands of the Japanese, was militarily weak and split by Socialist agitation, and was forced to yield.

The war between Italy and Turkey over Libya showed that Turkey had not recovered its strength, and once again the will to see the end of the Turkish empire was aroused throughout the Balkans.

Having been repulsed in the Far East, Russia returned to its traditional Balkan and Mediterranean policies, and it was quick to seize the chance of avenging itself against Austria, by supporting the Balkan nations' agreement to declare war on Turkey.

Flushed with victory in the first Balkan war (under the 1912 Treaty of London) and with a larger booty than expected, Bulgaria provoked the second Balkan war with the support of Austria which was anxious to trim Russia's plan to enlarge Serbia (1913 - the Treaty of Bucharest). Bulgaria's defeat left Austria diplomacy in tatters.

Austria then toyed with the idea of attacking Serbia, but since Germany did nothing to encourage it, and above all because Italy held Austria back, the war was put off by one year.

The outbreak of the two Balkan wars may be considered to have been the inevitable, cruel consequence of the European powers' failure to lay down a rational and constructive policy in the Balkans from 1878 onwards. The second war wiped out most of the advantages gained by the first, because by setting the Balkan States and peoples at one another's throats, it destroyed the union of the Balkans which might have acted as a bulwark against Austria's claims and perhaps prevented Austria's July 1914 initiative.


At the end of the first world war, with the fall of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, German and Turkish empires, things worked out favourably for Serbia and Greece against Bulgaria and, partly, Turkey.

In Asian Turkey, while the Arab world was being consolidated by rallying around nationalistic sentiments (Saudi Arabia), France and Britain extended their influence with their mandates over Syria, and over Palestine and Mesopotamia, respectively.

In Egypt, Britain consolidated its supremacy, but this was not enough to prevent recognition of the subsequent independence of Egypt in 1922, nor the 1936 treaty that emerged after a series of conflicts and agreements, nor the eventual complete British withdrawal in 1954.

In both the Balkans and the Arab Middle East, there were fresh clashes mainly as a result of the attempts at expansionism on the part of the various powers there, especially in the border areas.

Venizelos' "great idea" for Greece clashed with Kemal Ataturk's idea of a nationalist Turkey, leading to the war which ended with the 1923 Lausanne peace treaty that offered a reasonably fair solution that resembled the Italo-Yugoslav Rapallo Treaty in some respects.



The problem of Macedonia, which Greece and Turkey solved at Lausanne, remained a source of attrition between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and in the Arab Middle East there was friction between France, Britain, Arab nationalism and Zionism.



In 1934, the Balkan Entente united Turkey to the Balkan powers, and helped by French policy it appeared to be a useful means of curbing Fascist expansionist aims.

Nationalistic passions, the thirst for revenge, and fear of

Fascist expansionism in the Mediterranean caused the Balkan states and Turkey to take different sides in the second world war.

As the war drew to its inevitable conclusion, Churchill far-sightedly tried to prevent the

The Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878). The Russian general Gurko entering Sofia. In the background, the ruins of St. Sofia Cathedral, built by Justinian in the 6th century, and later converted into a mosque by the Turks.



Left

The map shows the Balkan States after the Congress of Berlin on 13 June 1878. Serbia almost doubled its territory, and Greece's rights over Thessalia were recognized, even though it was only able to occupy it there years later, while Bulgaria was dismembered.

Below

The Greek-Turkish war (1897). The battle of Domokos, the most important engagement happened during this conflict. In the battle excelled, gallantly fighting, the 700 Camicie Rosse commanded by Ricciotti Garibaldi.

to attract the Arab countries into the Western sphere of influence. Since it clashed with the Arab world's wish to keep out of the East-West conflict, it caused a crisis in the Arab League, which is still smouldering.

These two important pawns in the Western diplomatic game, designed to draw Yugoslavia and the Arab League into the Western camp, might have enabled the Mediterranean to become a fully-fledged internal basin for Western strategy, because having to face a compact block of countries running all the way from the Baltic to the Red Sea and beyond would have caused Russia to suffer yet another major political setback in an area in which it had previously tried, and failed, to carve out for itself an anti-historical and anti-European position of predominance.

I say that this "might have" happened, because things turned out differently.

Soviet forces from spreading out throughout the Balkans by opening up the "second front" there.

But the American wish to bring the war to a rapid end prevailed, and the strategically preferable idea of having the second front in France won the day.


After the war, with a disorganized Europe worried about its future, Romania and Bulgaria were child's play for Soviet expansionism, which bore down heavily on Yugoslavia, the Balkans in general, and the Middle East.

In the period 1945-1950, France was pushed out of the Middle East, Britain's influence was gradually replaced by Russia's (because of Communist propaganda in the Islamic countries, designed to eradicate the influence of the capitalist countries by supporting and encouraging the nationalistic movements there), and by America's, which had taken Britain's place in defending the Middle East against Soviet infiltration.

This led to Syria's successful struggle for independence, the revolution in Azerbaijan, the Iranian crisis, the struggle between Israel and the Arab states, the Egyptian crisis and the constitution of the Arab League.

Subsequent developments took matters still further. In 1953, membership of the Balkan League included countries belonging to NATO (Turkey and Greece) and Yugoslavia, whose political balancing act between East and West enabled it to take a more definite stand and reach a solution to the Trieste question, in addition to the rapprochement and the agreements made between the Italian and the Yugoslav economies, which had traditionally complemented one another.

The Iraqi-Turkish pact, drawn up by a Western bloc country and an Arab League member state, was an attempt



There were too many vested interests at stake, too much mutual mistrust and suspicion, and too little was done too late to overcome the diffidence and the dissent and to encourage a meeting of minds.

Around the end of the Fifties, the Middle East problem increasingly came to mean the Palestinian problem, and the situation gradually worsened as small underground groups that had been in existence for a long time grew more powerful as they became convinced that they were the only way of ensuring that their cause would be successful after the collapse of the union of Syria and Egypt in 1961.

Many different organizations in all the Middle Eastern countries sprang up, linked by common aims but differing in methods, structures and areas of operation.

Because of the danger of splitting and weakening the action of these organizations, the Arab League worked for the creation of one single organization that would attract all the converging interests and coordinate the "operations" of the individual underground movements.

This is how the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) came into being, broadly supported in the countries where the Pan-Arab tradition was most strongly felt.

But in 1967, the Six Day War showed that the combined efforts of Syria, Jordan and Egypt were unable to effectively match Israel's offensive capability.

Following its lightening victory, Israel occupied the Golan Heights, Sinai, the land to the east of Suez and the Western part of Jordan.

This new state of affairs persuaded the young leaders who were establishing themselves in the PLO that it was not advisable or a realistic politically viable proposition for the organization to be too closely linked to the "protector" States as the old founders of the Organization had wished.

Thus the Palestinians began to enjoy their first genuine taste

of policy-making and operational autonomy, and also to take a different approach to the Palestinian presence in their host countries.

The Palestinians living in exile (accounting for about 60% of the whole population) in countries sympathetic to their cause became actively involved in different social spheres, to raise their individual cultural levels and acquire international experience so that they could eventually attain their main objective.

Palestinians who had remained behind in the occupied territories supported the exiles by cooperating with them in organizing underground resistance activities at home.

As the movement grew in size, so did its armed wing al-Fatah, which had been operating for several years with less far-reaching aims, and which had now become large enough to be able to claim to represent the whole of the Palestinian national front.

Al-Fatah demonstrated this in a series of military actions against Israeli troops, such as the 1968 al-Karameh operation.

However, one should not underestimate the importance of

another operational group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which only really became significant in 1967 thanks to the active leadership of its founder, George Habash.

This faction's activities have not always been transparent and consistent, and it has been through certain notorious episodes such as splits and clashes, and the defection of individuals and whole groups who have declared themselves to be independent of it. But this is only due to the growing multi-directional ideological fervour that underlines the birth of different movements, some of which become firmly established because of their size or because of the support they receive from individual Arab countries.

It was this support from sympathetic governments that enabled the first guerrilla groups to emerge, composed not only of Palestinians but other nationalities, too. These groups varied

*The 1912 Balkan War.
The Chiefs of Staff of the Bulgarian 7th Division directing operations near Bulair, where the Turks tried to land using primitive vehicles and without adequate artillery cover, causing their defeat.*





*The Six-Day War (July 1967).
An Israeli tank in the Sinai desert.
The tank is the symbol of the crushing
assault which enabled the Israelis to rout
three armies in a war that only lasted
five days and eleven hours.*

widely in their policies, some of which were difficult to reconcile with the original ideology of the movement.

This inevitably led to differences of approach and method, and sometimes led to open clashes.

For example, there was the war of words between al-Fatah and the PFLP, and the independent line taken by the Syrian-backed as-Sa'iqa, and the Iraqi-backed ALF (Arab Liberation Front).

But in 1969, al-Fatah came out on top after the free elections to the "Palestine Congress", and imposed its leader, Yasser Arafat, as the leader of the PLO.

But with such a dynamic and self-willed leader as Arafat, the movement failed to win the authority it needed to attract positive reactions from the whole of the Arab world.


Very soon, serious differences surfaced: first with Lebanon, which was unhappy about having a large number of well-armed and organized Palestinians on its territory, and then with Jordan, which felt that its domestic stability was being threatened.

As if to confirm the fears openly voiced by the Jordanian government, in 1970, the Palestinians tried to overthrow the Hashemite dynasty which reacted with harsh countermeasures that ended with an all-out massacre.

Al-Fatah's bases in Jordan were dismantled.

Meanwhile, the United States was working on a peace formula which Egypt accepted, distancing itself from the guerrillas of the PLO which had now become an embarrassment.

Almost totally isolated, the Palestinians gradually lost what little sympathy and credibility that a few Western countries claimed — very prudently — to have for them.



Terrorism was the only vocation open to the PLO now, to attract world public opinion to the Palestinian question, to continue their resistance and to assert themselves.

However, the way was opened up to a political solution of the crisis after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when Israel withdrew its troops from some of the previously occupied territories.

However feeble, PLO support for anti-Israeli states gave the movement the chance to play an autonomous rôle once again among the Arab countries, and to acquire a new-found dignity.

Conscious of this new flush of popularity, Arafat set about drawing up a more moderate line of conduct, to encourage dialogue and play down terrorism.

As a result, the PLO was recognized by the Arab States in 1974 as the lawful representative of the rights of the Palestinian people, and the United Nations partly acknowledged Arafat's ideas, and condemned the Israeli expansion.

Meanwhile, however, the traditional antagonism between Christians and Moslems in Lebanon led to outbreaks of violence that soon took on all the features of a civil war.

The Palestinians were quite numerous in Lebanon and they were inevitably caught up in the tension, indirectly at first, and then directly when a number of them were killed by the Christian Right.

It was this (in 1975) that led the Palestinian guerrillas to ally themselves once and for all with the Moslem Left, which received substantial backing from Syria.

In 1976, Syria came forward with a peace plan, but it was so unacceptable to the PLO that when Syrian troops next intervened in Lebanon, Arafat's men sided against them.

Because of all these changes of position, the Arab States' support for the Palestinians began to wane. They were rigidly controlled on the one hand, and suddenly exposed to attacks on the other, as the political wind changed direction on the complex Middle Eastern political stage.

Seeing that their attempts and struggles over the years had come to nothing, the leaders of the various factions of the movement decided to seek common ground, and this gave the PLO a new lease of life, and enabled it to resume its rôle as the only lawful representative of Palestinian rights.


With its newly re-acquired status, the PLO gradually worked on an international psychological plan to sensitize worldwide public opinion.

Thanks to this less warlike and more political image, the PLO managed to acquire a spe-

Palestinian conflicts.

The efforts of the Multi-national Peace-Keeping Force, to which Italy made such an important contribution, with two missions to Lebanon, have been in vain.

The fact is that in addition to the many, worldwide interests that are involved in the Eastern Mediterranean coastal area, the Arab and Israeli "question" is plagued by the changing alliances, resulting in short-lived treaties, and a cavalier attitude to agreements, even those drawn up under the auspices of international organizations, as well



cial place on the international scene.

By the end of the Seventies, negotiations were the order of the day, with the mediation or at least the supervision of the countries most directly concerned by the Middle East problem.

The superpowers in particular made sure that the world knew about their plans for peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, where conflict was rife, and threatened to spread more widely.

Unfortunately, all the attempts made to find a stable solution to the problems came to naught.

Even today, tensions in the area are continually in the headlines, fuelling international terrorism, and leading to the more recent inter-Arab and Israeli-

*Lebanon
(26 September 1982 - 20 February 1984).
ITALCON Paratroops in Beirut during
the "Lebanon 2" mission.
Italy's peace-keeping contingent
managed at all times to maintain a
stance of total impartiality, and this
helped the rival factions to engage in
dialogue and negotiations.*

as the unbridgeable historical, ethnic or religious divisions that exist between the people in the region.

It is these features which lead the causes of attrition to explode in a chain reaction, and the chances of any lasting solution being found in the foreseeable future to the many issues at stake are very slim indeed.

The area's problems are kept continually on the boil by

the fact that the area is of such major economic importance as a crossroads of international trade. Overt and concealed pressures from outside also hamper the search for a definitive solution, or at least a peace plan that might guarantee a state of equilibrium between the warring factions for a reasonable period of time.

Another important factor is the very high armament density in the region, where demand outstrips the supply from the technologically advanced countries (with huge economic repercussions), which weakens the individual countries' resolve to withstand the temptation to resort to arms in reaction to provocation or to real or imagined outrages. All these factors taken together, plus the region's undoubted strategic importance, make the Middle East one of the high-risk areas in which a world-wide conflict could be sparked off.

The tension between Libya and Egypt, the Iran-Iraq war, the

stance of Syria and Jordan in regard to the Palestinian "question", Israel's refusal to budge on what it considers to be indefensible principles, and the profound religious divergences between the Moslem, Jewish and Christian communities, constitute aspects of a confused situation whose features are often hard to grasp and therefore more dangerous.

One of the many special envoys who have seen this situation that has overstepped the borderline of the absurd has given us a most emblematic, yet sadly realistic, description of contemporary Jerusalem and Beirut which sums up these dangers.

He says, quite rightly, that there is the traditional city, with its history, and the various "cities" with their day-to-day affairs, and their clearly defined districts transformed into villages/fortresses, in which each community lives with its ideology and traditions, its obsessions and its hatreds.

It is a situation that we cannot ignore, and which demands the goodwill and the help of every country that is sincerely concerned about peace.

If they are vigilant, and if their help is forthcoming, they can give substance to the hope that in the dialectical ups-and-downs of history, after the dreadful tragedy of war, the people

will learn to live together in peace, because this is the indispensable condition for any genuine progress. I know that this is still wishful thinking at the present time, and I realize that the chances of its becoming reality in the light of the tragic events of the past few years are slim indeed.

But it is a hope that must not be set aside, and which should cause us to reflect on what the UN might do to create a system for negotiating crises instead of managing them once they have broken out. It is quite clear that the normal function of any international organization in the present political situation, must be the very arduous task of seeking out the broadest possible consensus above all else, for this is the only way to draw near to the ideals enshrined in the United Nations Charter, but which are unfortunately still beyond our reach.

Exploring every area in which agreement seems possible is the only way to make an indirect contribution to the establishment of peace.

And this applies to the "Eastern Question" — a question that seems to become increasingly more problematic, and whose difficulties appear to become increasingly more acute, with the passage of time.


Ciro Di Martino

The commitment of the national contingents working with the UN wherever there was trouble, helped to lessen the tension. In future, the UN might be required to create a system for negotiating crises, instead of managing them after they have broken out.



THE EASTERN QUESTION SINCE 1878

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
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ITALY

UNI



The relations between Italy and the U.S. in the armaments sector are, among Europe - United States relations, a case apart. Nevertheless, they are clearly influenced by the specificity of the Italian armaments industry (technological level, specialization, capitalization, internal and foreign market) vis-à-vis the industries of the other European countries. The failure of CED in 1954 confirmed the industrial, strategic and political unbalance within the transatlantic dialogue, and was made worse by the fact that the EEC never worked out a vigorous and organic industrial policy. The European industry is therefore extremely fragmental (and this fragmentation is particularly evident in Italy). Its development on a national basis took place in the sixties, and particularly in the seventies. The possession of a national armaments industry was considered by each country an indispensable condition, not

only from the economic viewpoint — in order to avoid an excessive weight on the balance of trade — but also, and perhaps mainly, from the political standpoint, in order to obtain a

certain degree of independence and liberty of action for the European countries. Granted that the size of the individual national markets does not permit economic large scale productions, in all European countries there is an overdevelopment of the productive basis, with consequent heavy dependence on the world market and on exports — which make up from 35% to 60% of sales (1).

The incidence of exports is much heavier than that of international cooperation, especially regarding European co-productions, which, on the other hand, have had a remarkable development, starting from the late '60s. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that many co-productions in the European sector are, though with noticeable exceptions, such as MRCA, FH70 and SP70, German-French ventures. Great Britain is now entering the Franco-German partnership (the United Kingdom is linked bilaterally to Italy,



TEDESTATES

COOPERATION IN THE ARMAMENTS SECTOR

through important co-productions, especially in the helicopter, engine and electronic sectors) and, partly, also Italy (Leopard tank, Milan, etc.). As regards the Italian armaments industry (2) the agreements for international cooperation should concern 39 under licence productions and 23 co-productions, with a remarkable prevalence, as regards the U.S., of under licence productions (23 out of 39) compared with co-productions (6 out of 23), while there is a relative balance vis-à-vis the European countries (12 productions under licence and 10 co-productions).

Considering that the productions under licence entail, especially in the electronic and motor fields, a direct importation of the most valuable components, there is a noticeable imbalance against Italy in the military exchange with the U.S., greater than that of any other European country. In the period 1978-1982, according to the data obtained in view of the National Conference of the Defence Industry, it has been ascertained that the total imports from the U.S., made together by the Administration of Defence and the industry of armaments, amount to approximately 1,700 billion lire, vis-

Left.

Italian paratrooper descending with a "Stratocloud" high-performance parachute.

Right.

U.S. Marine armed with a Colt pistol, 1911 model. As a result of a recent commercial agreement, this weapon will soon be replaced by the 92F Beretta.



à-vis an export of about 300 billion lire, with an ensuing gap of 1:5.5 to Italy's disadvantage. In 1984 the import has been evaluated to be about 1,100 billion lire against an export of about 200-250 billion. It must be pointed out that only Great Britain has a relatively balanced exchange with the U.S. in the sector of armaments (due mainly to the acquisition of AV8s for the Marine Corps), while as regards other important European countries, the ratio is indeed always in favour of the U.S., that is $1:1.5 \div 3$, depending on the years, with an imbalance about one half of that between Italy and the U.S..

Nevertheless, if one considers the global import/export between Italy and the U.S., and not only the balance of armaments, it appears that such a ratio — again for the period 1978-82 — has been in favour of Italy for an amount of about 5,000 billion lire (28,500 billion Italian exports against 23,500 imports from the U.S.), and that the whole military sector covers only about 4% of the trade between Italy and the U.S.. It should be clear that these data do not represent the entire reality.

As a matter of fact, the Italian imports generally concern high technology products, with significant added value, while the Italian exports consist mostly of goods characterized by high-intensity labour and mature technology. Moreover, one must take into account that the Italian military importations do not fulfill only the needs of the Italian Armed Forces, but are also partly employed — both as technological know-how and as components and subsystems — for military exports, which in 1982, the year of booming export for Italy, have exceeded 60% of the revenues of the entire national industry of armaments.

The problem concerning the improvement of the military balance of trade with the U.S. is an extremely complicated one, also because the imbalance has a structural and not contingent character; it complies,



in fact, with the rule of Italian exportations to the industrialized countries, which concern mainly consumer goods and products of an already mature technology, allowing a very reduced space (about 10%) to high technology material. In the field of technology proper, Italy seems to restrict itself to imitative technologies, to processing and organization innovations (especially in the field of marketing) forgoing innovative technologies and produce innovations. Only the latter — without forgetting the historical conditions of undercapitalization of the Italian industry — could nevertheless strengthen the national economy, avoiding the inevitable decline and erosion of our spaces in the world market on the part of the

new industrialized countries (NIC) which, due to the much lower labour costs, can supply increasingly competitive products.

Going back to the question of balancing the military trade, we notice how delicate the problem is.

In fact, Italy tries to compensate for this imbalance with a heavy export outflow, mostly towards the Third World and the OPEC area. This flow can be stopped at any time, owing to the scarcity of liquid assets that these countries are now experiencing and, above, all, to the obstacles, when not blocks, constituted by the restrictions that the U.S. opposes to technological transfer. This is a danger, the size and seriousness of which have not been wholly



ITALY UNITED STATES

U.S. soldier using a portable transceiver.

former should prompt a greater European integration, including a rationalization which should start from a joint definition of the operative requirements together with the research and development of weapon systems as well as the specialization of production. A greater solidarity among the European armament industries, especially those of the four main countries (Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy), could be a prerequisite for productions competitive with those of the U.S. as regards both quality and quantity. In reality, European cooperation has a tendency to polarize on the Franco-German axis, in which Great Britain and, in a lesser and sometimes erratic way also Italy, insert themselves. One has the impression that Italy shares the conditions of the European minor countries. These, being in practice excluded from the major European co-productions, are led to prefer productions under licence or direct imports from the U.S., balanced through complicated mechanisms of compensation. It seems that, little by little, also Italy has set out on this course, owing to pressures exerted by short term, contingent and particular industrial interests. As stated by Ambassador Ruggiero, during the National Conference of the Defence Industry in July 1984, this situation is favoured by our incapability to come up with new proposals, by indecisions and changes of mind, by the too slow decisional and administrative processes, and by the lack of an organic vision of the relations with the other European countries. With this we risk isolation, and will probably limit ourselves to a scarce autarchic productions, which entails a heavy technological dependence

and the risk of commercial disaster, if the export markets of the Third World were to shrink.

THE TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE

The relationship between the U.S. and Europe in the field of armaments started with the constitution of NATO and underwent a constant evolution following the development of the economic, industrial and commercial relations between the two sides of the Atlantic. This cooperation has gone more or less through three, partially overlapping phases.

In the '50s, it developed essentially within the Military Assistance Programs (MAP). The European Armed Forces were reequipped with the American war surplus and with that determined periodically in the U.S. by the introduction of new weapon systems. The equipment was sent, generally, free of charge or against merely symbolic payments.

Starting in the '60s, after the European economic recovery, the U.S., instead of sending the armaments free of charge, started to sell them through "government to government" agreements (FMS: Foreign Military Sales) or through direct purchases from the U.S. industries by the European governments.

The present phase, which started in the '70s, is centered on the so-called Atlantic dialogue and distinguished by the attempt to find a more organic cooperation between the U.S. and Europe, founded on co-developments, co-productions and itemized compensation agreements, a very qualifying point of which is the transfer of technology and the restrictions set by the U.S. to the exports of industrial products or war equipment, employing such

evaluated; it could indeed affect the life of our armaments industry, whose technological foundations are extremely weak, due to their dependence on the U.S. industries, and are not sufficiently integrated with those of the other European countries.

The basic problem confronting the Italian industry of armaments is that of finding general strategies for a long-term development, two aspects of which, namely the problems of the "transatlantic dialogue" with the U.S. and, more realistically, those of a greater cooperation inside the European area, are crucial for the national choices.

The politico-strategic interests are often opposed to the commercial-industrial ones. It goes without saying that the



"Spartan" troop carriers of the British Army.

technologies, to third countries. The transition to the third phase of the transatlantic dialogue is influenced by imperatives of the strategic (to carry out the standardization of armaments within NATO or at least their complete interoperability, on the one side; to limit the unit price of the weapon system, in order to avoid the so-called "disarmament due to technological inflation" on the other) and politico-economic kind (to produce a better cohesion within the Alliance through a more equitable repartition of costs, avoiding imbalances and disharmonies that would widen the differences of interests and perceptions between the U.S. and Europe).

Whit its typical activism, the U.S. has already formulated, and keeps on formulating, a series of proposals aimed at obtaining the standardization, or, at least, the interoperability of the NATO equipment and weapon systems, for a more rational utilization of the resources available for the development and production of arma-

ments. The first proposal was advanced in 1975 by the Callaghan Report, suggesting a "two-way street" to be pursued with Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) between governments. This proposal was followed by those of 1978, formulated by the working group for "standardization" of NLTD (NATO Long Term Defence Programme), which still constitute the basis of the activity of the CNAD for the cooperation in the sector of armaments within NATO (3); by Weinberger's proposals of 1982 on a joint employment of the emerging technologies; by the proposals of 1983, made by the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Abshire, on the "strategy of resources"; by the 16 recommendations expressed by the Currie Committee in June 1983 (4) on transatlantic industrial cooperation; the task to foster the atlantic cooperation, also through direct contacts with the IEPG (Independent European Programme Group) entrusted to Assistant Secretary Taft; the yearly re-

ports on the state of armament standardization within NATO, submitted to Congress by the U.S. Secretary of Defence (5), which list in detail all the accords of cooperation between the U.S. and other NATO countries in the sector of armaments; Weinberger's offer, made last March, to participate in the Strategic Defence Initiative and, finally, the very recent Nunn amendment, which ties 200 million dollars of the 1986 U.S. Defence budget — 50 million to each Service, and 50 million to projects by joint Agencies, i.e. DARPA or SDIO (6) — to agreements of cooperation with the European NATO countries. To this main and more organic initiatives one can add the declarations made at every NATO summit or bilateral meeting between U.S. and European military or political representatives, as well as various initiatives



U.S. Army reconnaissance vehicle, equipped with a transceiver and armed with a 12.7 mm Browning machine gun.

taken by the American Congress (Amendment Roth-Glenn-Nunn of 1983, for example), all aimed at establishing a well-balanced transatlantic dialogue, based on the activation of a "two-way street", that is, on the redress of the imbalance in the armaments trade currently unfavourable to Europe. It must be stressed that the discussion on the "two-way street" is often intermingled with the one on "burden sharing" within NATO, which at present is a cause of great tension between Europe and the U.S.. The latter contends, at public opinion level at least, that Europe is doing too little for its own defence, causing an increased strategic engagement on the part of the United States. The armament trade's imbalance to the advantage of the U.S. is thus considered somehow a compensation for the burden loaded on

the American taxpayer for the defence of Europe. The prerequisite for establishing a well-balanced cooperation would be, as always, a limited disparity between the two parties concerned (and not only as regards technology and production capability, but also laws, mentality, etc...) as well as an absence of interests going against those foreseen by cooperation. In reality these two conditions do not exist. This makes a complete cooperation impossible, especially in this period, when the political atmosphere between Europe and the United States cannot be considered exactly serene, and there are considerable reasons for attrition and contrasts, which are added to divergences of industrial and economic interests, particularly felt in a conjuncture.

A short survey of the main reasons for contrast between Europe and the United States could be useful, in order to understand the state of the industrial-military relations between Italy and the U.S.. These

reasons are described in detail in the abovementioned Currie report. The resistances against a full activation, on an equal standing, of the transatlantic dialogue, come from the U.S. as well as from Europe. From the U.S. side, apart from the various lobbies within Congress which promote "Buy American" for contingent reasons (7), also the U.S. Armed Forces tend to buy their supplies from the American industries, which guarantee faster deliveries, better quality controls and much swifter administrative procedures than those encountered when dealing with the European industries and, above all, the European governments.

Moreover, the activation of a real "two-way street" is regarded with suspicion by the American industries, which are advantaged by the present imbalance and see with concern the increasing exportation of European armaments toward the Third World, since this threatens their export possibilities.

Lastly, the U.S. underlines the need to control the technological transfer, which would entail a kind of supervision over all military exports containing know-how or components coming from the U.S..

From the European side, the U.S. proposals for standardization have been regarded by governments and even more by industries with considerable reservations and concern. The Europeans had in fact the impression that, already with the Callaghan report, the U.S. was trying not so much to increase NATO's conventional defence capability as to regain control of the European military industries, in order both to consolidate their leadership within the Alliance and to check the booming European export of armaments to the Third World; a fact that could have produced not only economic damages but also situations which would be politically uncontrollable by the U.S. In reality the creation of

national armament industries was subordinate to the availability of extensive Third World markets, in order to achieve economic large scale productions. The outcome has been an oversize production capability. Incidentally this constitutes, in concrete, an enormous difficulty not only for coproductions within Europe but especially for those with the U.S. It is really unthinkable that the Europeans should give up well-set and certain — for the moment, at least — export prospects and turn to cooperations with the U.S., subject to much tighter restrictions as regards exports to other countries, the Third World in particular, if nothing else for the political and security obstacles that would be interposed by the U.S. The impression of absolute unreliability given by the American market is only not due to the difficulty to compete with the U.S. industries, which are generally more advanced from the

technological point of view, but also to the contradictory decisions repeatedly taken by the U.S. Congress. It is evident that the Italian manager's attitude — as well as that of the Defence authorities (8) — is extremely reserved vis-à-vis any prospective cooperation on an equal standing with the U.S., but with the awareness, at the same time, of Italy's convenience in maintaining trade with the U.S. as open as possible, also because, in the cooperation within Europe, we risk to be the losers. On the whole, the Italian industrialists seem to be content with the present situation, which ensures large profits through the exports to the Third World, and it appears that their main concern is not so much that of enhancing trade with the U.S., as that of avoiding more or less explicit U.S. restrictions to their exports. That is to say, they methodically follow a low-profile policy, which is unlikely to be auto-





Above.
British soldier wearing a complete NBC outfit.

Left.
U.S. soldier with Kevlar-resin helmet, bulletproof vest and M249 5.56 mm Minimi submachine gun.

Right.
M109 self-propelled howitzer of the Italian Army.

mously modified without a decisive course and impulse — not only regarding finance, but also planning — imparted by the Government.

Clearly the problem of the Europe-U.S. imbalance remains. The only realistic solution is a process of increased concentration, specialization and technological upgrading of the European industry, in order to enable it to compete on the U.S. market. According to the Currie report, both detailed government-to-government agreements and an integrated project-by-project management, at government level, are to be avoided. One should instead seek direct industry-to-industry agreements, in which the governments, with their institutional power, should act only as warrantors and controllers. Special importance should be given to cooperations for minor systems, sub-systems and subsupplies, where they are easier and more acceptable (9). Moreover, one should aim more at interoperability than at coproduction and standardization. Finally, the

critical point remains the technological upgrading of the Europe and the U.S.

This can be overcome only with heavy European investments in the field of research and development, with greater efforts in the technological areas, in which there is more disparity. Anyway, there is no doubt that the main obstacles are political ones, regarding both restrictions and controls of technological transfer and the American Congress' capability to impose its decisions on the

U.S. industry, for which joint ventures, co-developments and co-productions are far less attractive than the present direct sales.

The latter are evidently more profitable.

THE U.S.-ITALY RELATIONS

The 11th report on standardization within NATO, submitted to the U.S. Congress by the Secretary of Defence, Weinberger, in January 1985, is the



source containing the most exhaustive description of the cooperation programmes between the U.S. and other NATO countries, regarding the armaments sector. The report is extremely detailed. It examines only high-level systems, leaving aside the simple sales of licences, components or subsystems, which constitute the bulk of the exchange between Italy and the U.S. (10).

In any case, the cooperation picture is ample and multifaceted, and Italy undoubtedly occupies an important position in the projects of cooperation with the U.S. albeit not so important as the rôle played by Germany and Great Britain. Italy's rôle is nevertheless more on the passive side. Belgium, Holland and Norway occupy a wider space as regards the number of weapon systems that the U.S. is buying or intends to buy (see Tables A, B, C, D, E).

On the whole, we notice that the programmes in which Italy plays an active rôle (i.e. those in which the purchase by the U.S. is under way or is being evaluated) are, against a total of 85 U.S. programmes, only 4, vis-à-vis 38 for the Federal Republic of Germany and 45 for Great Britain. In the remaining programmes, in which the U.S. has a dominant position, Italy takes part in 17 programmes against 34 German and 28 British ones.

The extreme weakness of the Italian industry, at systems level, is evident. Italy's position at components and subsystems level should be even worse, given our industries' scarce specialization and low technological level in this particular sector. The situation reflects in substance the difference in political weight, technological level and industrial capability. Moreover, it is evident that the MoU of 1978 is essentially a political "scoop", which has not been able to make strategic considerations and imperatives prevail over the purely economic ones. It is, after all, quite clear, and not only for Italy but also for the rest of Europe,

Table A

U.S. programmes corresponding to NATO operational requirements (1)

SERVICE	QUANTITY	OF INTEREST TO ITALY
Army	7	RPV (Remotely Piloted Vehicles); main armaments for ICV (Infantry Combat Vehicle); electromagnetic chaffs, non retrievable (launched with artillery or drones).
Navy	15	1 and 2 Standard Anti-aircraft Missiles, successor of Terrier and Tartar.
Air Force	4	AMRAAM (Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile) (2); NAVSTAR GPS (Global Positioning System); MIDS (Multifunctional Information Distribution System, interfaceable with the USA JTIDS System (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System); AGM65D (IR guided Maverick).
NOTES (1) Total number 26, Italy is interested in 9. (2) Italy participates as observer.		

Table B

Programmes of purchases from allied countries by the U.S. Armed Forces (1)

SERVICE	QUANTITY	CONCERNING ITALY
Army	13	Beretta Pistol (the purchase of 315,900 guns is planned, of which 134,000 will be made in the U.S.).
Marines	2	Various equipment.
Navy	—	—
Air Force	8	Various equipment.
NOTES (1) Total number 23, of which 1 from Italy.		

Table C

Allied equipment under evaluation by the U.S. Armed Forces (1)

SERVICE	QUANTITY	CONCERNING ITALY
Army	41	None.
Marines	5	OTO Melara 76 Compact gun.
Navy	11	Italo-German devices for maritime mines; Pluto system for the neutralization of maritime mines.
Air Force (2)	16	None.
NOTES (1) Total number 73, of which 3 Italian. (2) It is odd that the Weinberger Report, while it mentions the purchase of Rolands from the FRG for the defence of the U.S. bases, and that of Rapiers from the UK for the defence of the U.S. bases in the UK and Turkey, does not mention the evaluation of the SPADA missile for the defence of the U.S. bases in Italy. Nor is mentioned the U.S. interest in the purchase of Leric-type mine hunters, interest made known earlier by the U.S. Navy.		

Table D

U.S. equipment being purchased or developed by allied countries (1)

SERVICE	QUANTITY	CONCERNING ITALY
Army	11	M 113A1 PC and mortar carrier, completed; Minder radar for Hawk I; Hawk I missiles; FLIR (Forward Looking IR) for a/t Tow missiles; Stinger; Patriot.
Navy and Marines	17	M46 improved ASW Torpedo; Standard 1 Missile in the Extended Range Version.
Air Force	8	NATO AEW (Airborne Early Warning); NAVSTAR; JTIDS; AMRAAM.
NOTES (1) Total number 36, of which 12 of interest to Italy.		

Table E

Co-production and co-development between U.S. and NATO countries (1)

SERVICE	QUANTITY	CONCERNING ITALY
Army	3	MLRS (with US, UK, GE and FR); improved 155 mm ammunition (with NL, UK and US).
Navy	9	Sea Sparrow Point Defence; FORACS (Forces Sensor and Weapons Accuracy Check Sites) (2); NATO Frigate Replacement for the '90s; Multi Service Electronic Warfare Support Group, for training and ECCM.
Air Force	9	LOCPOD (Low Cost Powered Dispenser) for attacks against fixed targets; SRARM (Short Range Anti Radiation Missile).
NOTES (1) Total number 21, of which 8 are of interest to Italy. (2) The 2 sites, for the adjustment of weapon systems, are located in Crete.		

Table F

General outline of the cooperation in the armaments sector between the U.S. and European partners

	Total U.S. other NATO countries	ITALY	FRG	UK
U.S. programmes corresponding to NATO requirements	26	9	18	14
U.S. purchases from allies	23	1	16	14
Allied equipment under evaluation in the U.S.	52	3	22	31
Co-productions and co-developments	21	8	16	14

though to a lesser extent, that the largest part of the cooperation projects simply represents Europe's acceptance of U.S. projects. In this context, the

European industry, and the Italian industry in particular, play essentially the rôle of subcontractor or simple assembler of the more valuable compo-

nents and subsystems, which come from the other side of the Atlantic.

From the data contained in tables A, B, C, D, E, which are very compact and therefore reductive and relating only to weapon systems and major equipment, it clearly appears that the Italian situation as regards relations with the U.S. is extremely unsatisfactory, not only in an absolute sense, but also with regard to the other European partners of the United States (Table F).

THE PROSPECTS

As concerns the actual situation outlined above, the prospects in the sector of military trade with the U.S. must take reality into account and not aim at impossible goals, quite outside our credibility and contractual weight. In this regard, one cannot avoid referring to the numerous appeals to realism made by Ministers Spadolini and Altissimo, by Ambassador Ruggiero, and especially by Gen. Piovano and Dr. Romiti, during the National Conference of the Defence Industry.

The situation is heavy indeed. And there are no easy ways to straighten it up. We must redefine our rôles, adapting them to our real possibilities. We must reacquire, at national level — and not only in the war industry sector — a greater specialization and a better planning capability for producing complete systems. Our capability has been eroded during the last years, so that we have now, at the most, the rôle of subcontractors in limited sectors. A first prerequisite is an enormous effort in the research and technological development sectors, with funds that could even be taken from the already scant Defence budget, by reducing the operation expenses. It is unacceptable that in the budget of Defence the research and development expenses should be, in proportion to the size of the appropriations, from 3 to 5 times lower than those of

our European partners, and that there should not be a wide-reaching and long-term policy, together with a strengthening of the technological foundations of our defence industries. Also evident are the instability, the uncertainties and the deficiencies of our planning, especially in the sector of land armaments, an objectively difficult field, due to its complexity and fragmentation, and the lack of the decisional capability to sacrifice the present, the unnecessary and the non-indispensable in favour of the future, if these sacrifices are necessary due to the shortage of resources. Our Defence establishment must acquire an organic vision of industrial international relations and of the possibilities offered by the extraordinary development of our times. It is particularly important that, as is done by the other European major countries, the negotiations be conducted with a commercial and industrial mentality, that is, in a non-nonsense way avoiding, in this sector, complaisances towards the counterparts, in the name of high principles and abstract politico-strategic objectives, if nothing else for the good reason that the other countries subordinate them to their concrete national interests. Lastly, the decisions about the participation in co-productions or co-developments must be extremely timely, in order to avoid seeing the Italian participation substantially edged to the margins as regards the technological field, owing also to the peculiar inclination to estimate compensations or to evaluate the Italian participation according to working hours, ignoring the technological contents. The latter can of course be evaluated only by relating them to farsighted industrial and technologically innovative policies, of which we are at present particularly in want, and clearly not only in the military sector. It is not a matter of following overambitious policies, disproportionate to our human and financial resources or, better, disproportionate to our capability to



Left, from top.

U.S. soldier in action, with an M60 7.62 mm machine gun.

The crew of an U.S. attack helicopter carrying out the maintenance of the aircraft's three-barrel rotating gun.

MAN trucks of the West German Army.

Right.

U.S. Army LVTP7 amphibious armoured vehicles.

manage innovations, both politically and socially. On the other hand, our potentials must not be underestimated, unless we want to resign ourselves to a smooth slide towards decline.

The preceding considerations are more related to the common problems of our industry in general than to the armaments industry proper. In particular, as regards the relations with the U.S., it must be underlined that our position is greatly imbalanced and it is therefore unthinkable, things being as they are, to redress our military balance of trade. We must therefore try to reduce our disadvantage, by pursuing a global balance, making recourse — as do the minor European NATO countries — to forms of compensation, such as under-licence productions for exportation, maintenance agreements (11), purchase of ordinary materials by the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in NATO's Southern Region (as it happened, for example, with the 10 ton trucks acquired by the U.S. from the German firm MAN also for the Cruise deployed at Comiso), U.S. financial aid to NATO countries, especially those of the Mediterranean littoral, for the purchase of Italian equipment, etc... (12).

One of the reasons for the Italian armaments industry's disadvantage vis-à-vis other European industries is the scarce incisiveness of Italy's presence in the American market. For instance, in Washington we lack an office charged

with the implementation of the MoU, which should also serve as a means of information, support and coordination for the Italian industries wanting to participate in the market of the U.S. Armed Forces. One has the impression that everything is more or less left to chance or to direct relations between industries, where evidently, the Italian firms can obtain some interesting sub-contracts, but remain inevitably losers because they are not supported by the Government's action, in its turn fragmented between various

structural one, in the short-medium term at least. One cannot think of reaching a compensation in the exchange of high-technology products. This does not mean that we should not try to penetrate the American market, especially that regarding the U.S. Forces stationed in Italy, in the Southern Region and possibly in Europe (and, if feasible, also in some particular sectors, as was the case for the OTO Melara 76 Compact and the Beretta pistol). Rather than to the sale of whole weapon system we must direct



Departments and Ministries (Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Industry, Defence) which the more jealous of their actual — or believed — competences they are, the less they have the capability to exercise them. As it often happens, in Italy the main problem is related to the operational management of the public action, given the scarce management capabilities of the State Administration. In view of improving the present unsatisfactory situation concerning the military exchange with the U.S., there are three aspects that seem to have particular importance.

The first aspect concerns specifically the relations with the U.S. The military imbalance is not a contingent but rather a

our attention to:

- co-production of components and subsystems, emphasizing, as much as possible, the already existing industrial agreements (which in some civil sectors appear to be much more satisfactory);
- contracts for the maintenance and overhaul of American equipment also employed by the Italian Armed Forces;
- purchase by the U.S. of ordinary equipment (trucks, for example), ensuring also the maintenance at the third technical level, and higher;
- U.S. funding for the purchase of Italian equipment by countries of the Southern Region and the Third World (also in order to acquire a certain degree

of standardization); incidentally, this would be a concrete acknowledgement of the effort made by Italy in accepting U.S. military bases on its territory, with all the problems and constraints that come with it, due to the increased strategic exposure, if nothing else; a fact that should deserve concrete compensations;

- purchase of ammunition, for example for the U.S. contribution to CINCSOUTH's reserve stocks;
- integral refitting of obsolete weapon systems owned at present by countries of the Southern Region, in view of exporting them to Third World countries (i.e. updating of the Turkish M48s or UB-IDs).

In this regard, it would not be a matter of establishing a new umbrella agreement with the U.S., but rather of managing the present MoU in a more dynamic way and reviving the already existing forums (High Level Defence Group = HLDG) and the Italy-U.S. bilateral commission for MoU enforcement, unifying them if necessary. It seems of particular importance that all problems concerning both countries be considered within an organic and unitary picture. In this context it would be necessary to single out not only the areas susceptible of an immediate or short-term Italian intervention, but also the sectors susceptible of later developments, because of a possible medium-term employment for improving trade with the U.S.. In substance, only a programmatic approach, covering a sufficient period of time, seems to be the premise for reducing the current imbalance.

Secondly, the entire Italian apparatus charged with the management of the relations with the U.S. should be reorganized. Military and industrial technico-operative groups should be established at the Military Attaché's Office in Washington and at the Ministry of Defence, entrusted with the tasks of information, stimulation and promotion. This is the



only way of inducing more Italian industries to bid for U.S. Armed Force's contracts and managing the higher-level policies, the offset agreements, the technological transfer, etc. in a more organic way.

Thirdly, besides the effort of technological upgrading which shall have necessarily to be made by the Italian armaments industry, also because we cannot expect others to resolve our problems, the compensa-

tion agreements ought to take into account technological qualifications and the prospects that the possible innovations will have on the mentioned industrial sector, more than the working hours involved. The existing imbalance could perhaps be redressed — of course not in the very short term, but in the medium-long term (and this is what really matters) — with technological transfers, which must be clear also from

Left, from top.

American CH-46E helicopter, with cargo attached to its barycentric hook.

*U.S. Tank Landing Ship (LST)
"La Moure County".*

Right.

Deployment of West German Field Artillery.

the viewpoint of a possible employment for our exports, and included in a policy of research and development, not a merely military one but regarding all sectors of the advanced technologies, on which we could decide to concentrate our national efforts.

An extremely delicate aspect concerns the bonds and controls on "strategic" technologies.

The utilization of the American technologies is more and more subjected — for well-justified reasons, no doubt about it (13) — to the existence of mechanisms apt to guarantee that the U.S. licences and know-how will not eventually be employed by the Warsaw Pact countries to strengthen their military power. The only way out in this case is possibly — besides the consolidation of a rigorous national line — a closer planning with the U.S.

In this regard, one could foresee that the organism charged with the management of the entire question of the Italy-U.S. relations should have a mixed cell for controlling the technological transfer, in order to diminish the typical unreliability of this sector. On the other hand, we need relatively more reliable long-term provisions in order to give organic unity to our industrial and technological policy, to the market estimates and to the evaluations about the advantages of national initiatives vis-à-vis cooperation within Europe or with the United States.

The fundamental aspect is nevertheless that of planning and management, which should use the direction and control capability and, most of all, the institutional power of our Defence Administration for strengthening our industrial basis



of the armaments production, and the "variable geometry" of its accords with similar foreign industries. After the National Conference of the Defence Industry, there have been several attempts at rationalizing developments and productions, by making recourse to various forms of consortiums. As far as the Administration is concerned, the reconstitution of the Defence-Industry Committee, and the Bill on the reorganization

of the military summit, will probably improve the situation a great deal. But it is necessary that the Committee devotes itself to the formulation of the general trends of the programme and not to specific and contingent problems, the management of which should be left to the National Armaments Director, in order to avoid at least the overlapping of competences and the subsequent uncertainties, confusion and



AB-205 helicopter flying at low altitude over the radio installations of a Command Post.

jurisdiction conflicts. Also in this case, like in many other sectors, the present main problems derive from the State's inability to perform in full its managerial rôle as is its duty, which in international relations and especially in those with the U.S. is of determinant importance. Italy's geostrategic importance should allow it to perform, with imagination and remarkable vigour, an effective action, if not for marketing the Italian products, at least for strengthening the industrial base of the Defence organization.

Anyway, we cannot ask the U.S. to adopt initiatives apt to improve the trade situation. We cannot ask others to fill our gaps and cure our illnesses. The U.S. necessities in the most different sectors must be taken into account; not only the short-term, but also the medium-long term ones, in order to bring about the conditions that will induce the U.S. to purchase our products, and convince our industries of the advantages of a vast and active presence in the markets of the industrialized countries, and of the United States in particular.

Gen. Carlo Jean

Notes:

(1) M. Nones: "Prospects of co-operation of the European military industry". According to IPD (Defence Parliamentary Information), May 1985, in 1982 the exportation percentage of sales was 60.3% for Italy, 41.6% for Great Britain, 35.9% for France and 11.5% for the FRG.

(2) M. Nones: see note (1); also S.A. Rossi: "The Defence economic system" and C. Jean: "The industrial strategy of the Defence system", introductory report to the National Conference of the Defence Industry, Rome, 2-3 July, 1984.

(3) In particular, PAPS (Periodic Armament Planning System) was introduced in the report, together with its application procedures (Mission Need, Outline NATO Staff Target, Military Requirement, etc.) permitting to carry out multinational cooperation from the initial stage of definition of the equipment's operational characteristics.

(4) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering: "Report of Defense Science Board Task Force on Industry - to Industry International Armaments Cooperation. Phase 1. NATO Europe". Washington, June 1983.

(5) Specific reference will be made, in these notes, to Secretary Weinberger's 11th report, January 1985.

(6) DARPA - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; SDIO - Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.

(7) A typical example of the contradictions of the U.S. policies is the fact that a few months after the Roth - Glenn - Nunn amendment, aimed at improving transatlantic cooperation had been approved by a large majority (87 to 1), the "Special Metals Act" was approved by a similar majority, blocking in practice the approved amendment, since it subordinated U.S. pro-

curements to the production by U.S. firms of any special metal.

(8) Gen. Piovano — then Secretary General of Defence and National Armaments Director — has expressed, during the National Conference of Defence Industry, great reservations on the validity of the Italy-U.S. MoU signed in 1978 by Minister Ruffini and Defence Secretary Brown. He stated that it would not be convenient to sign a new government-to-government agreement, due to the management difficulties that it would meet on the Italian side. Gen. Piovano implied to be in favour of a "deregulation" and "variable geometry agreements" between Italian and U.S. firms.

(9) One example is the purchase of the Beretta pistol, and of the SAW (Squad Automatic Weapon) from Belgium's FN. The Assistant Under Secretary of Defence for Research, Development and Production, Mr. Delauer, has defined 9 areas, called "small projects" of the above-mentioned types, which could be appropriate for transatlantic cooperation.

(10) Based on data made available during the preparation of the National Conference of Defence Industry, it is possible to say that complete weapon systems (with their spare parts) make up only one quarter of the trade with the U.S. These data refer mainly to the 450 billion directly spent by the General Directorates. The other 1,250 billion concern purchases made by industries, and refer essentially to components, subsystems and licences.

(11) For example, those already signed for the C 130s and CH 47s.

(12) It is difficult to see why the U.S. bases in Turkey should be defended by Rapier systems from Great Britain and not by Italian Spada systems.

(13) On this subject see the highly documented Perle report to Congress: "Assessing the Impact of Technological Transfers on U.S./European Security", Washington DC, March 1985.

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
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


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EUROPE VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVES

TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY

Strategy and technology have always been closely and reciprocally linked.

The strategic needs spur and direct technological and scientific progress. The technological and scientific progress. The technological possibilities influence the strategic conceptions of every historical period.


They also determine the rôle and use of military force as political instrument.

A new technological revolution has been occurring in the last part of this century, which is going to weigh heavily on the economy and to change society's very structures. On the international plane, this revolution will be a determinant selective factor among states. It will influence their status, the real extent of their independence, sovereignty and liberty of action in protecting their interests. New prospects will also open up in the fields of security and defence. This technological revolution will affect both global strategic relations and conventional defence capabilities, especially at regional level. Possibilities of effective active strategic defences — i.e. antimissile defence — with their appendages of equally effective anti-aircraft, anticruise and antisatellite capabilities, can be envisioned at global level. The so-called emerging technologies, whose employment would probably upset the current superiority of attack over defence, will be used at

conventional level. The conventional level could thus acquire that intrinsic stability it lacks today and has to borrow from the stabler nuclear level; in other words, by tying conventional defences to the theatre nuclear forces. At regional level, there will be an increase in importance and scope of the so-called conventional deterrence, which will be based on direct defence capabilities rather than on escalation and retaliation threats. Every transformation implies instability and uncertainties. The evolution of the elements of the present strategic equation modifies — in the short term at least, that is, until new balances are formed — Western Europe's comfortable sense of security and entails a reconsideration of concepts taken for granted until now. This implies, in order to keep up with the times and not be left out, an active involvement and the assumption of greater responsibilities, if the Europeans want to be active subjects and not objects of history, as they inevitably would be if they went on delegating their security mainly to the U.S. military protection.

This presupposes the capability to devote more resources to research and development, especially in the critical technological areas, sacrificing the present (forces' structure, degree of operational readiness, etc.) in view of the future.

First of all, Europe must be well aware of the present events, must evaluate their impact on



DETERRENCE AND ACTIVE STRATEGIC DEFENCES

The U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative is not a novelty as far as quality is concerned. It is part of the U.S. strategic concepts' natural evolution, which occurred at the beginning of the '70s, soon after the appearance of the MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) doctrine, i.e. of a strategy founded on the balance of terror and on the assured capability of mutual destruction. This doctrine appeared unacceptable right away, also from the ethical viewpoint. It must be underlined that it was never accepted by the Kremlin's strategic leadership. The attempts to overcome MAD brought about a progressive pliancy of the U.S. central deterrent, which was implemented mostly through the theories of limited nuclear war, limited strategic options (LSO) with the transformation of targeting from anti-city to anti-forces, and with PD-59 (Countervailing Strategy). The flexibility and gradualism of the strategic response were made possible by the warheads' "MIRVization", by their higher accuracy, by the nuclear weapons' decreased power and by the improved C3-I systems. But up to now the offensive weapons have had absolute priority, and deterrence has been founded essentially on escalation, i.e. on MAD. The deriving strategies have always substantially been sheer deterrent ones, not operational strategies. That is, they have not been based on an acceptable defensive capability. In case of aggression, the attacked would have been destroyed together with the attacker.

Now the situation has changed. The technological developments allow to foresee — in the medium, long, or very long term, no matter to what extent — the possibility to assign greater scope, if not priority, to active defence vis-à-vis retaliations carried out with offensive weapons.

The objectives attainable through this transformation can

Preceding page.

Artist's impression of a U.S. space station.

Above.

The "Hipparcos" satellite, realized by a consortium of European firms.

our security and find out the possibilities of choices that concretely exist. These assessments must of course be realistic. Realism, for Europe and particularly for the individual nations, means to be aware of some basic points. As regards the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative, these main points seem to be the following:

- the scientific and technological progress cannot be stopped; also the possibilities to guide it on a certain course instead of another are substantially limited;
- the concrete European possibilities of influencing American decisions are very scant: the situation is quite different from the one prevailing in relation to the deployment of Euro-missiles and neutron weapons in Europe;
- Europe cannot ask the U.S. for two contradictory things: to guarantee European security and renounce to reduce the U.S. strategic vulnerability;
- the Soviet initiatives in the sector of strategic defences, both active (of the antistrategic

and theatre missiles, as well as the anti-aircraft type) and passive (civil defence), must be considered more carefully than has been done up to now. Western security is not threatened by the American initiatives, but from the Soviet ones. They proceed with a logic of their own and in reality can only marginally be influenced by American decisions. A slow-down of the current U.S. programmes, therefore, would not have a great incidence on the Soviet efforts in the field of active strategic defences. There would be a repetition of what occurred in the '70s: the decrease in the U.S. military power did not prompt the Soviet Union to make similar reductions. The result was less security for Europe;

- a debate held at principle or major-system levels is not only completely useless (which is substantially of scarce importance: everyone has the right to amuse himself as he thinks best, playing with ecumenical considerations and preaching his prophetic vision of international relations) but also misleading. And this is dangerous indeed. In fact, it makes it difficult to consider the truth as it stands. It hinders the making of decisions. It prevents us from doing our best for influencing our future. And this is surely what really counts.


vary from a minimum to a maximum. The minimum refers to the offensive nuclear weapons' reduction of vulnerability, a reduction furthered by "MIRV-ization" (through which the number of the attacking warheads grows enormously, while the number of the objectives to be destroyed by a counterforce attack decreases, making "first strike" a concrete possibility) by the offensive weapons' better accuracy (the CBMs' survival cannot be ensured anymore by passive defences, such as silos hardening: in fact, the CEP — Circular Error Probability — tends to coincide with the fire-sphere of a nuclear warhead of a few hundred kilotons) and by the reduction of the side-effects of a counterforce attack (reduction of warhead power and specialization of the attack weapons, with ensuing decrease of residual radioactivity, for example). By insisting that active strategic defences destabilize deterrence, one ignores, or wants to ignore, that such destabilization is already produced by the technological development of the of-

fensive strategic weapons. By examining the technologies already available, it can be noticed that the imbalances are inevitably bound to increase. The only way of preventing this occurrence is the adoption of active strategic defences, which have first of all a "de-MIRVizing", effect, in that they reestablish a balance between the attacking warheads and the number of objectives to be destroyed by a first strike.

To have an appreciable effectiveness, the defences should be areal, therefore based in space, and be able to hit the attacking missiles during their booster, post-booster and ballistics trajectory phases. The simple point-defence systems, i.e. the antimissile weapons deployed near the silos, are not sufficient for restoring a stable and balanced deterrence at bipolar level. As a matter of fact, the direct defences that were the only ones available when the ABM Treaty was signed, could be saturated by an attacker with an adequate targeting policy. The defences maintain their significance and

efficacy only as regards the residual threat, i.e. the small number of attacking warheads missed by the areal defences. As imperfect and limited as they can be, they make the planning of a surprise attack impossible and therefore restore the stability of deterrence. In this regard, it must be pointed out that also the underwater and air components of this deterrent have become more vulnerable. In any case they are much less suited for a gradual and selective counterforce employment than the land-based intercontinental missiles. They are mostly, in substance, retaliatory weapons against cities. But deterrence based on punitive retaliation is becoming less and less credible, and also less acceptable from the ethical and political point of view. In the long run it cannot be the foundation of Western security. The active strategic defences' min-

Artist's view of the L-SAT telecommunications satellite.



imum goal does not entail upsetting the foundations of the strategic concepts that have prevailed in the West since the late '50s when the Soviet Union acquired the capability to hit the U.S. territory. It only reestablishes the stability of deterrence, making a counterforce surprise-attack impossible.

The maximum goal that the active strategic defences could pursue in a longer term is quite a different matter: it could be that of achieving a basically complete defence of population and territory, therefore completely impenetrable to a missile attack.

This objective is something substantially different from the minimum goal, both from the strategic and the technical point of view. The absolute prevalence of defensive over offensive weapons would permit to overcome the present "punitive" retaliation. The latter has undoubtedly had the great merit of having brought about a stabilization of the global strategic balances, by making a general nuclear war between the two superpowers and also direct clashes of limited intensity in peripheral areas more improbable, due to the risk of escalation into a global confrontation. It has nevertheless the big drawback of seeing its mechanisms become less and less credible, especially as regards the degree of deterrence outside the national territory. For the Soviet Union the question has different aspects: in fact, a defeat in a peripheral area of its continental empire would cause a serious crisis, not only in the other regions of the empire, but within the very structures of the Soviet power. Moreover, as has already been said, the offensive weapons' technological development is remarkably reducing the stability of the present strategy of deterrence. Besides, were deterrence to fail, there would be no other alternative outside surrender or destruction of what we want to defend, and, probably, the result would be a complete disaster, followed by the

collapse of our entire civilization.

Lastly, the concept of a deterrence founded on threats of massive retaliation against the population is becoming less and less ethically acceptable for the Western democracies. Even the Catholic Church acknowledges the legitimacy of deterrence, provided it is temporary and constitutes a way of transition, if not to a form of general and controlled disarmament, at least to less dangerous systems of security leading to an at least partial recovery of one of civilization's major conquests: the distinction between fighters and non-fighters.

It is evident that the maximum goal (complete defence) includes also the minimum one (antimissile defence). The latter can actually be considered an intermediate stage of the former; i.e. a short-term goal, aimed at obtaining limited scopes vis-à-vis wider, longer-term objectives to be pursued in the future.

DEFENCE OF MISSILES AND DEFENCE OF CITIES

The two objectives have different aspects, not only for their different impacts on strategic conceptions, but also as regards:



- the coefficient of impenetrability that must be realized for obtaining an effective defence;
- the type of offensive system that must be considered in preparing the active strategic defences.

A defence that aims at guaranteeing the strategic deterrent's invulnerability becomes significant even if it is not complete. All it needs is the ability to wear the attacking forces to the point of making the planning of a first strike impossible. Thus one should overcome the so-called vulnerability gap, which represents a danger for the balance of a deterrence based on second-strike capability on which, after all, the current balance of terror is

based. The existence of this kind of defence would permit to get rid of a particularly dangerous aspect of the present nuclear strategic forces' organization, i.e. the "Launch Under Attack" and the "Launch on Warning". This entails a very high operational timeliness of the offensive strategic forces and the planning of measures of automatic retaliation in case of alarm. Owing to their inevitable rigidity, they are objectively dangerous and could cause a nuclear war by mistake. A defence of the intercontinental missiles and the Control and Command systems of the whole strategic deterrent can moreover be limited, from the U.S. part at least, to the mere threat represented by the Soviet ICBM. The submarine launched missiles, the Cruise and the nuclear air forces are much less suited for launching a counterforce first strike. One must also consider the current nuclear proliferation, which would render more doubtful the two superpowers' possibilities of control.

The defence of territory and people requires an almost complete coefficient of impenetrability and must concern the whole range of offensive weapons: from ICBM to SLBM, from aircraft to Cruise. A few warheads that managed to overcome the defence could always cause intolerable damages. A complete defence is evidently impossible. Historical experience is witness of that. But this is not the point. Discussions over these questions are often misleading.

A defence, in order to be significant, need not always be absolute. Also limited defences have a political significance. Clearly, trying to pursue basically complete defences is much more expensive. There are technical difficulties that, even if not insuperable, are certainly much greater. The "ratio of exchange" between defence and attack, i.e. the ratio between the cost of defence and the cost of the provisions that must be made by the attacker to overcome the defence, in-



creases enormously in proportion with the level of coverage that the defence wants to establish. The problem of the options is always represented in terms of decreasing marginal returns.

Undoubtedly the discussions on the U.S. "Strategic Defence Initiative" have been marred from the beginning by the many ambiguities presented by the proposal. As always, there are interferences and contradictions between declaratory policy and actual policy, between rhetoric and logic.

On the one hand, the very term BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) which preceded SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) had a fundamental ambiguity. As a matter of fact, it means at the same time both defence "of" ballistic missiles and "against" ballistic missiles. In the term

SDI — which has wider meanings and goals than BMD, the ambiguities remain. The U.S. has not specified its real objectives. Probably it is not quite in a position to define them. The suitable technologies, whose impact can already be determined with sufficient accuracy.


On the other hand, another element of considerable confusion derives from the fact that the U.S. Administration has issued contradictory statements and that the SDI problem has become the subject of an internal political debate in the U.S. The quite justified criticism of Reagan's "prophetic" visions of a final overcoming of the offensive nuclear weapons' strategic importance — a criticism that concerned both the merely technical aspects of the question and the politico-strategic consequences of the U.S.

SDI proposed solutions for the interception of ICBMs.

Figure 1 shows a ground-based laser station, directing a laser beam — through two reflection mirrors — against an ICBM during the booster phase.

Figure 2 depicts two satellites conveying laser and particle beams against ICBMs in the booster and half-trajectory phases.

programmes — has helped to produce uncertainties and confusions. That is, by politicizing it, they have made an unbiased evaluation of the question rather difficult. The Europeans' irritation for having been presented with a "fait accompli" and unilateral changes in the American strategy, on which after all their security depends, has also had something to do with it. A source of particular concern was the sensation of



Technicians at work inside Spacelab, the European space laboratory.

being faced by the prospect of a complete change in the concept of a deterrence based on the balance of terror, with consequent possibilities of greater risks for Europe; above all, the risk of an increase of its strategic vulnerability and of a decoupling of the European defences from the U.S. central deterrent.

There is in particular the widespread feeling that a strategic defence of the U.S. would increase the risks of a war limited to Europe. The concept of limited war is inherent to the NATO doctrine of flexible response. This risk is reduced today by the scarce manageability of a nuclear conflict, also at theatre level. The possibilities of limiting a nuclear war are objectively very limited; this results in a strengthening of the coupling between the European defences and the

U.S. central deterrent. The Soviet Union, on its part, has always avoided a distinction between theatre and strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet response to a gradual and selective employment by the West of nuclear weapons, limited to the European theatre, would be a global one. This has permitted the Europeans to bask in the assurance that they could count on an absolute American guarantee. As Stanley Hoffman remarked, the Europeans have accepted the flexible response in that it is a response; the Americans, instead, have accepted it because it is flexible, i.e. a conflict in Europe would not involve automatically the U.S. territory and population. This is an innate ambiguity, to be sure, but it cannot be eliminated and, everything considered, is also convenient, since the politico-strategic

cohesion of the Alliance rests on it. After the deployment of active strategic defences, a war limited to Europe could probably become — at least in theory — a real possibility. In fact, the fundamental change occurred in the strategic field by the appearance of the nuclear weapons would become questionable. In the pre-nuclear era, one deterred the enemy and defended himself with the same weapons. Deterrence was a kind of fallout of an actual defensive capability. With the appearance of nuclear weapons — or, to put it better, when the Soviet Union in the late '50s acquired the capability of inflicting intolerable losses to the U.S. territory — given the impossibility to defend itself from this threat, the U.S. was forced to pursue security not through defence but through threats of retaliation in case of aggression. The doctrines of limited nuclear war, which were to justify extended deterrence, i.e. the widening of deterrence and therefore the continued American guarantee to Europe despite the conditions of vulnerability of the United States, had been perceived until now as a simple theoretic exercise, given the possibility of escalation from the tactical to the strategic level, precisely owing to a nuclear war's scarce manageability and to the vulnerability of the U.S. territory. Those doctrines were understood as a mere contrivance used by the U.S. authorities to justify, before the American public opinion, the continuation of the strategic guarantee to Europe.

A fundamental element that gives the Europeans the perception of a real American commitment to their defence was, and still is today (and is likely to be in the future), the presence in Europe of a substantial number of conventional U.S. forces. With the increased Soviet military superiority, not

only in conventional but also in nuclear theatre weapons, and with the loss of the American nuclear strategic superiority, sanctioned by the SALT negotiations, the European strategic exposure increased considerably, giving rise to doubts, at least at perception level, about the solidity of the strategic connection between Europe and the United States. The West's answer to the new situation was the deployment of the American Euromissiles in Europe, i.e. the deployment in Europe of a part, albeit a very small one, of the U.S. strategic deterrent. The Euromissiles have a substantially reduced importance as actual military capability, and in a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States they would have an insignificant impact. It is after all a matter of 500 weapons added to the approximately 10,000 U.S. strategic warheads. They are instead extremely significant from the political and psychological point of view; for they bear witness of the U.S. will to commit itself to the defence of Europe, despite the vulnerability of its territory and its loss of the absolute global-strategic superiority. Unlike the shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons, the Euromissiles' deployment removes the fears about a nuclear conflict limited to Europe, because the Soviet territory would be hit also in that case.

The deployment in Europe of "Pershing II" and "Cruise" missiles increases the level of strategic exposure of the U.S., not that of the European countries.

This is an aspect that has not been completely realized by large strata of the public opinion. The threat to Europe comes from the Soviet "SS20s" and "Backfires" and not from the American Euromissiles.

Given the Europeans' inability to elaborate their own concrete responses to that threat, the only solution was to strengthen the American guarantee and therefore necessarily increase the European

strategic reliance on the United States.

The Euromissiles problem, as regards the European defence, shows several analogies with the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative and a possible European participation in the programme.

REFLECTIONS OF THE U.S. SDI ON EUROPE


The European attitude towards the American military build-up has always been an ambivalent and contradictory one.

As logic would have it, every kind of American strengthening and possibly the reestablishment of the U.S. strategic superiority should be greeted with favour by the Europeans, for it increases their security against the Soviet threat, since actually it gives more credibility to the American commitment to the defence of Europe. On the contrary, the Europeans on the one hand refuse to make the military efforts that would make them more independent of the American guarantee and, on the other, seem worried by the strengthening of the U.S. military power, which is the prerequisite of such guarantee. It is a clear symptom of a certain schizophrenia, which leads to prefer rhetoric to reality and ignores the substance of the problems, instead of tackling them with a conscious resolve.

It is certainly an unpleasant feeling having to rely on others and seeing one's own actual space of liberty of action restricted as a consequence of a strengthened American leadership, at least in the strategic field. The clamours invoking negotiations, controls of armaments, disarmament and détente more or less consciously ignore that these objectives are attainable only if the negotiations are held from a position of sufficient strength and if the Soviet counterpart becomes aware of the Western determination to maintain a suffi-

ciently effective system of security. Otherwise, the Soviet Union could believe (with good reason, from its point of view) that it has no real interest in reaching concrete agreements that would increase the Western countries' security level. It would perhaps accept to negotiate only because the negotiating table allows it to spread its propaganda, aimed at loosening the political cohesion of the Western Alliance. A typical example of the ambivalence and contradictory character of the European perception is that the building of Soviet active strategic defences is seen by large sectors of Europe's public opinion as less dangerous than the American initiatives in that field. The same happened also with the Euromissiles. Reasonably, if anyone had to be worried about their deployment in Europe it should have been the Americans. The link between central deterrent and European defences and the possibilities to limit a nuclear conflict have noticeably diminished since the Euromissiles' installation. The coupling has become tighter and the U.S. level of exposure has grown in proportion. On the contrary many Europeans consider the Euromissiles with greater concern than the Soviet SS20s, i.e. they worry more about the provisions aimed at increasing their security threatened by the Soviet initiative, than about the threats to their security.

The Euromissiles increase the European strategic dependence on the U.S. and this is unpleasant, we are aware of that. It is nevertheless a solution forced on us by the increase of the potential Soviet threat. The only other reasonable alternative — excluding, clearly, that of stepping into the Soviet sphere of influence — would be for the Europeans to autonomously guarantee their own security. But if they refuse to accept the social and financial burdens that this entails, there is evidently no other viable solution. At the same time there are Europeans, the




French in particular, who, as concerns active strategic defences, are afraid that Reagan's SDI will neutralize their own nuclear forces. The danger for the French deterrent of being made ineffective, does not stem from the American initiative, but rather from the Soviet buildup of antimissile defences. The hope that the Soviet efforts in this particular sector will be significantly influenced by the American action appears quite groundless. We do not see why the Soviet Union should change the policy followed since the '70s. During that decade the pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union has led the U.S. to slow down its military effort. But this has not induced a slowdown in the Soviet military buildup. The Soviet Union has increased its military power both as a whole and as com-

pared with the West's, reducing the latter's security.

If the Americans were to drop their programmes in the strategic defence sector, the event would likely have no reflection whatsoever on the Soviet attitude. The threat to the West would be increased and there would be no significant compensation.

The real aspects of the problem are different.

Europe cannot expect the United States to continue the engagement in its defence, renouncing meanwhile to lower its vulnerability. Europe must moreover consider that an action of dissociation from the American initiative would very likely end up increasing the isolationist tendencies of the United States and, in any case, it would have scarce probability of affecting the American deci-



Other SDI proposed solutions for the interception of ICBMs.

Figure 3: a U.S. submarine launching a nuclear device, which explodes generating X rays or laser beams directed against the enemy ICBMs.

Figure 4: a railgun (top) launching homing devices; a particle-beam satellite (centre) directing its rays against the enemy warheads; a track-and-control satellite coordinating the action of two systems.

sions. One must face the truth and consider instead the influence of the American programmes on the European defence and the actions that the Europeans could undertake in order to increase their security, emphasizing the positive influence exerted on it by the

American action and deemphasizing the negative one.

Reality ought to be seen as it is, not as one wishes it to be; in other words, one must not be led by theoretic considerations but study the concrete options open to him. The whole problem of European security ought to be considered with a realistic eye and not in terms of ambition, hope, principle or delusion.

The fundamental problem that faces us is not so much that of the SDI reflections on European defence, but rather what the Soviets are doing in the sector of antimissile and anti-aircraft defences. This indeed further lowers the credibility and validity of the NATO Strategy of flexible response, at least in its present configuration. Clearly, as a premise to the whole matter, there is a fundamental question mark, that is whether the threat to the European security is embodied as always by the Soviet military power and whether the European security can be guaranteed only through the link with the American system of security. In other words, whether the Atlantic Alliance remains the prerequisite of European Security and whether we refuse the only possible alternative: that of a system of security going from the Ural to the Atlantic, which would make Western Europe dependent on the Soviet Union rather than on the United States.

After this premise, the next step is to single out what changes can be adopted for the European defensive organization following the modifications that the SDI, limited or vast is of little importance, will bring about in the global U.S. strategy.

It goes without saying that the implementation of a U.S. strategic defence will have two essential consequences. First, the U.S. capability to participate in the conventional defence of Europe will decrease, owing to the costs of both financial and human resources, which will certainly be considerable. Second, the possibility of a limited

nuclear conflict will increase. This will be even more dangerous if the strategic antimissile defence system is not matched by a theatre antimissile capability. In this regard, one must consider that the technological development — and not only in the miniaturization and specialization of theatre nuclear weapons but also in the new non-nuclear conventional and chemical warheads — will give shape in the '90s to possible so-called "surgical strikes", which could destroy the NATO forces at their peacetime locations, destroying all possibilities of an effective conventional defence.

This is a fact that cannot be ignored. If it is not faced adequately, to talk about effective defence does not make any sense.

The hypothesis of diminishing this vulnerability with the aid of surface forces, spread over the entire territory and based on largely decentralized structures, i.e. on the so-called alternative strategies, achieved through the "techno-commandos" proposed by the German expert Afheldt or through popular dissuasion, as advocated in France by Copel, is too questionable to become a credible hypothesis of a defensive organization replacing the more traditional classic advanced or in-depth defence, based on standing forces and on a centralized organization.


Taking this global reference picture for granted, the only realistic options appear to be the following:

- diminishing our dependence on tactical nuclear weapons, especially the shorter-range ones destined to the direct support of our conventional forces, due to the concrete danger — stemming from them — of a nuclear war limited to Europe;
- strengthening non-nuclear defences, in order to achieve a lower-level balance, counterbalancing the current Warsaw Pact's considerable superiority;
- guaranteeing the survival of our conventional defences

against missile, cruise and aircraft attacks by reducing their vulnerability to surprise attacks; a vulnerability which is already considerable and is inevitably destined to grow.

It is a fact that the European security will be less reliable and stable. But evolutive trends are inescapable. The situation changes and changes inevitably, because of its intrinsic logic, due mainly to the technological progress which cannot be stopped. The pleasant times of security based especially on the guarantee offered by the extended American deterrence are going to disappear for ever. The regional and conventional balances will acquire more importance.

A greater immediate commitment will be expected of the Europeans, who will have to stop relying on the "Deus ex machina" embodied by nuclear deterrence. One must not forget the political, economic and social problems caused by this. But they must all be overcome if Europe is to enjoy a reasonable degree of security and independence. The United States has great interest in European defence, which also in the future will be one of the hinges of the U.S. national system of security. Nevertheless we should not delude ourselves, thinking that the American leadership will be able to convince the U.S. public opinion to accept an engagement — perhaps not unlimited, but onerous nevertheless — for the defence of Europe, without European participation and without adequate political and economic offsets. Demands without repayments are outside reality. Evidently the strengthening of deterrence, in the whole range of capabilities needed to be effective, means neither the end of détente nor that of the negotiations with the Soviet Union for armaments control and for disarmament. They are nevertheless utopian objectives if considered as self-rewarding and independent aspects of security and defence. Détente is a variable, depending on the



capabilities of defence. The solution we have to find in order to give concreteness to these initiatives is that they ought to be managed by the West as unitarily as possible and that the management ought to be connected with — and not disconnected from — the assessment of the priorities regarding the security needs, as compared to those of détente and disarmament.


New vulnerabilities would otherwise appear, and the Soviet Union, at the Geneva negotiations, would have the concrete possibility to pursue its aim of undermining the Alliance's political cohesion,

foundation of its strategic cohesion and therefore cornerstone of Western security. In substance, the Soviet Union should have no real interest in reaching agreements which would diminish the costs and risks of mutual security. It is hard to believe that the USSR would give up the possibility of achieving unilateral advantages.

The European contribution must be aimed at avoiding sharp contrapositions between the two superpowers. This is an answer to both its security needs and its interest of not being belittled within the Alliance by an excessive strengthening of the American leader-

The first touchdown of the Columbia space shuttle. This vehicle, which lands like a normal airplane, can carry into space and put in orbit a remarkable payload.

ship. The success of a European action presupposes a review of the changes in both the global and the regional strategic picture, which follow not so much the U.S. strategic defence initiatives as the impact



that the technological progress of both offensive and defensive armaments has on European security. This success requires also a close European coordination.

Up to now there has been a total lack of it. The division into sectors, typical of the European initiatives, diminishes their weight and may be liable to political exploitation by the Soviet Union.

This is a greater risk than that concerning the Euromissiles. In the case of the strategic defence initiatives the danger exists that the agreements between the two superpowers forget about Europe's specific interests; in other words, there is the danger of a spatial Yalta. At Geneva, in particular, there is a remarkable asymmetry between the interests involved. The U.S. is interested mainly in obtaining a limitation of the Soviet strategic weapons; the

Europeans want a limitation of Euromissiles; the Soviet Union, instead, is interested in limiting or slowing down the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative. This asymmetry between Europe and the United States offers the Soviets excellent propaganda occasions. This is a fact that must be considered. It is a real vulnerability, which can be reduced first of all by an European effort in the field of conventional defences, particularly with the achievement of an effective antimissile, anticruise and anti-aircraft theatre defence, but which inevitably entails also a more concrete European support of the American positions during the Geneva negotiations.

Drawing of a space laboratory, where technicians can operate for long periods of time.

EUROPE VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVES

Giovanni Caroli

→ → → → → → → →

COMMERCIAL

TRAFFIC

TOWARD

ITALY



HYPOTHESES FOR A POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

The concept of national defence cannot be viewed today as defence of a nation's territory, but must be widened to include the protection of the supplies necessary to its economy and eventually to its survival.

Considering the fact that no country (except perhaps the United States and the Soviet Union) is self-sufficient and none can adopt a strictly autarchic policy, it may be interesting to outline a picture of the commercial traffic concerning Italy, as regards both quantity and type of the goods as well as the means and environments involved.

From the military point of view, it seems appropriate to point out, as conjectures, some implications on the inflow of foreign goods, stemming from changes in the political balances, from international crises or from armed conflicts.

It is known that the ways of the commercial traffic follow lines which can be linked to streams flowing in various environments: sea, land and air.

In each of these environments, the lines can be grouped into various systems (on sea and air, route systems; on land, road, railroad systems and inland navigation systems) which are influenced by both the economic rule of lower costs (or higher profits) and by the conditions and obstacles set by nature and men: one can imagine for example the marine routes converging on the straits or the same routes heading together to the major and better equipped ports or, last, the blocking of waterways for political reasons (Suez) and subsequent expensive lengthening of the routes (circumnavigation of Africa).

The study of this picture of essentially economic phenomena can be considered of military importance only so far as the commercial traffic of a country is seen as one of the many components of its "military" potential and more precisely, of its overall capability to endure

Table 1 IMPORTED GOODS (VALUES) BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN-YEAR 1983 (in million lire)			
COUNTRY	AMOUNT	% OF E.E.C. COUNTRIES	% OF TOTAL
West Germany	19,371,820	37.1	15.88
France	15,362,342	29.5	12.59
Netherlands	4,749,509	11.4	4.87
United Kingdom	5,941,564	9.1	3.90
Belgium and Luxembourg	4,127,558	7.9	3.38
Greece	1,178,692	2.3	0.96
Denmark	1,111,665	2.1	0.91
Ireland	314,236	0.6	0.26
TOTAL E.E.C.	52,157,386	100.0	42.75
Spain	1,708,634		1.40
TOTAL E.E.C. + SPAIN	53,866,020		44.15
Other European Countries	11,589,735		9.50
TOTAL	65,455,755		53.65
European Countries of Warsaw Pact Area	8,043,418		6.59
TOTAL EUROPE	73,499,173		60.24
Africa	14,996,095		12.30
North America	8,055,567		6.60
South and Central America	5,729,240		4.70
Asia	18,795,790		15.40
Other Countries	926,063		0.76
TOTAL EXTRA-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES	48,502,755		39.76
GRAND TOTAL	122,001,928		100.00

the war effort.

In other terms, it is a matter of defining one of the objectives of Defence, mainly from the point of view of its distribution over space.

In particular, one ought to outline a picture of the international exchange of goods interesting Italy, surveying its trends also through a comparison among the various ways mentioned before (sea, land, air), and to hypothesize possible modifications as regards areas and quality, in the event of international crises.

THE IMPORTS' SOURCES

An overall view of the areas of origin of foreign trade shows that the European countries

prevail over the extra-European ones.

Considering our imports by value, we find West Germany at the first place (raw goods and energy materials — coal for example — and semimanufactured and finished goods — iron, mechanical and chemical products), followed by France, United States, Holland, Soviet Union, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia (oil products), Belgium and Luxembourg.

Switzerland, Libya and Iran (oil), Egypt, Iraq, South Africa, Austria, Japan and Spain follow at a distance in that order, and finally a group of Central and South American countries, including in particular Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina.

On the whole, Italy imports from Europe (excluding the

Communist area) 53.6% of its requirements.

About 43% of the goods' global value comes from the EEC countries; a value that is presently exceeded, owing to Spain's entrance in the European partnership, since Spain represents approximately 1.50% of our imports.

As can be seen in Table 1, the remaining 40%, prescinding from the Eastern European countries, (6.5%), is almost evenly divided between Africa (with prevalence of the Mediterranean countries), America and Asia (where the Middle-East countries stand out with their 10% of oil supplies).

As regards the European sources in particular, we see West Germany first, followed by France and The Netherlands.

These three countries represent about 33% of the global value of the imported goods. A share which — and this must be emphasized — covers a wide range of wares, from raw materials (iron ore and coal) to semimanufactured and finished products; a similar variety is matched only by the North American area, while the flow coming from Middle-Eastern Asia is in substance of a single type, being made up almost exclusively by oil products: in 1983, 65% from the Middle East, 13% from Libya, 7% from the Soviet Union and 3.4% from Algeria.

On the other hand, it must be underlined that if one considered the "weight" instead of the "value" parameter, the extra-EEC percentage would rise to 90%, formed mainly, as we said, by "heavy" and bulky raw materials (the incidence of oil and meat is outstanding in this regard).

TRAFFIC LINES AND MEANS OF TRANSPORT

The Italian imports use four main categories of transport: maritime, railway, road and air means. On the other hand we must not forget a fifth type: the gas and oil pipelines, which are on a constant increase.

Italy, owing also to its geographical position at the centre of the Old World, seems sufficiently linked with the net of European and world communication lines; through a close integration of its structures with the Continent's road and railway systems, which are characterized by various axes closely intersecting in all directions.

In particular, prescinding from the Alpine tunnels and passes, the number of which is going to increase, the proximity of the Ligurian coast (outlet of the Italian "industrial triangle") to the French coast, permits close connections with the Rhone Valley's communication system (rivers, railways and roads) which, in its turn, flows into the industrial centre of Europe.

Similar considerations can be made on the Adriatic area, linked to the Balkans and therefore projected towards Eastern Europe and Asia through traditional maritime and land ways.

Finally, its location at the centre of the Mediterranean puts our Peninsula in the advantageous condition of being grazed by the bundle of routes that link Suez with Gibraltar — and therefore employ the short ramifications which depart from the bundle and reach our internal seas — as well as of projecting itself towards the belt of North African countries with which we have ever increasing commercial relations.

The statistic date referring to the percent incidence of the various means employed denote, in the period 1978-1983, a downtrend for the maritime transport, a stationary trend for railroads and an uptrend for roads and other modes (Table 2).


It can be preliminarily noted that the adoption of the "value" parameter leads to a certain levelling of figures, due to the maritime means' inadequacy, from the economic point of view, to transport small and valuable loads.

IMPORTS BY MODE OF TRANSPORT
(Years 1978-1983)

Table 2

MODE OF TRANSPORT	AMOUNT (in tons)	%	VALUE (in million lire)	%
RAILWAY & ROAD				
1978	33,312,339	15.15	26,220,703	54.78
1979	39,200,030	16.60	35,516,239	54.98
1980	43,091,872	18.78	44,662,381	52.20
1981	43,817,733	20.58	51,931,786	50.09
1982	47,837,931	23.06	61,003,182	52.49
1983	62,811,692	30.55	69,547,100	57.49
SEA				
1978	178,348,611	81.12	19,047,795	39.79
1979	187,701,495	79.52	25,844,407	40.01
1980	168,944,162	73.98	34,635,091	40.48
1981	151,476,387	71.14	42,610,349	41.10
1982	144,762,646	69.79	45,163,482	38.86
1983	125,200,925	60.89	41,107,922	33.98
OTHERS				
1978	8,191,639	3.73	2,599,401	5.43
1979	9,155,671	3.88	3,236,558	5.01
1980	16,337,869	7.15	6,266,831	7.32
1981	17,626,172	8.28	9,133,226	8.81
1982	14,825,160	7.15	10,045,369	8.65
1983	17,598,595	8.56	10,315,211	8.53

IMPORTS BY MODE OF TRANSPORT (1978-1983)



It is also indicative to remark that, in absolute value, the tons of goods imported by sea have gone down from 178.3 million in 1978 to 125.5 million in 1983, against a considerable

increase in the other sectors (railway and road, from 33 million to 63 million tons; other means, 8 million to 17 million tons).

A confirmation of the above

View of the port of Hamburg, the most active in West Germany, a link between the Atlantic routes and the communication lines of the European hinterland.



comes from the wares "unloaded" at Italian ports ("unloaded" does not mean "imported"): on the basis of the provisional data for 1983, there has been a 7.1% (217 million tons) decrease in the last 8 years.


This phenomenon is evident in the diagram of the preceding page, made on the basis of the statistic serialization of the last five-year period, and showing the imported goods "by mode of transport".

The growth of the land trasports between 1978-1983 reaches 89%, while shipping sinks to 30%. The comprehensive data shown offer a clear corroboration, on a world scale, of the downtrend of shipping (which covers 60.89% of the total), with a slight increase of all other means, while as regards "value" the percentage of the maritime routes (34%) is inferior to roads and railways, which are established at approximately 58%.

Ascertained that, as previously stated, Italy imports from non-communist Europe 53.6% of its requirement, at first approximation it can be gathered that the choice of the various types of transport of this share seems due more to economy factors at large (speed, safety, cost, bulk) rather than to geographical or environmental needs imposing the use of the seaways. The possibility of converting a large part of the European maritime share into others (road, railway, air) stems from this observation and later on we shall be seeing its developments.

Though complex and multifaceted, the possible causes of the shipping trade's decline can be reduced to four categories:

First, the so-called oil crisis' reflection: both because the oil transport is made prevalingly by sea, as we have already said, and because the industrialized countries (and therefore also Italy) have directed their efforts towards finding alternative sources of energy or other internal "land" roads.



Left, from top.

The Saint-Quentin canal, connecting the Paris basin to the Flanders through the Oise and the Somme; France's main industrial areas are around the waterways.

Loading of a "747" cargo of the Italian national airline.

Second — and this is especially true for Italy — the stagnation of the overall development, and the industrial development in particular, has caused, as an immediate effect, a lower request for "heavy" raw goods coming from trans-oceanic and transmediterranean countries.

Third, as regards only the commercial relations with the rest of Europe, the increased possibilities of land connections, from the qualitative and quantitative point of view (more Alpine passages, greater speed, improvement of the infrastructure).

Lastly, various deficiencies in the Italian port system (inadequacy of service areas, scarce deep-water moorings) and in the shipping organization (shipyard crisis, high management costs, etc...) (1).

The picture just outlined, regarding goods unloaded by the international shipping lines, is moreover confirmed by a survey of the overall maritime transport, including the national and coast traffic: according to the most recent data issued by ISTAT, in 1982 — as compared to 1981 — the tonnage of goods unloaded has gone down by 4.7%, and by 6% in 1983 as compared to 1982.

A look at the present system of European transport, which Italy is increasingly trying to join, leads to foresee a further increase of the road traffic (mostly highway traffic) at the completion of various projects now under way, which contemplate even closer links

between the Italian and the Central Eastern-Central European systems, through the Alpine region. With reference to the latter, suffices is to mention the highway stretching from Udine-Tarvisio to the Austrian border, linked to the Trans-European highway which in its turn, by crossing ten countries, will intensify and speed up the connections between the entire Mediterranean area and the geographic centre of great economic power formed by the Basel, Bavaria and Baden regions.

The system of waterways, which is going to be continuously expanded and integrated at international level, is complementary to the European road system.

We may also mention, owing to the remarkable implications of the ways of communication within the European framework, to the planned huge navigable canal, 230 Km. long, which should link the Rhine with the Rhone (and therefore the port system of Southern France with Strasbourg and Rotterdam, reducing to 4-5 days the time employed for carrying goods from the Mediterranean to the North Sea, with boats reaching a tonnage of 1,000 tons) as well


as the plans for the Monfalcone-Gorizia-Lubiana waterway that would link the Adriatic with the Danube and, through the latter, with the Rhine and the industrial and commercial heart of Europe (2).

The mainstay of the European waterway system is the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal (Europa Kanal) whose construction is well under way.

Linked to the French, Belgium and Dutch systems, it touches Nuremberg (whose port can manage a yearly traffic of 3 million tons) and will proceed to the Danube basin (Austria, Switzerland, Yugoslavia and, indirectly, Italy) allowing the passage of boats up to 1,350 tons (3).

As a matter of fact, even if the European network of waterways does not yet directly reach the Italian coasts (with the exception of the western Ligurian ones) and its most important industrial centres, nevertheless only the Northern Adriatic appears to be excluded from the system just described, even though one cannot properly speak of isolation, since there are several alternative means of transportation available.

On the whole, one can see that the four main organized



coastal belts (Channel and North Sea, Baltic sea, Gulf of Lions, Tyrrhenian sea) are interlinked and connected with the peripheral area of the Black Sea straits.

Prescinding from the network of waterways — which we found it interesting to discuss at length, perhaps because its function of commercial connection, within a framework extending beyond the national borders, is being underestimated — the contiguity of the Italian territory with the rest of Europe and its proximity to the North African coasts permit a comprehensive vision of the traffic lines, more detailed and offering more alternatives that could appear at a superficial glance.

IMPORTS, TRAFFIC LINES AND MODES OF TRANSPORT WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE EEC COUNTRIES

At this point it is interesting to make a further analysis, considering the repartition — absolute value (tons) and percentage value — of the imports from the EEC countries according to the means of transportation (Table 3).

We notice a sensible increase in the incidence of the land transports and a corresponding decreased incidence of the maritime means.

In absolute terms, still referring to the period 1975-1983, the road in particular records an increase of almost 11 million

tons, while the maritime ways have had an increase of only 484,000 tons (4).

Table 4 evidences, among other things, that France (using the Mediterranean ports for more than 40%) is shipping's best customer in the EEC, while West Germany employs prevalently the ordinary means of transport (road and railway).

As we have already remarked, the quantity of goods unloaded, in some cases (Greece, United Kingdom) exceeds the quantity of imports.

This is due to the fact that the ports' actual "hinterland" can sometimes be larger than that delimited by the national borders.

IMPORTS FROM E.E.C. COUNTRIES IN 1975-1982-1983
(Greece excluded)

Table 3

YEAR	ROAD + RAILWAY		SEA		OTHER MODES	
	ABSOL. VAL.	%	ABSOL. VAL.	%	ABSOL. VAL.	%
1975	18,300,128	65.6	7,213,360	25.9	2,381,909	8.5
1982	27,392,689	71.4	7,331,500	19.3	3,562,187	9.1
1983	29,429,400	71.8	7,698,100	18.7	3,844,000	9.5

Source: Ministri of Transports, based on ISTAT data.

GOODS IMPORTED AND SEABORNE FROM E.E.C. COUNTRIES (1982)
(in tons)

Table 4

E.E.C. COUNTRIES	IMPORTED	%	SEABORNE	NOTES
West Germany	12,228,703	31	296,878	—
France	14,755,317	38	6,777,797	40% from Mediterranean ports
Belgium-Luxembourg	2,483,229	6.3	938,053	—
Denmark	304,893	0.7	64,475	—
Greece	1,319,194	3.36	1,996,927	—
Ireland	62,133	0.15	19,827	—
Netherlands	5,998,346	15.25	2,747,114	—
United Kingdom	2,101,187	5.34	3,243,345	—
TOTAL E.E.C.	39,253,002	100.00	16,084,416	—
Spain	1,363,571	—	1,613,888	Almost completely from Mediterranean ports

Source: ISTAT, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, December 1982.

HYPOTHESES IN CASE OF INTERNATIONAL CRISES - ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

Granted the complexity of the variables in the phenomenon considered, it is nevertheless possible to advance some hypotheses about the probable variations in the picture outlined above, in the occurrence of international crises which could cut or at least obstruct the traffic lines which, being the most commonly used, can be defined as "normal".

This can be done keeping in mind the abovementioned situation of the international maritime transports concerning Italy, as well as the trends of development of transports, also

in connection with their geographic distribution.

We have seen and mentioned the main causes of the downtrend recorded by the foreign goods unloaded; an assumed international crisis would emphasize this trend, for it would have immediate reflections on the maritime traffic, both on the group of long-distance routes converging towards forced passages (Suez and Gibraltar) and on those connecting the littoral countries (i.e. between Italy and Tunisia, Algeria, Greece).

It can be said that the increased demand for supplies needed for supporting the war effort (and the diminished demand for non necessary consumer goods) would be matched by a marked recourse to autarchic sources and by the choice of the shortest and more protected ways of communication.

The maritime traffic lines interesting Italy are in general liable to be interrupted or obstructed at their origin or in the proximity of the peninsula: at their origin, through the blockade of the straits (Gibraltar, the Turkish straits, and Suez with greater probability) and subsequently at the point where those lines branch out towards the most important national basins site of our main ports. In other words, the traffic lines, which until they reach the points of bifurcation interesting Italy can be considered "international", and therefore be the object of multinational defence or offence (NATO or enemy), become "national" because they run through the operational basins and in the areas of the Northern and Central Tyrrhenian, the Canal of Sardinia, the Southern Tyrrhenian, the Canal of Sicily, the Ionian and the Adriatic.

In our opinion, it is rather unrealistic to surmise that, in case of a global crisis, NATO could maintain the control of the Mediterranean through the control of the Turkish straits and that, highly aleatory, of the Suez Canal, prescinding from

the unforeseeable attitude of the littoral countries. The Middle East oil crisis has in fact shown the vulnerability of the passages located in that area. The control of the Mediterranean could be justified by a strategy of defence (or attack) carried out by the so-called Southern Front, but in any case it would not guarantee the peaceful and safe movement of the commercial traffic which, this must be remembered, is managed by non-military people, interested mainly in their own profit.

The traffic lines' vitality "beyond" the abovementioned ramifications is therefore decidedly subordinated to the main streams of traffic in the three ganglia mentioned before, which could be reduced to two (Suez and Gibraltar) if we consider that, in case of crisis, Rumanian,

Transfer of a container on a trailer, by means of a pneumatic-wheels "Goliath" crane. Containers are complete cargoes, which need no particular adaptations for the vehicles.

Bulgarian or Soviet ships would not pass through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles anymore.

As we have already said, the Suez crises have demonstrated not only the possibility, but the probability, of a partial blockade of the Mediterranean, with ensuing recourse to two alternatives: either a concentration of routes at Gibraltar, or the forced recourse to the land roads.

On the other hand, the Eastern Mediterranean's in-





security, together with the vulnerability and unprofitableness of the super oil-tankers, forced to circumnavigate Africa, have prompted several countries to plan an oil pipeline across Africa of approximately 400 Km., due to be ready by 1990, capable of carrying 4 million barrels of oil daily from Saudi Arabia (Port of Janbu) to Douala in Cameroun. From there the tankers will follow the Atlantic routes going along the Black Continent's western coast, reducing by 16,000 Km. the distance between Europe and its oil supplies.

From the Italian point of view, the "land" solution would also be the possible consequence of the Atlantic routes' displacement towards the North, with a flowing of wares towards the Spanish, and especially French, Dutch and German ports (The Hague, Rotterdam, Bremen, Hamburg).

The commercial flows coming from America (North as well as South), in their final stretch towards Italy should therefore make use of the ordinary land roads, which already at present, albeit partially, complement them, conveying the goods into the continental hinterland.

Moreover, the land roads could ensure the continuation of the traffic originated in the Community countries adjacent to Italy, a traffic that supports more than 42% of our imports.

One should consider that more than 3 million tons of goods coming today from the French ports of the Mediterranean would in any case reach Italy, taking advantage of the two countries' contiguity, either through the numerous Alpine passes or along the coastal roads. The coast navigation (Marseilles-Savona-Genoa, about 200 nautical miles) can be compared to the coastal roads as regards protection from the enemy offence. Obviously in this particular case the merely economic considerations, which in conditions of normality lead to select the maritime option, would lose much of their weight in exceptional condi-



tions, in which the employment of the maritime means would appear to be impossible or too risky.

The overall picture outlined up to now, which hypothesizes a more intensive exploitation of the European countries' contiguity, presupposes also, obviously, two realistically reliable conditions: first of all, full operativeness of the ports and outer ports of the Atlantic, the North and Baltic Seas (to the ports already mentioned we must add Kiel, which ensures the connections with Scandinavia), as well as that of the ordinary lines (roads, railways, waterways) heading south; second, protection of the Atlantic routes, necessarily ensured all along by NATO and, in particular, by the United States (it must be remembered that these routes, as

we said, will also have to serve the increased oil traffic deriving from the planned trans-African pipeline).

There would remain therefore the streams of the Mediterranean traffic and in particular those interesting the commercial relations between the littoral countries and Italy.

In this regard it can be observed that only Morocco to the West, and Egypt to the East — among the countries with which the relations would probably continue, also in a critical period — would present distance problems, which would translate into a greater, mostly economic, difficulty of converting the traffic from the maritime to the land mode.

In fact, it seems possible to ensure air protection, directly from the national territory, both

to the routes reaching Tunisia and neighbouring Algeria (between Trapani and Tunis there is a beeline distance of about 260 Km., and between Tunis and Palermo a little over 300 Km.) and to the routes linking the Greek coast (the distance between Lecce and Igoumenitza is approximately 190 Km.).

Facing page, bottom.

Railways can assume the freight traffic originating in the countries bordering Italy. This traffic is 42% of our imports.

Below.

Container ship. This vessel is the expression of a relatively new concept in the handling of cargoes, which shortens the ships' turnaround time. The two cranes are used for the containers' ship-to-shore transfer.



One can envision the interruption of the Middle-Eastern Mediterranean lines (fed also, and mostly, by the routes going through Suez) as very probable; the interruption of the western lines (Gibraltar), which could obviously have the advantage of a more intense NATO protection, seems instead less probable.

Prescinding from the availability of the abovesaid short-range maritime connections with the North African littoral countries, if the Mediterranean were to lose its rôle as commercial route almost entirely, this unfortunate occurrence would not mean a complete blockage of our external resources, precisely owing to the

predominant rôle assumed by the Atlantic ports.

A presumed interruption of the supply flows coming from the Indian Ocean and even from the Atlantic, as it can be seen from the global statistical data referring to the origin of our imports and also considering the ways employed, would affect mainly (without nevertheless annulling it) a share of our energy resources, and, certainly to a lesser if not insignificant extent, all other types of necessary goods (raw materials, semimanufactured and consumer goods).

Keeping in mind our previous considerations about the fungibility of the various modes of transportation (in the mari-

time-land sense and not vice versa), and also the ascertained downtrend shown by the maritime transports, it can be affirmed that the lines of the Italian military policy in this specific sector should almost perforce and also with regard to the "cost-effectiveness" aspect, pursue the objectives of protection of the land and coastal traffic (especially at the points of junction with the various European systems) and integrated protection (together with the Allied Forces) of the remaining share of traffic carried out in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas.

Pierduilio Maravigna
Agostino Alderisi

COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC TOWARD ITALY → → →

Notes

(1) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Feasibility study on the waterway Monfalcone-Gorizia-Lubiana", Rome, October 1983, p. 40.


(2) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Feasibility study on the waterway Monfalcone-Gorizia-Lubiana", Final report, October 1983. L. Luigetti, "Military Regional Geography", IGM, Florence 1978, p. 147, where the projected channel Rhine-Rhone is considered as "a move which perhaps will un hinge the Italian port system, confining it to a subsidiary role".

(3) Two phenomena must be put in evidence for the increasing importance in the general situation of European traffic: first, the intense traffic of lighters transporting refined products on the Rhine and its tributaries and reaching most of the West German oil markets; second, the ever increasing importance of the "little" tankers intended for coastal navigation, and possibly for river use, in the northern seas (Northern and Baltic Sea, Arctic Ocean).

(4) G. Baldassarri, "The international wares transport between Italy and the E.E.C. countries, with particular regard to traffic by road: present situation and new trends", Istituto Studi Europei, "A. De Gasperi", 1983.



Col. Pierduilio Maravigna, Air Force Quartermaster Corps, has a degree in Law and one in Geography. Col. Maravigna, among other positions, has held those of Chief of the Administration Office, at the Airports of Centocelle and Ciampino. At the Air Force General Staff, he has been assigned to the Flight Safety Office, 3rd Division and, later, to the General Planning, Programming and Budget Office, where he now holds the position of Chief of the Data Processing and Financial Studies Office.



Lt. Col. Agostino Alderisi has a degree in Law, and has held, among other positions, those of Chief of the Administration Office, 9th Wing, and Chief of the Materials Office, Quartermaster Directorate, Air Force Academy. Lt. Col. Alderisi has been Chief of the Budget Section, of the P.G.P.B. Office, Air Force General Staff, and has served at the NAMMA Agency in Munich, as a specialist in the sector of contracts and analyst of costs for the equipment of the "Tornado". Upon his return to Italy, Lt. Col. Alderisi has been Chief of the Data Processing Section, P.G.P.B. Office, Air Force General Staff, where he is at present Chief of the Financial Studies and Legal-Financial Advisory Section.

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DA
PROTAGONISTA



ITALAIR

*A witness of the italian commitment to the preservation of peace
in Lebanon*



An helicopter squadron of the Italian Army's Light Aviation has been operating in Lebanon for over six years, within UNIFIL (United Nation Interim Force in Lebanon) - that is, within an international military force employed under the United Nations' flag.

In order to understand the reasons of this "military presence" in Lebanon, one must go back to the politico-military situation of that region in 1978, when the constitution of the above-mentioned force was decided.

As the events are rather recent, it is hardly necessary to mention that in March 1978, Israel, refusing to further tolerate the continuous Palestinian raids coming from the Lebanese territory, decided an action of force and invaded Southern Lebanon

advancing with its troops as far as the Litani river.


The delicate situation was immediately discussed at the U.N. Security Council, which decreed the constitution and transfer in the area of a military contingent of approximately 4,000 men, with the task of creating a buffer zone between the Palestinian formations and the Israeli forces. The latter had meanwhile abandoned the newly occupied positions and had withdrawn with their own borders, maintaining nevertheless the indirect control of a 40 Kilo-

meter-deep border strip, in which a pro-Israeli, Christian-Lebanese militia operated.

This buffer zone is therefore clearly delimited to the north by the Litani river, to the east by the ramifications of the Golan Heights, to the south by the just mentioned border belt and to the west by the Mediterranean sea (map 1, facing page).

The area is formed by a flat coastal strip, comprising natural ports, villages and roads, in contrast with the central and eastern parts, which is rather uneven, with small and scattered settlements and almost devoid of roads.

Such an area is almost inevitably the stage of repeated clashes between the opposing factions, with consequent heavy involvement of the UNIFIL con-



tingents, which have to pay a heavy tribute in order to accomplish their peacekeeping mission. They have had more than hundred dead and four hundred wounded. The UNIFIL's mandate is renewed every six months; its command and Headquarters are located at Naqoura, where the Italian helicopter squadron, together with other supporting units, is also based.

The deployment of the operating units (7 battalions and one company) and their country of origin are displayed on map 2. The present UNIFIL force consists of about 6,000 men, only 48 of which are Italian.

The exiguity of the Italian presence with UNIFIL should not surprise, because the function accomplished by ITALAIR (the squadron's telegraphic designation) is so important that it overshadows any other foreign presence in the area, no matter how sizeable it is.

ITALAIR has joined UNIFIL in July 1979, replacing a similar Norwegian unit. At the beginning, the joint squadron consisted of 31 men (all officers and non-commissioned officers), of which 21 from the Army, 6 from the Navy and 4 from the Air Force, and was equipped with four AB-204 Army helicopters. Subsequently, the squadron's organization has undergone various adjustments, regarding aircraft — replaced at first with the more modern AB-205, and then increased from four to six — as well as personnel, increased from 31 to 40 and then to 48 men, divided as follows: 33 from the Army, 7 from the Navy and 8 from the Air Force.

An average 40% of the personnel are employed as pilots, while the remaining 60% perform

SUBDIVISION OF THE OPERATIONAL SECTORS



logistic tasks or are employed in the communications field.

In the national chain of command, the squadron is subordinate to the Commander of the 1st "ALE-ANTARES" Group at Viterbo, which provides the necessary logistic support.

The responsibility for the unit's operational employment is assumed by the UNIFIL Commander, according to the tasks assigned and agreed upon at political level. These tasks are: reconnaissance, search and

Right.

Daytime medical evacuation. This activity is carried out for the U.N. forces inside the operational area, with urgent evacuation to Naqoura's Swedish military hospital or local institutions.

Below.

The six aircraft of the Squadron. When the unit was established, it had four AB-204s, later replaced by four AB-205s; at the end of 1984 they reached the present number of six.







Preceding page, top.

Elements of the French 420th D.S.L. descend from an ITALAIR helicopter.

Preceding page, bottom.

Aerial view of the Squadron's compound. In the foreground, the personnel quarters, the main heliport and the auxiliary helipad.

To the left of the main heliport, the two maintenance hangars and the Headquarters buildings.

Left.

Nighttime medical evacuation.

Missions of this type are numerous, because at night it is dangerous and difficult to travel on the roads of the operational zone with normal ambulances.

Below.

The Italian flag flies on the ITALAIR Base, together with the U.N. and Lebanese flags.



assistance missions, medical evacuations, liaison between the UNIFIL Headquarters and the operational units, logistic and personnel transports for the Headquarters and the battalions.

The activity of ITALAIR knows no pause. Helicopters are in fact the only means of transportation that can guarantee rapid connections in that tormented region.

One must also underline the existence of a certain risk, due to the constant state of civil war that has been characterizing the Lebanese situation for years. In fact the ITALAIR helicopters have repeatedly been fired upon during their missions, fortunately without serious consequences.

ITALAIR's commitment in its six years of activity is proved by the 8,928 flying hours, by the 37,000 persons transported and by the 645 medical evacuation missions, many of which were accomplished under very difficult environmental conditions.

It is an extremely positive result, constantly and unanimously appreciated and praised by military and civilian authorities, both from Italy and other countries.

Col. Angelo Sion



THE JOURNAL OF AN ITALAIR MISSION

It is just after dawn of a clear October day and I am about to make the preflight controls of helicopter UN 274 before leaving for a "Special Flight" (as the missions outside the daily routine are called), i.e. the transportation of UN Assistant Secretary Brian Urquhart to Beirut, where he is going to have talks with the Head of the Lebanese Government, Amin Gemayel.

Meanwhile we have also obtained the flight clearance by the IDF (Israeli Defence Forces) Headquarters. Israel has taken upon itself the control of Southern Lebanon airspace, therefore all UNIFIL flights must be authorized; the clearance has been timely requested by our ALO at Naqoura UNIFIL Headquarters.

Mr. Urquhart and his party will be arriving with another one of our helicopters, UN 280, from Jerusalem, which they have left at 07.30 local time.

At 09.30 sharp, punctual as all ITALAIR flights are, helicopter UN 280 touches down.

Then we take off with UN 274 towards Beirut, heading 020°, flying over the sea, keeping at a safe distance from the coast since in the past our helicopters have been shot at, from unidentified elements, and hit several times.

Soon after departure we contact "Israel Control" by radio, are given a radar identification code and head for our destination, keeping in constant touch with the Squadron's radio room, in order to let them know when we fly over the previously established report points, which permit to control the flight, from land, moment after moment.

Having left behind Tyre and Sidon, we descend to 100 metres above sea level for further safety and also because we are entering the traffic area of Beirut airport.

We contact TWR, which gives us permission to pass through the area,

but we must keep off shore because, in order to reach our landing point, we ought to fly around the city and enter from the North, heading southwards.

Athwart Ras Beyrouth (at the tip of the city) we drop our contact with TWR and make contact with the radio control of the General Headquarters of the Lebanese Army.

Meanwhile we have also contacted our liaison office in Beirut, who has arrived at our landing point with a UN vehicle, crossing the ill-famed "green line" that separates the Muslim from the Christian sector. Our officer assures

us (much to our pleasure) that there are no fights under way and informs us that there is a change in the programme: after landing at "Number One" we will have to pick up a Lebanese liaison officer and proceed to President Gemayel's residence because the talks will be held there.

As soon as we leave the sea and begin to fly over the inhabited area, the HFI (Hostile Fire Indicator - a device that signals the crew the presence of bullet trajectories very close to the aircraft) lights up on our left-hand side, and its lugubrious beeper gives us a most unpleasant feeling of danger.

We have on our left the heights located to the east of the city and, as they are firmly held by the Lebanese Army, we feel reassured, and guess that the signal is produced by radio electric interferences, probably coming from a radar. We proceed, accompanied by repeated HFI light-ups, fly over the rubble of the former Palestinian camp of Chatila, and land without problems at "Number One".

Here we pick up our liaison officer, together with a Lebanese officer who will guide us to our destination.

Keeping in constant touch with the regular land forces we resume our flight and reach Amin Gemayel's residence, where the talks between the two Officials take place.

We take off again as soon as our distinguished passenger returns, and, flying over the city, proceed peacefully to ITALAIR, where we land after a flight of approximately 40 minutes.



Lt. Col. Giovanni Tonicchi
Commander, ITALAIR



The unorthodox forms of fighting conducted by Special Forces behind the traditional units have lately been given an unusual emphasis, in the specialized press as well as in Command Posts and Field Exercises.

This marked interest for the Special Forces — which are, after all, an important operational component in many countries, especially in those promoting a distinctly aggressive doctrine — induces us to examine the response procedures, in order to give a contribution of thought for their possible improvement.

As is known, these Forces perform interdiction or diversion operations, aimed at creating disturbances in the enemy organization, through sabotage of military and civilian objectives. Their preferred areas of action are the rear lines and the Communications Zone, i.e. the "soft belly" of every army, but their employment close to the line of contact cannot be excluded, since in that case the effects of their activity can have a more direct weight on the combat's outcome.

As a consequence, all army units must be trained to contrast them, with no distinctions among Branches or particular specializations, particularly the units destined to Territorial Defence, since they operate precisely in the areas preferred by the Special Forces.

TERRITORIAL DEFENCE



**WITH
UNORTHODOX
PROCEDURES**



The most effective form of defence (besides the units' and objectives' self defence) is the one based on the same procedures and criteria followed by the attacker and has been called "areal counterinterdiction". This concept has been confirmed by experience.

Procedures and criteria for the conduct of counterinterdiction have already been worked out and examined during specific exercises; the purpose of these notes, therefore, is not so much that of repeating well-known doctrinal concepts, as that of giving an outline, based on experience, of the modes of application of those procedures to combat, and to propose possible criteria for the training and organization of the forces. A short study of the threat, in terms of time and space, strengths and weaknesses, will be a guiding element for the following discussion, since the defensive instrument must be matched to the potential enemy.

THE THREAT

The Territorial Defence can be interested in unorthodox operations conducted by Special Forces and paratroop units; nevertheless, due to their greater dangerousness, we shall consider the former as our reference.

The employment of the Special Forces occurs normally in groups of 4 to 12 men, and — in terms of time and space — can be foreseen as follows:

- spreading of groups during the crisis' initial stages and immediately before the conflict, in order to disrupt the operations of mobilization and deployment of the units;

Left.

Against an enemy characterized by high professionalism, strong ideological motivation and ability to operate on wide spaces attacking by surprise, it is necessary to employ forces able to carry out the defence with the same procedures followed by the attacker. Photo: member of an Observation and Alarm Post surveying the surrounding terrain.



- at the beginning of hostilities, engagement of the second echelon units, communications area and logistic support;

- massive introduction of other groups, as a premise to the decisive attack and in support of possible outflanking operations.

The factors that can be considered advantageous for the Special Forces are essentially: initiative, employment of forces dispersed through vast areas, ability to "surprise" the objectives, reaching those with scarce or no protection with distant fire and, last, the personnel's professional qualification and ideological motivation. On the other hand, the Forces' vulnerability derives from their limited tactical mobility, the need to have sheltered areas at their disposal, for survival and organization, the need to move through adverse zones, on their way to the objectives or while getting away after the attack.

Lacking informations about the enemy, it is necessary to carry the research on the terrain in view to find the areas exploitable for infiltration and cover by the enemy. In the picture, a paratroop patrol studies the terrain where it will successively operate.

Two considerations can be added to this short survey:

- the groups' reduced size does not always bring about the complete destruction of the objectives, but their continuous and scattered action can produce devastating effects on the adversary's morale. In order to avoid this, the defence must act aggressively, taking advantage of the enemy's vulnerability in order to seize the initiative;

- considering the times of employment previously pointed out, before the beginning of the hostilities one must have at his disposal all the territorial units destined to counterinter-

diction, therefore also those to be assembled through mobilization, realistically presupposing that the already operational police and territorial forces could turn out to be inadequate.

COMBAT PROCEDURES

The essence of the operational problem regarding areal counterinterdiction is the search and destruction of the enemy forces operating with non-traditional procedures; like any other operational problem, it must be approached through its conceptual aspect first, and then through its executory one.

Lacking information about the enemy, the reasoning process for the search must be based on the survey of the terrain in order to single out the areas that can be used as *shelter* and for *infiltration*; the process must then be developed by linking the two areas and the enemy's potential *objectives* through the available *itineraries* and approaches.

The choice of the line of action is the subsequent step. This also must be done keeping in mind the environmental conditions confronting the enemy: in fact, the hilly and mountain areas, usually rich in vegetation and sparsely inhabited, offer ample shelter possibilities but, in the meantime, restrict the movement to easily identifiable itineraries, while the plain, with scarce spontaneous vegetations and densely settled, offers shelter only in small, dot-like areas, therefore easy to locate, but facilitates the off-road movement.

In the first case, the best thing will be trying to intercept the enemy in movement along the approaches and, in the second, to find him in his possible bivouacs, later complementing the two lines of actions depending on the available forces.

It is interesting to remark at this point that the conceptual activity previously outlined can be developed before the units are introduced into the field and that the entire matter could be

subject of planning already in peacetime, like all orthodox operations, in order to avoid penalizing the territorial Defence with improvisations.

As regards the execution aspects of combat, two procedures of actions, fundamental in counterinterdiction and specular to interdiction, take shape following the above considerations: a dynamic procedure of search carried out mostly in daytime with combat patrols, and a static procedure of Observation and Alarm Posts (OAP) and patrols.

The search patrols can be limited in size (8-10 elements), similar to the groups confronting them, owing to which the platoons usually operate in squads, sometimes non-cooperating, but always linked by radio for coordinated interventions. The search must be carried out systematically, combing carefully entire areas chosen among those apt to provide shelters and suitable for the acquisition of objectives, and checking at irregular intervals the already patrolled zones, in order to keep them under constant control.

The patrols, with light weapons and light equipment for maximum mobility, must use vehicles only for reaching the zones of employment, where they will proceed on foot (the enemy will not normally stay in areas that can be reached by vehicles), along possibly convergent lines, with combat-ready formations in order to prevent the enemy from disengaging itself when intercepted.

The spreading of forces is even more marked in the observation activity, because this must be carried out by groups of 2-3 elements in order to increase the control and alarm capability as much as possible, while saving forces. In this way, one platoon can form at least 9 OAPs with its 3 squads, each controlling an itinerary or, if equipped with night-vision goggles, a front, whose extent, like the distances between the OAPs is determined by the environment's cover and fragmentation, conditioning the

field of sight. The ambush patrols, with the same structure and size as the search patrols, keep to the rear of the OAPs, within radio range, at points where the itineraries converge, or somewhere else according to circumstances.

In implementing this organization one must be sure that the enemy has no possibility of getting through, and a link must also be ensured between the operational elements and their Commanders, in order to use any observation datum with timeliness. Furthermore, any element operating at night must sneak surreptitiously on the terrain, possibly within a decep-

The task of the Special Forces engaged in counterinterdiction operations is that of disrupting the enemy organization, by sabotaging military and civilian objectives. The photo shows an attack during a two-party exercise.



tion plan for surprising the enemy.

For example, in order to carry out the actions described above, one company can employ two platoons for mop-up operations in daytime, while the third platoon rests; the latter, at night, carries out search and observations activities, while of the two remaining platoons, one rests and the other stays on the look-out. This is of course, "one" solution, because the squads of each platoon would also be rotated in the various tasks: it is a choice connected with the Commanders' and personnel's level of training, the natural environment and the situation.

An aspect collateral to counterinterdiction, but important for the operative contribution that this action may obtain from it, is the method of fighting used by the objectives' defence forces and the coordination between these forces and the

ones employed for counterinterdiction. The coordination between the various forces must be obtained by assigning to the defence of each objective an appropriate area from which the objective itself could be hit with the direct fire of portable weapons or acquired at a short distance. In this area the defence forces, although adopting different methods at daytime and nighttime, will have as a priority the protection of the objective entrusted to them rather than the search of the enemy. In particular, by day, they will man a minimum number of posts, not the same manned at night, and will frequently patrol their area of responsibility, in order to prevent the enemy from acquiring the objective; at nighttime they will instead occupy posts along the perimeter changing them at irregular times to avoid discovery.

To conclude, a word about the possible organization of

Command. The coordination between the counterinterdiction forces and the forces defending the objectives pertains to the Headquarters responsible for the area and sector to which these objectives belong. The Headquarters will command and/or control the counterinterdiction forces, depending on whether these are organically subordinate or assigned for the specific need, and will divide the area or sector among the units. In this connection, we must finally add that the battalion represents the basic element in the planning and conduct of counterinterdiction, due to its command organization and global operational capability.

TRAINING

The first goal to be reached through the training activity is the psychological and technical





Left.

By studying the enemy's potential targets, as well as the itineraries and approaches that enable him to reach his objectives and leave them after the attack, the defender can prearrange a stationary observation and ambush system, capable of carrying out an effective action of contrast.

Photo: members of a patrol laying an ambush.

Right.

Areal counterinterdiction is an activity requiring high training by the Territorial Defence forces, and must therefore be planned already in peacetime.

The photo shows members of a platoon engaged in a mop-up operation.

THE FORCES

Before concluding, a word regarding the organization of the forces that could be employed in counterinterdiction.

Considering the professional qualities of the potential adversary, these forces should be especially and thoroughly prepared to conduct defence with unorthodox procedures. Due to the length of our military service, this goal is realistically unattainable. It is nevertheless possible to devote to this specific need a good part of the training done by the units already in service in peacetime and institutionally destined to Territorial Defence, meanwhile attributing them the rôle of suppliers for the forces to be established through mobilization.

The latter, in order to carry out their task, should on their turn:

- have a structure adapted to the particular operational needs, as regards organization, armament, transportations and communications;
- be constituted with a higher priority than the other mobilization units, considering the likely times of development of the threat, through the incorporation of personnel more recently discharged, possibly according to the criterion of regional employment;
- always be maintained with full

readiness of the Cadres, i.e. the Commanders, to fight according to the methods described above.

Through psychological preparation the men become convinced that, with unorthodox forms of defence, one can prevail over an enemy who employs similar unorthodox methods of attack, and the preparation is founded, in the concrete, on the confidence derived from a tough technical training.

The result that should be obtained through this training can be summed up as: knowledge of the threat; assimilation of the reasoning processes for planning and conducting counterinterdiction; capability to act with great autonomy even at the lower levels, besides, of course, perfect battle training.

As it is realistically impossible to attain these goals during the units' normal activities, since the Cadres would be

simultaneously students and instructors, this activity should be developed through appropriated courses held at Service or Specialization Schools, or with Units that have highly qualified personnel available.

Once the Cadres are formed (especially those on long-term duty) it will be possible to train the units according to a progression which should include at first the assimilation of the elementary modes of operation, in the defence and offence rôles, and subsequently training exercises opposing two parties from platoon to battalion level, of gradually increasing difficulty as regards length and extension of areas.

An element that deserves careful, constant consideration during training is the attention to detail in the preparation for combat, which is an integral part of the exercises, being directly connected with the enemy's professionalism.



equipment and at the same quality level of the units in service.

Within the framework the units that, from the training point of view, seem more suited for this task are the paratroops: in practice, it seems unprofitable to commit "a priori" active paratroop units, spending reserves which, moreover, would suffice to meet only part of the

needs. On the other hand, also to avoid wasting the wealth of precious experiences matured by the airborne troops, one could take into consideration the possibility to destine to counterinterdiction, especially in the more operationally sensitive areas, paratroop units established on mobilization, following the criteria already pointed out.

CONCLUSIONS

The operations carried out with unorthodox procedures constitute a global threat, and we cannot afford to accept a negative gradient of reactivity of the defence when it is carried out far from the line of contact: a reactivity that must show in self-defensive preparation as regards the combat and support units, and in areal counterinterdiction as regards the units destined to territorial Defence.

The area counterinterdiction, in particular, must be seen as a form of defence conducted with unorthodox procedures, and as such can and must be planned already in peacetime, with interventions in three sectors:

- operational, carrying out a specific planning according to the goals and the natural environment;
- training, adequately preparing the Commanders with appropriate courses, giving priority to the training of the Units involved in the conduct of counterinterdiction;
- organizational, operating on the structure of the active Territorial Units and adapting accordingly the mobilization units as regards operational readiness, criteria of employment, qualitative and quantitative level of the equipment.

In conclusion, the Territorial Defence can face with effectiveness also the unorthodox operations carried out by Special Forces, provided that it can, on its part, avail itself of forces capable of conducting the defence with unorthodox procedures. In order to reach this goal, one must plan the operations, train and organize the forces as required by this particular task.

Col. Franco Monticone



Le uniformi del Regio Esercito Italiano

1898-1902

Rivista Militare

Every uniform reflects the spirit of the army in a specific historical moment, and the relationship between military traditions and civilian customs is very closely connected with the succession of fashions, which are preceded or followed by the uniforms, in a surprising flourishing of styles and modes.

Convinced of this — continuing its programme of research, which has already enabled "Rivista Militare" to publish the volume "The Italian Armies from the pre-unitarian States to the national unification" — the magazine has started, in 1985, a study of the Italian Army's uniforms. They are of remarkable aesthetic interest and, above all, have moral contents concurring with the ideals that motivate the soldier.

The series reproduced in this book, which is in possession of Rome's National Museum of Castel Sant'Angelo, consists of 67 photographic plates, retouched and hand-painted with the watercolour technique, in the absolute respect of the original colours. Made by the Lavazzano photographic studio of Rome, the set was delivered to the Museum of the War Ministry in 1932; it is not known whether the photographer was also the author of the subsequent colouring or whether this exceptional operation was carried out by somebody else.

The photographs represent officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men — of all corps, services and institutes of the army — wearing the uniforms established by the Regulation of 1880 and modified by Act n. 101 of May 16, 1895, in force until 1902.

An aspect of these photographs, increasing their rarity and importance — not only for those who are especially interested in this specific field, but also for all students of that particular period — is the great difficulty in finding original material representing single individuals and not groups. At the end of the century, in fact, photography was a valid "message" sent by the soldiers to their families, a witness of their service in uniform; the photographs still existing are therefore widely spread and scattered in private collections.


The work of filing the photographs and the individuation of the various Corps has been carried out, for the first time, during the preparation of this volume which, as a whole, is an absolute novelty.

It has the merit of bringing back to light real images of our military tradition.

The book costs Lit. 30,000 (+ Lit. 10,000 post & packing). Non-subscribers can get a 20% discount off the cover price if they send a subscription request to "Rivista Militare" with a remittance of Lit. 24,000 (or U.S. \$ 12 - D.M. 36 - F.F. 100), by cheque or international money order, addressed to: Stato Maggiore Esercito - Rivista Militare - Sezione di Amministrazione - Via XX Settembre 123/A - 00187 Roma - ITALY.

IL SOLDATO ITALIANO DELL'OTTOCENTO


NELL'OPERA DI QUINTO CENNI



Quinto Cenni's watercolours revive the conscripts of the just unified Italy, the officers and non-commissioned officers, veterans of the battles of the Risorgimento, fought also on the side of the losers, but always with sense of duty and spirit of sacrifice.

With skillful strokes, the painter brings back to light the everyday life of an army which had been entrusted with the difficult task of combining very different cultures and distant traditions, held together by a single unifying cement: the tongue of Dante and Mazzini.

Quinto Cenni, who was born in Romagna but lived in Milan, a "bourgeois" artist who was never a soldier, spent all his life depicting the military customs. From this point of view, he is the best witness of the affection for the Armed Forces felt from at least a part of the "Third Italy".



To
RIVISTA MILITARE
Via di S. Marco, 8


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00186 Roma

Others could have doubts or show hostility: Cenni always saw, crystal-clear and unequivocal, the continuity between the armies of the Risorgimento and the Italian Army, custodian of the unity and freedom conquered on the battlefield.

The initiative to recall the history of the Italian Army, through the work of this artisan of the image, was not taken at random by "Rivista Militare" and the Director of the Museum of Castel S. Angelo. "Rivista Militare", of which, in my capacity of Minister of Defence, I am — let us say — the publisher, has had, from the beginning, the purpose to keep alive the relations between military and civilian society; the Castel Sant'Angelo Museum from the time of its first director, General Borgatti, has been the scene of an active cooperation between military and civilians aimed at the enhancement of a common heritage of history and traditions.

I am happy to sponsor this project and I hope above all



that the new generations will rediscover, through it, an important — and up to now neglected — aspect of our history: the contribution to the moral and civil growth of our country given by the Armed Forces. Our Armed Forces as

an essential factor of a moral conscience on the making.

Sen. Giovanni Spadolini
Ministro della Difesa

Giovanni Spadolini

Dear Reader,

we plan to publish in the very near future the volume "Il soldato italiano dell'Ottocento" (The Italian Soldier in the 19th Century) illustrated by Quinto Cenni's watercolours, with captions in Italian and English and high quality binding.

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THE ROYAL ITALIAN ARMY

OVERSEAS OPERATIONS

1911-1942

This instalment comprises, for ease of reference, the three main operations carried out overseas by our troops during the period of the thirty years indicated.

The reasons behind the decision to intervene differ widely from one to the other and it would, therefore, be difficult to find a common denominator to all three.

In the recent considered opinion of historians, the Libyan expedition seems to have arisen for internal needs rather than due to an international problem. In fact, both the Crispi and Giolitti governments felt the need to create a diversion — a point of interest and doubtful accomplishment of the civilizing ideals of the Left which was gaining strength and a reason for patriotic pride for the middle classes — a premise with possible catastrophic consequences for the very survival of the country.

Actually, the war was well prepared from a psychological point of view, representing a subconscious consolation for the bitter disappointment caused by the Eritrean campaign. In effect the war soon proved to be a tiring and long drawn-out task with no material gains. Naturally, the heads of the ministries involved did not hesitate, immediately prior to the First World War, to denounce the serious problems which the Libyan question continued to raise.

As regards the military aspects of the campaign, one cannot overlook the somewhat excessive caution which forced troops to defend themselves rather than attack, and the psychological unpreparedness for quick and unexpected guerilla warfare such as that carried out by the Arabs.

The East African campaign in 1935-1936 [the official duration was 7 months]

which brought Italian troops to the heart of the Ethiopian Empire was based on political premises and military preparedness very different from the Libyan campaign. In 1935 the Government felt the need for a show of military power in order to justify in the eyes of public opinion the much-publicized strength which had been reached but never tested. The occasion of the incidents on the Ethiopian-Somali frontier was only the final moment of a complex and care-

ful preparation initiated some time before. This explains why, almost at the waving of a wand, a vast mass of some half million men was placed at the disposal of the military leaders together with a profusion of arms and equipment, which was certainly not usual in the Italian armed forces. Careful planning, together with the overall support of the nation, contributed to bring to an end in a remarkably short time the most massive and intensive military campaign that is to be found in the history of colonial warfare.

The operations carried out with difficulty in the period 1940-42 in North Africa are, on the other hand, based on motives completely different from those governing the other campaigns. A part of the overall picture of the Second World War, these operations were a severe test for the Italian military machine which was not ready to sustain such a difficult front on account of the distance from the home country and of the remarkable operative capacity of the enemy — a front which was characterized by special environmental difficulties. It is no exaggeration to state that in Libya the most valuable part of the Italian Army was prostrated, with grave consequences which the subsequent war years inflicted on Italy.

The logistics requirements imposed on the General Staff by the Libyan expedition can be defined both considerable and involved if one takes into account the immediate availability of troops upon mobilization. In fact, the overall strength was rather low and for this reason a feverish search ensued to locate industries capable of meeting the quantity of requests in practically every sector, both heavy industries and

ITALIAN

MILITARY

UNIFORMS

manufacturing industries. The complex operation which was carried out in a period of two years, can be considered as a whole successful, since the troops received practically all their requirements to maintain themselves and fight. The 55,000 men, 8500 horses and mules, and 134 guns despatched at the outbreak of hostilities were almost doubled in the following months. These figures give an idea of the vast undertaking, bearing in mind on the one hand the total lack of local resources which required the transport of everything, even of water, and on the other hand, that for the first time in history regular use was made of aeroplanes and motor vehicles.


When at maximum strength the Expeditionary Corps was organized in two army corps, each of two divisions, each in turn composed of two infantry brigades, in addition to a further independent brigade forming the Tripoli garrison which was composed of two battalions of Grenadiers, two battalions of "Alpini", and three Infantry regiments. To this force various additional troops were assigned, such as two "Bersaglieri" regiments, some Cavalry regiments, together with adequate support from Artillery, Engineers, Service Corps, Royal Carabiniers and "Guardia di Finanza" (Finanze Guards).

Quite different was the situation of the Expeditionary Corps sent in 1935 to East Africa for the Ethiopian campaign. Based on intensive preparations and provision of supplies the corps comprised approximately 400,000 men with the latest equipment and materials. It was transported some four thousand kilometres from the home country to Eritrea and some eight thousand kilometres to Somalia with a regularity and efficiency which surprised foreign experts.

Five full strength divisions of the "Regio Esercito" (Royal Army), three divisions of "Blackshirts", plus an imposing number of units independent from the divisions (Grenadiers, "Alpini", "Bersaglieri", tank troops, cavalry, artillery, the various branches of engineers, etc.) and the backing-up services (from medical groups to disinfection units, supplies, transport groups, etc.) constituted the backbone of the forces sent to East Africa to supplement the 60,000 men of the colonial forces already there. Mention should also be made of the numerous troops sent to face emergencies in Libya and the Dodecanese Islands.

As regards operations in North Africa during the Second World War, calculation of the forces involved results in figures far higher than those referring to the previous overseas operations because it was not an expeditionary corps which was involved but one of the major fronts into which the energies of the Italian Army were poured until its annihilation.

The uniforms worn by the Army Corps despatched to Libya in 1911 are basically the grey-green clothing just



1911 - Bersaglieri sergeant, in uniform at time of mobilization.

The equipment and uniforms of the Bersaglieri units are identical to those distributed to the Line Infantry, apart from the special characteristics (badges and plumes) of the Corps.



1911 - Soldier, Field Artillery, in uniform at time of mobilization.

His mixed dress - tropical topee without cockade, fatigue dress tunic, new style grey-green trousers and puttees instead of leggings - is a typical example of the difficulties encountered by the supply organization when equipping the expeditionary corps.



1911 - Private of the 1st Grenadiers Regiment, Lieutenant-General and Major of the 84th "Venezia" Infantry Regiment, in uniforms at time of mobilization.

The grey-green accountrements for the 1891 model rifle were gradually distributed to troops. Photographic material shows that often officers omitted to wear the belt.

Gibe
11

approved for troops in the home country. However, as already mentioned, the urgent need to equip units caused a series of delays in distribution, delays which became the main reason for a wide variety of solutions, some of them far from the regulations in force. Thus, some units landed already wearing grey-green and with a palm fibre topee plus the accessories duly transferred from

peace-time headwear. But others received the tropical helmet only later on and were wearing the grey-green cap. Finally, at least for the first months of hostilities other units kept the dark blue uniform worn in Italy, adapting it temporarily by the use of fatigue dress in lightweight coarse cloth. Not all the troops received the proper badges and insignia for the tropical helmets with the result that

photographs depict a considerable variety of solutions to the problem (sometimes a cockade was missing, sometimes a pompon, sometimes a metal badge, etc.) which were not always pleasing to the eye. The special anti-sand glasses were also distributed irregularly.

The accountrements followed the same destiny as uniforms, so that the

**1911 - Private, 16th Regiment
"Cavalleggeri di Lucca" (Light cavalry),
in uniform at time of mobilization.**

The only difference in this uniform as compared with that worn in the home country is the tropical topee made of palm fibre, to which the ornaments normally worn on the busby have been transferred.



1935 - Lieutenant, Flay bearer of the 83rd "Venezia" Infantry Regiment, Gaviana Division, in armed duty uniform.

The normal colonial uniform mainly repeated the same ornaments as the grey-green dress with, the elimination of the coloured collars and trouser stripes.






1912 - Private of the 68th "Palermo" Infantry Regiment, in grey-green uniform for armed duty.

No change is made at the time of mobilization for the Libyan campaign to the uniform worn in the home country. Note should be taken that due to the lack of metal badges of the new type, a plain white numeral on black is sewn to the cap.

1936 - Private, Medical Corps, in service dress.

In addition to the badges of the Corps, the soldier is wearing the armband with a red cross, as set out in the Geneva Convention.



1935 - "Alpine" soldier of the 7th Alpini Regiment of the 5th "Pusteria" Division, in service uniform with cape.

Only the headdress, the uniform and the footwear are of the special model for overseas service, while the remainder of the dress and equipment is grey-green according to the regulations for the home country.

1939 - Private of the 10th Regiment "Granatieri di Savoia" on armed duty uniform.

Garrisoned at Addis Abeba, the Regiment is distinguished by the characteristic blue collar badges on red background.

1941 - Paratrooper, 186th "Folgore" Infantry Regiment, in combat uniform.

When assigned to North Africa, troops carried the normal arms and equipment but were issued the typical uniforms of the unit, in khaki material rather than grey-green.



1941 - Engineers' Major, in tropical field uniform.

When on duty in North and East Africa, officers used the comfortable forage cap with fixed peak and the special tunic called "sahariana", together with the shoulder straps envisaged for colonial duty.

old type pouches were often used, despite the fact that troops had been supplied with the 1891 model rifle.

In the second part of the campaign, thanks to the efforts of the manufacturing industries, many deficiencies were eliminated and the troops finally had a more orderly overall look.

The enormous quantity of means available and the timeliness of the orders submitted to manufacturers were the main differences in the exterior aspect of the soldier operating in East Africa in 1935. In fact, personnel were allocated everything they required. However, the simultaneous use of colonial uniform and tropical helmet with dress and equipment worn in the home country resulted in a characteristic mixture of khaki and grey-green which, nevertheless, was not unpleasant.

Finally, the uniforms worn in Africa during the Second World War are mainly those worn on other fronts, that is the grey-green. In effect, the grey-green uniform was certainly not ideal for a soldier fighting in the desert. On the other hand, the "Intendenza" (supply organization) provided items in khaki cloth and cork helmets only from time to time. Thus, it can be said that the soldier operating in the period 1940-43 was the most ill-supplied and —equipped among all the overseas campaigns fought in this century. Apparently, following the lead set by colleagues in the colonial service, officers often bought, with their own funds, items which were more appropriate.

Gen. Valerio Gibellini

RIVISTA MILITARE EUROPEA



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
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*Pierre
Lellouche*
**L'AVENIR
DE LA
GUERRE**

MAZARINE

P. Lellouche: "L'avenir de la guerre" ("The Future of War"), Mazarine, Paris, 1985, 334 pp., F. 89.

In the past few years, the evolution of the world political-strategic framework has brought about profound changes in the assumptions which underline European defense policy. Gone are the days when American military protection offered Europe a guarantee of cheap security, a situation which led the Europeans to adopt an irresponsible attitude towards defense and military policy, though, at the same time, it did allow them a certain freedom of action, at least in the economic sector. On the contrary, today Europe's very identity is caught between the Soviet military challenge on the one hand, and the economic and technological challenge of the United States on the other.

As far as France is concerned, the defense policy which General de Gaulle created by establishing a French nuclear deterrent designed solely to defend the French nation has gradually lost its effectiveness. Indeed, the fundamental assumption behind this policy was that the strength of the NATO forces stationed in West Germany would protect France. According to the author, the evolution of the current situation clearly demonstrates that the German Federal Republic will increasingly turn to agree-

ments with Moscow as a way of assuring its own security, inevitably sliding towards some form of neutrality or neutralism, a course which would put both the vital interests and the very national security of France at risk.

This dangerous tendency can be stopped only by a change in French defense policy. France must move the bulk of its conventional and tactical nuclear forces into West Germany. At the same time, it must reinforce its strategic nuclear forces, launch a program of Franco-German military co-operation in space and deploy a theater antimissile system to protect the principal military bases, with particular attention to strategic nuclear forces.

The key point in the system proposed by Lellouche is the shifting of France's forward line of defense from the Rhine to the Elbe. Clearly, France would expose itself to a greater set of dangers, losing, it would seem, part of the freedom of action guaranteed by de Gaulle's military policy. Nonetheless, the author holds that there is no alternative. This course alone would provide the Germans with irrefutable evidence of France's willingness to stand by their side, reversing any German neutralist tendencies while overcoming that nation's gradual spiritual disarmament, a phenomenon which represents a potential death blow for the defense systems of both Europe and France. The French forces in Germany would act as reinforcements to German units, permitting France to retain its position of independence within NATO.

The defense system described above would also represent the framework for a revival of Europe's political, economic and technological unity, and indispensable precondition to redressing the imbalance of power which exists within the Alliance vis à vis the United States. The Alliance itself remains indispensable to both the Americans and the Europeans. But its internal imbalance must be corrected. The Europeans must regain a greater sense of awareness, trust and responsibility, overcoming their leanings towards a "Europessimism" which, in the long run, would inevitably bring about the decline of all European countries.

In France, Lellouche's book has aroused a great deal of interest, touching off impassioned debates. In a way, it represents the "charter" of a new Franco-German alliance, an alliance which many European nations view with suspicion, despite the fact that, realistically, it alone can lead to a renewal of European unity. In concrete terms, this alliance is based on the increasingly close military ties which have been established between Paris and Bonn. In this context, one must ask what rôle Italy is to play if she wishes to safeguard her own national interests and identity.

**Strengthening
Conventional
Deterrence
in Europe**

*Proposals for
the 1980s*

REPORT of the EUROPEAN
SECURITY STUDY
ESECS

"Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe. Proposals for the 1980s". Report of the European Security Study, McMillan Press, London, 1983, 260 pp., £ 5.95.

The report of the European Security Study (known as the ESECS), a commission composed of roughly 30 experts from the United States, England and Germany, with Professor Wilson of M.I.T. as chairman, represents one of the fundamental texts on the topic of strengthening conventional deterrence in Europe. At present, NATO relies too heavily on the use of theater nuclear weapons. This means that any conventional attack could rapidly lead to a crossing of the nuclear threshold. Given that there would be no way of controlling a nuclear war, which, even if it were to be waged on a controlled, limited basis, would still destroy the European territories NATO is charged with defending, it is imperative that Europe's conventional defenses be strengthened. The transformation must take place quickly, and within reasonable cost limits.

The commission was organized into three work groups, each of which proceeded to analyze one of the following topics: the nature of the conventional threat posed by the Soviets; specific measures to be acted upon in order to achieve adequate levels of conventional defense; weapons and equipment already available, and other matériel which, given the current state of technology, can be developed in a short space of time. On a number of counts, the analysis of the conventional Soviet menace and its weaknesses resembles the analysis presented by the studies which gave



rise to the "Airland Battle" concept in the United States and the FoFA (Follow-on-Forces Attack) theory in SHAPE. Special attention is given to the weaknesses of the Soviet forces, weaknesses which the Alliance must exploit if it is to wage a successful defensive battle. The Soviet Union is particularly vulnerable on the following points: it must always seek to maintain the element of surprise, making a full mobilization of its potential resources very difficult; it must rely on an uninterrupted flow of supplies and reinforcements coming out of Russia, an arrangement which requires that all lines of communication be kept open on a permanent basis; it must seek a rapid victory; and, finally, it must concentrate its forces in order to break through NATO's forward defenses.

The analysis of the measures to be acted upon by NATO begins with an assumption considered to be sacrosanct: the wisdom of a forward defense as opposed to an in-depth defense, which, given West Germany's specific geo-strategic situation, is an unacceptable alternative. For a forward defense to be successful, the enemy's weaknesses must be exploited to the fullest. To this end, the NATO forces must carry out five vital missions: halt the initial attack; wear down the air strength of the Warsaw Pact forces; stop the enemy's flow of strategic reinforcements; strike at the enemy's command and control system; guarantee the performance of the NATO command and control system.

The report's third section deals with the weapons and equipment needed for a greater "conventionalization" of Europe's defenses. Here, the commission focused its attention on three fundamental areas: bombs of the guided sub-

munitions and area-saturation type; air and land-based missile launchers to be used with these bombs; surveillance systems for battlefield reconnaissance as well as target acquisition. These new systems, derived from recently consolidated technological advances, some of which have already reached the development or production phase, are vitally important, both for gaining air superiority and for inflicting losses on enemy formation, be they positioned to the rear or at the front. In particular, the systems could be used to put enemy airfields out of action and gain control of the battlefield itself, replacing the theater nuclear weapons previously assigned to these tasks. The acquisition of these systems, however, will not allow the Alliance to eliminate the nuclear element from its defensive formations. The rôle of theater nuclear weapons will always be a fundamental one. The threat they represent leaves the Warsaw Pact nations with no other choice but to disperse their forces, a move which only adds to the strength of NATO's conventional defenses. Furthermore, theater nuclear weapons would act as a deterrent against Soviet nuclear attacks aimed at the NATO defenses. For the NATO countries, the additional financial burden of the new systems in the Central Region should amount to roughly twenty billion dollars (with a 50% margin of error for either increases or decreases over a period of ten years, calling for a spending increase of 1% above and beyond the annual rise of 3% already agreed upon in NATO circles. These figures are very similar to the ones used by SHAPE in its FoFA proposals.

On the subject of forward defenses, the report recommends a greater reliance on solutions of a technologi-

cally simpler nature plus the formation of units whose light-infantry core makes them extremely mobile. These forces must be capable of saturating an entire front, securing areas where movement is limited to a significant degree, in particular the densely populated urban zones. Such a strategy would allow for a more concentrated use of armored and motorized forces, units whose strength must remain limited on account of both cost factors and a lack of enlisted personnel serving on a long-term basis. Long-range guided weapons, armored forces and light infantry units would provide an effective defense, working in synergy to create an appropriate "mix" whose dimensions would be compatible with the projected availability of human and financial resources.


The study does not deal specifically with the problems of the Southern Region. Indeed, its conclusions seem especially relevant to the defense of the north-eastern theater on at least three counts: first, even a surprise attack would come with more advanced warning in the southern region than in Central Europe; second, the attacking forces, having no choice but to file through the passes in the Julian Alps, would be unable to take full advantage of their numerical superiority over the forward-based defensive formations; third, the geography of the southern sector is better suited to a defensive action than that of Central Europe. The ideal "mix" of forces for the southern region, a factor which must be calculated in terms of available resources, could also differ from the projected mix for Central Europe. Priorities for the Southern Region, however, should not vary noticeably from those forecast for Central Europe.

Carlo Bess

S. Loi: "La Brigata d'assalto 'Italia', 1943-1945" ("The 'Italia' General Staff, Rome, 1985, Historical Bureau of the Army High Command, Rome, 1985, 327 pp., L. 8,000.

This book tells the little-known story of the operations carried out in Yugoslavia — at the side of Tito's Army — by a large, very mixed group of Italian soldiers, who, following the dramatic events set in motion by the Armistice of 1943, escaped capture at the hands of the Germans.

The author — an authority on the course of the Second World War in the Balkans, as well as a direct participant in the actual events — has devoted his carefully researched work to depicting the actions of the "Italia" Brigade. He was aided in this task by access to the unit's historical diaries. These were recently made available by the Brigade's last commanding officer, Giuseppe Maras, a second lieutenant in the Bersa-



glieri who was decorated with the Gold Medal.

The book is organized in a truly original way.

The first part contains the diaries of the unit's different combat groups. Reproduced in full, these documents provide the book's narrative thread.

The second part guides the reader along "a tri-colored path through the Balkans", an intellectual journey which the author undertakes in order to place the diaries in a broader, more fully integrated context.

Divided into ten chapters, the book provides not only a general index, but also an index for the names of people and places, plus a series of 29 interesting photographs and a map which is enclosed as a supplement to the text.


The names of those fallen in battle are also listed, along with a record of the different decorations awarded to members of the unit, plus a detailed chronology of its operations.

Alessandro Bianchini



A. Fara: "La metropoli difesa. Architettura militare dell'Ottocento nelle città capitali d'Italia" ("Defending the Metropolis. Eighteenth-Century Military Architecture in Italy's Capital Cities"), With a story by D. Del Giudice, Historical Bureau of the Army General Staff, Rome, 1985, XXII-282 pp., L. 35,000.

This book, as the head of the Historical Bureau points out in his introduction, offers the reader two novel points of interest: it confronts a question which has yet to be dealt with by military historiography, and it includes a story written on a freely-chosen theme, a story which, nonetheless, is pertinent to the subject at hand. The originality and the unquestionable intrinsic value of the book are further enhanced by an elegant, carefully designed editorial format. The author reviews the fortification systems constructed in the three cities which served as the Capital of Italy during the course of the nineteenth century. In so doing, he provides the reader with an abundance of detailed information and critical observations,



clear evidence of his solid professional training. The text combines military-technical themes with architectural-artistic ones, delving into both areas

with equal attention. The result is a noteworthy treatise on urban planning.

The work is divided into three densely-packed chapters: the first considers the architecture of the Capital cities within the context of European military culture; the second describes the life and work of Giovanni Castellani, responsible for the fortifications at Turin and Florence; the third is devoted to the defense systems and military buildings of Rome in its rôle as Capital of Italy. The author's presentation is accompanied by a rich appendix. Among other treasures, it includes some truly valuable, as yet unpublished documents, such as those dealing with the defense of the State, written in 1866. The book ends with two indexes: one for names, the other for places and "items of note".

"Dillon Bay" is the title of D. Del Giudice's story, whose theme — as is noted in the aforementioned introduction — is the comparison of two types of war: that based on the fortress, "which multiplies military forces and time", and nuclear war, in which, "time has disappeared, broken down into instants, while the fortress has become an invisible threshold, present throughout space".

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
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"Studi Storico-Militari 1984"
("Studies in Military History
1984"), Historical Bureau of the
Army General Staff, Rome,
1985, 601 pp., L. 22,000.

In 1977, the Historical Bureau of the Army General Staff, reviving a long-held tradition which had originally led to the publication of a periodical (1909-1914), began publishing a series of "Historical Military Memoirs". Appearing at the rate of one a year, these volumes contain lively monographs on both classic and modern military topics. The questions raised for discussion, though not broad enough to merit extended treatment, provide interesting, well-developed points of departure for members of the academic community and military scholars.

The volume under review, the eighth in the series, comes with a new, more appropriate title and an improved editorial format. As was the case with the previous volumes, the different contributions are grouped under five categories: essays, graduate theses, first-person accounts, biographic profiles and research studies.

The first category includes: "The Volunteer Army in the Second War of Independence", by Anna Maria Isastia; "The Role of the Bayonet in the History of Warfare", by G. Rotasso; "Reconstructing Balbo's Secret Plan", by D. Ferrari; an analysis of recent developments in psychological warfare by P. Baroni; a description of "The Roman Republic's Army of 1798-1799", by V. Ilari; a memoir dealing with the struggle against banditry, written by L. Tuccari.

A Brugioni's graduate thesis on the subject "Strategic Planning on the Eve

of Italy's Entry into the First World War" appears in the second group.

Two first-person accounts follow: G. Adami on the retreat of the 5th Alpine Regiment from the Don in the second half of January 1943; L. Weiss on the 2nd Battery of the 150th Bn 149/13 howitzers, at the fall of Tobruk in January of 1941.

There are three biographic profiles: the life of Luigi Pelloux is examined by Oreste Bovio; A. Rasero looks at Giuseppe Domenico Perrucchetti's life and Giovanni Battista E. De Giorgis is the subject of a work by A. Biagini.

The fifth group presents two research studies: one by E. Calabresi, the other by F. Frattolillo.

Piero Petrilli



M. Montanari: "Le operazioni in Africa Settentrionale. Vol. I - Sidi El Barrani (giugno 1940-febbraio 1941)" ["Operations in North Africa. Vol. I - Sidi El Barrani (June 1940-February 1941)"], Historical Bureau of the Army General Staff, Rome, 1985, 702 pp., L. 25,000.

Beginning in the late 1940's, the Historical Bureau of the Army General Staff sponsored the creation and publication of a series of monographs which examined the fighting that took place along the coast of North Africa during the Second World War. Eight essays were published in the series, covering the entire chronology of those events. Nevertheless, the Bureau has decided, and very wisely so, to reintroduce the narrative histories in a more complete form, further enriching the new editions with documentation which

has come to light in the intervening years.

The first volume to appear describes the Italian drive into Egyptian territory. This action, which eventually stalled on the Sidi El Barrani line, was conducted in a spirited, aggressive style. The weapons and strategic concepts put to use, however, were soon shown to be completely outmoded.

The pages which follow describe the first British offensive. Though our troops fought courageously, they were forced to retreat into Cyrenaica, out-matched by an army which was well equipped with armoured vehicles of both the tracked and wheeled variety, an indispensable part of desert warfare.

The book includes a supplement of 69 interesting documents, plus indexes for the different names, the towns and cities, and the commands and units, along with 24 photographs and a list of the documents and other works used as source materials. The book also offers the reader a total of 20 sketches, in both black-and-white and color, not to mention a separately enclosed set of 11 topographical maps.

With its extremely accurate references, the essay offers a complete picture of episodes which are still very much alive in the memories of many veterans.

Nicola Della Volpe



L. Tuccari: "L'impresa di Massaua cento anni dopo" ("The Massaua Expedition: one hundred years after the fact"), Historical Bureau of the Army General Staff, Rome, 1985, 244 pp., Illustrated, L. 8,000.

This essay is a "reconsideration" of the expedition which, roughly a hundred years ago, marked Italy's entry into the circle of nations who were then



seeking to expand their territory through colonial ventures in Africa. Today this policy is roundly condemned, but at the time it was accepted with an equally unanimous chorus of justifications, being pursued by almost all the European states, both large and small, with the exception of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which, as always, had its sights set on the Balkans.

The expedition was sponsored and approved by the De Pretis-Mancini government. Italy was abandoning its so-called "clean hands" policy, a policy which had led it to decline the territorial advantages granted by the Congress of Berlin in 1878, as well as suffer a setback in Tunisia at the hands of the French in 1881 and refuse Britain's invitation to participate in an 1882 intervention in Egypt. Our nation could point to a history of peaceful activity in Africa, a continent to which she had sent explorers and pioneers. The policy of De

Pretis and Mancini was based on a need for both prestige and an outlet capable of absorbing some of the nation's mass of untrained laborers, most of whom lived in the south, an area both poor in natural resources and lacking in significant industrial concerns.

Between February 5th and March 1st of 1885, three expeditionary forces came ashore at Massaua and Assad, led respectively by Colonel Saletta, Lieutenant Colonel Leitenitz and General Ricci. The existing Egyptian garrisons put up no resistance. The convoys were escorted by Navy units whose ships moved into the main ports of the Red Sea. The first police operations are also described, along with the administrative and logistical tasks.

The preparations for the expedition are examined in detail. They were perfect, despite having been carried out in a very short amount of time, the result of a traditional tendency to

keep military leaders in the dark concerning political developments: a tradition which, unfortunately, was very much alive as late as 1940. The undertaking was organized by Enrico Cosenz, a venerable, courageous veteran of Garibaldi's army who, at the time of the expedition, was Chief of the Army General Staff.


This book, a work of unquestionable value both for the historical precision of its research and for its highly accurate critical analyses, is also meant as a remembrance of the actions of those soldiers who, though limited in number and forced to operate in a natural setting both hostile and far from home, managed to carry out their duty with a great deal of dignity.

The book includes photographs, drawings and, in an appendix, a series of 6 interesting documents.


Fernando Frattolillo

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Giovanni Costa - Silvia De Martino: "Management pubblico - Organizzazione e personale nella Pubblica Amministrazione" ("Public Management - Organization and Personnel in the Public Administration"), ETAS Books, 328 pp., L. 30,000.

The growth of public spending, combined with the subsequent intervention of political and administrative bodies in the social and economic spheres, has led to a progressive decline in the performance of Italy's public administration, to the point where the growing gap between the services requested of the State and the State's limited ability to satisfy these requests, either by developing institutional remedies or providing economic and organizational solutions, represents the key to the very serious problem commonly referred to as the "crisis of the State".

The authors, drawing on decades of experience as educators of public sector administrators and executives,

Economia aziendale

Giovanni Costa Silvia De Martino **MANAGEMENT PUBBLICO**

Organizzazione e personale
nella Pubblica Amministrazione


ETAS LIBRI

claim to have discovered the cause of the public administration's inability to adapt itself to the new tasks of government: the overly legalistic, formalized training of its personnel. Accustomed to working along such lines, the administrators and executives of the public sector feel uncomfortable using modern techniques designed for the management of human resources and corporate organizations. With this in mind, the


authors have written this lively, informative book for "young people starting careers in the public sector, politicians with administrative responsibilities, heads of government agencies, executives, union officials and teachers involved in the growing number of training courses. A simple, yet rigorously constructed tool, it is meant to further the reader's understanding of the manager's rôle in the organization of personnel, avoiding all myths and preconceived limitations in the process". The book is divided into three parts: the first establishes the crisis of the State and the lamentable condition of the public sector as givens; the second examines the evolution of the models on which organizational and decision-making procedures are based, as well as the evolution of the regulations governing personnel in the public administration; the third section deals with techniques and policies which would allow for the current system of personnel administration to be replaced with a more modern, rational system of personnel management.

Mario Iannacci

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
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
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The aim of Rivista Militare is to broaden and update the technical and vocational training of Army Officers and NCOs. To this end it functions as a vehicle for the dissemination of military thinking and as a forum of study and debate. Rivista Militare is also intended to be a means of informing the general public about the Army and military matters through the publication of articles of current technical and scientific interest.

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CHARACTERS AND ASPECTS OF PUBLICITY



Publicity, lexically defined as "any form of activity aimed at guiding the public's preference towards a given product or service", is, first of all, an economic factor.

A hinge between production and consumption, publicity carries the message of industry and commerce to the public and is, without doubt, a typical expression of our industrialized society. A society that, in order to expand production, must create new, more or less real needs and new types of consumption, often connected with the "status" and aspirations of the individual.

The original task of publicity was only that of informing: that is, making the existence of a new product known.

Examples of this existed also in ancient times, in the written "advertisements" discovered in Pompei and Ostia, or with the town criers and heralds of the Middle Ages, whose tradition in Southern and insular Italy has not completely died.

Nevertheless, the greatest development of publicity occurred with the appearance of printing.

Starting from the first printed announcement, displayed in Great Britain in 1480 to promote a book, through the first newspaper advertisement appeared in Germany in 1525, to the first paid personal advertisement published in 1651 by a doctor on the 6th issue of the "Gazette" – later "Gazette de France" – the way was long but progressive, and in 1830 led to the first wall posters and placards.

The initial black and white poster was printed in two colours (red and blue) in 1836 and became subsequently polychrome and ever livelier, thanks to two concurrent factors.

On the one side, the advent and improvement of chromolithography; on the other, the interest of famous artists who, like Henri Toulouse-Lautrec, in the second half of the 19th century

Facing page.

From 1915 to 1918 the war loans followed one another, and their promotion, for lack of means such as television, was entrusted to newspapers and, most of all, to posters. One of the most striking for its realism and dramatic impact is undoubtedly this one drawn by Mauzan, which appeared around the period of Caporetto: in the portrait of the fiery-eyed infantryman, with his finger pointing almost threateningly towards the public, one can almost perceive the symbol of the resistance on the Piave.

Below.

While the 19th century was a period of great inventions and scientific discoveries, the following one appears from the beginning as the century of technique: almost immediately, the automobile becomes one of its symbols. This poster of the new born FIAT (whose vaguely Latin trademark is really made up by the initials of *Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino*) shows one of the first models. The external frame is that of a horse coach; the steering wheel has not yet appeared.



Right.

The 1910 Milan Air Rally was a European event; 45 pilots from all over the world accepted to participate; five of them declared to be ready to engage in the "almost impossible" flight across the Alps, planned to take place before the rally. Actually, only Chavez made the attempt, and died after his victory. The rally took place all the same, and the public was certainly not less enthusiastic than the spectators imagined by Jean Béraud, author of this poster extolling the "new sport" of the beginning of the century: aviation.

Below.


From the appearance of the first "coaches without horses" of Daimler and Benz, the automobile has progressed enormously and is considered by many the "transportation means of the future". The car industry is developing very rapidly, as proved by the Milan exhibition, which opened just before the Paris-Peking raid. The winged genius on the poster gives almost the impression of a fast, melancholic tribute to the world of the 19th century.



overcame their initial adersion for this new activity and created posters that were successful as original artistic expressions.

Colour printing, photography, newspaper and magazine advertisements, ever brighter and more attractive, luminous signs, radio, cinema and television led with time to an extremely rapid "explosion" of the publicity message. The salient aspects of the peculiar mass civilization, which had fostered this "explosion" were caught in 1930, with fine perception, by the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset in his book "The Revolt of the Masses".

The phenomenon was then actually only moving its first steps and the author had been able to perceive its mechanisms because it was still in its initial, simpler and therefore more evident phase. He could consequently affirm, with modern and up-to-date expressions: "He who wants to meditate, to collect his thoughts, must learn to do it submerged by the public din, like a diver in the ocean of collective noise. It is practically impossible for man to be alone. Willing or unwilling, he must stay with others. The



Below.

During the years of the Triple Alliance, the official Italian policy seems to be that of forgetting the past conflicts with Austria.

Everything "German" if fashionable, including beer which, nevertheless, is still foreign to the Italian taste and must therefore be vigorously advertised, although – as a tribute to the particular climate – it is named "Italia". The poster reflects at the same time the spirit of a period when Europe, essentially peaceful, could afford to fight "small wars overseas".

big avenue and the square throw their anonymous hubbub through the domestic walls. All that was meant as a protection against boundless publicity vanishes day by day.

That was 1930, but we were at the heart of the problem and faced situations similar to the present ones which, after the respite of the second world conflict and the hard, immediate

post-war years, record the rampant success of a more and more sophisticated publicity.

Publicity is sometimes not fully known as an economic activity because next to the major full time advertising agencies, sometimes quoted on the Stock Exchange, there are "miniagencies", that base their production mainly on their "gray matter". As a matter of fact, there are many small organizations that do their work in a precarious setting: two small rented rooms, a telephone, two or three people, a few letterheads and a lot of will and initiative. This is the embryo of the advertising agency, whose survival and development will depend on the talent and ability of the founders.

The large industrial and commercial enterprises mostly

fulfill their publicity needs autonomously. There are in fact publicity services within the companies, with tens or hundreds of employees, capable of conceiving, carrying out and developing any type of campaign. The availability of these "home" services does not exclude the possibility that the companies entrust the launching of some of their products to well-established advertising agencies.

Moreover, in this multiform and variable way, next to the two main groups of independent and integrated agencies already considered, there is the category of the consultant offices that cooperate with the heads of the major firms and, as experts in an activity in which innovation has the highest priority, supply appropriate ideas, suggestions, criticism.

As a profession often envied, sometimes defamed, doubtlessly necessary, publicity, often considered a witchcraft endowed with powers that it certainly does not possess, suffers – in case of crisis – the repercussions of the unfavourable conjuncture more rapidly than other activities.

In the business field it is not unusual to hear the statement that a good part of the publicity expenses is wasted money.

The difficulty is to find out the useless part, for the returns of the "campaigns" cannot be quantified with scientific exactitude. Despite polls, investigations, inquiries of every kind and size, the returns of the publicity expenses in terms of business remain hard to determine, despite the "specialists'" affirmation that their activity is the motive power of economy and expansion.

Actually, mass production and consumption cannot do without this product of our times.

As an integrant part of the producing companies' strategy, publicity takes part in the various phases of marketing. From the conception of the product to its presentation, its marketing, its pricing, publicity



Tricolor flag, plumed Bersaglieri hat, laurel foliage: today, these elements would be used with caution even for an Armed Forces propaganda poster. Between 1910 and 1918, instead, they were considered suitable ingredients for the publicity campaign of a newspaper – one of the most renowned and important.

Prices are also remarkable: a yearly subscription brought the price to 5 centesimi per copy.

It is interesting to note that 5 centesimi was the equivalent of 150 lire of today.

accompanies the article and almost prepares it with a sort of "pre-sale" that results in making it considered as indispensable.

Just as one proceeds when the promotion regards the name of a "pop" singer or the image of a person to be imposed on public opinion.

On the other hand, the advertisers' situation is not always as brilliant as it might appear.

Apparently omnipotent in the eye of the people at large, who sometimes resignedly endure a real persuasive hammering, often considered as the ultimate expression of luxury and modernity, the advertising agents in reality must sell their ideas and skills to businessmen who want and demand an actual increase in their sales and who, if difficulties arise, are ready to reduce, as a first measure, the expenses of this specific sector.

Designated by some as the spearhead of contemporary life, often considered an affirmation of optimism and enjoyment, publicity really does entertain the eye and the spirit, and deserves to be regarded as an outstanding feature of our civilization, on an equal footing with the car, the "exotic" holidays, the conquest of space.

It is a "feature" which is continuously reevaluated. As one can read in an essay by Gian Paolo Ceserani "The unarmed persuaders", a Gallup poll conducted in the United States in 1940 showed that only 40% of the people interviewed expressed criticism about publicity, which was deemed

useful, honest and sincere by 51% of the interviewed.

In more recent times – on the contrary – an inquiry held by the "Harvard Business Review" ascertained that 85% of the interviewed criticized publicity, perhaps because they considered it a factor of the excesses of consumption.

A peculiar "fact" which, just a few years ago, was well liked by almost 7% of the Italian consumers, who considered it a proof of the social advancement of our society.

A "fact", finally, with its restraints and limitations, for in the reality of our days the mass of consumers has ceased to be a submissive, easily conquerable terrain, that affects instead in its turn, as a kind of social echo, both production and publicity.

In its continual eagerness to sell more and in better way, publicity seeks and employs all possible means to reach its potential customers. "Props" of all sorts are multiplied toward this end: all that can be used to draw the attention of the particular category of people considered the "objective" of the "campaign".

Press, radio, television, cinema, walls of the underground and railway stations, buses, taxis, etc. are suitable for this goal.

In a powerful "crescendo", the written or spoken texts employ sounds, images, music.

The operators' imagination explodes, searching for increasingly effective ideas, up to the point of manifestations which having reached the permissible limits, border



IL GIORNALE D'ITALIA

ROMA · PALAZZO SCIARRA


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STABILIMENTO DOTT. CHAPPAIS BOLOGNA



In 1918, the participation of the United States in the war is not yet very weighty on the military plane, but is already decisive from the economic viewpoint.

The American foodstuff invades Europe well before the U.S. soldiers reach it.

The spectre of hunger, that in 1917 had begun to haunt the countries of the Entente, is exorcised.

This poster of the U.S. Food Administration shows an often neglected aspect of war: unlike the soldiers at Caporetto, those on the Piave had behind them a country where there was no danger of revolts caused by the lack of bread.

the professional rigour of the editors.

There are, moreover, forms or attempts of actual false publicity which are sometimes the result of a behaviour which, being naturally inclined to hyperbole and emphasis, often results in actual falsehoods.

The ideal would be that the spontaneous and general observance of a deontological code could lead to a kind of self-discipline. But this, desirable and enticing as it may be, will never be able to work without the cogent power of laws and rules.

The Italian criminal code, in Articles 662, 663 and 664, considers a group of crimes (unlawful printing activity; unlawful sale, distribution or posting of inscriptions or drawings; destruction or defacement of posters and placards), which lists the transgressions concerning the surveillance over the advertising means.

One can note, in this regard, that the norm of Art. 663 on the unlawful distribution of printed publications has been deemed constitutionally illegitimate, together with the corresponding norm of Art. 113 of the Police Law.

It must also be remembered that, as from 1954, all forms of advertising have been subjected to new tax regulations.

These days, finally, advertising has definitively rejected the idea of the simple, rather unrefined "réclame" of its beginnings, and has also

sometimes on abuse.

Surreptitious advertising, pressures on the press and false publicity are the most common expressions of these abuses.

The fact that a publicity "flash" turns out to be more effective if concealed and not shown as such, is the main reason for the so-called surreptitious advertising.

Press, cinema and television can take part in the game, unbeknownst to the reader or the audience.

There are obviously norms and prohibitions in this regard, but they can be – and often are – more or less openly circumvented.

Pressures on the press are another form of abuse. The relations between the organs of the press and the advertising organizations have never been

simple.


Newspapers cannot live without publicity, which – in the form of insertions or editorial pages – make up the most substantial part (up to 80%) of the revenues. There is therefore no reason to be surprised if, with some frequency, certain advertising organizations or other enterprises – in a complicated interplay of public relations – try to obtain the publication of articles of indirect support – or at least not adverse ones – threatening, in case of refusal, to cancel or reduce the publicity contracts.

The effectiveness of these undue pressures diminishes when the press takes its precautions, both through wider all-round publicity concessions to different sectors, and through



A 1934 poster.

The author is Dudovich, easily recognizable for his style and composition. As for the "Balilla", it is not exactly "for all", considered that its price is the equivalent of an average worker's two-year wage. Still, it is a new and important fact in the history of the automobile in Italy: "Balilla", for the first time, offers "four wheels" to a public which is no more formed only by rich people. With "Balilla", in fact, the number of cars in Italy increases rapidly, from about 60,000 to more than 300,000.



overcome the successive moments of confusion between "information" and incitement to purchase.

With the advent of mass society, a consuming society, gone and far away are the times cited by Maria Corti in her work "The Sectorial Languages in Italy", when advertising was called "réclame" and was considered "the very soul of trade", when it was "homemade" and pathetic, a bit bizarre, deliciously naive.



Today the modern techniques make possible to know the consumers' tastes and preferences; advertising, availing itself of psychological and psychoanalytical knowledge, exploits the consumers' unconscious motivations in order to present itself increasingly in the form of amiable and objective information.

In this light, publicity avails itself of fashions, trends, models that in other fields have shown their vitality and which, through the advertising message, become officially acknowledged.

The admen – called by Vance Packard with a fitting expression "The Occult Persuaders" in his work by the same title – see their position in today's society shade off into one in which, in the words of the already mentioned Ceserani, he assumes the rôle of a qualified and diligent "occult observer". An observer who must strive to perceive in advance the fads, needs, impulses and languages that seem to breed and develop spontaneously in society and which represent society's emotional profile and vulnerable points.

Among the more or less subtle distinctions that can be

For the British propaganda, calling the Germans "Huns" (and also "dogs"), is a habit going back to WWI. We see it again in this poster of 1942, urging the soldiers on the North African front not to underestimate the importance of camouflage nets. And for good reasons: the excellent concealment of the artillery positions was in fact very useful for the British forces during the Battle of Alamein.



made in the extensive field of publicity, some are particularly interesting.

It goes without saying, in fact, that the advertising techniques, widespread today in all directions, from their primary economic purposes can be projected on other courses.

If subjected to an ideology, in particular, they become propaganda techniques.

This British poster refers to the Mediterranean landings during WWII. But the picture is perfectly fitting also for Normandy: the sea teeming with craft of all kinds, tanks advancing directly from the beach, the soldier on the foreground, equipped with the most modern weapons – all details contribute in composing a picture very similar to that of the "great invasion". The common element of the Allied landings is in fact the great abundance of arms, materials and equipment: in this respect, the operations in Normandy are not very different from those carried out in Italy.

From the ethical point of view, as concerns the public, the dangers of this manipulative techniques are of much greater significance, because it is not a matter of improving the sales of a car or a television set, but an attempt at influencing the individual's mind and the citizen's behaviour.

According to a creditable assertion by Kenneth Bouldin of the University of Michigan, one can envisage a world dominated by a sort of invisible dictatorship, where, nevertheless, all the outward forms of democratic freedom are preserved.

In the face of this danger, the individual's right to autonomous judgement demands that all be ready to discern and reject the more or less concealed attempts at persuasion. Luckily, as observed by Clyde Miller in his book

Today American women are even at West Point, and a poster like this would be unthinkable. But in distant 1942 it had a remarkable psychological impact.

The exhortation "be a man" (with the implicit addition "don't let a woman be 'more of a man' than you") was typical of the pioneer mentality, which was still alive in those years. The United States, which at that time was fighting mainly in the Pacific, needed mostly sailors.

"The Persuasion Process", the persuaders' devices sooner or later are revealed and followed by the development of an instinctive mechanism protecting the freedom of will and choice.

Also the Government authority, working on the same line, can try to employ advertising methods to effectively spread ideas and norms.

The postal code, used for speeding the mail service, was divulged employing all means, and in a relatively short time has come to be a generally accepted rule, thanks to an expert and insistent propaganda.

What are the possibilities and limits of advertising as regards the Armed Forces? The problem can perhaps be observed from two angles.

The first, more simply and immediately perceived, concerns weapon systems and all kinds of military materials.

In this respect, the characters and techniques of advertising in general can be found in full also in the special branch which addresses itself to the Armed Forces.

It is a branch that, for reasons of appropriateness, and sometimes of reserve, often avoids radio waves, cinema and television screen and centers essentially on the press, through specialized reviews and magazines, newspaper articles, promotional pamphlets.

It is also a branch that does not turn to the public at large but rather operates towards circles and groups of "initiates". The whole is done, perforce, with an exasperated and exasperating attention to public relations.



A number of exhibitions, of the "fair" type, are also addressed to the abovementioned circles and groups of specialists; some are yearly, such as:

- the electro-optics exhibition at Brighton (GB);
- the military electronics exhibition at Wiesbaden (FRG);
- some are biennial, such as:
 - Farnborough (GB), in even years, and Le Bourget (F) in odd years, displaying means and weapon systems in the field of winged and rotor craft and anti-aircraft weapons;
 - Aldershot (GB), in even years, and Satory (F) in odd years, regarding land vehicles, materiel and weapon systems;
 - Athens (Gr), even years,

concerning technologically advanced equipment and materials of the three Services, produced by the most important European, American and Asian industries.

These and other minor exhibitions, often presented under the banner of technological incentive in the service of progress and security, are often crossroads of industrial and national interests of great moment.

Security, defence, international cooperation, offsets, industrial and economic returns, bilateral or multilateral associative proposals are the expressions that dominate in the meetings and disputes of the specialists, in a "sui generis" world, striking for its vitality and



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impressing – in all positive and negative senses – for its achievements.

The other aspect of our problem is a wider and more composite one.

For the defence of security in peace, there are the recurrent and rightly dominant concepts of dissuasion and deterrence, as premise and foundation of détente.

The common denominator of these values is universally recognized in the "credibility" of the military instruments.

But how can this credibility be pursued and attained? Certainly not through publicity "tout court", but also with the help of advertising techniques, always strictly within the bonds of "fair" information. An

information that can avail itself of some of the tools of publicity, but must reject its philosophy.

An information which should reject with the same rigour, as counterproductive, any form of propaganda. Finally, an information which must absolutely not be tainted by commercial interests.

It must be, in short, an activity, whose ultimate purpose is to give updated information to the citizen. An activity that does not take advantage of the people's credulity, but stimulates their interest.

The goal of this type of information is after all the country's security, in freedom and peace.

There is therefore an urgent need to make public opinion

This is the time when, on the entertainment pages, newspapers present Hollywood's war movies with teasing words such as: "Three-Americans-three against all-Japanese-all: incredible, the Americans win". Rock Hudson seems tailor-made to embody the "hero made in USA": strong, brave, invincible and, at the same time, human, unconventional, apparently shunning all forms of rhetoric.

aware of the problems and difficulties of national defence.

For such an opinion campaign all media must be urged to make an information effort that will become an effective credibility only if the appropriate informative activity is supported by the irreplaceable persuasive power of concrete facts.

Defence, strategy, security, peace are undoubtedly issues that the public is ready and willing to leave to the experts, or to those that like to think of themselves as such. But these are also issues with which the public opinion must be confronted.

It is in this context that France – within an attractive formula of civic education – has recently produced a new kind of television programme, intended to warn against the dangers of war and entrusted to the professionalism and popularity of Yves Montand.

As rightly maintained by Pierre Lellouche (author, among other works, of the recent "L'avenir de la guerre"), the West European man, accustomed to seeing on the screen somebody else's wars, has been led to take a closer interest in the threats and risks of war and has been able to reflect on the close ties between deterrence and peace.

Among the salient arguments of the cited television programme, there is one that deserves to be mentioned: having enjoyed peace, day after day, for a long time, has made it hard for the European countries to realize how and to

what extent the very concept of war has been removed from their life and culture.

To our contemporaries, the well-known diagnosis made by Raymond Aron, "impossible war, improbable peace" seems sufficient to continue the course of civil progress and peace in security.

By proceeding along this path one risks, regrettably, to ignore, when the time comes, the difference between the benefits of the peace enjoyed and the elements that must realistically be protected and deserved.

The responsible evaluation of this difference can be helped with an information that employs the most convincing and valid tools of publicity in its broader sense.

This kind of information – or civic education, if you prefer – is in any case also necessary in order to confront the subtle Soviet weapon that could be called "psychostrategy", largely employed in a sort of nerve-racking war of disinformation.

The Soviet Union has already achieved some noticeable success through the employment of psychological means (one example: the U.S. has given up the neutron bomb project).

With its psychostrategy, the Soviet Union constantly tries to transform the justifiable abhorrence for war into resistance against the programmes of Western defence. Through alternatively threatening and conciliating attitudes, the USSR really aims at maintaining unchanged the advantages obtained in the military sphere.

The campaign against the Euromissiles has, in this sense, stirred up discussions, protests, uncertainties and delays.


Efforts are made to interpose similar elements of confusion, doubt and mistrust between Europe and the United States as regards the SDI project, instrumentally labelled "Star Wars".

Making a lot of noise about the U.S. project of

strategic defence, the Soviets manage to distract the attention of the world from the fact that they have been for years pursuing a similar project of interception and active defence against missiles.

since it has become clear that a nuclear conflict would not bring about the victory of Communism, but would rather mean mutual destruction.

It might be wise to return to Lenin's doctrine, which



These are the most evident aspects of a threat that hovers in permanence over the Western world and which, far from being limited to the military components, seeks to undermine the balance of the wills.

Victory without war is one of the goals of Soviet policy,

foresaw – if necessary – to alternate phases of violent and direct revolution with an indirect strategy which enabled to disrupt and wear out the adversary, maintaining the advantages obtained and preparing other advantages for the future.

Left.

In this poster, published in the first months of 1942, there are all the ingredients of the American propaganda against Japan. A young sailor, stabbed by a samurai sword lies on the Stars and Stripes: it is a reminder of the Pearl Harbour "treacherous" attack and, at the same time, the exhortation – unspoken but no less eloquent – to avenge the victims and save the honour of the nation. There are neither inscriptions nor slogans: this makes the image even more impressive.

Right.

This poster, published in 1943, is kept at the "Musée des deux Guerres Mondiales" in Paris.

Considering these realities, the French television experiment must be appreciated and understood as an example of how to inform and make public opinion conscious of the problems of defence, which are also – and above all – problems of survival, if – as was rightly maintained in the broadcast – a country or a continent, which is no more in a position to guarantee its defence, is destined – sooner or later – to forfeit its independence.

These are, again, realities that the European citizens – willing or not – will have to take into account in the near future, realities which give new dignity to the advertising techniques, if these, correctly employed and coordinated, succeed in making the common man more aware of the problems of defence, and make more credible before the country the aspirations of the military instrument and its effort for an improved efficiency.


This is perhaps the only way to contribute to the transformation of the mentioned diagnosis by Raymond Aron into a milder formula, in the sense of making war "even more" impossible and peace a little "less" improbable.

Ciro Di Martino



CHARACTERS AND ASPECTS OF PUBLICITY

THE IMAGE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN MASS COMMUNICATIONS



This is a topical, complex and extremely important issue. I shall try to tackle it as a journalist and manager, in the firm belief that I can make a contribution, however small, to a current debate in Italy which concerns all of us, and that we all hope will be constructive.

First of all, I must point out that "the world is turning into information" is not such a new idea, but it has by now become a fact that none can doubt.

Under the powerful influence of the mass-media, there is a risk that reality and representation can become superimposed; the necessary distinction between appearances and what is really happening is becoming increasingly difficult to make, and calls for greater care being taken by the information providers and a higher level of maturity from information consumers.

"If a tree falls down in the forest and the telecamera is not there, the tree has not fallen". To this "paradox" of Tannenbaum's we may add: but if a TV director has it fall in his programme, the tree also falls in the minds of a million viewers.

This is the central issue in our image-based civilisation. It is an issue that brings into the arena the great responsibility of all those involved in piecing messages together and circulating them. This responsibility weighs heavily on journalists in particular, but also on TV directors, programme planners and the administration.



Left.

A "bersagliere" manning the gun on an armoured troop carrier.

Above.

A parachutist using a CMP 55 parachute about to touch the ground.

In a recent "Premio Italia" speech I stressed the importance of a type of information that was not merely superficial, that did not patronise the powerful, that did not yield to arrogance or interference, but that presented the many aspects of the facts, always comparing the various approaches to them. Indeed, the influence of the media is not new, but goes far back in time; it is, so to speak, one of the earliest problems of mankind.

There is some food for thought in the fact that many historians today distinguish the various epochs in terms of the means of communication, because these means are considered to have caused, or at least encouraged, the most significant changes mankind has had to face. One example of this is the link between the rise of nationalism and new developments in printing techniques. Nor would it be possible to fully account for the

Napoleonic adventure without considering the bureaucratic machinery that used to complement the many rapid conquests with documents, laws and procedures, all dependent on the "might" of the printed word.

Even after the collapse of certain regimes (e.g. Austria-Hungary in Lombardy and Veneto and the Bourbons in the Two Sicilies), the effects of the "communications systems" they established between state and citizen lingered on, and are still reflected in the differences and even conflicts between North and South Italy.

Communications media, therefore, represent an extremely important factor in social organisation.

The daily newspaper, "La Repubblica", recently announced that: "In the age of symbols created by television and the war of images, the age of instant opinions to be consumed like fast food, Gorbachev's face is worth more to the Russians than victory in a battle and much, much more than a hundred SS20 missiles". And, according to the experts, the meeting of the Russian leader with Reagan was managed as much at the level of images as at that of actual agreements.

I have no intention of going into international politics, bound up as they are with military-strategic matters, but I cannot help feeling that, even though there is no point in pretending that images can eliminate arms, there is no doubt that responsible use of mass-media could gradually replace the balance of terror with the balance of persuasion.

This conviction of mine finds support in Umberto Cappuzzo's introduction to a feature in "Rivista Militare" dedicated to "star wars". In connexion with the risk of nuclear war, Cappuzzo had this to say: "Once again a problem is back in the political arena, namely the search for ways and means to bring about a steady



reduction of the super-powers' immense arsenals. A process of this sort depends on the creation of mutual confidence, and so information takes on as much importance as dissuasion, and both come to represent the necessary conditions for detente itself".

There is a gap for the mass-media to fill between the decisions taken by the technical experts and public opinion, which is becoming increasingly responsive thanks to

the media.

The question arising at this point is: what do we read in the papers? what do we hear on the radio? what do we see on television?

Let us begin with the printed word.

In 1983 the then editor of "Il Giorno", Guglielmo Zucconi, wrote: "The citizen has no real information, and this is also due to the fact that problems of defence filter through to him from



disagreements among the parties".

The editor of "La Stampa" is more optimistic. "There has been an undoubted improvement in the last few years", wrote Giorgio Fattori, "due to the fact that Italian newspapers have begun to specialise in defence problems, as had the major newspapers in other countries long time ago".

There are good reasons for focussing this sort of attention on the subject, considering that,

as Eugenio Scalfari wrote "while Italian industry is passing through a critical period, the armed forces are beginning to represent virtually a post-industrial force, in the sense that they are able to handle the advanced technology of computer science, telematics and wargames".

If, then, the amount of information on defence problems given by the Italian press is still insufficient, a step has, however, been taken in the right

direction as a result of the mutual attention army and press have paid to each other.

On the one hand, the various organs of information are gearing up to deal with these matters, through the increasing specialisation of journalists and the collaboration of experts, while, on the other hand, the military forces are playing their part, too. Organs of information are being produced, public relations channels are being opened up, and all this is helping to create what a military publication describes as: "an education in security, which is not only the heritage of the armed forces, but of all citizens".

And now we come to broadcasting by RAI.

In addition to reference to military problems contained in political and parliamentary reports, news about the armed forces represents a fair slice of current affairs broadcasts.

As it was such an exceptional event, I shall not dwell on the many full reports on the Italian peace contingent in Beirut. I prefer to take a "normal" period and note some of the various subjects recently dealt with: conscription; conscientious objection; opinion polls on the efficiency of the Army, Navy and Air Force; the fight against the mafia; the defence budget.

The treatment given to these and other subjects was marked by respect in two ways: on the one hand, for the dignity of the military

Italian soldiers engaged in mock combat on marshy ground. Today information on defence problems can still be considered inadequate, even though some progress has been made after the general appreciation of the fact that security education is not only necessary for the armed forces, but for every citizen.

institutions and, on the other hand, the sort of respect that the professional journalist must show in presenting facts as completely and concisely as possible, avoiding lack of clarity, which amounts to a subtle form of censorship.

Endeavouring to respect these principles, RAI has been present on every significant occasion: when the army has been called in to deal with natural disasters, for example, or reappraising important historical events, such as the war of liberation, the two world wars, or the campaign in Ethiopia. Sporting fixtures in which army teams compete are reported, as well as the displays of the "Frecce Tricolori", the aerial acrobatics team whose professional and technical prowess and sheer courage are the envy of Air Forces the world over.

The sort of message conveyed by radio and, above all, by television has seen a period of profound change, and it seems increasingly clear that when special political, civil and military commitment is called for, journalistic reporting is no longer enough. This is why military institutions and staff have had a rôle to play in entertainment programmes, which perhaps have the greatest influence on public opinion owing to the examples of attitudes and behaviour they provide.

I am thinking of programmes like "Pronto emergenza", "Caccia al ladro d'autore", "Italia in guerra", the edition of "Fantastico", "La piovra 2", "Il cugino americano", "A viso scoperto", "Il piccolo alpino".

I consider it important to list these titles because the world of entertainment – the cinema, for example – has tended to neglect the important rôle played by the armed forces, while in other countries it is an essential part of the adventure film, as well as films with a historical background.

Finally, we must mention the weather forecasts for which not only RAI, but all the mass media must thank the Air Force




for their daily, and even hourly service. Considering the great importance of meteorology for the economy, and in defending the country against natural disasters, the message transmitted to the man in the street must be clear. RAI's high-tech presentation would be useless if Air Force data processing was not rigorous enough.

So far I have mentioned the press, quoting three authoritative representatives, and I have dealt with Italian radio and television programmes. At

this point it would be useful to take a brief look at what is happening abroad; in Great Britain, for example, the Soviet Union and the United States.

• **Great Britain.** All levels of military organisation show a particular interest in the press, radio and television. This is in part to be put down to the fact that, as military service is voluntary in this country, recruitments give a measure of the general respect and consensus enjoyed by the armed forces. The project entitled "An army performing before the



eyes of the mass media" includes the setting up of an ad hoc studio, where officers can get used to microphones and telecameras, and are thus equipped to give the most satisfactory answers when interviewed by journalists, especially on the delicate issue of Northern Ireland.

• **The Soviet Union.** Radio and television are employed on a massive scale to give information about the armed forces together with large doses of ideology, and for civil defence training for the masses,

particularly geared to the eventuality of a nuclear war.

• **The United States.** Specialised offices in every sector of the Defence Department provide the armed forces with access both to the major national and international agencies and to local newspapers and broadcasting stations. This grass-roots approach means that all levels of the population are alerted to the importance of security matters.

Having presented a panorama of the Italian situation and a brief but significant

comparison with that of other countries, we can ask: can we be satisfied with the way the armed forces appear in our mass media?

Although much has been achieved, quite a lot still remains to be done. In a recent survey conducted by the second channel news service, a young officer said: "We endeavour to show our fellow citizens that we are normal people, with our own personal responsibilities. What distinguishes us is, perhaps, the fact that we all wear a uniform, but the individual inside the uniform has the same feelings as everyone else. Our relationships are necessarily subject to a hierarchy, but these feelings are there, and even lie at the base of our military service. I wish that "civvies" could understand these things".

This young officer's words bring us face to face with the problems, warning us against rash judgements or rhetorical attitudes, and suggesting that we should aim at a deeper understanding.

Both the mass media and the armed forces must offer an image that is not only the result of routine reporting, but that shows the significance of the various choices, and what their possible consequences may be. This would enable people to identify with the issue of defence and, in particular, with those who represent it. Soldiers, sailors and airmen are people

Facing page.

A gunner photographed in an M109G self-propelled howitzer.

Above.

A gunner using an optical sighting system. RAI has been present on numerous occasions in the field of defence reporting, with broadcasts ranging from historical issues to the most topical events.

like us, and public opinion readily responds to this fact; they represent a heritage in terms of humanity, training and competence, and the press, radio and television should be able to make this clear to us.

Why, then, is not more information given on what the Army, Navy and Air Force are doing today in terms of education and specialised training?

Why do we not give more thought to the fact that the armed forces are training young people for the professions of today and tomorrow?

Why not, for example, see this as part of a potential "turn-over", which could also be advantageous for industry and research?

Why not consider the young people in the armed forces a useful, reliable reserve for the demands of civilian society, now that the use of advanced technology has been introduced into many activities of the armed forces?

Not only can these questions can help to stimulate the debate that is going on in Italy, but they also need to be answered.

I have just mentioned the technological innovations that, in my opinion, bring the military organisation closer to a non-military organisation like RAI, both sharing the same sense of responsibility. And I do not think I shall be digressing if I now go into the question of telecommunications, considered by RAI of strategic importance not only for its own future, but for that of the armed forces and the country as a whole.

Five levels of activity have been identified by the experts and managers.

The **first level** is involved with the evolution of systems and changing patterns in domestic use.

The television set in the home is rapidly turning into what the experts call the "peripheral multifunction terminal". Used with videotapes,

videodisks, personal computers and various other devices, television can offer the citizen an increasing variety of services through a number of channels. These services can be reorganised by the individual to suit his needs. **Televideo** is a good example; with its 700 pages of continually up-dated electronic information, it could also give some space to the armed forces.

The **second level** is that of the cable TV networks, the scale and features of which vary according to the particular requirements. Alongside the traditional networks, which have the simple function of distributing programmes, others are coming into existence that will exploit the technical applications of optical fibres to provide a far greater range of services at extremely competitive costs.

The **other three levels** form the most fascinating chapter of our times: satellites, divided by experts into several generations.

The **first generation satellites** have already celebrated their twentieth birthday; we are indebted to them for the first world-wide communications, sporadic though they may have been.

The **second generation satellites** supply cable networks with programmes transmitted over long distances.

The **third generation** will be formed by direct-broadcasting satellites, originally designed to serve a single country, but that users over practically a whole continent will be able to pick up. In conjunction with these, new systems will be employed, such as improved quality, high resolution television, both used with multilingual audio.

RAI is very much involved in this field.

Between the end of '87 and the beginning of '88 the "Olympus" satellite will be launched into geostationary orbit. This satellite is being developed by the ESA syndicate, in which Italian participation,



both financial and technical, is quite high (32%). RAI will use both channels; one exclusively, the other through the European Broadcasting Union.

Programme plans follow two main guidelines: to use the satellite not only for extremely spectacular programmes with



international appeal, but to broadcast them with standards of high definition. This has been the subject of fruitful experimentation in which Italy has played a leading rôle.

To consolidate the results of "Olympus", immediate approval must be accorded to the

subsequent project, which is to be entirely Italian.

Any slackness or delay in this truly strategic field implies the risk of a proliferation of initiatives that – in a very delicate international context – will lack the fundamental requisite of reciprocity.

"Lagunari" of the "Serenissima" battalion on drill.

Unlike the cable system, which enables the circuits to be limited and rigorously controlled, the satellite system by its very nature ignores national frontiers. It would be most hazardous to let the system develop in an uncontrolled fashion. This is why an organic initiative based on mutual exchanges must immediately be planned at an international level, based on mutual exchanges, and not left to chance initiatives taken by some interested party.

Telematics, advanced technology, computer science, teletext, satellites: all show that the year 2000 is just round the corner. In fourteen years we shall be into the twenty-first century: we are in a phase of transition, on the brink of the "information society", a society open to radically different developments that can change the customary balance, the ways of working and producing, and the organisation of society itself.

Many expect telecommunications to occupy a central position in these changes: all the threads of history and communications technology, which today appear to be inextricably interwoven, will slowly become disentangled and be given well-defined rôles within a system.

Given this extraordinary prospect, I can confidently assert that the interests of the young are quite clear, as is the imperative not to fail in the enterprise. This holds good, I am convinced, both for the young people who are attending university today and for those studying in military academies.

We must go towards the year 2000 fully prepared, and not isolated!

This is why, in my capacity of General Director of RAI, I find it quite natural to recommend a united approach to proceed in full respect of the particular aims and methods of a military organisation on the one hand, and of a civilian organisation on the other.

With regard to the short term, I should like to make three points.

The first concerns technological innovation.

I am sure that the flexibility of structures and the multiplicity of services involved in the new media will provide opportunities for exchanges of information and initiatives leading to fruitful collaboration.

The second is related to training.

The armed forces' schools are highly trained in the theoretical and practical preparation of young people who must face the future not only as members of the armed forces, but also as citizens equipped with high professional standards in the leading sectors.

RAI takes particular interest in the matter, and, as we consider staff training to be of fundamental importance, we have developed a project for a School for re-qualification and refresher courses, employing the most modern methods.

Comparison with military schools would be extremely

useful for us, and we look forward to receiving the contribution of the instructors.

The third point arises from a proposal I made on the occasion of "Premio Italia": yearly campaigns, the organization of which should be adapted from year to year in the most suitable way to achieve the particular aim, and the whole programme being based on the principles of cooperation, sense of direction and commitment to social standards.

Looking back over some of the fields I mentioned on that occasion – the struggle against drugs and alcoholism, ecological education, prevention of juvenile delinquency and re-habilitation of the young delinquent, encouraging responsible behaviour in the stadiums – it becomes immediately clear that in all cases the armed forces have a potential rôle. We could certainly achieve better results





if we combined our efforts, and I have no doubt that we shall meet with a serious, apt and concrete response.

CONCLUSION

When I was offered the privilege of dealing with this theme, my mind ran back twenty years into the past: to November 4th 1966, to be precise.

I was then in charge of the television news service, and just before the evening edition went on the air I was viewing on the scenes of two highly topical events: the flood in Florence and the war in Vietnam. Both "fronts" offered a terrible spectacle, and on both "fronts" the armed forces were in action.

Presenting these two events, geographically so far apart the one from the other, but brought so close by television, made me think how much could have been done if all the might

of the military machinery in Vietnam could have been "magically" transformed into aid to the soldiers at work in Florence.

Obviously it was just a thought, a "dream" if you like, because the organisation of the armed forces could never be entirely turned to the pursuit of civil objectives, just as we can not ignore the fact that defence is among the most essential objectives that any country has to attend to.

But I cannot get away from the idea that television, radio and the mass media in general can help us to pick out those common aims for us to channel all our resources towards, in the name of peace and progress.

With such an attitude, it is not at all difficult to offer the citizen the real image of his fellow soldier-citizen.

Facing page.

An "alpino" of the "Cuneense" Tactical Group belonging to the AMF, the NATO mobile land forces.


Above.

A 105/14 airborne artillery piece ready for action against armoured vehicles.




Biagio Agnes

industrial cooperation



between
the countries
of western europe



DEVELOPMENT POSSIBILITIES

THE EIGHTIES

The world economy in the Eighties is going through a period of far-reaching structural change, brought about mainly by technology.

The source of this change is the market of the industrial countries, where most of the high technology products are produced and consumed. It is estimated that in the OECD area (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), the industries which generate the most innovation (electronics, information technology, telecommunications, fine chemicals and pharmaceuticals) – which account for between 6% and 7% of the GNP on average – have contributed at least 15%–18% of overall development during the past decade.

However, let me say at once that the spinoffs of the rapid and intense technological progress currently taking place cut across all industries, including the traditional, or mature industries, particularly in terms of process innovation. Innovation also seems likely to have worldwide ramifications, fostering the introduction of new production techniques even in the developing world, creating a new international division of labour, the extent of which is as yet impossible to predict.

Left.

The Selenia-Spazio Integration Centre.

Right.

Launching of the "Ariane" rocket. Aerospace, nuclear energy, robotics, telecommunications and biotechnology are areas of innovation in which the European countries must work together on a Community basis if they are to keep their economies on a par with the United States and Japan.




TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIAL AGREEMENTS

In the industrialized countries, the quickening pace of technological change is proving extremely costly in R&D terms and for investment. It requires considerable financial resources to be invested under conditions of great uncertainty (against the general economic background of lower growth), and the payback period is becoming increasingly shorter because of the very speed of the innovation process.

Hence the advisability for companies to enter into technology agreements, because where this solution is not the only one available, it is always preferable to the alternative of acquiring knowhow by going it alone. In addition to this is the need to be able to operate on sufficiently large markets and to enter into trading agreements that will ensure a full return on the short-term investment that is essential in a time of rapid obsolescence, and to reduce research expenses as a proportion of turnover.

This makes it necessary to enter into *financial* agreements, which partly accounts for the larger number of company acquisitions and takeovers, amalgamations and mergers.

It was after the second energy crisis that the phenomenon of mergers and takeovers began to appear in the United States, fostered in many industries by deregulation policies and low share prices. After that, it spread to the other Western countries, mainly as a means of procuring the knowhow and market share of the company with which the financial transaction was made.



INTERNATIONALIZATION AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT


All this gave companies a great boost to internationalize their operations, creating closer economic interpenetration between countries in technological, commercial and financial terms. It was mainly the large corporations and national Governments which gave this process its impetus, in view of the rôle that the country, as a system, plays in fostering innovation and accumulation through government procurement and the provision of soft loans and other incentives.

In an internationalization system increasingly based on capital movements and company acquisitions (in which commodity export flows play an important, although secondary, rôle), government development strategies are designed far more to boost the worldwide ongoing accumulation and innovation process than to defend domestic markets. At all events, the implementation of these policies does not always reach the minimum dimensions needed to achieve what they set out to do. And this applies not only to small and poor countries, but also to the countries of Western Europe.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE THREE MAIN AREAS (United States, Japan, Europe).

The tendencies that I have just referred to are radically changing the industrial power relations between the three main economic areas – the United States, Japan and Europe.

The main strengths of the U.S. and Japan, where industry is largely made up of multinational, large companies and corporate groups, are the large domestic market, a large government procurement demand (which plays a locomotive rôle in the advanced sectors), aggressive industrial policies (in Japan, mainly), and large and efficient unitary



capital markets. All these are conditions that are giving both countries competitive advantages and a technological lead in many industries.



EUROPE

Europe's potential is no smaller than the other two areas, all in all, particularly as far as the size of the internal market is concerned. It is the world's largest market in terms of the economy, financial resources, and development potential of the new technologies. But the internal market is not a unitary market, not even within the EEC itself, because while there are some industries (such as steel, or motor cars, etc.) in which a common market has been set up, this is not the case with a great many others, which are often the most innovative, such as telecommunications, in which public procurement plays a dominant rôle, or in which technical standards or regulations are imposed, creating non-tariff barriers to protect national industries.

Neither is the capital market integrated. In many countries, capital movements are subject to restrictions and controls. There is also a lack of agreement between countries on questions of general economic policy, and particularly on industrial policy.

Each country does its own thing in the industrial field, defensively looking after its own national interests, both when supporting mature industries that are in trouble because of productive over-capacity or inadequate productivity, and when setting about developing an autonomous national technological capacity in advanced sectors.

Upper left.

The CERN bubble chamber, Geneva.

Lower left.

Oil-tanker under construction in a Japanese shipyard.

THE SHORTCOMINGS IN EUROPE'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY

The result is that even though the European countries spend almost as much on research and innovation as the US, and no less than Japan, Europe has failed to develop new sectors with the same speed and the same degree of success as the other two areas, with comparable spinoffs on the rest of the industrial production system.

Being unable to establish their hold individually on the international market, and burdened down by sociological difficulties and the low profitability of large corporations, European countries have bled themselves dry implementing their policy to hold on to crisis-ridden sectors in order to try to obviate, or reduce, the social cost of recovery by passing it on to others. By so doing, they have squandered the resources that should have been spent on developing advanced technologies.

Take European steel as an example: in a single decade, over 50,000 billion lire have been spent on subsidies, writing off corporate losses and indirect charges.

But the damage done by this policy has not been financial alone. The United States and Japan have been pushing through a tough industrial renewal policy and, above all, they have introduced innovation in advanced industries in which they have created 15 million and 3.3 million new jobs, respectively, in ten years. While all this was going on, Europe's unemployment was growing,

precisely when it was going all-out to protect existing jobs, come what may.

THE RECOVERY OF EUROPE THROUGH COOPERATION

In view of these eloquent results, European countries now have to find new ways of cooperating in order to reverse the present trend. It is the fragmentation of decision-making that constitutes the main cause of the present disarray. The fact is that Europe is the only market run by ten different governments.

A strategy to revive the European economy must therefore be based on trying to find a more incisive rôle for the Community authorities, and on a policy for industrial cooperation between countries.

Such a common European strategy must contain measures to rationalize branches of industry that are still afflicted by surplus production capacity, or which are no longer able to compete on the international markets; to foster innovation in industries in which Europe can sustain a high international competitive edge; to implement largescale innovative projects in research-intensive sectors; and to unify the internal market, particularly for technology-intensive products which depend very heavily on government procurement.

THE "MATURE INDUSTRIES"

As far as the first set of problems are concerned, (rationalizing the mature industries) one only has to think of textiles, or shipbuilding – where the Community has imposed rules to restrict the rights of member States to take unilateral measures. But it is particularly the steel industry which stands out, with the delays and the reluctance to introduce the measures needed to revive the industry which eventually had to be imposed by the EEC Commission to cut back

production capacity, sharing out the necessary sacrifices among all the member countries.

Plant shutdowns, market regulation measures, corporate support schemes and other measures adopted so far have helped to weaken the dogged resistance of individual countries wishing to shore up their national steel industries willy-nilly, and the Community steel market is now better balanced than before.


Yet these measures cannot be considered adequate in themselves, and the Commission is likely to demand further cutbacks in production capacity, mostly from companies that have not yet been streamlined, at a time when the largest Community corporations seem incapable of making manufacturing and trading agreements that will enable them to implement the measures needed to rationalize their plants.

INNOVATIVE SECTORS IN WHICH EUROPE IS COMPETITIVE

In the technologically advanced sectors, Europe is certainly as strong as the other two areas.

The nuclear energy, pharmaceuticals, robotics, aerospace, telecommunications and perhaps biotechnology industries need to be developed on a Community scale if Europe's international competitiveness is to be maintained, and if it is to keep up with the United States and Japanese economies.

Telecommunications, for example, are going through the delicate phase of the changeover from electromechanical to electronic switching, and in the immediate future, the European market can offer the same opportunities as the American market, from which the large telecommunications multinationals draw their strength. But this can only be done provided that government procurement policies do not set



up protectionist barriers around the national industries. They must enter into appropriate agreements to meet their needs in terms of technologies, research, size thresholds, marketing networks and controlled access (in the case of components manufactures, for example).

AN EXAMPLE OF COMPANY-LEVEL EUROPEAN COOPERATION

A first step in this direction was taken with the agreement between the Italian IRI-STET Group (through its telecommunications equipment companies) and the French CIT Alcatel company, which have since been joined by the German Siemens A.G. company and the British Plessey.

Under this agreement, these companies will set up identical "user links" in their electronic exchanges. The next stage in the cooperation plan could be the

joint development of the next generation of telephone exchanges scheduled for the end of the decade. These agreements are of major importance, because between them, the four companies account for about 70% of the European market and 26% of the world market.

EUROPE'S ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY GAP

It is in the information technology sector that Europe is still lagging far behind, in the fields of advanced microelectronics and computer hardware.

This gap is very dangerous, because the competitiveness of other sectors could be jeopardized due to the inter-industrial spread of innovation.

It is estimated that electronics has a decisive relevance to 80% of the output from the Western industrialized countries.



In the particular case of semiconductors, which are vitally important electronic components for a wide range of apparatus and systems, Europe's share of world consumption fell from 27% to 17% between 1976 and 1984. The drop in Europe's share of sales was even steeper: from 20% to 10%. If we then look at even more advanced technologies, such as MOS integrated circuits and high density memories, Europe's share is totally insignificant: less than 5% for MOS integrated circuits, and virtually negligible for high density memories.

EUROPEAN CORPORATE COOPERATION IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES

In the short-medium term, it will not be possible to narrow the gap described above. However, it is now dawning on companies, governments and

Community institutions that industrial cooperation is necessary.

It is true that many European companies have a wide range of agreements with Japanese and American companies, because they are considerably ahead of Europe in terms of innovation.

But while these agreements are a step in the right direction, they do not go far enough, because the technologies procured under them are mature technologies which can narrow the gap, but not bridge it completely.

To do this, European companies need to invest heavily. Hence the importance of agreements of the kind made between Nixdorf (West Germany) and Ferranti (UK), or between SGS (IRI-STET Group, Italy) and Ericsson (Sweden), and above all, between Philips (Netherlands) – Europe's largest manufacturer – and Siemens (West Germany). Under the last-mentioned agreement, the Dutch and

German governments will make a financial contribution to the joint scheme to produce a new generation of memories – which is without any doubt the area that is currently spearheading the microelectronics industry today – with investments of around 2,000 billion lire.

COMMUNITY COOPERATION: THE ESPRIT PROJECT

One of the outstanding examples of European cooperation for the promotion of major innovative projects was the decision taken by the Community in February 1984 to launch the *Esprit* project, which is designed to enable Europe to narrow the technology gap with the United States and Japan. Member States' companies will conduct research projects in various areas of relevance to electronics, such as advanced microelectronics (LSI circuitry), software technologies, office automation, plant automation, artificial intelligence, and systems architecture. The project is scheduled to cover ten years, in two five-year stages, with Community financing for the first 5-year period worth 750 million ECU. Since the Community is financing 50% of the research costs, that means that the aggregate expenditure will be 1,500 million ECU.

Less than two years after its launching, there are about 180 contracts covering the various R&D sectors and themes of the *Esprit* programme, involving 1,300 research workers.

COMMUNITY PROJECTS UNDER STUDY


As envisaged in the memorandum adopted last June by the European Council in

Facing page.

Robots welding car bodies on an assembly line.

Above.

Molten steel being drawn off at a blast furnace.



Milan entitled "Towards a Technological Community", the Commission is studying a number of important issues to make a major step forward in the scientific and technological fields, which will form the basis of specific proposals during 1986 and early 1987. They include:

- information technologies (microelectronics, large capacity computers, artificial intelligence and applications such as automated integrated manufacturing and office systems);
- communications technologies in the fields of both telecommunications and advanced transportation systems;
- the use of space (telecommunications, remote sensing and industrial applications);
- industrial technologies (such as lasers, new materials, CAD/CAM, etc.).


THE EUREKA PROJECT

When speaking about European intergovernmental industrial cooperation, one immediately thinks of the Eureka project which was put forward by France and launched last July, with the participation of other European countries and the EEC Commission.

Eureka is a non-military research programme, although there will probably be military spinoffs. It covers a wide range of advanced technologies: EDP, telecommunications, robotics, new materials and biotechnologies.

The programme is still being defined, to identify the projects and the companies which are interested in taking part, and to decide on the ways of financing and managing it.

However, it is hoped that the countries which are interested in it will not waste this chance to stimulate the internationalization of technological research on a



European scale, fostering schemes that could promote alliances between the various companies involved.

Eureka could provide a chance to implement specific major long-term projects, which will have an impact on a number of different sectors, military, telecommunications, integrated transportation, energy, the exploitation of the sea – all sectors in which government agencies are the customers and the ones who decide on the market size and the pace of innovation.

FINAL REMARKS

Europe certainly has a major trump card on its side: the Community market taken as a whole.

With the relaxing of customs barriers, this market has been attacked, unifying the demand side, and the main beneficiaries have been firms supplying commodities in general demand, such as consumer durables, semi-finished products, and capital goods for small and medium firms.

But for the industries that rely on government contracts (defence, transport infrastructure, energy, health care) the unification of the market is taking an extremely long time.

For this reason the minimum thresholds were not reached, precisely in those industries in which the thresholds were higher and had to be reached all the more quickly, namely, in the market for products incorporating advanced technologies of strategic importance in some sectors which would benefit the whole of the economic

Upper left.


Detail of a rolling mill.

Lower left.

Forging press.

Above.

A Personal Computer used by ENEA to design energy-saving schemes for private homes.



system in the long run.

Efforts to take concerted action, mainly in the form of government tenders have been tried out by the only country – France – which deliberately pursued a policy of technological excellence, backed by huge public funding. But the objectives of the other countries, each looking after their own interests, did not lead to any agreement, save in a few specific sectors, such as aerospace.

Neither was there a tradition of multinational corporations in Europe that could unify these efforts. Paradoxically, the only corporations that were potentially able to link up were the national subsidiaries of American multinationals (IBM and ITT, to quote two of the best known cases). But even though they did link up, they were guided by strategies designed abroad to use, rather than to create European markets.

This war of nationalisms has had repercussions mainly


on standards, precisely because the attempts made by each national manufacturer to lay down his own standards and impose them on the rest (or to reject American standards, under the misconception that this would help protect the national market) create further barriers, in addition to the nationalisms of public demand.

In the final analysis, the unification of the market from the demand side has proven a failure for the advanced technologies.

But there are signs ahead – not many, but they are growing, and that in itself is significant – that the market can be unified on the supply side.

Paradoxically, these signs relate more to evolved technology sectors, and not mature technology sectors.

These signs are the production of common parts, the definition of alternative standards (how much more has been achieved by American deregulation and the emergence




Left.

Precision control with automated systems using laser, video and computer technologies.

Below.

An image obtained using the Czcs (Coastal zone colour scanner) to study the marine environment.



of AT&T compared with what the Europeans have been able to agree upon!), and joint product development agreements (and not just research agreements carried through in a pool under the aegis of the Community).

There is still a long way to go, and there are so many hurdles, of which the most important is the rising rate of unemployment, particularly among young people. Because of these difficulties, individual Governments are not focussing their resources on reaching critical levels in the advanced sectors, but allocating them to prop up the domestic demand in mature sectors.

The only way out, then, is for companies to unify the supply. It is a path to be pursued with great determination, and the Community authorities could do much to encourage progress along it.

But it is a path that companies have to take, armed with joint production agreements and alliances, without counting on public procurement from individual governments. This will follow only if the products come into being, and if they are European technology products, manufactured in different countries by national companies, as the result of a joint effort in the design, research and development phases.

Romano Prodi



RIVISTA MILITARE EUROPEA



Supplemento alla edizione inglese
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Maggio-Giugno 1986

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THE RAPID



INTERVENTION FORCE


AFTER FoPI..... FIR

FOPI and FIR are purposely placed side by side, since this allows to make clear from the beginning that, although the same terminology is used for both, the two forces are completely different and set up for absolutely diverse purposes.


The Ready Intervention Force (FOPI), in fact, was established in 1983 essentially for social requirements (5th joint mission), in order to give more incisiveness to the Armed Forces' participation in rescue operations in the event of disasters (an article by Brig. Gen. Lusa on FOPI has been published on the 2/86 issue of Rivista Militare, English Edition).

The Rapid Intervention Force (FIR) is, on the contrary, a newly-born creature, whose existence is justified by the need to give credibility to the defence of our peninsular and insular territory. It tends, therefore, to meet an operational requirement, and its location is mainly within the 4th joint mission, which is actually charged with the Defence of the Territory.


In fact, the inadequate availability of units to be destined to this specific task makes it necessary to keep at hand a complex force able to rush to any area of the national territory and to integrate with the local defence in order to contrast any outside attack. The necessity is all the more felt if one considers that the event could take place at a moment when it is impossible to divert forces from the Northeastern Theatre and when the mobilized forces are not yet available.





RAPID INTERVENTION FORCE



4th JOINT MISSION



5th JOINT MISSION



The essential characteristic of FIR is therefore its high mobility – both tactical and strategic – which permits the timely conveyance of the Force's components to the threatened areas.

It is easy to understand that, once such an instrument is established for "internal use",

any other international commitment (within the framework, for example, of peacekeeping operations) can be met with greater ease, counting on pre-organized and on especially trained units.

We can say, then, that FIR meets two types of operational requirements: the first, of the

highest priority, is distinctly national (4th joint mission); the second is essentially outward-bound (5th joint mission), albeit in a subordinate position.

In more explicit terms, FIR's operational options of employment are:

- intervention on the whole national territory – as a



complement to the territorial defence forces – for a timely containment of the enemy action and to create the conditions for an eventual retrieval of occupied territories.

The intervention (especially in the small islands) can take place – in situations of tension or crisis – also for deterrence

purposes;

- the creation of a security and/or interposition truce force, based on bi/multilateral agreements;

- the provision, with the agreement of the nation concerned, of a security framework during the evacuation of Italian communities

threatened by conflictual situations escaping the local Government's control.


High mobility, both tactical and strategic, is a typical characteristic of FIR, enabling the force to carry out timely all-around interventions. The photo shows a G-222 tactical transport aircraft.

COMPOSITION OF FIR



"COMMAND" MODULE

- Commander (Army General)
- Joint Staff




"LAND FORCES" MODULE

- Cbt. support bn.  
- Tactical support   




"NAVAL/AMPHIBIOUS FORCES" MODULE

- Transport & landing units 
- "S. Marco" Operational Group 



"AIR TRANSPORT" MODULE

- Transport airplanes  
- EM/ETM helicopters  

A detailed analysis of these options of employment shows the convenience of possessing a modular instrument, which should permit to create – through the appropriate combination of the individual components – the most suitable structure for accomplishing the assigned task.

In practice, FIR includes:

- a joint "Command" module (the only ex-novo component, albeit of a reduced size), with the task of planning and coordinating the training activities of the earmarked units. In operations, the FIR Command avails itself of a Signal Corps support from the 11th "Leonessa" Signal Battalion. Contingent reasons, mostly based on the locations of most units, have advised to base the FIR Command in Florence, within the Tuscany – Emilia Regional Military Command, which gives logistic and administrative support to the Force;

The employment of highly specialized units tends to give FIR a high level of operational efficiency, proportionate to its tasks.

In the picture, elements of the "San Marco" Battalion disembarking from an LVTP-7 tracked amphibious vehicle.



IL BATTESIMO UFFICIALE DELLA «FOIR»

In Italia una Forza di intervento rapido

ROMA — «La forza di intervento rapido (Foir) è un complesso di uomini interforze dotati di elevata mobilità tattica e strategica in grado di intervenire tempestivamente in qualsiasi zona d'Italia, o anche all'estero — soprattutto nell'area mediterranea — in ausilio a forze tradizionali operanti in loco. Questo contributo dell'Italia al mantenimento della pace viene attuato innanzitutto con la difesa del territorio nazionale»: con queste parole il capo dello stato maggiore dell'esercito, generale Luigi Poli, ha commentato ieri mattina nel poligono di Monte Romano, in provincia di Viterbo, il battesimo ufficiale della Foir nel corso di un'esercitazione della sua componente terrestre.

La forza di intervento rapido, circa diecimila uomini, è infatti costituita, per l'esercito, da sette battaglioni con relativi supporti tattici e logistici (dalle brigate paracadutisti «Folgore» e motorizzata «Friuli» e da due gruppi di elicotteri da trasporto dal primo raggruppamento «Antares» (dell'aviazione leggera). Da Viterbo alla Marina, c'è una componente navale-anfibia (unità trasporto, sbarco e operativo) del battaglione San Marco).

Dall'aeronautica è assicurato il trasporto aereo con la quarantaseiesima aerobrigata.



Il gen. Giorgio Malorgio, cui è affidato il comando interforze della nuova unità di intervento rapido (Foto Afg)

ta. Il comando interforze è affidato all'esercito (al generale Giorgio Malorgio), mentre il comando operativo è riservato allo stato maggiore della difesa.

La Foir, alla quale sono affidati compiti puramente operativi, mira a neutralizzare eventuali colpi di mano di forze straniere sul territorio nazionale, facendo soprattutto leva sulla tendenza legata all'immediatezza dell'intervento.

Il successivo ruolo di supporto alle forze in loco colloca la Foir nel complesso quadro della difesa del territorio in corso già da due anni con la costituzione della Fopi, la Forza di pronto intervento, nata per affrontare, con unità interforze, alluvioni, terremoti, calamità naturali in genere. Anche per la Fopi massima rapidità di intervento legata ad alta specializzazione operativa.

- a "land forces" module, centred on the combat battalions and the combat and logistic support units of the "Friuli" motorized Brigade and the "Folgore" paratroop Brigade;
- a "naval/amphibious forces" module, consisting of the "San Marco" Battalion's Operational Group plus Navy transport ships and landing-craft;
- an "air transport" module, which includes the transport airplanes of the 46th Air Brigade

and the multi-rôle and medium transport helicopters of the Army Aviation's 1st "Antares" Group.

For particular missions, FIR can obviously avail itself of naval and air cooperation both for its protection during transfers and for fire support.

It can be noted that the FIR's composition is sufficiently wide and diversified, so as to allow the constitution of instruments geared to the particular tasks.

For its military employment, FIR is subordinate to the

Defence Chief of Staff, who holds the "operational command" and delegates the "operational control" to the Commander of the Military Region concerned in case of a national necessity, or to the FIR Commander himself for extranational tasks.

During its first year, the FIR's activity will mainly be aimed at setting up valid plans for all the identified options of employment, and developing a specific training focused on the Force's foreseeable tasks.

In this perspective, it is most important to perfect the capability to operate with a joint spirit, in order to achieve a satisfactory degree of readiness and reactivity. At the same time — in the equipment sector — a large programme of modernization and strengthening of all FIR units must be studied and implemented, in order to grant them a high degree of efficiency, proportionate to the importance and delicacy of their tasks.

In conclusion, FIR was born without great efforts because preexisting structures have been used, with the exception of the new Command. Nevertheless, it has only walked a few steps along a rather long and winding road. It has been "unofficially" presented on December 16, 1985, on the occasion of a specific exercise in the Monteromano range. Actually it was not a real FIR exercise, since there were only Army forces, and their size was rather limited. The test — as it has more appropriately been called — was made with the "outward" purpose of drawing the general attention to the FIR problem, as well as with the "inner" aim of giving the "air baptism" to some units which up to then had been kept earthbound.

There will be no lack of opportunities to see — rather soon — something more complex and complete.

Col. Angelo Sion

ANTITERRORISM

THE MANAGEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS



Next to the traditional forms of violence, international terrorism has lately been developing new techniques based on blackmail, following the capture and detention of hostages.

With increased frequency, we witness terroristic actions, such as plane hijackings or seizure of buildings, which actually aim at holding, as hostages, people that happen to be there, in view of obtaining various results. When these events occur, one is bound — led by an instinctive reaction

caused by the insistent action of the mass media — to immediately think of an intervention of special units, which would solve the situation. All the more that the terms "leather heads", "Delta Force" etc. have been — right or wrong — acquired by today's language.

As a matter of fact, in an antiterrorism operation, the armed intervention is only one of the possible solutions, and the last among them. In fact a terroristic action of the type we are discussing (for brevity

we will refer to it as an "incident") must be managed through negotiations, in order to reach a negotiated solution first of all, and help a possible action of force, in view of guaranteeing at any cost a maximum level of security and safety for the hostages. It can be indeed affirmed that an action of force cannot take place without previous negotiations and preparations which, owing to the connections entailed, are neither in the sphere nor among the possible duties of the operational units.

In the last years, international terrorism has developed new techniques based on blackmail, following the capture and detention of hostages.

An example of this took place on April 30, 1980 in London, where six armed men broke into the Iranian Embassy, seizing twenty-six hostages, two of whom were murdered by the terrorists, who were all killed, on May 5, during the attack launched against the Embassy by the Special Air Service (SAS).

The success of the operation was largely due to the close cooperation between the SAS operational unit and a "committee" of experts, headed by the British Home Secretary.

The photo shows an hostage fleeing the Iranian Embassy.



The picture below describes the phases of the assault:

1. A microphone is lowered through a chimney to control the terrorists.
2. The SAS assault force coming down in pairs.
3. The first pair rushes through the back entrance, throwing a deafening bomb, and moves to the main stairway through the hall, shooting a terrorist.
4. The second pair enters through the first-floor balcony, firing at a terrorist in the ambassador's office.
5. The SAS climb the stairs and shoot a terrorist.
6. The SAS throw a deafening bomb into the chargé d'affaires' office.
7. A soporific-gas container is thrown into the room where the hostages are held.
8. The SAS men enter the teletype room, shoot two terrorists and free the hostages.

Therefore the management requires the organization of specialized personnel, who, like the operational units, should be in a condition to act with great timeliness and efficiency when a crisis occurs.

As this organization demands of its members an outstanding technical qualification and a continuous and limitless availability of time, it should not coincide with the State Leadership, but rather be a supporting connecting element for a specific need, together with the other State bodies involved.

THE ATTACK AGAINST THE IRANIAN EMBASSY



In the following pages we shall describe a possible model of such organization, in order to verify in which context a possible intervention with force could be framed. With this intent, we shall be considering first the objectives and goals of the management of an "incident" and, subsequently, the model itself, in its components, with their respective functions. We shall close with the modalities and times of the most important operations within this action.

MANAGEMENT OF THE INCIDENT

In the management of an incident, the greatest difficulty is represented by the need to safeguard the hostages, whose survival, on the other hand, can be threatened at any moment by their captors.

The dangerousness of the hostages' situation affects every rescue initiative and, in equal general conditions, it influences the terrorists' attitude. The risk grows when they perceive that a menace could neutralize – by freeing the hostages – the purposes of their action, and is mostly emphasized in case of an action of force, since this can succeed only if the terrorists are restrained from carrying out any kind of reaction. It follows that anyhow one must try to find a solution through negotiations, while prearranging a possible armed intervention, to be carried out if the counterpart adopts a haphazardly violent behaviour, which could justify the risks of the intervention itself, or if an exceptionally favourable occasion occurs.

Within this framework and in order to control the incident, one needs a body (which will

be called "committee") in a position to technically manage the crisis, with the task of planning and guiding the negotiations and coordinating the organizations concerned, thus enabling the Government Authorities to decide a viable course.

In order to outline the composition of the committee we shall now examine its already mentioned functions.

Negotiations are the fundamental element of the management. It is in fact most important to get in touch, because, without dialogue, there is no alternative but the employment of force, and also because talks can be useful to understand the purpose of the action and to consequently plan an appropriate reaction. The main goal is doubtlessly that of convincing the terrorists to desist, "bargaining" and discussing their requests –



trying at least to reduce them to acceptable dimensions – and granting the immediate ones, based on the terrorists' behaviour and the hostages' conditions. Meanwhile, by analyzing the conversations, it becomes possible to identify the group to which the terrorists belong and thence deduce their political or religious creed and consequently the degree of fanaticism or determination, as well as the methods employed in previous actions and the type of weapons and explosives at their disposal. Moreover, we can obtain information about the setup and condition of the group, especially on its psychophysical conditions. This information is needed in order to manage the negotiations, adjusting terms and tones to the situation, also by applying political and diplomatic pressures on the group leaders.

In short, negotiations permit to control the situation, avoiding its deterioration until an agreement – or a time favourable to an armed intervention – is reached. It is also evident that time is not on the terrorists' side.

The committee's second function is the coordination of all the organs involved in the event, of its constitutive elements and of all the actions undertaken during the management of the incident. This action concerns Agencies and staffs that are quite different from each other as regards background, activity and mode of operation, and it must be carried out without interruption as long as the crisis lasts, i.e. for a period that cannot be predetermined. In order to accomplish this task, the committee must operate in

close connection with the State Leadership and, at the same time, at the place of the incident, where only the presence of specialized elements, accustomed to work within the committee, can ensure the constant control of the situation. Therefore, a section must be mobile, a fact that presupposes the availability of reliable connections, autonomous and technically adequate to the foreseeable needs.

The third remaining function to be considered is the advice and the technical support that the committee must give to the Government, which is obviously the body which must decide the solution to be adopted. This function is the real purpose of the organization and is considered last because it is accomplished through the activities carried out in the context of the other functions.

In this rôle, the committee can be compared to the General Staff of a Headquarters, which evaluates the terms of the operational problems, introduces the enemy's foreseeable actions and its own line of action, performs the ensuing organizational activities and issues the orders to the executive organs according to the Commander's decision: an organ of managerial and executive support, therefore, but devoid of decisional competence.

ORGANIZATION OF THE MANAGEMENT

From the picture outlined above it emerges that the management of an incident requires a throughout and specialized organization, which can neither be improvised on an emergency nor be predisposed and assembled only when the crisis occurs. In substance, not only must the members of the staff have an individual preparation, but they must also be accustomed to teamwork and must know their own

capabilities as well as the operative possibilities of the task units.


Going back again to the comparison made before, between the committee's functions and those pertaining to a General Staff, we can take the model of an operational Command as reference also as regards the structural organization, given the analogy of the operational needs.

According to this reasoning, the composition of the committee ought to be limited to the indispensable elements, also in view of alternating the personnel, in order to guarantee a continuity of function and an immediate reaction in case of incident. Therefore we can foresee the participation of representatives of the Departments involved and technical experts in the various fields of the management; a part of these experts, comparable to an advanced tactical Command, should be prepared to be detached for operation on the site of the crisis.

Among the first, there should be representatives from the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Transportation and Defence Ministries, each with organizational, executive and liaison functions, which we are going to describe:

- "Official of the Minister of the Interior", charged with the tasks concerning public order and the liaison between the Ministry itself and the local Authorities of the place where the incident occurred, if it is on the national territory. Moreover, he must coordinate the Police forces and activate, if necessary, other available State corps, keeping in touch with their respective Departments. Considering the complexity and importance of the information aspect in this activity, an element of the Intelligence department should work with the abovementioned official, both for managing his specific sector and for keeping the necessary contacts with the national and foreign

Unsolved social, political and religious problems of minorities and discriminated-against groups are often fertile ground for terrorism. In the picture, a Belfast young man throws a stone at the police in Falls Road, a town area peopled prevalently by Catholics.



The Army intervening in a Belfast street during a riot. In the small photo, soldiers carrying out a perquisition after a terrorist attack.

operational unit. Moreover, until the unit is conveyed to the troubled area, he must provide information support for the planning of the intervention.

The group of technical experts should include the elements listed below together with their respective tasks:

- "Expert in potentially terroristic groups and movements", charged with the task of finding out, through the clues picked up from the terrorists' behaviour, the groups to which they belong, and check the accuracy of their possible claims. As we have already said, this is a most important function, for it can be of great help in discovering the terrorists' strong and weak points; in this capacity, the expert is the committee's intelligence element. His action will be all the more effective if he is able to avail himself of a computerized data bank about the terrorist movements;

- "Psychology expert", for analyzing and evaluating the terrorists' behaviour, foreseeing their psychological endurance and reactions. In particular, from their attitude he must find out the themes that might be introduced, moment by moment, in the negotiations, and give his advice on how to deal with the terrorists;

- "Speaker", spokesman of the committee, capable of using the tone suitable to the circumstances and to the development of events: the convincing power of the arguments depends on how they are introduced. It could be the psychology expert himself; nevertheless another element would be desirable, possibly an interpreter of the languages currently used in international relations;

- "Expert in the employment of special units", charged with

intelligence departments;

- "Foreign Affairs Official", for the aspects of the incident that concern other countries involved. It is a multifaceted function that includes various activities, such as requesting authorizations for sending forces to other countries (if the incident is aimed against a national carrier on foreign territory), requesting information and operational support or asking the authorities to veto the intervention of foreign forces. His activities include, moreover, the relations with the foreign security forces and finally the

possible direct or indirect contacts with the terrorist organization concerned;

- "Transportation Official" – if the terrorist act concerns a carrier – charged with the task of providing the timely availability and adaptation of the structures that have been – or could be – involved in the incident, as well as providing the vehicles needed for the operation;

- "Defence Official" for liaison with his Ministry and to keep it constantly informed about the situation, and be informed in his turn about the state of readiness and availability of the

Launching teargas grenades to dispel a mob.

the task of contributing to the analysis of the situation, especially as regards the operational aspects, and evaluating the risks of an armed intervention in the prevailing situation. Moreover, he must suggest the information requirements to the Psychology expert and the Speaker, and turn into information the data acquired during the negotiations. This task is usually carried out by the Commander of the operational unit; failing this, it should be in any case a man from that force, familiar with the possibilities and needs of the unit.

Lastly, we should consider the Head of the committee who, due to his preparation and specific experience, should have a charismatic rôle within the committee itself. Among the desired parameters, and prescinding from his Ministry of origin and his military or civilian status, priority should be given to experience and the possibility to retain the appointment over a long period, in order to ensure the continuity of the management.

Moreover, the committee needs a structure of technical and operational support, if it wants to do its work properly. The technical support must include especially the organization of communications independent from the general networks, and capable of linking, without interruption, the committee with the area of the incident and with the operational unit, as well as guaranteeing the electronic coverage of the entire possible area of interest.

The operational support will include, among others, the staff taking care of the relations with the mass media, and a team of interpreters, absolutely necessary given the heterogeneity of the threat.



MODES OF OPERATION

We have already mentioned that, in order to fulfill its functions effectively, the committee must operate in the area of the incident, for the activities requiring a direct contact with the terrorists, and with the State Leadership for easier coordination and for understandable organizational needs.

The group assigned to the area of the incident will act in connection with the local Authorities and with the operative unit, as an integrant part and direct support of the committee. With reference to the modes of management previously outlined and the tasks assigned to each member, the elements included in this "technical section" will be: the experts in psychology and in the employment of special units, the speaker with the interpreters and the supporting staff. If the incident occurs outside the national territory, it would be advisable that representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

the Security Service be at hand.

As regards the times of operation, the following sequence of events can be foreseen:

- the committee goes into action with utmost timeliness as soon as the incident occurs;
- the "tactical section" and the operative unit reach the area of the incident;
- the "tactical section" conducts the negotiations, according to the committee's directions, until the conclusion of the incident or until a moment favourable to an armed intervention;
- the special unit intervenes if the risks entailed by the action become justified by the terrorists' behaviour towards the hostages.

CONCLUSIONS

The liberation of hostages held by terrorists is an operation that cannot be improvised, owing to the high degree of risk for the hostages. Therefore the management of an incident requires personnel trained in



The Army in a Belfast street, after the explosion of a car bomb.

together, because only mutual knowledge encourages the cooperation that will be transformed into an increment of operational efficiency.

The conceptual dimension of the problem examined can be considered as defined, though in general and in its essential aspects, by the terms outlined above.

As regards the composition of the committee and its modes of action, it has been our intention to give an example of possible solution, coherent with that dimension, being understood that the experience deriving from its practical employment will permit to formulate methods that will ensure the highest efficiency. On the other hand, the variety and number of the possible occurrences and consequent requirements will demand adjustments on the spur of the moment, which prescind from the accuracy of the conceptual formulation.

In conclusion, the adoption of measures and provisions allowing to avoid an armed solution of a terroristic action, tends to keep the threshold of dangerousness of the operation at the lowest level and meets criteria of rationality which repudiate all emotional components, including that of systematically opposing force to violence. Nevertheless, if this becomes necessary, we must be equally ready to use it without hesitation; the availability of an organization efficient in all its components, as well as the clear willingness to employ it, must be a deterrent in itself.

Col. Franco Monticone

the specific field, accustomed to teamwork and cooperation: it needs in substance an experienced and trained staff, reactive, similar in shape and tasks to a General Staff.

It operates at two different levels:

- a politico-diplomatic level, aimed at reaching a negotiated solution through negotiations, and creating the most acceptable conditions for a possible armed intervention, gaining time till the less unfavourable moment;
- an operational level, providing information support for the action of force which, although considered an extreme resource, must be kept in a

potential state and ready to be developed at any moment.


The committee must be able to operate with efficiency, without warning and for undetermined lengths of time, keeping in mind that, when the incident occurs, negotiation is the activity that is unquestionably carried out. The Authorities, therefore, have at their disposal a proper operational tool, which has a readiness of employment, training and reaction at least equal to that of the special units. Moreover, considering that the committee and the units' activities will be integrated for employment, it becomes essential that they be trained

ANTITERRORISM

INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT by Vitroselenia the winning card

...electronic defence systems require an integrated logistic support that will ensure their efficiency and complete availability under the most stringent operational and environmental conditions. To ignore or pay marginal importance to this problem represents a grave strategic error, as any system is only as good as its logistic support. An adequate logistic support is the winning card of the game.


VITROSELENIA, backed by twenty years' international experience, can guarantee a highly professional approach to your logistic support problems – whatever the system.



THE «CUNEENSE» ITALIAN CONTINGENT



OF THE MOBILE FORCE OF ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE



On December 7, 1985, the Italian Contingent of the Mobile Force of Allied Command Europe, an organic component of the "Taurinense" Alpine Brigade, was given the official name of *Contingente Italiano "Cuneense"*.

The event was celebrated with a solemn ceremony in Cuneo, on January 11, 1986, at the presence of the Army Chief of Staff, the Commander of the 4th Army Corps and the Region's civilian and military Authorities.

The occurrence was amply emphasized by the press and it deserves the same emphasis also on these pages, if only to revive the history of the glorious "Cuneense" Alpine Division and for making the functions of the Mobile Force better known.

THE "CUNEENSE" 4TH ALPINE DIVISION

The "Cuneense" was established in Cuneo on October 31, 1935, following the transformation of the "Cuneense" IV Alpine High Command. The "Taurinense" 1st Alpine Division, the "Tridentina" 2nd Alpine Division, the "Julia" 3rd Alpine Division – which, together with the Central Military School of Alpinism, constitute the framework of the Alpine Troops – were established together with the "Cuneense".

Alpine of the Italian Contingent of the AMF(L) in training.



On its foundation, the "Cuneense" Division included the 1st Alpini Regiment (with the "Ceva", "Pieve di Teco" and "Mondovì" Battalions), the 2nd Alpini Regiment (with the "Borgo San Dalmazzo", "Dronero" and "Saluzzo" Battalions) and the 4th Mountain Artillery Regiment (with the "Pinerolo" and "Mondovì" Battalions).

In November 1935 a composite company of Engineers was added to these units; a year later, it became the

"Cuneense" 4th Mixed Engineer Battalion.

All these units have had a glorious past in war and an intensive activity in peacetime, made even more significant by several rescue operations in favour of the mountain populations hit by natural disasters.

The first significant operational employment of the "Cuneense" took place in the East African campaign, in 1935-1936. Some of its units (the "Pieve di Teco" and "Saluzzo"

Battalions, as well as the 11th Battery of the "Mondovì" Battalion) were included in the newly constituted "Pusteria" 5th Alpine Division; with this Major Unit, they fought valiantly, in line with the best traditions of the Alpine troops.

At the outbreak of the second world conflict the whole "Cuneense" took part in the campaign of 1940 on the Alpine western front, giving a valuable contribution to its victorious conclusion.



In the second part of December 1940, while the troops engaged on the Greek-Albanian front were retreating, the "Cuneense" was sent to Albany to give its support to the most threatened points of the front. The 1st Alpini Regt in the Tomoritza Valley staunchly opposed the enemy advance and counterattacked with unyielding courage, giving a decisive contribution to the positive conclusion of the battle of containment. In the Shushica Valley, the 2nd Alpini Regt

The AMF(L) units are characterized by high efficiency and operational readiness. The Mobile Force is air-transportable; this capability is assured, for the various contingents, by the respective Nations.



tenaciously blocked the way to the sea to the enemy emboldened by success, and counterattacked vigorously, blunting his offensive intentions. Also the battalions of the 4th Mountain Artillery Regiment fought gallantly in the "Julia" Division's ranks. Subsequently, the "Cuneense" took part in the offensive in Yugoslavia and advanced steadily as far as Dibra. For these operations the 1st and 2nd Alpini Regiments were awarded the Silver Medal for military valour, and the 4th Mountain Artillery Regt was awarded the Bronze Medal.

In July 1942, the "Cuneense" became part of the Alpine Army Corps, together with the "Tridentina" and "Julia" Divisions, and was sent to the Russian front. After the valiant resistance on the Don line, the "Cuneense" did not give up an inch of ground – it retreated from its positions, as a consequence of the unfavourable development of the strategic operations. During twelve days of exhausting retreat, the units, deprived of food and ammunition supplies, in terrible weather conditions, fought their way towards Valujki which, instead of offering them the freedom so longed for, turned out to be a deadly trap. The thirty hours of bloody fighting at Novo Postojalowka drained the last forces of the already worn-out troops of the "Cuneense" which, with its sacrifice, had the sad record of dead and missing soldiers among all the Divisions of the Italian Army in Russia and all Italian units during WW2 (87% of the effectives, for a total of 13,000 men). No less valiant was the "Pieve di Teco", 1st Alpini Regt, which operated with the "Vicenza" Infantry Division

during the entire retreat. The heroic behaviour of the "Cuneense" units is witnessed by their decorations: a Gold Medal for military valour to the 1st and 2nd Alpini Regiments and 4th Mountain Artillery Regiment, a Silver Medal for military valour to the mixed Engineer Battalion.

After September 8, 1943, a great number of Alpini of the "Cuneense" fought gallantly with the partisan formations, adding glorious pages to those of the units that had preceded them.

Swept by the events of that period – as it happened with other Army units – the "Cuneense" Alpine Division has nevertheless handed down its glorious traditions through the flags of its Regiments, now entrusted to the "Mondovi" and "Saluzzo" Alpine Battalions and to the "Pinerolo" Mountain Artillery Battalion. All these units are now part of the "Taurinense" Alpine Brigade.

THE MOBILE FORCE OF ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

The AMF (ACE – Allied Command Europe – Mobile Force) is a NATO rapid intervention multinational task force, established with the aim of proving, in case of emergency, the solidarity and unity of intents of the Atlantic Alliance and its will to defend itself.

The Mobile Force consists of two components: air AMF(A) and land AMF(L). Only the Command and the Commander of AMF(L) are at the orders of SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) in peacetime, while the operational contingents of the two components are transferred



Soldiers of the "Cuneense" Contingent in training. Each contingent has a "key component" which must be deployed as planned within 48 hours; the rest of the units have six days at their disposal.

to NATO in emergencies or for exercises.

The AMF(A) is formed by three-four squadrons supplied by Belgium, Canada, Italy, Holland, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, United States. At present there is no AMF(A) Command; therefore the squadrons are assigned to an ATAF (Allied Tactical Air Force) or to an equivalent Air Command, according to the area concerned.

The AMF(L) is comparable to an Infantry Light Brigade and consists of three-four combat groups with the relevant tactical-logistic support, supplied by Belgium, Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, United States, depending on the area of employment.

The entire AMF(L) can be air-carried: the air transport facilities for the various contingents are provided by the respective Nations.

As the employment of the AMF constitutes one of the possible options in the complex management of international high-level political crises, its deployment is disconnected from any particular national or NATO alert measure.

The units at the AMF(L)'s disposal must have a high-level efficiency and operational readiness.

Each contingent has a "key component" – at company level – which must be deployed as planned within 48 hours after SACEUR's order; the rest of the unit have six days at their disposal.

The AMF(L)'s most important mission is that of contributing to increase deterrence, through its deployment, in periods of tension, in one of the so-called "contingency areas" in Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece and



Turkey, where it was surmised that the Warsaw Pact could initially wield its threat.


The basic principle of the employment of the AMF(L) is that of making clear to the aggressor that any attack – even if waged against a single NATO country – will be considered as aimed at the entire Atlantic Alliance.

To this end, the Force can take some dissuasive steps, such as, among others:
 “showing the flag”,
 “strengthening the relations with the local communities”,
 “patrolling the boundary lines”,
 “training with the national



Above and right.

The basic principle of employment of the AMF(L) is that of making clear to the aggressor that any attack – even if waged against a single NATO country – will be considered as aimed against the entire Alliance. In this role, the AMF(L) can carry out some typical combat actions: defence of positions, protection of flanks, security/control of the rear areas, etc.



General Franco Angioni, Commander of the AMF(L).

The plans for the employment of the land component of the Mobile Force in the Italian Northeastern theatre, contemplate that both deterrence tasks and combat missions can be assigned to the Force, always under the command of the 5th Army Corps.

Today the legend of the "Martyr Division" is revived in the Italian Army through the "Taurinense" units, which for more than twenty years have been representing Italy within the Atlantic Alliance's Mobile Force, and whose essential framework is the "Susa" Alpine Battalion, loyal custodian of the traditions of the 3rd Alpini Regiment.

This further emphasizes the bond that has been uniting, within the "Taurinense" Brigade, the Piedmontese, Ligurian and Apuanian people, from the past to the present day.

Ferruccio Boriero

forces" and "informing the local communities".

Should deterrence fail, the AMF(L) is ordered to take part in the fighting, under one of NATO Subordinate Commanders.

In this role the AMF(L) can carry out typical combat actions, such as: defence of positions, protection of flanks, security/control of the rear areas.

The land component remains under the tactical command of the AMF(L) Commander (a Major General designated, in turn among the nations concerned, for a three-year appointment). The Headquarters is at Heidelberg, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The task of representing the Italian Army within the AMF(L) is entrusted to the "Taurinense" Alpine Brigade, which accomplishes this important duty through three components:

- Airborne Alpine Combat Group;

consisting of the "Susa" Alpine Battalion, the 40th Battery of the "Pinerolo" Mountain Artillery Battalion, some Brigade anti-tank, Engineer and Signal Corps units, plus a helicopter belonging to the Army Aviation's 4th "Altair" Group;

- Airborne Medical Unit, which ensures the medical support to the entire Mobile Force;
- NSE unit, formed by elements from the logistic battalion, capable of giving the necessary support to the Contingent, in order to enable it to live, move and operate far away from its permanent quarters.

While the latter operates in all contingency areas, the Airborne Alpine Combat Group is employed with a primary rôle in the northern contingency areas, with a secondary rôle in the other areas. The Airborne Medical Unit, together with the 40th Battery, operates exclusively in the Southern Region of ACE.



Lieutenant Colonel Ferruccio Boriero has attended the 18th Course of the Military Academy, the Infantry and Cavalry Service School, the Italian War College, the Bundeswehr War College in Germany and the Joint Staff Institute. He has carried out his command activities with the "Orobica" Alpine Brigade and "Taurinense" Alpine Brigade, where he has been Commander of the "Susa" Alpine Battalion. At the present time Lt.Col. Boriero holds the position of Chief, 3rd Section, Operations Branch, of the Army General Staff.

OTO R 2.5 'GORGONA' SPECIAL TASK VEHICLE

Crew: 1 + 3


Weight: 2700 kg

On road speed: more than 120 km-hr

Range: 500 km

Armament: TPT turret for gunner protection,
automatic T 7.62 FA or T 12.7 FA turret.

Armour protection: against NATO 7.62 projectiles.



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
THE NATIONAL

It is common knowledge that in the United States of America conscription does not represent the rule but is actually the exception, albeit not an infrequent one, since it is determined by conflicts that may seriously involve the U.S. Armed Forces. This has repeatedly occurred in this century, as everybody knows, and Vietnam has been the last bloody experience.

Nevertheless, conscription can be considered the last resource because, next to the regular Armed Forces, there are two large "reservoirs" formed by voluntary personnel of every order and rank. These are represented by two distinct categories: the «Reserve» proper, and the «National Guard». The two main differences are that the first includes all four Services (it should be remembered that the «Marines» are a Service in itself) and is organized at «Federal» level; the second includes only Army and Air Force personnel and has an essentially territorial (individual State) configuration. What the two categories have in common is that the enrollment is made on request and entails the obligation to take part in periodical paid training, as well as the possibility to be recalled on very short notice and employed for emergencies.

Of the two structures, the National Guard certainly presents decidedly more interesting aspects, at least in the eye of the Italian military: first, because it is a totally atypical organization; second, because some of its units are looming on our own operational horizon as "external reinforcements", as we shall see. With these notes, we intend to have a closer look at the structure and operation of this organization which, although little known to us, is a very important component of the U.S. Armed Forces.

OF THE UNITED STATES



GUARD

CITIZENS - SOLDIERS

HISTORICAL OUTLINE

The members of the National Guard are very proud of their long history and solid traditions of patriotism and valour. They pride themselves on having counted in their ranks such men as George Washington, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Charles Lindberg.

The origin of the National Guard can be traced back to December 13, 1636, when the governor of the British colony of Massachusetts set up a locally recruited militia, for helping the regulars of His Majesty's Army to defend the territory from outside attacks. The members of the new Corps, organized in three regiments, maintained their civilian status, in the sense that, generally, all continued to carry out their normal activities, but at the same time they had to procure and look after their arms and equipment and were frequently called for collective training. Soon the other twelve colonies followed Massachusetts' example, establishing their own local militia. These forces were widely employed during the various campaigns waged by Great Britain against the Indians (legitimate inhabitants of the American continent) and against the French (who competed with the English for the possession of the New World).

But – irony of fate – it was precisely on that militia that the “revolutionary” General George Washington could largely count to coagulate the Colonies arisen against the motherland. The War of Independence, started on April 19, 1775, with the “skirmishes” of Lexington and Concord, soon flared up on the entire colonized territory and involved up to 164,000 militiamen who fought side by side with the



"continental" army and wrote glorious pages, fighting with extraordinary determination until the English troops were utterly defeated. Lord Cornwallis, the English commander, who surrendered at Yorktown on October 19, 1781, openly acknowledged that the English defeat was largely due to the militia.

At the end of the war, the militia obtained a more regular status, through a special "Act" of 1792; each State was compelled to enter in the conscription lists all able men aged between 18 and 45, and organize them in companies, regiments and brigades. Similarly, each state appointed an Adjutant General, who was – and still is – the interpreter of the Governor's directions. The service was, or was not, compulsory according to the various events and actual needs of employment. The Corps was, in any case, always based on more or less substantial groups of volunteers.

The term "National Guard" was used for the first time in August 1824, when the Marquis de Lafayette, a famous veteran of the American revolution – in which he had taken an active part, showing undisputed qualities as a leader – returned for a triumphal visit to New York. The military honours were rendered by the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Artillery Regiment, which for the occasion was renamed "Battalion of the National Guard", in homage to the French hero, who had become Commander of Paris' Garde Nationale. This name was more and more widely adopted, till it received official consecration with an Act of Congress, on June 3, 1916.

Among the many conflicts arisen on the American soil, there is not a single one for which the Guard was not called by the various Presidents, to give its contribution to the Federal cause. It started in 1812 with a new war against the English for the possession of the Canadian territories (which



remained English): there were 116,000 militiamen on the front. The Mexican war, a consequence of the annexation of Texas in 1845, raged for two years and another 73,000 guardsmen took part in it. The long and bloody Civil War in which, from 1861 to 1866, the States of the Union and the Confederate States were opposed, called on both sides an undetermined number of guardsmen, certainly hundreds of thousands.

In the 20th century, besides the final sanction of the National Guard's denomination – as we have already seen – there was also a new legislative revision, by which the Federal Government took full authority over the National Guard in case of war. At the same time, the experience, training, and tactical and organizational configuration of the Guard units were constantly improving. In 1911 there was, among other things, the first

appearance of the air force component.

The outbreak of WWI was the macroscopic occasion for the Guard's employment outside the national borders: 40% of the American Expeditionary Force sent to Europe in 1917 was formed by Guard personnel. We wish to mention that, significantly, the German High Command, already defeated on the Argonne thanks to the decisive intervention of the National Guard Major Units, in drafting a classification of merits of the enemy Divisions, listed among the first eight as many as six Divisions of the Guard.

The second World War witnessed again the participation of approximately twenty Guard Divisions, in 34 different campaigns, in the European and Pacific operational theatres; about 5,000 men complemented the Army Air Force. Nearly 200,000 dead or wounded, and approximately 700 war decorations, are the figures of a titanic enterprise.

The rest is recent history: the Korean war, the Berlin crisis, the Vietnam war, all are scenarios in which the Air Force and Army components of the National Guard were deployed in support of the U.S. regular forces, and where they distinguished themselves for cohesion, fighting capabilities and valour.

STATUS, TASKS AND STRUCTURE

The National Guard's present status, as well as its organization, with the exception of some minor amendments, in substance date back to 1946. It has a twofold dependance and consequently a twofold task:

- as an integrative component of the regular Armed Forces, it is subordinate to the Federal Government; as such it can be entirely or partially mobilized to cope with national emergencies; that is, for

interventions in large-scale armed conflicts in any part of the world;

- as a force mainly originated in the individual States, it is under the orders of the respective Governors, who avail themselves of a military structure headed by an Adjutant General (Major General); with this status it is called to intervene in case of natural calamities or public disorders.

The relations between the Federal Government and the Governments of the individual States are regulated by a detailed legislation – on which we shall not dwell – concerning recruitment, training, armament



Facing page.

The integration between Italian and U.S. soldiers during their training at the Cellina-Meduna range is well represented in this picture.

Below.

Soldiers of the «Ariete» Armoured Division and of the 30th U.S. Brigade, after joint training at the Cellina-Meduna range.



and equipment, infrastructure and training areas, logistics and budget (in particular as regards personnel wages). In very simple words, one can state that recruitment and training are essentially under the various States' responsibility, while the Federal Administration provides for the remaining items. As regards mobilization, this is obviously regulated by the requesting Authority. Finally, it must be emphasized that national needs

always have first priority. We shall make later a concise survey of the various sectors.

The Guard's distinctive feature is that almost all of its members hold normal jobs in the working world, but, as we shall see, must carry out a minimum of training activity each year. Approximately 10% are in active permanent duty: these are the operational and technical Cadres, charged with securing the operational continuity of the units.



Infantrymen of the U.S. 30th Brigade engaged in Exercise "Display Determination".

We have already seen that the National Guard consists of Army and Air Force units.

According to figures dating back to the beginning of 1984, the Army component included approximately 420,000 men, organized in 9 Divisions (consisting of three Brigades each), 22 autonomous Brigades, 4 cavalry regiments, besides various units of tactical and logistic support. At the previously mentioned date, the Air Force component consisted of 24 wings, 67 groups and 91 squadrons (plus supports), with over 100,000 men and as many as 1,600 airplanes.

The Guard is deployed in about 3000 bases, in the 50 States and in the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

In short, the National Guard contributes in forming the U.S. Armed Forces global organization, with about 40% of the Army and almost 20% of the Air Force units.

RECRUITMENT AND PROMOTIONS

Recruitment pertains entirely to the various States and aims at filling the existing or foreseeable vacancies. All U.S. citizens, male and female, between 17 and 35, can apply for admission to the Adjutant General's Office of their State, undertaking to be active members for at least 8 years (6 for women) as well as to attend an initial training course of four to five months (which includes a basic phase and a specialization phase) at Federal Schools.

The applicants are enlisted as privates; there are

possibilities of reenlistment at the end of the initial period; promotions proceed with a mixed system of seniority and selection (in this regard it must be remembered that in the U.S. there is no categorical difference between privates and non-commissioned officers: they all are "other ranks").

According to his/her school degree, the candidate can ask to be enrolled as an Officer: in this case, the training lasts longer and takes place at a State Academy or Federal Institute, together with the officers of the Regular Armed Forces and Reserve. The promotion mechanism is similar to that of the "other ranks", Major General being the highest rank attainable.

Right.

Soldiers of the U.S. 30th Brigade in formation, at the conclusion of "Display Determination".

TRAINING

The periodical training obligations require that the National Guard members be present at their respective units for at least 48 days in a year (normally during weekends) and two or three consecutive weeks (in the summer). The weekend activity is essentially carried out at the lower organizational levels and on a rotation basis. During the summer period, on the contrary, efforts are made to simultaneously assemble a high percentage of the Major Units' strength, with wider-range training objectives. In this regard, it must be emphasized that the training (especially the longer one, during the summer) is essentially carried out in view of federal operational tasks, which, like those assigned to the regular Armed Forces, include employment options in various areas of the world. In this context, an ambitious programme has been started,

which envisages both the "affiliation" of Guard units (generally at battalion level) with the regular Major Units, and the autonomous conduct, with large parts of the Divisions and Brigades, of overseas redeployment exercises.

Greatly emphasized is the application of manual or computerized operational simulations (the well-known war games) which permit an excellent and inexpensive training of the Cadres.

The training for tasks at State level finds its space in the conduct of exercises conceived for confronting hypothetical natural disasters, as well as in the accomplishment of public utility duties, especially by the logistic units.

As concerns individual training, it is important to underline that during their career most personnel attend courses of various types at the regular Armed Forces Schools.

From the "motivation" point of view, it is important to remark that during their



training activity, the participants are regularly paid (with double pay on holidays) according to their rank. Moreover, employers are compelled by law to grant leave to their employees upon request, as well as to keep their jobs for them, continuing to pay their normal wages also during their absence.

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT

The '70s were decisive years in the modernization of the National Guard, so much so that, today, the standard of its units is qualitatively not very dissimilar from that of the regular Forces.

As regards the Army, suffice it to say that several units have acquired the most recent "gems" in the tracked vehicles line: the "Abrams" M-1 tank and the "Bradley" M-3 combat vehicle, which have firing and movement capabilities superior to any other precedent similar system. In the antitank sector the "Cobra" and "Apache" attack helicopters, and the "TOW" and "Dragon" missiles are already operational, while in the anti-aircraft sector the "Improved Hawk", "Chaparral" and "Roland" missiles are being delivered.

As far as the Air Force is concerned, we just mention that it has the "F15", "F16" and "A10" combat aircraft, as well as the "C130-H" and "KC135-E" lined up in its hangars.

The sophisticated C3 systems include the latest radio and data transmission devices, effective objective acquisition means, powerful computers for tactical and logistic employment.





MOBILIZATION

Thanks to the high degree of operational readiness and the possibility of recalling the personnel (who lives in the vicinity of the respective bases) with extreme rapidity, all National Guard units are considered "M" (Mobilization)-Day forces.

The order for total or partial mobilization can be sent out at any time (with very short notice), either by the Authorities of the various States or by the Federal Authorities, for emergencies that pertain to their respective domains.

"Ad hoc" exercises are planned within the States, in order to check the suitability of the procedures of notification, as well as that of the loading and movement plans.

THE NATIONAL GUARD THAT MOST INTERESTS US

Up to now we have intended to draw a concise but fairly complete picture of the U.S. National Guard as a whole. But the Italian reader, lay or military, will probably be more interested in knowing the involvement of this singular American Corps – at the present time, or as a future possibility – in the Italian operational scenario. As we are reporting widely known information, we are disclosing no classified matter in saying that units of two States – North Carolina and Vermont – have been assigned, among their federal duties, also a NATO mission in the Italian northeastern operational theatre, as "external reinforcements".

More precisely, they are the 30th Independent Mechanized Infantry Brigade, from North Carolina and a Mountain Infantry Battalion from Vermont.

The 30th Brigade is the direct heir of the glorious 30th "Old Hickory" Infantry Division, which distinguished itself on the European battlefields, in both world conflicts. It includes

INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRAINING AREAS

We cannot certainly dwell too much on infrastructure and training areas, even though they are the cornerstone of the National Guard's whole organization. We shall only cite the already mentioned approximately 3000 bases, spread throughout the entire national territory, many of which have been built in recent years, with criteria of high efficiency. They are owned partly by the Federal Government and partly by the States and private citizens.

As concerns training areas, there are no problems, owing to the US' huge extension. Most of the areas enable units, at Brigade or higher level, to carry out exercises, also with live ammunition.

Vast amounts of money have been appropriated for the improvements that are now being made in this sector.

LOGISTICS

The field logistic organization does not greatly differ from that of the Major Units and the Air Force units of the regular Armed Forces, meaning that this envisages normal supports assigned to the various "classes", which moreover ensure a remarkable autonomy. On the other hand, as these supports consist of Cadre Units (just like the tactical ones), in the daily routine it becomes necessary to completely rely on a fixed, territorial organization, which is nevertheless an integrant part of the Guard. This organization is formed by permanent technicians, who are charged mainly with the constant operational upkeep of the combat equipment. The muster rolls of this personnel list 45,000 men, almost equally divided between Army and Air Force.

two mechanized battalions, two tank battalions, a self-propelled artillery battalion, one scouting company and several tactical and logistic support units, for a total of approximately 5,000 men. It can operate in any operational, geographical or climatic environment and can be structured according to the assigned task; moreover, it can easily absorb various reinforcements, as in the case of Vermont's mountain infantry battalion, that could be attached to the Brigade, in order to enable it to carry out mountain operations. Due to its organic dimension; high mobility, outstanding fire capabilities (especially antitank fire) and large logistic autonomy, the Brigade can be considered rather a "mini-Division", so much so that, in the normal tactical organization, it is directly subordinate to an Army Corps.

In the framework of the task described above, the 30th Brigade has participated on several occasions in Command Post and Field Training Exercises in Northeastern Italy. The most significant moments have been the yearly exercises of the "Display Determination" series, in which the Brigade has taken part, from 1983 on, with considerable contingents. It is well known that these exercises are carried out mainly with the purpose of showing to the world the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance, but, at the same time, they are the ideal ambience for attaining interoperability between the Armed Forces of different nations.

The participation of the 30th Brigade has been an historical event, for it was the first time after WWII that a National Guard unit operated again on Italian territory. The Major Unit has been entirely up to the new operational situation, showing high professionalism, cohesion and outstanding spirit of cooperation, integrating perfectly within the Italian Corps.



In "Display Determination 1986", the 30th Brigade will be again at Comlandsouth's orders, with an even greater contingent, about one third of its entire strength.

CONCLUSION

We believe to have sufficiently explained why not only the members of the National Guard, but Americans as a whole are proud of this very efficient instrument, ready to ensure, day after day, the citizens' safety on the entire territory and to protect American interests in every corner of the world.

We do not intend to point out the National Guard as a model for a possible similar organization in Italy: this seems out of the question because the U.S. Corps is established in a well-defined historical, political and administrative background and, above all, in a country where there is no conscription. Nevertheless there are some points that could be a matter for reflection for us, especially as regards mobilization.

We close with a quotation from Harry Truman, who, during WWI, while serving with the National Guard as a young captain in command of a field artillery battery, said: "I am exactly where I wish to be: I prefer this to any other job, even to that of President of the United States!".

Col. Giovanni Di Simone

Above.

Gen. Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. Donati, Commander Allied Land Forces Southern Europe and Gen. Newbold, Commander 30th U.S. Brigade, together during "Display Determination".

Facing page.

U.S. infantrymen during the joint training of the National Guard 30th Brigade and the Italian 5th Corps.



Col. Giovanni Di Simone has attended the Military Academy, Service Branch School, War College, NATO Defence College and numerous other courses, both in Italy and abroad. An artillery officer, Col. Di Simone has always served in antiaircraft units and has been the commander of a "Hawk" missile battalion. As a Staff officer, he has been assigned to several Commands and since 1977 has been at LANDSOUTH in Verona, where he has held, among others, the position of Chief, Training Branch. At present, Col. Di Simone is Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Support.

THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES



A NEW AND UNIQUE DESIGN CONCEPT IN NIGHT VISION TECHNOLOGY

From Norway comes a new generation of night sights with a new and unique design concept. The sights are designed for use both with second and third generation image intensifier tubes. No modifications to the sights are required when replacing a second generation tube with a third generation one. The weight of the new sights is extremely low. It takes only a couple of seconds to connect the new night sight on to the existing weapon sight and start firing with maximum precision. Boresighting is not necessary.

Two different models of the new sight concept (patent pending) are now available:

The KN250 night sight with

75 mm $\varnothing$ entrance aperture weighs only 700 grams including bracket and battery. It can be mounted as an "add on" unit on top of ordinary day sights for various weapons as for example anti-tank guns, sniper rifles, etc. The KN250 fits perfectly on to the new LP100 laser rangefinder from Simrad Optronics which means that a laser rangefinder with full night vision capability is now available.

The KN250 night sight has recently been tested in the UK. The results proved to be extremely good. Despite of extensive firing tests no kinds of sighting errors were recorded. The KN250 was mounted on top of a new army day sight enabling the gunner to aim through the ordinary day sight eyepiece even during night time, an advantage very rarely achieved with the traditional types of night sights. The unique construction of the new night

sight made it possible to look through the day and night sights simultaneously enabling continuous operation irrespectively of light conditions. Sudden illumination of the scene did not have any effect on the sighting capabilities.

The larger model KN200, which is based on the same design concept, but with a 100 mm $\varnothing$ entrance aperture has a surprisingly very good range performance. It is, like the KN250, mounted as an "add on" unit on top of the existing day sights. Very good results are achieved with the KN200 mounted on to the well known LP7 laser rangefinder from Simrad Optronics. This configuration proves to be very efficient and practical: The display in one eyepiece can be

The SIMRAD KN200 Night Sight mounted on SIMRAD LP7 Laser Rangefinder.





read simultaneously as the night scene is viewed through the other eyepiece. No unnecessary head movements are required. The configuration also ensures the use of the same operator procedures both during day and night conditions.

KN200 NIGHT SIGHT

The KN200 is a X1 magnifying image intensified night sight designed for combination with standard telescopic aiming sights, thus providing both day and night sighting capabilities for:

- Infantry fire arms,
- Anti-tank weapons,
- Laser rangefinders,
- TV-cameras.

Compared with traditional night sights the KN200 offers several advantages due to its

The SIMRAD KN250 Night Sight mounted on a Smith & Bender Sight (The Norwegian-produced sniper rifle VS 84S from Vapensmia).

unique (patent pending) design:

- Uses the existing day sight which ensures that the position of the eye remains unchanged,
- Extremely easy and quick mounting,
- No boresighting adjustment required when mounting the sight,
- Continuous operation independent of light conditions.

The KN200 can be combined with the LP3 and LP7 laser rangefinders, thus providing full night vision capabilities for these instruments.

The use of a 100 mm $\emptyset$ entrance aperture yields a very good range performance. With the KN200 the soldier will be able to detect and engage targets within the practical range of the weapon during night time operations. The KN200 includes a catadioptric, high performance objective, a second generation

image intensifier tube and a collimating lens. The second generation tube is directly replaceable by a third generation tube. The sight is powered from a single built-in lithium battery or two standard AA alkaline batteries. Accessories include a protective cap for the optics and a canvas carrying bag.

TECHNICAL DATA

Magnification: x1.

Field of view: 10°.

Max. detection range (target 2.3×2.3 m, contrast 30%, reflectivity 50%, illuminance, level 3×10^{-3} lux): > 700 m (2nd. gen tube).

Focusing range: Fixed (option: 20 m to infinity).

Resolution (target contrast 30%, illuminance level 10^{-1} lux): 0.5 mrad/lp.

Objective lens: Catadioptric;

EFL/100 mm, F no/1.0, T no/1.3.

Image intensifier tube: Second or third generation, 18 mm wafer tube.

Operating voltage: 2.8 V DC nominal.

Battery life > 50 h at +25°C.

Operating temperature range: — 30°C to + 50°C.

Weight: 1600 g incl. battery.



**KN250 NIGHT SIGHT**

The KN250 is a X1 magnifying image intensified night sight designed for combination with standard telescopic aiming sights, thus providing both day and night sighting capabilities for:

- Sniper rifles,
- Infantry fire arms,
- Anti-tank weapons,
- Laser rangefinders,
- TV-cameras.

Compared with traditional night sights the KN250 offers several advantages due to its unique (patent pending) design:

- Uses the existing day sight which ensures that the position of the eye remains unchanged,
- Continuous operation, independant of light conditions,

- Extremely easy and quick mounting,
- No boresighting adjustment required when adding the night sight,
- Low weight.

The KN250 can be combined with the LP100 laser rangefinder, thus providing full night vision capability for this instrument.

With the KN250 the soldier will be able to detect and engage targets within the practical range of the weapon during night time operations. The KN250 includes a catadioptric, high performance objective, a second generation image intensifier tube and a collimating lens. The second generation tube is directly replaceable by a third generation tube.

The sight is powered from a single built-in lithium battery or two standard AA alkaline batteries.

Accessories include a protective cap for the optics and a canvas carrying bag.

TECHNICAL DATA

Magnification: x1.

Field of view: 12°.

Max. detection range (target 2.3×2.3 m, contrast 30%, reflectivity 50%, illuminance level 3×10^{-3} lux): > 500 m (2nd. gen. tube).

Focusing range: Fixed.

Resolution (target contrast 30%, illuminance level 10^{-1} lux): 0.6 mrad/lp.

Objective lens: Catadioptric,

EFL/80 mm, F no./1.1, T no./1.6.

Image intensifier tube:

Second or third generation, 18 mm wafer tube.

Operating voltage: 2.8V DC nominal.

Battery life: > 50 h at +25°C.

Operating temperature range: —30°C to +50°C.

Weight 750 g incl. battery.

BOFORS' 155 MM ARTILLERY SYSTEM FH 77 BOLSTERS INDIA'S DEFENCES

The Indian Ministry of Defence has awarded AB Bofors of Sweden a contract for deliveries and licence production of the complete field howitzer 77 artillery system. The order for FH 77 artillery follows successful tactical and technical trials.

Deliveries will start at the end of 1986 and are estimated to be completed within 4 years. A gradual transfer of technology and production to India is planned during the contract period.

These are the most significant characteristics of this howitzer:

- High-tech, high-performance, coupled with ease of operation and maintenance (originally developed for the requirements of a conscript army).





- His instantaneous rate of fire and high mobility – both strategic and tactical – gives survivability in the battlefield of coming decades.

It can fire all NATO bag-charged ammunitions, achieving an high rate of fire at all angles of elevation.

The Swedish Army, which operates in the severe arctic climate as routine, is fully equipped with the FH 77 system; coastal defence units are also equipped with a gun that may be called a variant of this system, though this version differs even as to calibre.

On the other extreme of climates, the FH 77 system is in operation with the Nigerian army.



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tilos an integrated logistic system designed and manufactured by Tangram to suit all your needs when operating in tactical area.

tilos a really mobile system made up by an intelligent, multipurpose wide body (4x4) towing vehicle and a towed unit convertible to all logistic function you may

need. Both elements are completely armored and cross country.

tilos a new concept in military logistics; when auxiliary functions are required, the towing unit acts as a shuttle or as a complementary mobile shelter, to integrate the main function making the system self sufficient.





NEW AMMUNITION FOR THE 40 L/60 AA GUN

The new L/60 PFHE ammunition is a proximity-fuzed prefragmented round that draws heavily on experience from the successful Bofors L/70 PFHE round. The fuze is a doppler radar fuze with an automatic sensitivity control, which means that is inhibited from initiation from surface objects when fired at low elevation angles. In favourable cases it gives a burst on passing within 5.5 m of the target, whilst at low altitudes this initiation distance is reduced.

The shell contains 100 grams of octol explosive, giving it a very high blast effect. In the event of a proximity burst the shell generates a great number of shell-body fragments but, more important, spreads some 600 heavy metal pellets of high inertia over the target area.

Thanks to their spherical shape, high specific weight and very high initial velocity these pellets do critical damage to vital components of the target even after travelling several meters.

The propellant gives a muzzle velocity of 860 m/s and, together with a heavier shell, this gives the same ballistics as the

previous L/60 ammunition, which means that modern L/60 practice ammunition can be used in training instead of the more expensive proximity-fuzed ammunition.

TECHNICAL DATA

- Muzzle velocity: 860 m/sec;
- Operating temperature: 30° to +60°;
- Triggering distance:
 - aircraft: 5.5 m;
 - missiles: 1-2 m;
- Shell weight: 980 g;
- Explosive weight: 90 g;
- Explosive type: octol;
- Fragments: tungsten pellets: 600;
- Round length: 447 mm;
- Maximum diameter: 62 mm;
- Round weight: 2150 g.



IL SOLDATO ITALIANO DELL'OTTOCENTO


NELL'OPERA DI QUINTO CENNI



Quinto Cenni's watercolours revive the conscripts of the just unified Italy, the officers and non-commissioned officers, veterans of the battles of the Risorgimento, fought also on the side of the losers, but always with sense of duty and spirit of sacrifice.

With skillful strokes, the painter brings back to light the everyday life of an army which had been entrusted with the difficult task of combining very different cultures and distant traditions, held together by a single unifying cement: the tongue of Dante and Mazzini.

Quinto Cenni, who was born in Romagna but lived in Milan, a "bourgeois" artist who was never a soldier, spent all his life depicting the military customs. From this point of view, he is the best witness of the affection for the Armed Forces felt from at least a part of the "Third Italy".




To
RIVISTA MILITARE
Via di S. Marco, 8

Others could have doubts or show hostility: Cenni always saw, crystal-clear and unequivocal, the continuity between the armies of the Risorgimento and the Italian Army, custodian of the unity and freedom conquered on the battlefield.

The initiative to recall the history of the Italian Army, through the work of this artisan of the image, was not taken at random by "Rivista Militare" and the Director of the Museum of Castel S. Angelo. "Rivista Militare", of which, in my capacity of Minister of Defence, I am — let us say — the publisher, has had, from the beginning, the purpose to keep alive the relations between military and civilian society; the Castel Sant'Angelo Museum from the time of its first director, General Borgatti, has been the scene of an active cooperation between military and civilians aimed at the enhancement of a common heritage of history and traditions.

I am happy to sponsor this project and I hope above all



that the new generations will rediscover, through it, an important — and up to now neglected — aspect of our history: the contribution to the moral and civil growth of our country given by the Armed Forces. Our Armed Forces as

an essential factor of a moral conscience on the making.

Sen. Giovanni Spadolini
Ministro della Difesa

Giovanni Spadolini

Dear Reader,

we plan to publish in the very near future the volume "Il soldato italiano dell'Ottocento" (The Italian Soldier in the 19th Century) illustrated by Quinto Cenni's watercolours, with captions in Italian and English and high quality binding.

By returning this form, the subscribers of "Rivista Militare" will obtain a discount of 20% on the book's cover price of Lit. 100,000.

Non-subscribers will be able to purchase the book either at full price, or with a 20% discount if they send this form together with a request for subscription to "Rivista Militare" and a remittance of Lit. 24,000 (or U.S. \$ 12 - D.M. 36 - F.F. 100), by cheque or international money order, addressed to: Stato Maggiore Esercito - Rivista Militare - Sezione di Amministrazione - Via XX Settembre 123/4 - 00187 Roma (Italy).

For subscribers.

I wish to reserve the volume "Il soldato italiano dell'Ottocento" at the price of Lit. 80,000 (20% discount on the cover price) - Mailing expenses: Lit. 20,000.

Name
Street Postal Code
City Country
Signature

For non-subscribers.

I have subscribed to "Rivista Militare" on
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
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MILITARY THEORY

JULIAN LIDER



power of military instruments, leading to a gradual decline in their role and their effectiveness in the field of international relations.

Total war has been replaced by limited, indirect war, and the armed forces have been charged with the task of avoiding a nuclear war.

As a result, the scope of military theory has been considerably broadened. Whereas it was once focused on the military's international role and the waging of conflicts, that is to say, wars, battles and military instruments, it now includes other factors: factors which range from the prevention of war to the potential use of military force.

The consensus opinion supports the validity of the "global strategy" concept, a concept in which the military component is seen as simply another element in the overall national security policy and power of a given nation. Increasingly, military theory is becoming a part of the larger field of political science.

There is a difference between the Soviet approach to military theory, which has remained "war-centered" through the present day, and the western conception. For Soviet scholars, military theory involves the study of how to prepare for a war and how to win it. Further considerations, in particular those of a social nature, are dealt with outside the realm of military theory, being treated as mere military appendices to other sciences.

The author holds that the western approach, which has broadened the scope of military theory to include its various related disciplines, would appear best suited to gaining an understanding of the nature of military activities, military institutions, war and deterrence. Questions concerning the necessary preparations for war and the possibility of its prevention have taken on a fundamental importance, placing them right alongside the traditional issues of the nature of war and the techniques for winning wars. The study of the preparations for war includes everything from the development of strategic doctrines to the interrelationship between strategy and politics, not to mention the readying of a nation for war. The question of preventing wars is tied to the peacetime use of a nation's armed forces in carrying out a policy based on coercion. It is also related to the policy of deterrence and a limitation of the escalation of violence in the eventuality of a conflict.

Essentially, the author takes a thorough look at the factors which have led to a situation where military theory must move beyond its traditional focus on armed forces and war to become a multi-disciplinary theory which studies not only the techniques for winning wars, but also the methods for preventing or limiting them.

An effort is made to provide an epistemological framework for the so-called global strategy. The drawback to this course, as we have pointed out in previous writings, is the de-militarizing effect it has on strategic thought as a whole and on the military profession itself. By focussing on peace rather than war, one tends to lessen the ability of the armed forces to contribute to the keeping of the peace by fulfilling that function which lies closest to the heart of their institutional objectives: preparing for war and aiming for victory. The rejection of a theory of victory in military circles runs parallel to the abandonment of the traditional theory of dominance in the fields of politics and ideology, a phenomenon which involves forsaking the theory that has led not only to the construction of Western European civilization, but also to its might and expansion.


J. Lider: "Military Theory, Concept, Structure, Problems", Gower Publications, Aldershot (UK), 476 pp., £ 21,95.

The term "military theory" refers to a very large and complex reality: one which touches upon every area of military studies. It is a discipline that deals not only with the criteria to be used in committing armed forces to the field of battle, but also with the military's role in international relations, its interrelationship with society and its internal structures.

As regards the nature of military theory and its relationship to the social sciences, a number of different opinions are current in the West. Indeed, there is much debate as to whether military theory constitutes a pure science, an applied science, an art, or simply a series of ideas and concepts relating to military activities. In contrast, Marxist-Leninist thinkers claim to have developed a military science which complements their vision of history as well as their projections for the future evolution of the world and society.

In the past, military theory was essentially concerned with two problems: what exactly was a war and how did one go about winning it. The first of these questions fell under the subject of the philosophy of war; the second was a matter of strategy. Armed forces were seen as nothing more than simple instruments to be used for the waging of war. For the most part, their other capabilities were ignored.

A number of factors have combined to change this situation. For one, the creation of national, popular armies has lent added importance to the relationship which exists between a military force and the society which provides its soldiers. In the process, the social role of the military itself has been expanded. What is more, technological progress has added to the destructive



Fondation pour les Études de Défense Nationale: "L'Europe Occidentale vue de Moscou" (National Foundation for Defense Studies: "Western Europe as seen from Moscow"), Stratégique Publications, Paris, 1984, 107 pp., 60 F.

Since 1978, a group of specialists working under the auspices of the National Foundation for Defense Studies has been carrying out research on aspects of Soviet Strategy. To date, the group has published two books: the first dealt with the doctrinal foundations to Soviet military thought; the second examined the strategies pursued by the Soviet Union in the Third World. The group bases its findings exclusively on original Soviet sources, avoiding secondary materials so as to eliminate any risk of distorted interpretations.



The volume deals with the full range of problems associated with relations between the USSR and Western Europe. In other words, consideration is given not only to questions of a strictly military-strategic nature, but also to the overall state of political, economic and cultural relations between the USSR and Europe. What is more, the analysis makes particular reference to the institutional structures and the special interests of the Soviet ruling class, not to mention the effect exercised by the traditional historic perceptions of Russia on issues involving defense.

The beginning of the 1980's has seen a change in the objectives of the USSR's policy towards Europe, with this transformation being particularly evident in the field of political strategy. Until Andropov came to power, the fundamental goal of the Soviet Union was to weaken the unity of the Atlantic Alliance by encouraging tensions and differences of opinion between Europe and the United States. During this period, Soviet propaganda stressed the fact that America had made a less than total commitment to the defense of Europe, thus exposing the Europeans to the threat of a limited nuclear war which would only further the national interests of the United States. For the Soviets, the deployment of the euromissiles clearly indicated the strength and purpose of the western alliance, demonstrating the foolishness of any attempt to separate Europe from the United States. This development had a decisive effect on the aforementioned evolutionary change in Soviet policy. Faced with the prospect of a more solid integration, if not an actual fusion, of European defense efforts, the USSR seems to have opted for a policy aimed at encouraging disputes among the various European nations while weakening their internal structures. This last tactic is to be directed in particular measure at the more vulnerable of the European nations.

In Europe as a whole, this strategy has involved pressuring the individual nations with the threat of unfavorable changes in economic and commercial relations. Most importantly, an effort has been made to impress the non-nuclear European nations with the danger represented by the French and British nuclear deterrents. Within the individual European states, on the other hand, there has been a resurgence of efforts aimed at de-legitimizing political and military leaders, efforts which are accompanied by support for pacifist, terrorist and anti-nuclear movements. This support has always been an intrinsic part of Soviet strategy. It is rooted in that doctrine's ideological foundation, a body of thought in which the concept of class struggle has been transposed to the realm of international relations. Nonetheless, the support has always been offered within a precise set of limits. These are implicitly determined by the

potential repercussions which a wave of neutralism in Western Europe might have upon the satellite countries of the USSR. The consequences of such a development are not easily predictable, but, to a large extent, they would probably escape the control of the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is not as paradoxical as it might seem to venture that the American presence in Europe is making a vital contribution to the unity of the Soviet "empire", conferring an aura of legitimacy to the USSR's domination of Central and Eastern Europe.



A. Rossi: "La Strategia: da arte della guerra a scienza della pace" ("Strategy: from art of war to science of peace?"), Tipoveloxy Publications, Torino, 1984, 142 pp., L. 1,500.


This small, lively volume is meant to provide the general public with an overview of current developments in strategic thinking. The starting point for the author's presentation is the following assumption: at any given stage of history, military force has a specific function, importance and eventual use. A very close interrelationship ties political thought to strategic thought. This bond is influenced by the particular social, economic and technological characteristics of the individual nations, the lone arbiters of strategic decisions.

Politics and strategy exist in a continuum. No clear distinction can be made between the two. Any attempt to do so produces nothing but an artificial, circumstantial division which is strictly determined by the nature of the relationship tying the civilian sphere to the military sector. In order to have an identity of its own (and in order to serve a practical purpose of its own) strategy must be based on the preparation, potential use and actual deployment of military forces. For the most part, the

so-called "global strategy" lies outside the realm of strategic speculation.

The post-World War II "dilution" of strategy, a phenomenon which followed the spread of strategic considerations into the field of politics, producing the new "global strategy", has, on the one hand, unduly militarized the language of politics, while, on the other hand, and to an even greater extent, politicizing the language of strategy. This trend must be met with strong opposition if strategic studies are to regain their specific identity and their practical function. The tie between strategic theory and practice must be re-established. What is needed is a precise definition of the role of those persons who have been institutionally charged with managing the state's wartime violence: the military. Strategy and strategic-operational decisions must be considered apart from defense policy and global strategy, two areas of thought which both tend to underestimate the importance of force and the specific role of war, overestimating instead considerations of another type, in particular those associated with the so-called "peace research". This school of thought belongs to a sphere which, though it is definitely related to the area where strategic decisions are made, lies outside the military sphere all the same. Strategy can not be subordinated to this extra-military sphere. The one thing a soldier can do to help avoid war is to prepare himself to fight and win wars. If the political leaders then choose not to send him to war, so much the better! A soldier who concentrates on peace instead of war, however, is clearly jeopardizing his professional integrity.

The volume under review examines the feelings of unease and the desire for change currently being expressed in many western nations as a result of the steady decline in the credibility and validity of both the nuclear deterrent and the American guarantee of European security. The possibility of an armed confrontation is no longer an improbable absurdity, having once again become a concrete reality. Obviously, such a confrontation would present itself under new forms: forms which might have nothing in common with those of previous conflicts. There exists an apparent need for a strategic revision which emphasizes the interests of the individual nations while adding substance to strategic thought. The all or nothing approach, a product of nuclear deterrence, has proven to be an abstract concept, far removed from the reality of the current situation. Further thought must be given to the underlying principles of strategy. Only through an understanding of these principles can we find the strength we need to carry out practical activities while making strategic decisions effective enough to guarantee the security of the West. This is what the author has set out to do.



A. Brigot, Y. Boyer, J. Klein, R. Fritsch-Bournazel: "Sécurité et défense de l'Europe - Le dossier Allemand" ("The Security and Defense of Europe - The German Dossier"), Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale, Paris, 1985, 232 pp., 65 F.

For the last thirty years, the German Federal Republic, which occupies a crucial geo-strategic position in Europe, has firmly positioned itself on the side of the Atlantic forces, acting as the foundation to their alliance. Until the 1970's, the strength of West Germany's ties to the West had never been a source of either controversy or speculation. The birth of pacifist and anti-nuclear movements of considerable strength, whose inspiration can often be traced back to nationalistic ideologies, along with the realization that West Germany would find itself on the frontline of an eventual war, plus the perception of the intrinsic limits of "Ostpolitik", have all led to a more fluid, ambiguous situation. The resulting transformation has partially eroded the consensus which once supported both a military policy tied to the Atlantic Alliance and a defense strategy which had been virtually dictated by that policy. The so-called alternative strategies, which threaten to produce a strategic "decoupling" between Europe and the USA, originated in West Germany, and the country's Social Democratic Party, whose leader, Schmidt, actually requested the deployment of euromissiles in 1977, now favors the denuclearization of West Germany. The volume under review examines the principal dilemmas connected with the evolution of the current situation in West Germany.

A. Brigot examines the defense policy of the German Federal Republic. Despite the internal political changes, defense policy is characterized by a significant degree of continuity. Membership in the western alliance and the existence of a strong system of defense and deterrence represent essential components of that policy, as does the lessening of tensions with the eastern bloc. Nonetheless, West German public opinion, increasingly aware of the country's vulnerability, has become extremely unsettled. This represents a potentially destabilizing element for the management of the dual policy of deterrence-détente.

Y. Boyer takes an in-depth look at West Germany's defense forces and their position within the NATO ranks. The power of their military instrument allows West German commanders to mount forceful arguments for their national points of view and interests within NATO circles. To a certain extent, this makes West Germany's defense policy less structurally dependent on the decision-making problems which exist within the Atlantic Alliance. German influence, though quite strong in the area of conventional weapons, is felt only incidentally on matters concerning nuclear weapons.


J. Klein examines the debate taking place within the Social Democratic Party over the "new strategies". In essence, the argument centers around attempts to diminish, if not actually abolish, the dependent relationship which exists between West German national security and nuclear weapons. These efforts are geared towards protecting Germany from utter destruction at the outbreak of an eventual conflict. So far they have produced theories calling for a conventionalized defense and the principle of minimal deterrence.

R. Fritsch-Bournazel deals with the issue of German national identity. The problem of the two Germanys has returned to the fore with the debate over the euromissiles. The West Germans have been afforded a clear view of both the military consequences of the partition and German vulnerability, as well as the negative effect of a decline in strategic responsibility among the other Europeans. Obviously, if the Germans are to commit themselves to a strong, lasting alliance with the West, they must not be made to feel that their own national interests are being subordinated to those of their allies.

Following the above lines of thought, A. Brigot attempts to forecast the evolutionary course of future events, paying particular attention to West Germany's ties with France. All the theories currently under consideration agree on one point: that only through Franco-German cooperation can the questions and doubts referred to in the preceding paragraphs be satisfactorily resolved. This

is the course which must be taken. Once it has become a reality, the rest of Europe will have no choice but to fall in line.

In large part, this work supports many of the theses currently in favor in France, all of which back a more active role in the defense of Central Europe; and this despite the objective limitation represented by France's wish to maintain complete national autonomy. In the face of this restriction the complete alliance which is indispensable to diminishing Europe's dependence on the USA becomes objectively impossible.



M. Hobkirk: "The Politics of Defence Budgeting", MacMillan, London, 1984, 117 pp., £ 22.50.

The planning, financial organization and development of a budget are determined by political-strategic decisions. These decisions must address all aspects of the budgetary process in order, on the one hand, to maximize the contribution made by each branch of the armed forces towards the attainment of various defense objectives, while, on the other hand, fixing the level of financial resources to be committed to overall defense spending so as to balance this level with the sums allocated to other socio-economic areas.

Before such an all-encompassing policy can be implemented, an appropriately structured decision-making process must exist, complete with an inner mechanism of administrative bodies. Another factor governing the implementation of any such plan is the relative



weight brought to bear by the executive branch and the defense administration upon the definition of the financial parameter mentioned above as compared to the influence of the legislative branch on this same issue.

This book analyzes the current situation in both Great Britain and the U.S.A. The United States Congress and Senate have much more of a say in the writing of their national defense budget than is the case with the British Parliament, and so the two examples differ quite a bit. Nevertheless, the key element in a unified development of economic policy and a national defense budget, the process which represents the focus of political and strategic decision-making in peacetime, is the same in both cases: the organization of the military hierarchy. The problem lies in finding procedures by which the strategies, planning and budgets of the three branches of the armed forces can be brought together in a harmonious mix. In both Great Britain and the U.S.A., this issue is currently receiving a great deal of attention. It has given rise to much debate and does not lend itself to an easy solution: especially considering the hysteresis of the current system, one organized to favor the independent operation of the individual armed forces rather than the interforce approach.

Clearly, the most obvious solution is to centralize decision-making power at the interforce level, producing a single, unified direction for strategic

choices, operational priorities, supplies, the structural equalization of the different forces and the subsequent planning and policy for the defense budget.

The current situation in both the UK and the USA discourages this type of approach. The interforce bodies have been assigned a coordinating rôle, but they have no real power. For the most part, the decisions made on planning and budgetary priorities and their development are the product of proposals made by the individual armed forces. There is really no room for harmonious consensus or integration, either at the interforce, or the governmental, or the parliamentary level. The reality of such a situation, however, is not a source of inconvenience in every sense. Indeed, it favors an increased vertical coordination within the individual armed forces, though at the expense, it must be said, of the horizontal coordination between the different forces. Due to the structural solidification which is the rule within each of the armed forces, any overall transformation would be problematic. And the question arises as to whether such a change would even produce the advantages it is theoretically meant to provide. In actual fact, a certain amount of competition between the different armed forces has a positive effect on both their internal unity and their continuing development. Though, of course, this competition should not exceed certain limits, lest it produce an excessively distorted

situation.

The author sets out to formulate a balanced solution. Though he calls for fundamental decisions to be made on the interforce level, he leaves the general staffs of the individual armed forces with enough power to participate in the decision-making process and to implement its results within their own commands. In other words, he seeks to formulate a perfect balance between degrees of centralization and degrees of decentralization within the decision-making process, between the interforce level and that of the individual armed forces. The proposals set forth are more readily applicable to the British model than to that of the United States. For the most part, the British military and political leadership do not make joint decisions on defense policy, whereas the United States Congress actually plays a critical rôle in such decisions.


In many countries, this question is very much a subject of debate. It can also be a very delicate issue, depending on the complexity and esprit de corps of the individual military units. Without a firm, decisive interforce policy, one runs the risk of both heightening the current level of "intraforce" conflict and eliminating the advantages of the present system. Naturally, one would also fail to reap the benefits which, in theory, a fully unified decision-making process should offer.

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G. Bonacina, R. Bonetti: "I giorni dell'Apocalisse" ("The Days of the Apocalypse"), Mursia Publications, Milan, 1985, L. 16,000.

Mindful of its apocalyptic subject, one would expect this book to present a series of moral and political condemnations aimed at the author of history's very first nuclear exploit: the United States. The volume at hand, however, does nothing of the sort. Indeed, written in a language whose tone is calm and measured, it limits itself to describing the slow, arduous periods of study, planning and experimentation which led to the creation of the uranium bomb by the most impressive team of scientific thinkers ever assembled. Providing a wealth of detail, the book narrates the operational side of the missions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, taking due note of the situation of lasting tension produced by these missions: a situation which has led to the growing escalation of the arms race between the two super powers.

If the goal of the authors was to avoid making value judgements by faithfully describing the facts, thus leaving the reader free to draw his or her own conclusions concerning the scientific, political and military actions of those responsible for dropping the nuclear bombs on the two Japanese cities, then their book is a complete success. Their wide-ranging, well organized reconstruction of the various phases of the operation is accompanied by a subtle psychological analysis which affords an in-depth look at the drama, the uncertainty, the anguish and the moral reservations of the episode's chief protagonists. The reader is encouraged, indeed, he or she is almost obligated, to reflect at length upon the different

events and people of the book, formulating valid responses to all sorts of questions and unresolved issues.

Forty years have passed since those tragic days in 1945 when the technological and strategic evolution of the world entered a period of awesome acceleration.

Today mankind lives in uncertainty and fear, balanced precariously on the strategic equilibrium produced by the chain reaction set off in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

What is the world's destiny?

Once again, the authors decline to act as judges or prophets of history. Instead, they choose to respond as agnostics, citing an aphorism taken from the German historian Mommsen: "Though men may believe they are making history, history makes itself".

Fully complementing the neutral tone with which the book examines facts and events, this agnostic approach lends literary merit and value to a work produced by a pair of writers who have approached their task with an exemplary intellectual honesty and a finely-honed narrative prose style.

Neither an apologia nor a condemnation, this volume presents a scrupulously accurate, documented record of an event for which we must still await the ethical judgement that only history can provide.

Giovanni Cerbo



R. Puletti: "Genova Cavalleria", De Stefano Publications, Padova, 440 pp. plus 10 tables, L. 80,000.

The book under review presents the 300-year history of one of the oldest, most glorious units in the Italian Army.

Written by the 74th and last commander of the "Genova Cavalry", the volume is not merely a straightforward record of the "events". Indeed,

the author has succeeded in placing the "facts" within their historical and social framework, adding depth, vigor and immediacy to his narrative. What is more, his work never loses sight of the evolutionary trends in the organization and doctrine of the cavalry as a whole.

The act creating the Regiment is dated January 23, 1683. Christened as the "Dragoons of his Royal Highness", the unit, better known as "Dragons Bleu", first saw action at Staffarda and Avigliana during the War of the League of Augsburg (1690-1696). They next mounted a series of raids which took them into the Dauphinate and Provence (1692). In 1693, they fought in the Battle of Marsaglia.

In 1706, during the siege of Turin, Vittorio Amedeo II personally led the "Dragons Bleu" charging into the battle of the "Madonna della Campagna", crying out, "A moi mes Dragons", a phrase which was to serve as the Regiment's motto for a good many years. During this same period, the unit also fought in St. Jean Maurienne and Cesana (1708), Mouthiers (1709), Conflans and Demonte (1711).

As a result of the Peace of Utrecht, the Duchy of Savoy became a kingdom and the Regiment was given the title "His Majesty's Dragoons". The unit took part in the Battle of Guastalla (1734) and the Battle of Tidone (1746). During this last engagement, two battle-flags were captured from the enemy. In 1796, Napoleon descended upon Italy. The Battle of Mondovì found "His Majesty's Dragoons" engaged in the skirmish at the "Bricchetto". Two squadrons, the 1st and the 2nd, mounted repeated attacks against an enemy cavalry division, eventually routing it. Thanks to this action, the Piedmontese troops were able to retreat in good order. So significant was this event, that Vittorio Amedeo II chose to recognize the courage and the valor of his dragoons by decorating their battle-flag with not one, but two gold medals.

Following the abdication of the King of Sardinia, the Regiment was placed under the service of the state agencies, which, despite an appearance of independence, were in reality beholden to the French. On whatever battlefield they fought, the fortunes of the Dragoons were now tied to those of the Napoleonic eagles. In 1814, with the restoration having already taken place, the Regiment was given the title of "The King's Dragoons". It was to participate in the 1821 uprising.

On account of this "revolutionary" choice, the unit was disbanded. In its place, Carlo Felice created the "Dragoons of Genova", drawing on the men who had remained loyal to him. The colors of the new corps were yellow, and its battle-flag became the repository of the two gold medals won at the



"Bricchetto". In 1832, the unit was renamed "Genova Cavalry". It participated in all the wars of independence. A number of its members were sent to serve in the training units which took part in the Eritrean and Libyan campaigns.

The "Genova" began the First World War as a cavalry unit in the Julian Alps, taking part in the initial fighting along the border with Austria. In 1916, having been transformed into an infantry unit, it won a silver medal for capturing Hill 144, the key to control of the Doberdò Valley. By 1917, the Regiment was once again a cavalry unit. Following Caporetto, it fought a holding action to help cover the retreat of the 3rd Army, assisting other units capable of executing rapid manoeuvres in establishing defensive positions along the only obstacles available: towns and waterways. The unit next saw action in the fighting in and around Pozzuolo del Friuli, an engagement for which it received both a second silver medal and a citation in the War Annals of the Supreme Command. In 1918, a second citation in the War Annals was awarded for the pursuing action carried out against the enemy in the Battle of Vittorio Veneto.

The Regiment sent two machine-gun squadrons to fight in the war in East Africa. In 1939, it took part in the conquest of Albania.

During the Second World War, the "Genova", still a mounted unit, fought in Yugoslavia. It was represented in the North African campaign by a machine-gun group. Later, the Regiment was sent to Croatia to take part in anti-guerrilla operations. Its men also served as occupation troops in France. Eight squadrons drawn from the ranks of the "Genova" were assigned to defend the nation's interior and its coasts. A number of these units distinguished themselves by resisting the Germans during the tragic events which followed the signing of the Armistice.

In 1946, the Regiment was reorganized in Albenga as the 4th Armored Cavalry Regiment, "The Genova Cavalry". In the wake of the 1975 restructuring program, it was reduced to the status of a mechanized battalion. At the same time, the 28th Armored Battalion, "Treviso Light Cavalry", was formed from within its ranks.

This volume is illustrated with sketches, reproductions and graphic representations of the most important battles. A rich appendix further adds to a work which proves interesting both as a source of documentary evidence and as a contribution to historical writing.

The book can only be obtained by writing to De Stefano Publications, via Ivrea, 1/5, Padova.

Claudio Magris



"Costituzione di una aviazione navale. Il perché di un dissenso" ("The Creation of a Naval Aviation. The Reasons behind a Dissenting Opinion"), Air Force information bulletin no. 1/85, a supplement to "Aeronautica", the monthly magazine of the Italian Air Force, no. 1, May 1985, 60 pp., no price indicated.

The pamphlet under review is the first "Air Force information bulletin" in a series designed to be issued as a supplement to "Aeronautica", the monthly magazine published by the Center for Military Aeronautical Studies, a division of the Air Force Association, a group whose headquarters are located in the "Palazzina Douhet" on via Marcan-tonio Colonna 23/25, Rome, where it operates under the direction of Lt. Gen. Catullo Nardi.

The pamphlet, which includes 16 photographs of the most advanced vessels and aircraft currently in possession of the Navy and the Air Force, along with two maps depicting the strategic position of the Italian peninsula (defined as a huge aircraft carrier), opens with a presentation of the goals and organizational structure of the Center for Military Aeronautical Studies. The function of the Center is to "support and carry out studies and research efforts", aimed at "maintaining the professional readiness of both auxiliary and reserve personnel" and providing both the general public and the nation's key policy-making centers with useful information on the subject of aviation so as to contribute to the creation of an adequate body of knowledge in the field of aeronautics. The nineteen members of the Center include Generals

Emanuele Annoni, Mario Bacich (former chairman of the Cmas), Manlio Biccolini, Francesco Cavallera (former chief of the Defense General Staff), Franco Ferri, Paolo Moci, Luigi Pirozzi and Fulvio Ristori, plus such renowned scholars and publicists as Generals Antonio Pelliccia and Sebastiano Licheri.

The pamphlet argues against the legislative proposal calling for the creation and organization of a naval aviation, a measure presented to the Senate on December 20, 1984, (chief sponsor, Senator Severino Fallucchi). The legislative proposal is reproduced in its entirety on pages 7-11 of the pamphlet.

Three essays follow. Their titles are, respectively: "Naval Aviation, Analysis and Observations", "The Issue of Naval Aviation" and "Defending the Fleet. Onboard Aviation?".

These essays examine the "historical precedents" for the issue of an Italian Navy Aviation, beginning in 1923, the year in which the Air Force was first established as a separate branch of the armed forces. The analysis also includes the decision made by the Admiralty in the 1920's (a decision which was reaffirmed in the 1930's) vetoing the construction of aircraft carriers. At that time, the Naval commanders felt that, given the relatively small size of the Mediterranean Sea, air-cover should, and could, be provided by land-based planes.

A good deal of attention is given to an analysis of the military and technical "lessons" of the conflict in the Falkland/Malvine Islands, supporters of an onboard naval aviation often make reference to these events. It is noted that the Royal Navy's use of 42 vertical take-off Sea Harrier planes was responsible for the loss of 20 Argentine planes from a total of 72 shot down. At the same time, however, 10 Harriers were lost. Further mention is made of the fact that the lone Argentine aircraft carrier, the "25 de Mayo", was unable to leave its base due to the presence of two or three British nuclear submarines. In the event, the responsibility for Argentina's air operations fell almost exclusively to units of land-based planes: this, despite the fact that the distance separating these units from the theater of operations was significantly greater than even the maximum hypothetical distance in a potential Mediterranean conflict. In conclusion, the pamphlet makes reference to the distinctly political-strategic side of the issue, asking if Italy happens to possess, "tiny pieces of empire scattered throughout the world", as is the case with Great Britain. On the subject of the Italian intervention in Lebanon, the pamphlet points out that while it was impossible to provide air cover for the Italian contingent using planes based on Italian soil, this problem was overcome through the simple forward deployment



of Italian Air Force units on the Island of Cyprus. There, the Italian planes were able to operate from the available allied airstrips.

The pamphlet goes on to criticize the "controversies" being stirred up in "navy" circles on account of the supposed "monopoly" of air units enjoyed by the Air Force (a charge directly contradicted by the existence of the Army's Light Aviation Units and the Navy's Helicopter Centers) as well as the "policy of the fait accompli" which was introduced with the passage of the Naval Law through "preferential channels". The authors of the pamphlet feel that the presentation of a legislative proposal formulated outside both the government's legislative program and the approval process of the Chiefs of Staff Committee should be criticized on political and procedural grounds, given that such a course treats a very delicate, very relevant problem - that of providing air cover for ground units - as if it were an internal concern of a single branch of the Armed Forces, and not, as is actually the case, an issue which must be dealt with in an interforce forum.

The problem at hand can not be properly resolved with the simple purchase of a dozen Sea Harrier planes:

the essence of the proposed program for creating a Naval Air Force. Apart from their low level of technical reliability and their vulnerability in general, the cost of the Sea Harriers is excessive, running into the billions of dollars. For the same expenditure, according to the authors of the pamphlet, one could purchase another 25 Tornados, or 30 EFA, or 65-75 AMX. Among other advantages, these land-based planes, operating out of heavily protected, armored installations, would be invulnerable to surprise attacks from the air or the sea. Rather than resorting to a "scattering of resources", or a policy of "parallel wars", or other products of a certain "megalomania", the problem of providing proper air cover should be resolved through a program of interforce cooperation.

This concisely written text provides a very clear picture of the criticisms raised within those areas of the Air Force which are most adamantly opposed to the fleet's proposed creation of an onboard air element. The same point of view has been expressed in a number of articles, in particular those written by Generals Ferri and Pelliccia. The most complete expression of the opposing Navy point of view has been produc-

ed by Admirals Angelozzi and Bernini ("Italy's Air-Navy Problem", Belforte, Livorno, 1981).

Those able to approach this long-running feud between Air Force and Navy personnel in a spirit of tranquillity, a spirit free of any preconceptions, can not fail to notice how the arguments used during the debates of the 1920's mirror those in circulation today (the role of an air threat in relatively restricted seas, the vulnerability and/or advantages of aircraft carriers, the principle of command unity in terms of a naval airforce, the principle of economy, as opposed to dispersion, of available forces). An overview of this debate can be found in the writings of Lieutenant Colonel Ferruccio Botti: Botti and Ilari: Italian Military Thought from the First to the Second Post-war Period", Historical Bureau of the Army General Staff, Rome, 1985. Other sources include the 1927 essays of Amedeo Meozzi and Francesco Maugeri, reissued at the same time as a pair of contributions from General Ferri and Admiral Bernini, all of which appear on pages 117-198 of "Global Strategy", no. 1/1985 (with an extensive bibliography).

Virgilio Ilari

SEA MINES LAND MINES SCATTERING SYSTEMS COASTAL DEFENCE SYSTEMS




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E. Jacchia, F. Amadei: "La guerra chimica. Incubo sull'Europa" ("Chemical Warfare. Nightmare over Europe"), Sugarco Publishers, 116 pp., L. 12,000.

This interesting study, whose alarming title is now appearing in bookstores,

is the fruit of a collaboration between Professor Enrico Jacchia, an authority on political and military problems and a teacher of strategic studies, and Major General Franco Amadei. General Amadei, former director of the Army's Technical Center for Chemistry, Physics and Biology, has participated in international work groups addressing problems of chemical defense measures. He has also taken part in meetings of expert panels held at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

The two authors have produced a concise, but complete, treatment (tying it to the issue of weapons designed for the purpose of mass destruction, a dilemma which, for far too long, has led to nothing but useless debate at the Geneva Disarmament Conference) of this controversial topic, providing a frighteningly realistic picture of the tremendous risks connected with the production, storage and use (as a terrifying alternative to nuclear war) of the most recently developed chemical weapons, which, on a number of counts, are still shrouded in mystery.

The study under review also provides a new and thorough examination of the evolution of chemical weapons, along with a consideration of the equally

dangerous side-effects produced by the peacetime use of certain chemicals (hazardous to vegetation, animals and man).

The work includes a series of appendices containing data which should be of considerable significance not only to military personnel, technicians and a wide range of other experts (in the fields of chemistry, industry, health-care, agriculture, zoology, botany, ecology etc.) but to all managers at every level, whether they be employed in the public or the private sector.

Written in a subdued style, the authors' presentation is both smooth and convincing. The results of Jacchia and Amadei's praiseworthy effort deserve to be introduced into the curriculums of the Universities' various science and political science departments, as well as all the nation's high schools. Similar programs have been established for quite some time now in other NATO countries and among the member nations of the Warsaw Pact.

Giuseppe Consoli

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TENUTE DAL CAPO DI SM GENERALE
VOLUME III
(1° GENNAIO 1942 - 31 DICEMBRE 1942)

RACCOLTA DI DOCUMENTI
DELLA SECONDA GUERRA MONDIALE

Verbal delle Riunioni tenute dal Capo di SM Generale, vol. III - 1° gennaio - 31 dicembre 1942 (Minutes of the meetings held by the Chief of the Military High Command, vol. III - January 1 to December 31, 1942), Historical Bureau of the Army High Command, Rome, 1985, 936 pp., 20,000 lira.

This is the third in a projected series of four volumes, the last of which is currently nearing completion. In charge of the project are Professor Antonello Biagini, Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Frattolillo and Major Silvio Saccarelli.


The three hundred sets of minutes presented in this book were recorded in 1942, a year in which wartime events centered around the renewed offensives launched by the Italian and German forces in both North Africa and Russia and the setbacks which soon followed.

Unlike the first two volumes - which were very thin - the third is quite impressive in terms of size: this may be due to the fact that Marshall Cavallero, having returned from Albania, was able to shake up the High Command, at the same time creating a markedly more cooperative relationship between the three branches of the armed forces; the heft of the volume may also be attributable to the problems experienced with transport, a situation which only deteriorated with the passing of time, especially in North Africa, thanks in part to a growing shortage of raw materials, a factor which adversely affected industrial production and led to a lack of logistical support

in the various theaters of the war, crippling the armed forces, whose strategic and tactical mobility - and, as a result, overall operational capacity - depended on this support.

Besides reflecting the events of a year which proved to be both crucial and irreversible for the Axis powers, the minutes from 1942 offer scholars a tool which can be used to penetrate the psychology, the climate and the spirit of the men who, at that time, carried the weight of wartime command upon their shoulders.

Mario Iannaci



A. Pecchioli: "Le armi bianche" ("Steel Weapons"), Editalia, 300 pp., no price indicated.

All great poems begin by celebrating the deeds and weapons of men who knew how to acquit themselves well in the course of grand adventures. In every epic, feats of heroism are accompanied by tremendous duels in which the finely-honed, sharply pointed weapon takes on an almost mystical value, both on account of its use and its celebration. Achilles' weaponry, the two-edged sword of the Roman Legions, the Durendal, the magic sword of Arthur: these were the steel weapons a man used when he met his adversary in face-to-face combat, staking both his life and his honor on the outcome; throughout history, these weapons have had a sacred value.

Using an extraordinarily rich supply of images, Arrigo Pecchioli's work

manages to provide a precise overview of the art of forging iron and steel, a craft which harkens back to the armorer's role as artist and artisan, as it developed over time. Directed at the connoisseur, the book is written with all the scientific and critical thoroughness its subject demands, and yet it is not meant solely for specialists, be they experts or collectors. Having set out to reach the general public, the author establishes tre appropriate references to the history of human civilization, paying particular attention to the Humanist and Renaissance periods, where a study of the visual arts reveals the importance of the role played by the steel weapon in the iconography of the epic figures depicted by such artists as Donatello, Paolo Uccello and Piero della Francesca. The author writes: "In the works of these artists the warrior appears in all the splendor of his armor, complete with his swords, his helmet, his armored horse: the arms and armor all but hide the man, leaving only his face to be seen; they envelope him and transform him; they protect him, all the while providing that 'ferocious' air which was undoubtedly necessary to the making of history".

In tracing the history of these weapons, which, despite their inevitable ferocity, always complemented the figure of man, never becoming larger than life, we are led to a time when combat, though no less bloody than it is today, would certainly appear to have been a more honest, more gentlemanly pursuit: one in which the chief virtue of the warrior was his courage. The author further observes: "Indeed, the man of the steel weapons was a born professional, or, at the very least, a trained practitioner of the art of war: he fought face-to-face; he killed and he could be killed, but he did not murder his adversary". But steel weapons, as is shown by this handsome book, were also an outward sign of elegance and sophistication, expressing to an extraordinary extent the intelligence and taste of entire peoples. This book, with its beautiful series of photographs in both color and black and white, most of which are taken from famous works of art, is further enriched by a glossary of arms and armor plus an unusual document dating from 1642: "The Blacksmith's Art" by Antonio Petri, a seventeenth-century armorer under the Medicis.


The author's narrative style is fluid and easy to follow, and the present work is just one of a series designed to illustrate and document specific aspects of art. On the whole, the effort represents an appropriate cultural tool for anyone who wishes to understand certain details of human history: details which are not necessarily of secondary importance.

Carlo Felici

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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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THE ROLE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND ITS POLITICAL CREDIBILITY

I am very grateful for the kind words of welcome addressed to me, and I am fully aware of the great symbolic significance of my visit to the Atlantic Council today. Through my presence here, it is the whole Italian nation that intends to demonstrate its appreciation for the enormous contribution of the Allies' solidarity to safeguarding its security, and keeping the peace in Europe and the world.

A few weeks ago, public opinion in every country greeted with confident relief **the message of détente that came from Geneva** as a result of the meetings between the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. It was a moment of genuine hope, which opened up to an anguished mankind the prospect of resuming the dialogue and constructive cooperation on which the solution some of the most crucial issues afflicting the international community will depend. Perhaps not everyone saw this as the outcome and further confirmation of **the historic role played by the Atlantic Alliance** in bringing about the stability that our Continent has enjoyed for decades. We are so used to living without war that this tends to obscure our realization of the essential nature of the Alliance's role, almost to the point of thinking that it has played a completely negligible role in establishing the equilibria that exist in the world today. To mention here, and under



these circumstances, what has not occurred and what would have most likely occurred in the absence of the Alliance would only serve to re-open a chapter in our recent history that is now over. What we have to do is to continue to work together to bring about détente and establish peace between East and West which nearly forty years of coexistence and solidarity have made possible, bearing firmly in mind the permanent validity of our bonds in the Alliance.

In the minds of our younger generations the period in which a prostrate and terrified Europe was looking for ways of responding to the dramatic reality of its decline forms part of ancient history. But I am quite sure that the echo of the collective sense of grateful friendship with which the people of Western Europe greeted the commitment of the people and government of the United States to making a decisive contribution to the

reconstruction and the defence of Europe has not faded in the consciousness of our peoples. This friendship remains as deeply rooted as ever, despite the changed international situation, as a substrate of solidarity which must necessarily characterize the future relations between both sides of the Atlantic.

The Alliance was founded because of the situation that prevailed in the wake of the war, but the ground for its foundation had been prepared as a result of a centuries' old process of maturity, expansion and amalgamation of different civilizations, of mutual enrichment through human contacts and converging interests. So much so that one might say that the Treaty was more than an Alliance: it heralded in a genuine community. Following the often unfathomable movements of history, the great vitality and creative energy that had enabled Italy's cities to leave a glorious imprint on the Mediterranean gradually moved westwards, and from the shores of the Atlantic, it was projected with indomitable boldness in the quest for new lands. The destiny of the world was marked for good. History would never be the same again. The Atlantic was henceforth to become the Mediterranean of the modern world.

It was by establishing the **bonds of this defensive alliance** that the Atlantic community became aware of itself, of its own existence, of the underlying



The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance made it possible to accede to a Treaty to guarantee security and peace, and to prevent war.

solidarity that had gradually fashioned the history of our countries. And the men who promoted the original Alliance and helped to draft the Treaty were certainly aware of this. The principles set forth in the Preamble and reiterated in Article 2 state that the main purpose of the Alliance is to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of our peoples. The commitment to collective defence was deemed by the founders to be an indispensable means of bringing about the peaceful regeneration of Europe.

There were **two Italian statesmen** in particular who took this view of the Alliance: **Alcide De Gasperi** and **Carlo Sforza**. In the debates that took place in those difficult months in the Italian parliament, there were not only impassioned speeches for and against the Alliance, but also the perception on the part of the members of the Government of the real motivations, scope and innovatory objectives of the Alliance that was being formed. In the first parliamentary debate on the subject, even before the conclusion of the preparatory phase to the negotiations, Alcide De Gasperi gave a concise foretaste of the essential objectives that the West hoped to attain by forming their alliance. He told parliament that the allies were anxious to create "a security treaty, to guarantee peace, and to prevent war". And on another occasion, when someone provocatively recalled the ancient Roman maxim about how to keep the peace, he replied by bringing it up-to-date as follows: "Si vis pacem, para securitatem et defende libertatem" (if you want peace, guarantee security and defend freedom). These are the marching orders to which the



Alliance has remained true for almost forty years.

This fidelity, which reflects a respectful compliance with the duties laid down in the alliance's charter, has been so highly appreciated that I am happy to say that Italy's membership of the Alliance has been endorsed by all the leading political parties in our country, in government and in opposition alike.

Preparing a defence system was deemed to be indispensable right from the outset, as a prelude to developing the grandiose project for a united Europe. There is no doubt that it has been thanks to the peace and stability that the Alliance has guaranteed that the European countries have been able to embark on various forms of dialogue and cooperation. The first of these is the European Community, but there is also the Helsinki Final Act, both of which are significant stages in the rediscovery of a means of working together. Some of these stages have been run through

with hesitations and frustrated ambitions, but all of them have signalled the great hopes of our peoples, and a potential that has never been fully expressed.

The European members of the Alliance, who were originally mainly the recipients of the guarantee extended to them by their larger overseas ally, have been able to strengthen their social and economic structures, and as a result of the changed strategic situation, they have been able to take on a fuller role in which they have been able to take up a greater share of responsibilities, in terms of their resources and their re-discovered sense of pride as free and democratic societies. This more balanced and incisive participation process will certainly be perfected as time goes by, because our European countries cannot and will not turn down the promptings of history. But they must be clearly aware of the fact that they can only create a better partnership, as the United States has advocated on many

occasions, if they manage to make that effort that has so far not been made, to transform Western Europe into a real, solid political union of free people. This will only come about when Europe is able to be an active and autonomous subject in international politics and not an object/space of other nations' initiatives.

But it is certain that **none of the members of the Alliance can take on the increasingly complex challenges of the contemporary world unaided.** This is why relations between the allies, between all the European countries and with the Third World countries, must be able to take in the wealth of ideas and actions of a Western Europe which at least projects an impression of unity to underpin its political credibility. The West's overall attitude can best be fashioned by the diverse, but complementary, analyses, responsibilities and concrete possibilities of the individual allies. This constructive pooling of national ideas has always characterized our association




of sovereign nations, united by common traditions and aspirations.

Strengthened by the cohesion that has remained unchanged through the ups and downs of the last few decades, the Alliance, through the **Atlantic Council**, which was the first permanent joint consultative body to which the Western countries belonged, has more sharply defined its essential function as **a forum where ideas and proposals are advanced and discussed day by day**, and as an ideal place for the drafting of Western policy.

The joint statements and reports that periodically formalize the allies' attitudes demonstrate the abiding willingness of the West to engage in constructive dialogue with Eastern European countries and peoples. We continue to advance formulae to overcome the tragic consequences of the rift in the Continent which the war can explain, but which the evolution of history can never sanction as something permanent.

We cannot, whatever happens, give up the hope in a slow osmosis process occurring between the two worlds which are ideological antagonists and political competitors. We cannot, whatever happens, give up the "consensus strategy" which, through a consistent and tenacious fidelity to the negotiating option, requires us to be permanently willing to negotiate the solution of crises, to do anything and everything to smoothe over the contrasts, to constantly seek out the broadest agreement whenever a dispute arises.

The irreplaceable role of our organization will be further confirmed and enhanced by the



Over the years, the Atlantic Alliance has taken on the role of total responsibility-sharing, consonant with the resources of the member countries in their refound pride as free and democratic societies, placing their strength at the service of security and peace, and not of hegemonic ambitions or the thirst for power.



creative effort that can be made, consistently with our ideals and with unstinting inventiveness, by pursuing converging policies, negotiating proposals and ambitious projects to reduce the dependency upon nuclear weapons, without jeopardizing vital strategic stability. It is these same proposals, the proposals of our organization, which have cleared the way for the initiative of the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mr Gorbachev, in addition to those no less important proposals that have been worked out in recent months which, taken together, are a major contribution to reversing the arms race, once and for all, which all countries and all peoples so deeply desire.

Aware of its success in fostering the conditions that have made it possible to find new opportunities to reduce the military stockpiles, the Atlantic Alliance must take up this new challenge of the present time,

revealing itself as an association with historically innovative features, which has focused its efforts on guaranteeing the security and peace of nations and of peoples, and not to serve hegemonic or power-based interests.

If we look at the pitfalls that followed in the wake of the second world war and the problems strewn in our path over the past few decades, we can see that the function performed by the Alliance has been extraordinarily positive. It has kept Europe free of any more conflicts, and has guaranteed the Continent a long period of security and peace in which the Western European countries have rebuilt their economies, and rediscovered new zest and ambition to embark on large-scale projects. The warning that Carlo Sforza issued in those years of anxiety and confrontation – "History shows no pity on the nations that have failed to look to the future, and have not perceived the

The President of the Italian Republic during the special session of the Atlantic Council.


course of events" – has, fortunately, been heeded by the generation that preceded ours. We trust that in the future, to which we must look with serene optimism, the peoples of the Atlantic community will not renege on the ethos of rejecting fatalism, which has made the West great.

Italy will continue to contribute her moderation, her wisdom and her total commitment to this community of sovereign peoples, governed by free institutions, striving for ever greater social justice and peaceful governance of international relations.


Francesco Cossiga

Text of the address delivered by the President of Italy, Francesco Cossiga, to the Atlantic Council, Brussels, 21 February 1986.

A close-up photograph of a fossilized skull, likely of a hominid, showing the jaw and teeth. The fossil is dark and textured, with the teeth clearly visible. It is set against a plain, light-colored background.



OF SUBVERSION



The term "subversion", derived from the late Latin word "subversio", in its lexical definition ought to be understood as "the overthrowing of a traditional order, often associated with the idea of a degeneration and corruption of values".

A sociological definition tends to explain subversion as the psychological transition of a collectivity from a given sociopolitical context to a different one.

Proceeding from the latter definition, one can state that any subversive movement presupposes a group of individuals animated by a common ideology. An ideology which, in its turn, prompts the groups as well as the individuals to a cogent solidarity that verges on real military discipline.

From this point of view, it is easy to perceive the characters of an actual struggle, which can affect the very existence of any collectivity. Initially shaken at its spiritual, ideological and political foundations, this collectivity falls victim to a real "hypnosis of decline" and, in a successive, more or less rapid and conscious phase, advances towards the formation of a different community.

All this, namely the process through which subversion aims at obtaining its scope, entails time, money and patience, and is based on two prerequisites:

- collective organization of groups and individuals;
- psychological penetration.

Pieter Bruegel the Elder: "Battle between Carnival and Lent", 1559, Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum. The composition of this work is entirely done in sober tones just enlivened by dashes of red.

A tremendous vitality animates the picture and is expressed in various figurative episodes, in which reality and grotesque, symbol and satire, intermingle in a language which, on one side echoes the medieval typology and, on the other, paves the way for the seventeenth-century style.

Of these points, the first – **collective organization** – presents aspects of special interest.

For the totalitarian regimes this kind of organization has always been a primary objective, that can be attained through the fragmentation of groups – homogeneous as regards ethnical background, religious and political creeds, social habits – and the establishment of groups differing from each other in their respective function. This becomes in itself cause of union and origin of real “parallel hierarchies”, which come to form heavy and effective nets of reciprocal mistrust and mutual control.

Subversion, nevertheless, lacks the state authoritarianism that regulates the collective organization in the totalitarianism regimes, and therefore must reach the same goal with different methodologies. The simplest way – no other seems to be available anyway – is that of operating on the human groups that form each collectivity, in order to seize the command of the most important ones.

It is an action that requires the support of an ideology, but which can initially be conducted also without such specific support. In other words, one tries to weigh upon the Western culture with the gloomy shadow of a so-called “scientific” vision of the world, expanding the Marxist seduction from old Europe to young Africa and to South East Asia.

Once the main human groups are set into a frame and, through them, the masses themselves are controlled, it will be easy to label with a given ideology the resultant organization.

In this sense, Communism itself can appear, besides a doctrine and a creed, essentially a collectivization technique, suitable to the global character of modern societies, complicated and ambiguous, and oppressed by a deleterious levelling trend.

Apparently the success of Soviet Communism and Mao Tse-tung’s very victory can be attributed to Lenin rather than Marx, and more to the efficacy of Mao’s political organization than to an actual ideological conversion of the Chinese masses.

In other words, the rigid structure realized in the two emblematic cases was more influential than doctrine.

Once a satisfactory collective organization is

obtained, one can deal with the second preliminary condition of subversion, i.e. the psychological manipulation of groups and masses.

The transition of a collectivity from an ideological conviction to another, from a certain mood to a different vision of problems and realities, requires a variable amount of time, which often involves more than one generation, and avails itself of the composite system of communications and



Pieter Bruegel the Elder: “The Triumph of Death” (detail), Madrid, El Prado.

mass-media. In any case, within a shorter or longer term, no segment of the communications system remains immune from the inflationary subversive disinformation.

It is a wide-range action, aimed at progressively destroying the amalgamating values of each collectivity, replacing them with a new and different psychological condition.

This psychological condition is not attainable through the simple use of advertising and propaganda criteria and techniques.

Some criteria and proceedings of this particular "world" are indeed useful towards this end, but the undertaking is of much greater dimensions and formed by more composite strata.

In fact, it concerns at the same time culture, will and sentiments of the various groups.

By "culture" is meant, simply, the "whole" formed by the sentiments and values that configure a man's way of life, which – more or less consciously – inform a man's existence, as the air of the times he breathes, the horizon in front of him, the language he speaks, his personal convictions.

In order to influence culture at large, the psychological action must upset or sterilize the community's fundamental values.


"The Intellectuals' Opium", the well-known work by Raymond Aron, mentions – as an example of subversion's attack on culture – the sly and persisting action aimed at silencing or converting the Personalities who are held as the most representative and influential custodians of the fundamental cultural values of the community.

The destruction and sclerotization of these values are the most probable causes of the intellectual confusion and spiritual anguish that are spreading today like an oily stain. Nowadays, the young and the

not-so-young, dazzled by a false prosperity and an attractive permissiveness, are led to ask themselves questions about the very meaning of existence, and risk to lose the sense of evolution, which nevertheless exists and bears a positive mark.

In this state of collective confusion, it is neither surprising nor amazing that the individual's and the groups' accomplishing will should lose ground, and that the motivations to defend the

Salvador Dali. "Presage of Civil War", 1936, Philadelphia, Museum of Art. A complex and multifaceted personality, Dali has worked with unique liveliness and phantasy in various art fields, giving, in painting, a personal interpretation of surrealism, labelled as "critical-paranoid" by the painter himself; it consists of a "critical" setting and use of the visionary imagery derived from delirium. In this work, the sense of the absurd and of violence flows from the desertic landscape, peopled by anthropomorphic creatures bound in a precarious poise.



community should tend to fade away.

Neither should it come as a surprise that organisms and initiatives slip through the open gap trying, in the name of a false pacifism, to undermine the community's defensive will.

Having caused the deterioration of the community's cultural bases and the drainage of its defence motivations, the successive step directed against the sentiments that

govern the human soul becomes much easier.

At this point the typical techniques and procedures of propaganda permit to develop a subtle psychological action which, according to André Malraux's appropriate definition is "the organization of passions" ("The Conquerors"). In fact, it is a matter of seizing and exploiting, towards a definite end, the hopes and fears, the grudges and hostilities, the

dissents and disillusionments, in order to work slyly on the subconscious. It is moreover an action all the more crafty and effective because it operates from within the communities.

In a 1959 press conference, General De Gaulle, referring precisely to such troubled and troubling situations, in which subversion and the ideologies that justify it meet and intermingle, stated that at a time when a colossal action of destabilization is carried out against the West and its fundamental values, the West itself seems to overlook the absolute necessity to defend itself.

What are the possible and necessary measures for an incisive response to subversion?

A surely effective formula does not exist. Tragic events – some of them recent – are pitiless proof of it.

In order to protect and consolidate the existing political and social structures, one must conduct a preventive vigilant action and duly consider the subversive threat in all its forms, securing, first of all, public opinion's assent.

One must think and act bearing in mind that the most appropriate, meaningful, elevated human experience is that of meeting others. More sincere and unconditional or non-instrumental relations, a society richer in values, a more humane culture, will most probably render the relations between man and community – also with the help of faith – more responsive to understanding and progress.

When faced by a more or less coordinate range of multiform threats, the struggle must be extended from the political to the diplomatic field, from the economic to the social world, from the cultural to the religious and military contexts.

Moreover, as the objective is mostly political, the "response" must be of the same kind and, consequently, it becomes the Executive's chief responsibility. Military action,

in this context, is only one of the components. But the action cannot be fully implemented without the support of the people who – precisely for this reason – are the objective and the tool of subversion.

Other essential aspects, which concur in outlining the features of the anti-subversive struggle can be seen in:

- the need to isolate the subversive organization from the outside, in order to deprive it of the moral material support that it could obtain from world public opinion and especially from the friendly countries;
- the dynamism with which the encounters or confrontations must be faced, to avoid losing the initiative completely, shunning supine resignation and skepticism;
- the flexible employment of means, which must constantly be adapted to the adversary's pragmatic and variable procedures;
- the fundamental function that must be performed by an effective intelligence organization;
- the employment of the psychological weapon, for strengthening the defensive will of the community, thus retorting the similar, sly action of the adversary.

Moreover, these elements evidence that the struggle against subversion involves all sectors of national life and consequently requires a convergence of efforts from all the institutions of the State.

Information and communications dominate at present the world scene and – coming to think of it – influence our way of perceiving today's phenomena and challenges. This way of perceiving appears sometimes more altered than the evolution itself. In other words, it is not so much the world scenario that has undergone transformations but – as it happens on the stage – the changes have occurred in the "lights" and the "perspective"

Right, from top.

James Ensor: "The Strike", 1892, Antwerp, Musée Royal des Beaux Arts. Ensor has followed many trends of the contemporary art (Expressionism, among them), without joining any particular current.

This painting, marked by a strong realism and done with lightness of touch and delicacy of tones, evidences the artist's commitment to social and political themes.

Renato Guttuso: "The Flight from Etna", 1939, Roma, Galleria Nazionale di Arte Moderna.

An outstanding figure of the Italian Realism, Guttuso, in this work of deep epic-narrative engagement, seems to foreshadow the oncoming ruin of war in the gleaming of the advancing lava and in the Sicilian village destroyed by the earthquake.


in which these phenomena are observed.

Furthermore one should also consider the preponderant influence that the popular sentiment has on the outcome of the struggle. As regards final success, the military force ought to be considered only one of the many tools available to politics.

In particular, in the preliminary study of the adversary's possibilities, one can find some logistic axes of effort, but, in the tactical field, it would be detrimental and dangerous to claim the ability to point out directions and efforts, ignoring the hard truth of a fight that, in its customary forms (terrorism, sabotage and guerrilla warfare), spreads "on the surface".

Considering that subversion is characterized by the existence of a rigid apparatus for the organization of human groups and by the obstinate attempt to infiltrate its elements into the ganglions of the leadership, an effective countermeasure should tend to isolate this apparatus from the various social groups and make sure that the levers of the institutional structures are in reliable hands.

In substance it is a matter of guaranteeing and inciting





an active presence in all sectors; a presence whose effectiveness stems from a precise informative and formative effort. The former permits to know the adversary, the latter is used for countering its infiltration and expansion attempts.

If, on the one hand, the information of the masses serves to isolate the subversive apparatus and is therefore realized through a reasoned and reasonable rejection of totalitarian principles and snares, on the other hand, the

David Alfaro Siqueiros: "Death to the Invader", 1941-1942, Chillain (Chile), Mexico School.

This painting is an example of ideological painting, in which the leitmotifs of vanguard art stand out, from Expressionism to Futurism, from New Objectivism to Surrealism.

Cadres' formation must ensure an operational capability apt to be transformed into positive facts.


These must find their logic and coherent implementation according to a realistic programme which should entail:

- simultaneous social, political and economic development of the national community;
- gradual attainment of mediate and immediate objectives, which should satisfy the expectations of individual and collective progress;
- strengthening of the political institutions' efficiency;
- improvement of the masses' living standard;
- employment of all possible means – in particular towards the development of agriculture, industry, public health, building industry, education and major public works, placing particular emphasis on individual initiative.

All induces to uphold one of the West's fundamental and irrenounceable values: liberty in general and, in particular, spiritual liberty. It has been said that subversive totalitarianism is the enemy of the total man. It is not a new concept. Socrates, in front of his judges, reminds us of it.

The West, and Europe in particular, face a dilemma: either renounce gradually their age-old civilizing function to the point of jeopardizing their very existence, or concentrate their will and efforts to harmonize the human tendency to collective organization with their ancient and never extinguished moral, the sole capable of giving a meaning and a limit to our spreading and desolating mass society.

It is neither a battle of one party against another, nor a war waged by religious believers against the followers of Reason. It is a battle outside and above all various possible antagonisms, because it concerns the liberty of man and that of his spirit and welcomes with equal dignity the support of Faith and that of Reason.



The persistence of the subversive danger must be countered with a similarly persistent response. A response capable of opposing conscience to irresponsibility, good-will to skepticism, truth to deceit.

A response capable of bringing back to a troubled world, standing on the verge of ruin, that special way of conceiving man and life, which could be found in the spirit of Cluny and in the universal conception that informs the Franciscan teachings, although with the indispensable transpositions required by our century.

In this connection, our thought goes to Ignazio Silone who – in "La Nuova Resistenza" – suggests that our epoch has been called the era of atom disintegration, but he says that one should add to that also the disintegration of the soul.

It is hard to indicate the most frightening of the two phenomena. We know for certain

Roger de la Fresnaye: "The Cuirassier", 1910, Paris, Musée National d'Art Moderne.

De la Fresnaye, as is evident in this picture, adopts the Cubist procedure of decomposing the atmospheric space into coloured planes. He remains nevertheless strictly anchored to the rules of traditional composition, maintaining the subjects' essential forms.

that both threaten the very survival of mankind.

Together with Silone, we can conclude by affirming that the password of the new resistance to subversion is every human being's right to his own spiritual entity, as an expression of the Universal Spirit.

There is no other way of facing and overcoming the strife between "education and subversion" which – as we are reminded by A.G. Wells – is the dominant note of the modern world.

Ciro Di Martino

ITALIAN MILITARY POLICY



ANALYSES AND PROSPECTS

A striking feature of Italian military policy is the gap between the continuous, coherent approach presented officially and the changing realities of the international situation that it has to reckon with. At times our military policy is also called upon to back up our foreign policy.

On the one side, the essential points of reference remain stable: our relationship with the United States; confidence in the deterrent effect of American nuclear weapons; full support of the principle of gradual, flexible response; close cooperation in NATO's plans and tasks; the continued use of conventional means of

detecting and locating a potential threat.


On the other hand, we have a very complex situation to face: new ideas and developments in Atlantic strategy, and the decisions that emerging technologies demand; issues like the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the French "Eureka" project and the German EVI (Europäische Verteidigungs Initiative), all posing difficult choices at political, military and economic levels; the occurrence of crises affecting Italian interests and security outside NATO areas, which clearly cannot be ignored or underestimated; requests for

intervention by the Armed Forces in support of a higher-profile foreign policy; and finally, a more diversified threat scenario of a different type and from a different origin.

Italian military policy has undergone a gradual but evident transformation during the last twenty years. This has not affected the bases upon which it has rested since 1949, but has extended the field and opened new prospects.

In short, this change has meant a transition from a "policy of defence" to a "policy of security" (1).

NATO remains the keystone for military planning. The build-up of nuclear and



conventional forces in the Soviet Union represents a real cause for concern. Some reaction is necessary, and this is why we fully supported the NATO decision of December 1979 concerning the installation of Euromissiles, which we consider essential for the preservation of the balance of military power and of a sufficient degree of deterrence.

Even though the chances of conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact at present look remote, the threat from the east is still considered to be the most serious and the most difficult to counteract.

The presence of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean is still an important factor to reckon with when we are considering the demands of national defence. Quantitative and qualitative developments of the Soviet fleet are being monitored, as well as its level of performance and training. Considerable attention has also been paid to anti-submarine equipment and techniques, especially since the Soviet submarine incursions in the Gulf of Taranto.

Stability in Yugoslavia and the maintenance of excellent



political and economic relations between Rome and Belgrade, together with the non-alignment of Albania, remain essential factors for our security.

However, the military threat to Italy is no longer seen solely in terms of a possible attack in a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Today we recognize the possibility of a bilateral military confrontation between Italy and another Mediterranean country arising from a clash of national interests.

Moreover, we must be

prepared for the possibility of indirect threats to the country's political or economic system, as well as the sort of blackmail with which terrorist groups may confront us.

Today developments in the Mediterranean are being watched even more carefully, with particular attention being focussed on the build-up of the navies and air-forces of the littoral countries. The latter are now almost all equipped with extremely efficient fighter planes and sea-craft armed with sophisticated anti-ship missiles;

this means greater "sea denial" capacity (2).

It is becoming increasingly clear that foreign policy and security policy are closely linked, and that political use may be made of military strength. The need to take an active part in international initiatives in the Mediterranean area, in accordance with our increased prestige and responsibility, is equally clear. Moreover, there is still much to be done if we are to forge the right sort of attitude and tools to deal with crises in this area.

Left and right.

"Leopard" tanks of the Armoured Troops School.

The Armed Forces are faced with new tasks today; strategies must be developed for surgical-type operations against terrorism. We must extend and improve our capacity to step in quickly where needed – an Italian rapid intervention force has been created for this purpose (3) – and there is still more to be done in terms of technical preparation to take part in multinational peace-keeping missions. This applies both to our presence in situations of hostility (standing between contenders, military police operations, protection of territories and populations), as in the case of the Multinational Force in the Lebanon (MNF), and in situations created by the drawing-up of peace treaties, as was the case of the Multinational Force Organization (MFO) in Sinai.

We have passed, then, from a defence policy geared exclusively to the risk of east-west conflict and to NATO's operational plans, to a security policy that takes much greater account of the north-south or south-south axes of possible crises in the Mediterranean area. We have also become much more aware of the "national" implications of new security threats that are more ambiguous and complex than those coming from the east; in political terms, the latter have lost a good deal of credibility, even though the military credibility remains as strong as ever.

There are a number of features to consider in this process of transition. First of all, the importance of NATO as a point of reference remains unaffected. Italy's respect for the principles and decisions of the Alliance is, today as before, total. There have been no signs of disaffection or neutralist pipedreams. The whole affair of the installation of Cruise missiles at Comiso, over and above the

tensions that are always created when choices at an international level influence the internal political picture, is clear proof that Italy's attitude to NATO remains unchanged. Just as the special relationship between Italy and the United States emerges unscathed from the momentary problems connected with the "Achille Lauro" incident.

Secondly, though we are well aware that the Persian Gulf crisis could eventually involve vital Italian interests, there seems to be no likelihood of our going beyond the

Mediterranean area on military missions, even when the aim is merely peace enforcement or peace-keeping, except for participation in multinational initiatives undertaken by the United Nations. It is highly unlikely that Italy would be prepared to take part in military operations outside the Mediterranean area, whether more or less explicitly involved in actions undertaken by the American "Rapid Deployment Force" or any other multinational western force (Euro-American or solely European).



Italy, of course, is still willing to offer the technical and logistic support of its infrastructures to American units en route to crisis areas in particular cases. This condition of "particular cases" excludes, however, any automatic involvement, reserving for Italy the right to weigh up the political consequences that could derive from an excessively manifest identification with American policy. This could lead to a refusal, as happened during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict.

Thirdly, while it is true that the strategic transformation of the Mediterranean area has catalyzed the changes we have described, it has not fully entered our political and social awareness. It has not yet come home to our politicians and public opinion as a factor that is going to pose hard and even painful decisions for Italy in the future. In other words, we have not yet come round to accepting the probability that our military forces will be involved in "peace" operations that are actually tantamount to war. Only a further turn of the screw of Arab terrorism, especially if clearly linked to one or more countries, could bring about a change in attitudes.

This does not mean that the general attitude today is basically wrong, or that Italy should allow military policy, and the possibility of the use of force this implies, to have greater bearing on the traditional lines of foreign policy. We are only stating that, faced with the sort of problems the French have had in Gafsa (4) and Chad, and given similar interests, Italy would probably react rather differently.

There is quite a strong sense of the country's interests among Italians today, and it comes to the surface when national sovereignty seems in some way to have been offended or trampled on. When the Italian Premier Craxi adopted a tough line with the American government over the hijacking of the Egyptian plane at

Sigonella, he had a very large part of public opinion behind him. This was also due to support coming from the traditionally anti-American extreme left.

Fourthly, the change in military policy has in part been brought about by another sort of catalyst, as we suggested earlier, and this is the fact that foreign policy achieved its highest profile when it made use of military arguments. The Armed Forces have consequently had to consider the possibility of preparing for missions quite unlike the classical defence missions conceived to deal with a possible east-west conflict. The missions carried out by Italian contingents as part of UNIFIL and the MFO and the mine-sweeping expeditions in the Suez Gulf in 1984 were fairly typical of the tasks performed by the Army and Navy, and therefore represented a novelty only in terms of political context. Participation in the second multinational force in the Lebanon raised some new problems, however, because of the mixture of political, humanitarian and military aspects involved.

The beginning of the eighties marked an important phase in the development of Italian military policy, not only due to the repercussions of international events, but also because, for the first time in the history of the Republic, a socialist, Lelio Lagorio, was appointed Minister of Defence.

Only two months after his appointment, Lagorio presented the Parliamentary Defence Committee with an extensive report on the lines followed in our military policy. This was a real break with established procedure, as the country's military policy had hitherto only been debated during discussion and approval of the defence budget.

Once again NATO was taken to be the constant factor in Italian military policy. The real novelty lay in the fact that, for the first time, a Defence Minister felt the need to put particular emphasis on the defensive and

Right.

A parachutist of the "Folgore" Brigade.

geographically limited nature of the alliance.

The report stressed geographical limitations by pointing out that, while it was true that the interests of the Alliance could be threatened in territories beyond those covered by the Pact, this did not mean that automatic military procedures and political solidarity with the Allies could be extended to areas outside NATO.

While recognizing the fact that the continual growth of the Pact's military strength gave cause for concern, and that deterrence was only possible when defence had sufficient credibility, the Minister nevertheless stated that the guidelines he intended to follow could be summed up as the four D's: Deterrence and Defence, Disarmament and Detente. He also stressed the need for a certain "stubbornness" in the pursuit of east-west dialogue.

On the subject of the politico-military role of Italy in the Mediterranean area, while making no mention of the old idea of "vocation" Lagorio reasserted the need for an intermediary to pull together the east-west and north-south dialogues, with the hope that Italy could have a "more authoritative" say in the matter.

However, these were not the only novelties. Giving his answers after the parliamentary debate in the Upper and Lower Houses, Lagorio asserted: military force should be considered a "second-line element"; Italian military policy should be framed in such a way as to enhance Italy's international standing – a military policy not aimed at the use of force but at giving technical assistance in support of a policy of friendship and peace with other countries; the idea of "a general levelling down of



national interests, with a subordinate role" was to be rejected; there was a regional limit to the sphere of action of Italian military policy ("there is no need to raise the Italian flag anywhere else"); direct confrontation was a thing of the past, the new threat being of "encirclement from the south", which was, however, to be met with political initiatives and not with "roaring cannons"; there was no doubt that Italy's role and commitment in the Mediterranean area had become

more demanding, but the commitments were national, dealt with on a national basis, and there was no question of being "hired out" to other powers; finally, the idea that potential enemies started at Gorizia was "a bit old-fashioned", while in fact "there was absolutely no threat to be anticipated from Yugoslav territory" (5).

There was enough here to suggest a real turning point, and the impression was reinforced by the fact that the

ideas came from a socialist Defence Minister, as politicians and the mass-media could not forget.

Lagorio's line became still clearer and more explicit as Italy's role in the Mediterranean area assumed larger dimensions.

The national dimension of Italian military policy was rooted in the solid links with NATO and its strategies.

It was clear that security threats were increasing on all fronts. While the situation in

A helicopter pilot of the Army Light Aviation.



perfectly apparent.

Moreover, in 1981 the General Staff was called on to work out a defence strategy that "also" took into account the new situation in the Mediterranean area, and that could "also" satisfy security requirements that did not involve NATO. Among the points that eventually emerged in the new defence picture was the need to foster recognition by the other countries in the area of Italy's active role in the Mediterranean, and this made the connection between military force and Italy's international policy even clearer.

Again, however, it was stressed that the role of military policy in the more general context of foreign policy should always be seen as a contribution to ensuring peace and stability.

Finally, in 1982, Lagorio stated that the Atlantic Alliance was not, and could not, be the be-all and the end-all of Italian policy. Italy had its own policy which, while having a great many points in common with that of NATO, differed with regard to certain actions; above all, it took an independent stand on issues concerning all territories not covered by the North-Atlantic treaty.

Lagorio also pointed out that since the second half of the seventies the Alliance had no longer offered a total guarantee for the defence of Italy (6).

As a result, it had clearly become necessary to gear Italy's military force not only to meet the requirements of NATO, but also to guarantee the country from "dangers that could come from the south".

This reference to the Alliance did not imply any change in Italy's position in the international scene. More simply, it reasserted the country's autonomy within NATO, and therefore the possibility of arriving at independent decisions

Europe was fairly settled, things were getting steadily worse in the Mediterranean area. Italy again asserted its intention not to get involved in any operations in areas it did not geographically or strategically belong to, and not to use its military force for other strategies than those devised strictly for national defence.

At the same time, it had by now become clear that Italy had an important contribution to make to stabilization and the

relaxation of tension in the Mediterranean area. Significantly enough, the recognition that this was to be achieved through initiatives in foreign policy bore with it the understanding that the support of concrete military capacity was necessary if these initiatives were to be credible.

Italy's involvement in the MNF in the Lebanon made the connection between the feasibility of diplomatic action and actual military capacity

over issues that did not directly involve east-west relations or the military balance of power between the two blocs. Nor did it imply any lack of confidence in the Alliance, or weakening of Italy's sense of commitment. NATO remained "the constant factor in Italian military policy".

Rather, it served to underline the fact that, even when differences with the United States arose as, for example, in the case of the Lebanon crisis and the situation in the Middle East, Italy identified fully with the Atlantic powers.

The Minister of Defence was simply drawing attention to the fact that Italy might have to defend its own interests, and expressing the concern that Allied support for Italy might arrive late or even not at all in the case of a military confrontation in the Mediterranean area.

At the same time, his warning might have been an indirect message to Italian politicians, to bring home to them the potential dangers in the Mediterranean area, and consequently gain support for the Defence Ministry's request for more funds.

On the whole, Lagorio's period of office marked a real revolution in Italian military policy with regard to a number of points: he vindicated the role of military policy in the more general context of Italian Mediterranean policy; he recognized that the north-east front should now receive less priority than the southern front; military force in the south of Italy was stepped up; a boost was given to the defence budget (7); general defence strategies were revised, made more coherent and endowed with greater efficiency and a higher level of operational readiness; finally, a rapid intervention force was planned, to be deployed in any part of the country not only for "operational necessities" but also to deal with natural disasters.

All this represented a real novelty, all the more significant

in the context of the stress laid on the matter of geographical limits, the defensive aim and the independence of the member countries of NATO, together with the singling out of defence requirements and the forceful way the new policy was presented. It was a clear sign of the new role the Socialist Party was assuming in Italian politics.

An interesting sign of the times was the flat refusal of the American proposal, advanced in June 1980, for the formation of an Allied naval force to keep the Straits of Hormuz open when they came under the threat of the Iran-Iraq war.

Another significant point was Lagorio's direct criticism of the United States after the clash between American and Libyan planes over the Gulf of Sidra and the shooting down of two Libyan "Su 22" planes by two "F 14" Tomcats of the Sixth Fleet. Essentially, this was a criticism of the lack of coordination and consultation between Rome and Washington on actions carried out by the Sixth Fleet which could have led to a serious crisis in the Mediterranean.

The Republican Giovanni Spadolini was appointed Minister of Defence in the Craxi Government that was formed after the 1983 elections. The appointment came at a delicate moment for the Lebanon mission: at home, opposition to the presence of the Italian military contingent in Beirut was increasing, while the situation in the Lebanon had become more dangerous, raising new problems for foreign and military policy.

In November 1983 Spadolini presented the lines of his Ministry's military policy, which remained much the same. The basic points of reference were the same (NATO and EEC): the sense of the important stabilizing role to be played in areas where, as the Minister put it, "for various historical and geographical reasons Italy has a certain edge over the others. The Lebanon is one


example, the Mediterranean another" (8); there was no change in the trend (less quantity, more quality) in the development and modernization of the armed forces.

The only real difference consisted in a change of tone, emphasis and priority. It was no longer considered desirable to stress the defensive nature and geographical limitations of the Alliance. The role of east-west mediation and contribution to Mediterranean stability were considered possible and desirable only "in the case of dissent in western strategy". The possibility that the country's needs might not be entirely covered by NATO was wrapped in the more nebulous statement that Italy could come under a local threat, while the need for Italy to concern itself with potential causes of crisis in the Mediterranean area received particular emphasis.

The reason for this change of emphasis was above all connected with Spadolini's intention to bring Atlantic considerations back to the centre of Italian military policy, which was to be more closely bound up with western strategy in the context of east-west competition. This fierce competition tended more and more to take place against the background of the developing countries.

Spadolini seems to have sensed the potentially revolutionary implications of the Lebanon mission, and made every effort to prevent them from leading to rash policies or ungrounded expectations. A definite effort was made to dispel the illusions shared by some members of the Armed Forces and civilians that Italy might take on an independent military role and carry out its own form of mediation in the Mediterranean area.

Nevertheless, the policy of the following year was dominated by the need to improve the general efficiency of our military force, thrusting the question of international and, in particular, European





An Italian Navy submarine.

connections into the background. This appeared to contradict the line adopted in 1983 (9).

In fact Spadolini returned to the subject of strictly national requirements, referring quite explicitly to the security dangers that could derive from "increased politico-military dynamism in the Mediterranean area", and to the possibility that Italian companies and operators abroad might need protection should emergency repatriation become necessary. In addition, he pointed out that "the recurrent difficulties experienced by the U.N. and even by the superpowers in dealing with individual crises could oblige a Mediterranean country like Italy to take on definite, though limited, responsibilities to prevent conflict and ease tensions through mediation in the name of peace".

Though within the limits of mediation and preventative measures, the image of a particular, autonomous role for Italy in the Mediterranean seemed once more to be taking shape.

The "1985 White Paper" (10) once again stressed, however, the need for organic links with Atlantic strategy to give meaning and credibility to "the endeavour to maintain stability in the Mediterranean", which was by now the cornerstone of Italian security policy.

Military policy will remain firmly anchored to NATO. Given the changes in the Mediterranean picture and the likelihood of the endemic instability growing even worse, however, there will be no interruption in the trend that began in 1980 to pay greater attention to potential dangers to Italy, as well as to security requirements that may not be covered by NATO should particular bilateral crises arise.

Modernization of the military apparatus will go ahead, though somewhat slowly. There is some concern about the level

of the defence budget, which is considered inadequate to cope with the, at times, unforeseeable costs involved in high-tech weapon systems. The 17,602 billion lire of the 1986 budget, corresponding to a 6.1% increase in monetary terms (taking the 1985 situation as a base), will not enable the Ministry to meet the required 3% increase in real terms. Given the lack of flexibility in the Italian defence budget, the 1,500 billion missing from the original budget will, above all, affect procurement programmes.

Nevertheless, modernization of the Armed Forces, together with the thinning out of administrative, technical and logistic structures decided on by Minister Spadolini, will lead to improved operational capacity and, consequently, to greater credibility. This will apply both to the deterrent function and to dealing with NATO and national commitments.

The "Europeanization" of defence will remain a long-term process to which Italy is ready to make its own contribution, but only on condition that there is no intention of creating an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance and the strategic and nuclear agreements with the United States. These are considered fundamental for European security.

The question of the so-called emerging technologies to be employed in terms of NATO strategy and "Follow-on Forces Attack" (FOFA) will remain a source of problems, both because of costs, given the limited resources available, and because it overlaps with that awkward area of technical and operative choices connected with the possible development of a European anti-missile defence system.

Apart from the fact that NATO bases in Italy can only be used by the American Armed Forces in situations arising from an east-west crisis, there are also agreements for Italy to provide logistic and technical support to the American rapid intervention force for crises

ITALIAN MILITARY POLICY

arising outside the NATO area. Such support would be forthcoming only after careful examination of each particular case. This policy will be maintained in the future, though cases may well recur in which use of the bases is refused, or in which their use could spark off controversy and crisis within the country.

The military authorities greeted the strategic transformation of the Mediterranean area and the more dynamic role Italy has now assumed with mixed feelings.

On the one hand, Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean gave the Italian Armed Forces greater and more demanding tasks in terms of NATO commitments, while at the same time political developments and growing regional instability opened new areas of confrontation.

On the other hand, expectations were raised by the role the Armed Forces were called on to play in active support of Italian Mediterranean policy. And it was hoped that, in response to this role, further resources could be devoted to the necessary modernization and reinforcement of the Armed Forces. Experience in the Lebanon led to a new sense of responsibility and pride, and this encouraged some military authorities to envisage a more effective presence for Italy in the Mediterranean area, even beyond the area NATO was responsible for, on the basis of its enhanced operational capacity.

Finally, there was also some concern that Italian foreign policy might eventually burden the Armed Forces with tasks or missions that exceeded their real capacity.


We can safely assume that this attitude will not undergo any great changes in the near future. The Armed Forces will maintain their essentially "Atlantic" identity, and will continue to consider the prospect of military conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe more dangerous,

demanding and urgent, in terms of military preparation, than the chances of extra-NATO conflict in the Mediterranean involving Italian territory or breaking out in the form of a bilateral dispute between Italy and some other country in the area.

Maurizio Cremasco

Notes

- 1) Cf. Stefano Silvestri, "The general picture and problems of Italian defence" in Maurizio Cremasco (ed.), "Italian military apparatus. Problems and prospects", Franco Angeli, Milan, 1986.
- 2) On the militarization of the littoral countries, cf. Maurizio Cremasco, "The military Presence of the Riparian countries" in Giacomo Luciani (ed.), "The Mediterranean Region", Croom Helm, London, 1984, pages 206-227.
- 3) On the Italian rapid intervention force, cf. Maurizio Cremasco and Luigi Caligaris, "An Italian Rapid Intervention Force", unpublished IAI Paper. Cf. also Maurizio Cremasco, "An Italian Rapid Intervention Force: the Geopolitical Context", "The International Spectator", no. 2, April-June 1985.
- 4) In 1980 a guerrilla squad supported and financed by Libya attacked the Tunisian city of Gafsa. On that occasion France sent naval units to the Gulf of Gabes in indirect support of Tunisia and as a warning to Kaddafi that France could not remain indifferent to a campaign to destabilize Tunisia from within.
- 5) Cf. Lelio Lagorio, "The lines of military policy", published by the Defence public information service (Spid), Rome, June-July 1980.
- 6) Lelio Lagorio, "Report to the Defence committee of the Chamber of Deputies", October 13th 1982, a text of the Defence public information service (Spi), p. 1.
- 7) Defence budgets were as follows (in billion lire): 1979-5,119; 1980-5,780; 1981-7,500; 1982-9,918; 1983-11,648; 1984-13,820; 1985-16,500; 1986-17,602. The defence budget grew as a percentage of the GNP from 1.71% in 1980 to 2.29% in 1984. Cf. "1985 Defence White Paper", Rome, 1984, p. 66.
- 8) Cf. Giovanni Spadolini, "Lines of military policy", Chamber of Deputies, November 8th 1983, Spi text, p. 9.
- 9) Cf. Additional note to the 1985 Defence budget, submitted by Minister Spadolini to Parliament on October 10th 1984.
- 10) Cf. "1985 White Paper", cit., p. 7.




On the left.

An "Alpino" signalman of the 4th Army Corps.

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OPERATIONAL SURVIVAL AND LIGHT INFANTRY

The modern battle is distinguished by a marked dynamism of operations, the offensive ones especially, which develop through deep and swift penetrations, often supported by concomitant surface and vertical outflanking actions.

In this scenario it may frequently occur that small units or groups, engaged in defence, loose contact with their units, remain isolate and be thus overtaken by advanced enemy elements and by the line of contact. If they are not immediately spotted, these groups face the alternative of either surrender or try to reenter into the friendly lines. The first solution presents a high degree of risk, due to the instinctive reactivity of the opposed advanced units and is moreover psychologically influenced by the rather unpleasant prospect of being captured. The second solution is equally dangerous but it appears instinctively more acceptable, for the men perceive the possibility of returning among friendly troops; on the other hand, it requires a firm character, grit and the conviction of its feasibility, a conviction that can be acquired only through adequate training.

The personnel that is going to be prepared to face the situations just outlined must undergo a specific training activity, considering that the traditional themes tend to confer operational capability to organic units, in view of "conventional" operational situations.





In the case considered, we want to demonstrate to the man that he is not necessarily lost when brutally thrown into a hostile environment and, furthermore, we want to redimension the panic that inevitably seizes an individual who suddenly finds himself in a difficult situation.

One can employ to this end the techniques of operational survival. The introduction of this training by the units, besides fulfilling the abovesaid need, would permit to obtain interesting side results. Actually the availability of personnel trained to fight in situations of isolation and autonomy offers interesting prospects for employment in various kinds of actions, typical of the light infantry units. So much so that the goal of the introduction of these techniques could be the basic training of the Brigades destined to this specialization.

Nevertheless, in order to

proceed to a complete evaluation of the characteristics of this training, and also to ascertain its feasibility in the context of our Armed Forces, we must outline the training objectives pursued and the ways for achieving them.

For this reason we shall first make a quick survey of the operational environment, i.e. the situations that will most probably produce the emergencies described above. Successively we will consider the reflections on the military training and the spillover on the units' operativeness, with special regard to light infantry.

SITUATIONS

The operational situations in which little groups of men can be more easily "cut off" are those distinguished by a marked dynamism on both sides, such as the actions carried out

in the areas of containment and security, or between two defensive positions. They can also occur during the defensive action accomplished in the resistance position, due to sudden penetrations or because some elements (for instance the external elements of stationary structures) are separated from their units by the enemy's forces or fire. Last, one must also consider the situations concerning air or sea landings, especially when heliborne or mechanized troops are employed for expanding the beachhead.

Within this picture, in order to evaluate the operational environment in which the cut-off elements will have to move, one must evaluate the maximum distance, from the line of contact, within which their disengagement can realistically be considered.

This depth can be reckoned in a maximum limit of 15-20 km,



The modern battle, characterized by a marked dynamism, is a scenario where small detachments or groups of men can loose contact from their units. In this case, it is necessary to resort to the technique of operational survival.

i.e. the distance that can be covered in two nights: the reentry from greater distances cannot realistically be taken into consideration because the progression speed of the line of contact in the situations just outlined will be, as a rule, greater than that of the "lost" elements. These could find themselves in a belt of the enemy deployment which, from the front backwards, can include the exploring or vanguard units and the 2nd echelon.

In particular, if the lost elements are in the forward part of the belt, the enemy has less operational density but greater mobility and higher progression speed: therefore, for survival, there will be better possibilities of movement but less time at one's disposal. On the other hand, if they are in the rear part of the belt, this will be characterized by a high operational density and less progression speed, owing to which the conditions will be the opposite.

In any case, a decisive element for the success of operational survival is the time factor. When the emergency occurs, the more immediate is the reaction of the "lost" elements and the beginning of the disengagement, the better are the chances of a successful outcome. Reactivity, on its turn, depends on the will to survive and carry on the fight, and consequently on the degree of training.

Next to the survey of the operational scenario, two side considerations:

- the personnel of the units destined to operate on forward positions are in a higher danger to be involved in the described situations. Consequently all units, prescindig from branch or specialty, should be trained in view of this need;





- night movement should be considered the fundamental parameter of training and understood as the ability to move on rough terrain with obstacles (because these are systematically avoided by the attacker) or at close contact with the enemy, without being detected.

THE TRAINING GOALS

The aim of the survival training is that of strengthening the soldier's will to fight and to avoid capture, to give him high confidence in his means, making him realize that he can do much more than he believes, and to teach him the technical elements of escape.

In this line of thought, and keeping in mind the parameters considered, the training goals can be grouped in two orders:

a moral and physical one and a technical one.

The moral training plays a determinant role in all exceptional situations, therefore training must be a real exercise of the will in overcoming fatigue, obstacles and hardship. Meanwhile, the physical training is employed to develop the means and qualities that enable a man to calmly confront efforts and difficulties and to dominate the effects of fear and privations.

Nevertheless, besides pursuing the individual's betterment, it is necessary to create and improve the men's amalgamation, strengthen the confidence of the individual in the effectiveness of the cooperation among the group's elements, in the assumption that the certainty of mutual help can compensate for individual deficiencies. In view of this,

the psychophysical training must emphasize physical complementarity and envisage mostly exercises which need the cooperation of all members of the group.

The technical training, for its part, pursues the aim of enabling the personnel to move and fight in the operational environments outlined before: this is an indispensable requirement, for its "philosophy" differs from that of traditional training though it originates from the same fundamental assumptions. In fact, while the former usually considers the systematic "onward" fight, carried out mainly in daylight after specific organization and planning, or backward movements made at a distance from the adversary with precise reference to the friendly troops' position, in the operational survival one has to

It is important that the personnel assigned to light infantry be able to fight in situations of isolation and autonomy.

move in conditions of constant danger, in contact with the enemy, trying to avoid detection, and, if this occurs, one must withdraw and fight to disengage himself from a very near enemy, acting exclusively by night.

It ensues that the technical training must essentially improve the preparation for night combat, concerning aspects such as the modes of group movements, as well as halts, withdrawals and surprise actions. As regards this latter aspect in particular, we must limit ourselves to the techniques for the elimination of isolated elements or soft objectives, that can be attained with a sudden fire action that prevents the enemy from reacting.

The training can be integrated with elementary notions on first aid, pioneer technique and employment of the most common weapons and antitank mines.

It goes without saying that, in order to attain these goals, the personnel must already have an adequate basic combat training.

TRAINING PROCEDURES

After examining the goals of training, though only in their essential lines, we have to consider the procedures necessary for reaching them and to this purpose we are going to answer the questions: *when, who, where, how.*

The first element to be taken into consideration is time, as regards both the length and the period of conscription in which the mentioned activity can be introduced. The length must be as limited as possible, taking into account the number of training tasks already scheduled, as compared to the limited time of service. A

two-week period should be adequate, for it is the minimum required, according to experiences made, for attaining the envisaged psychophysical objectives and for verifying the attainment of the goals, through at least one continuative tactical attack in real time and, on the other hand, it is the maximum that can be set aside in the current programmes.

As regards the period of service in which this activity could be introduced, the 3rd training cycle seems the most suitable, for by that time the personnel has completed the individual and unit training at platoon level and is proficient in the techniques of daytime and nighttime combat, and therefore is in the most favourable conditions for starting a special training, which is also a way of perfecting those techniques. Meanwhile, all that has been learnt in

the survival training can have a positive spill-over on the successive training of the 3rd cycle and be a good premise for the activities that require a high degree of autonomy at the lowest levels.

About the "actors", it would be desirable that the activity be extended to all operational units, or at least to the battalions of infantry and its various branches, and to the cavalry battalions, which are more bound to operate in fluid situations.

The units engaged should be at company level, because of the company's homogeneous training (typical of one-echelon units) and also because it permits a proper control when training requires that the personnel be detailed in patrols.

A most delicate problem, at least for the initial cycles, is the choice of the instructors,



who must be specialized in this specific branch, and come from special units or Schools. Later, when the techniques have been assimilated by the units permanent cadres, the best of these officers and NCOs can take over as instructors.

As regards training areas, an organization at Brigade level (or two-three Brigades, as a maximum) is considered most suitable, because the concentration of training in a few specialized centres would cause long "waiting lines" and, for many units, the elapsing of the most suitable training period. These zones can be envisaged on the borders of normally employed shooting ranges or training areas, considering that for the operational part, consisting in the activity of small patrols, carried out mainly with blank ammunition and at nighttime, one does not even need actual shooting ranges; sparsely populated areas will be sufficient.

It remains to be considered how the training can be carried out. In order to employ the available time to the best advantage, also the organization of life must tend to psychologically introduce the personnel in the atmosphere of precariousness, typical of survival and escape. Consequently the equipment must be limited to the essentials necessary for the operational employment, the camp must be set up and taken down at the beginning and at the end of the daily activities, and sometimes even occasional shelters should be employed; as regards provisions, only a supply of hot meals at irregular intervals is envisaged while, in all other cases, the preparation of food is left to the individuals.

For attaining the goals described, the training methods will have to simultaneously develop the two already mentioned activities, the physical-moral one and the technical one, planning the development according to

operational assumptions, involving the active participation of the whole group.

For the first activity it is necessary to have an obstacle course similar to the traditional one, but equipped with structures that due to their width, height and difficulty cannot be surmounted by an individual alone, and should be comparable to the most difficult obstacles existing on the field. The structures should in any case be unexpensive, made with materials found on the spot or making use of elements available in the area, such as ravines, walls, canals, etc..

To meet the requirements outlined, this activity must be carried out by personnel organized for employment, carrying weapons, ammunition and equipment, with an attitude that guarantees a constant operational security and reactivity. To this end, one can liven up the training with explosive charges set along the course, to simulate enemy fire, or with the intervention of activators, to cause the reaction of the personnel under training.

As regards the technical-tactical activity, the themes have already been described during our mention of the training objectives and, owing to their simplicity, it is not necessary to illustrate here their procedures. Also in this instance it is appropriate to resort to already trained countering elements who, under the instructors' guidance, propose situations that could actually occur in reality.

CONCLUSIONS

The possibility that isolated elements can "filter out" and reach the friendly lines is a reality requiring a specific moral, physical and technical training. The training for operational survival answers this need because it improves the personnel's self-confidence and teaches them the indispensable notions for confronting emergencies.


This activity constitutes a training method that can concretely be introduced in the units programmes, because it is an unexpensive formula as regards training areas and structures.

On the other hand, besides the attainment of the immediate goals connected with the "filtering out", the most outstanding features of this activity are the moral and training effects on the soldiers' preparation and consequently on his operational efficiency. The grit acquired by the personnel comes from the consciousness of being able to do things outside the traditional themes and schemes and this requires personal qualities, such as initiative, imagination and autonomy of decision, which greatly encourage the individual's involvement. In the meantime, the development of an activity that bases its "philosophy" on mutual support and cooperation, improves esprit de corps, discipline and amalgamation of Commanders and subordinates.

From the training standpoint, the survival exercises developed according to preestablished procedures, can be a common denominator for the better integration of units belonging to different branches and specialities and can contribute to standardize the training methods of the activities following the 3rd cycle.

In this light, survival training can be taken into consideration as propaedeutic for exercises and activities which – as regards dynamism, fluidness and fragmentation of forces – are typical of the specialities destined to converge in the light infantry. To connect each activity with the units that could be interested in it, we mention:

- intervention against air – and sea – landings, especially in the fluid phases of search and contact and beachhead delimitation;
- employment for control of large areas, most of all in the



Control of large areas and infiltration of patrols in the enemy penetration flanks are activities which take place preferably in a mountain environment. The Alpine troops can therefore play a very important role within the light infantry.

sources of information, especially as regards the enemy formations closer to the line of contact, within which they have recently moved.

In conclusion, with our remarks we intend to present an atypical and specialistic training model that answers exceptional operational needs that could nevertheless realistically occur. Besides the validity of the answers to the particular problem, it has emerged that the results obtained, on their turn, can be the starting point for a wide range of distinctive operational activities for the units, especially if projected in the dimension of light infantry, and, in any case, can have a spill-over that improves its cohesion and operational level. Moreover, the possibility of carrying out the training within strict economic limits in every sector, makes this activity even more advantageous, all the more that it requires only little modifications in the current programmes.

In substance, its profitability and technical feasibility have been proved: it remains now to evaluate the convenience of introducing this model of training, at least in the light infantry units.

Col. Franco Monticone

mountain zone of the territory or in the mountain sector of the combat zone;

- areal counterinterdiction and interdiction;
- delaying action and dynamic contrast at any moment of the battle;
- infiltration of patrols on the flanks of enemy penetrations, especially in mountain and hill areas.


On the other hand, one must remark that it is indeed the units of light infantry, destined to be employed in direct contact with the enemy, often in fluid situations, which can more easily than others find

themselves isolated and "cut away" from the friendly troops; therefore, the training for operational survival can be of the greatest importance.

Finally, the operational results. The admittedly unintentional presence, behind the enemy lines, of well trained elements, create a sense of insecurity, despite the limited size of their actions: suffice it to think about the displacement of the road signs or of the enemy military signs or the mining of roads that the enemy believes already cleared. Meanwhile, once these elements have reentered the friendly lines, they become valuable

OPERATIONAL SURVIVAL AND LIGHT INFANTRY

THE BERSAGLIERI



A RUN THROUGH THE PAST A COMMITMENT FOR THE FUTURE



The one and a half centuries of history symbolized in the feathers adorning the Bersagliere's hat offer a wealth of events and leit-motifs for a deeply-felt epic evocation. But the very nature of the Bersagliere Corps, which was born as a challenge to traditional concepts, demands a different approach, which takes into account the many whys and wherefores of a continual contemporary and future challenge. It is in terms of the strength and determination of a collective programme capable of constant renewal that we can unravel the history of an idea, a passion, an impetus handed down over the years. Above all there is the challenge presented by the future: a challenge that the Bersagliere will meet with closed ranks and the enthusiasm that has always been theirs.

THE FORMULA FOR A NEW SOLDIER

The story told by the veteran Bersagliere to all the new recruits runs more or less as follows: "At daybreak on the 18th June 1836, the 'piercing sound of trumpets' caused the peaceful citizens to peer down from their balconies in doubt and confusion. It was the first company of the Bersagliere proceeding at the double towards a distant parade-ground, now buried amidst residential quarters. A few hours later, they were to be presented to King Carlo Alberto for his final approval".

In truth, the Bersagliere had come into existence some years before according to the blue-print drawn up by Alessandro Ferrero della Marmora. He was a Captain of the Guard, a brave and experienced officer who had studied and tested his tactical theories by close observation of our neighbours (France, England and Prussia). His instinctive grasp of military principles led him to see the lines of mass manoeuvre that Clausewitz had already theorized, for the initiated, in terms of the "speed" of the fundamental pawn – the individual soldier – and hence of the fighting units – first the companies and then the battalions.

As with so many things that afterwards appear obvious and self-evident, the concept was a real innovation. Heavy infantry, used with what almost amounted to contempt for the individual, constituted mass through weight of numbers and was the object, rather than the subject, on manoeuvre on a battlefield where only the cavalry was seen as an element of manoeuvre and surprise. It is therefore by reappraising and reflecting on the "Proposal for the formation of a company of Bersagliere and model of a carbine for their use", dated 1835 and sent by the Founder to the King of Sardinia to illustrate the requirements and characteristics of the Corps, that we can take the first step towards an understanding of the history of these one hundred and fifty years.

The document, albeit written with the concision typical of a service report, appears extraordinarily far-sighted in its vision of the requisites and tactical-training background necessary to produce a trained, efficient and, above all, motivated soldier.

In fact, alongside the solid physical qualities that are to be developed to the full by continual energetic activity, we find for the first time, the *sine qua non* of moral requisites ("perfect conduct, principally as regards honesty") and specific



Proposizione per la formazione di una Compagnia di Bersaglieri e modello di uno schioppo per l'uso loro ~

Convinto dei servizi importanti che potrebbe rendere una truppa di abili Bersaglieri, particolarmente nelle montagne e paesi rotti, quali coprono le Regie Stati e i confinanti suoi, e avvisando dell'indole e delle abitudini della popolazione la facilità di organizzarli; ha l'onore di sottoporre a V. S. R. M. una proposizione per la formazione di una Compagnia di Bersaglieri, e anche il modello di un'arma che a questo riuscirebbe di maggior vantaggio.

L'Arma fu congegnata all'uso di evitare gli inconvenienti operati nella Carabina semolata, sol'arma usata sin ad ora da questa specie di truppa; quali inconvenienti, consistendo principalmente nella lentezza del caricare e nel poco mezzo di difesa all'arma bianca, non danno abbastanza confidenza al Soldato per comprometterli corpo a corpo; perbuchi presso varie Piazze hanno chiamata questa truppa colla fantasia leggiera per intenerir recisamente, non senza grave danno nel servizio d'imbudue. Difatti: avendo un modo di combattere affatto opposto non possono a meno che di nuocersi a vicenda. L'Ufficio della truppa leggiera consiste nel distendersi, coprire di fuoco tutta la linea, e essere sparando; questi Bersaglieri devono invece portarsi in siti coperti, non sparare che dopo giunta a precisa portata, concentrare le palle su d'un punto solo, e non avere altra cura che di colpire con esattezza. Spesso di natura ad accompagnare le spedizioni tanto della truppa di linea che della leggiera, e prendendo ogni volta posizione, li Bersaglieri non si devono dunque considerare come una vera truppa leggiera, ma piuttosto come una specie di Artiglieria a piccola portata e di grande mobilità ~

*De La Marmora Capitano
dei Gran-Guardie*

1835

Left.

Facsimile of the proposal put forward by General La Marmora for the founding of the first company of Bersaglieri.

Right:


Above.


The "quadriglia" of the Bersaglieri. This formation helps give continuity and efficacy to firepower. The resulting small organic unit is capable of acting independently and fully exploiting the functions of the corporal.

Below.

Percussion carbine mod. 1844 with bayonet and gunpowder horn.

characteristics which, in today's language, could be defined as aptitudinal, for instance, marksmanship. In particular, physical and gymnastic activity was considered both as schooling in courage and daring and as a means developing basic skills ("running, jumping over ditches and barriers, climbing trees and walls, swimming"). These skills were to enable the Bersagliere to act in an unprecedented way and with greater autonomy; they were to produce a soldier possessing tenacity and endurance and capable of operating in difficult conditions, but above all of carrying out a decidedly innovatory tactical function. This function derived from the need, on the battlefield, for a mobile element which was capable of rapid deployment and reaction and able to operate on rough terrain where cavalry would be relatively ineffective. In short, the Commanders were offered a new and reliable option for tactical manoeuvre, defined as the concentration of effort in the right place at the right time, enabling them to intervene rapidly with considerable firepower. The latter was provided by a new weapon of great power and precision, the "schioppo". The accuracy of this weapon was such as to guarantee marksmanship, the essential characteristic of this new Corps, whose name could be translated as the "sharpshooters".





Bersaglieri training for the somersault. Physical and gymnastic activity provides the Bersagliere with a schooling in courage and daring and serves to develop his basic skills.

new Corps, something quite different from that of the traditional infantry or the light infantry used to cover a line. The Bersaglieri were the forerunners of a modern concept of manoeuvre, and their fire and movement brought out the basic requisites ("deploying each time ... like a sort of short-range and highly mobile artillery").

Thus, unlike the other infantry divisions, the Bersaglieri were agile and swift, they moved without cumbersome wagons, they were self-sufficient (having "block provisions" for three days and 100 cartridges), and they were provided with an essential logistic support by the company, which was furnished with a small wagon containing the essential equipment and "the armourer's workshop". Their equipment was studied with great care so that each and every detail corresponded to some precise functional requirement, from the hat ("made so as to protect the back of the head from the heat of the sun and to prevent rain from running down the neck") to the pack with three compartments and the accoutrements with the ammunitions for immediate use and "the small objects necessary for loading the weapon".

The first years of activity were to serve as field testing for the contents of the "Proposal" and to prepare the new soldier for his "baptism of fire", which was to come with the First War of Independence (Ponte di Goito, 1848). The historic CEPPI Barracks were full of ropes and apparatus never seen before in the Army, whose training methods had so far been elementary and repetitive. There, day after day, the men gained experience

The "schioppo" was a special carbine capable of firing 7/10 rounds every two minutes over a range of 400 paces. The weapons of the time were effective at no more than 300 paces and could fire only 3/4 shots in the same two minute period. The barrel of the "schioppo" could withstand at least 100 consecutive shots as against the 30/40 of the other weapons.

A decisive contribution to the efficacy of firepower was also to be made by the new technique adopted. In place of the pairs of marksmen used

by the infantry, the men were grouped in fours (known as the "quadriglia" of the Bersaglieri), the oldest of whom became the natural commander and took charge of operations. This formation gave greater continuity and incisiveness to firepower and, at the same time, gave birth to the first small organic unit capable of acting independently and fully exploiting the functions of the corporal.

As regards these and for many other aspects, the "Proposal" delineated a selective and decisive use for the

The "Ten Commandments" of the Bersagliere, written by La Marmora. This is the spiritual testament left by the founder of the Bersaglieri.

of the concrete aspects of commitment, fatigue and imagination. However, the activities of the Bersaglieri were not confined to those barracks or to the others that were gradually to follow. As the "Proposal" had laid down, "they are to be inured to forced marches and to be fully acquainted with the country, especially the mountains and the borders". They were to be found moving swiftly in full kit on the slopes of Monferrato, the crests of the Canavese and on the foggy banks of the Po and the Sesia, wherever the terrain could be used as a tough training-ground. They were soldiers who trained hard and whose abilities developed day after day, together with their esprit de corps.

It was then, in the field, that the "Ten Commandments", the vigorous precepts which La Marmora imparted to his men, were developed. These were not only free from "sacrilegious" intent, but were intended to provide the men with a simple but absolute ethical basis. In fact, there are two elements that distinguish the Bersagliere: physical training and self-confidence. These are the requisites of a well-trained and gallant soldier, of one prepared for great tasks and, above all, of a man who is resolute and fully aware of the important role he is called upon to play.

A SOLDIER WHO HAS NEVER GONE OUT OF DATE

While recalling their origins can help us to understand the innovatory impact of the Bersaglieri on the battlefield, a re-examination of some of the basic characteristics of the Corps, which have emerged in the course of its 150 years of history, can be equally useful



in focussing on their unchanging adherence to the operative requirements that have emerged over the years and, above all, how they fit in with the complex world of today.

In fact, the Bersaglieri have always displayed a kind of penchant for extremely difficult situations, where the limits of the foreseeable are soon surpassed and it is necessary to draw on man's deepest resources. In this sense, the name sometimes given them of "soldiers of the impossible" is right and appropriate. This begins with the physical

component: this basic characteristic, viewed in the wider sense of vigour, endurance and agility, has made of the Bersagliere a steadfast and determined soldier, trained to be consciously courageous. This is why he has so often found within himself those elements necessary to carry out a task, even at the limits of survival.

The moral and spiritual component deserves special consideration. On the one hand, it represents a basic heritage, carefully preserved over the years. On the other, it involves the experience of the individual

within the collective atmosphere of the Corps, an experience shared with generosity in the fraternal spirit of comradeship and solidarity. In this way, the unity of the Corps has laid the ground for immediate and complete social relationships and so enabled the individual to become more fully aware of his own value.

Acting in a small group has prevented the soldier from feeling hemmed in by an indifferent anonymity and stimulated him to discover and develop his personal capacities. Now, more than ever before, all this appears as the right way to produce a soldier from whom we demand full self-awareness, resolve and, especially in situations of isolation, a strong sense of initiative.

While such elements seem to be closely akin to the human component of the Bersaglieri, others, which are certainly more strictly bound up with today's needs and the new operational and technological situations, have developed to keep their performance and tactical potential in step with the times. In fact, the Corps has a natural predisposition towards innovation and has always been eager to try out new instruments and techniques. Whenever possible, it has sought to develop means and equipment to ensure that its decisive capacity remains vital and up to date. The need for functionality was felt by the Founder and expressed in the care and understanding with which the equipment was designed. This has become the essential element in the constant endeavour to ensure that the instruments used are fully able to do what is required of them.

Against this background, mention of the development from the bicycle to the tracked vehicle by way of the motorcycle and the armoured car recalls visually some of the significant moments in a continuous process of adaptation to the changed




Left.
1849. Officer in field uniform.


Below.
Bersaglieri on the double.
The physical component, seen in its widest sense as vigour, endurance and agility, has made the Bersagliere a resolute soldier, imbued with conscious courage.

Right:
Top left.
Cyclist Bersagliere in the First World War.

Top right.
Motorcyclist Bersagliere in the African campaign.

Bottom.
Bersaglieri in action on the "M113" combat vehicle.







Left.

Bersaglieri landing from a "CH47" transport helicopter.

Below.

Bersaglieri in action on an LAV (Light Armoured Vehicle) armoured car.



entrance on to the battlefields.

They therefore continued to provide the Commander with an essential element for manoeuvre and all the more so as they were organized into brigade-size reserve units and thus had to have a superior capacity in order to intervene at any stage of the fighting and handle any type of operational situation.

THE PROBLEMS OF TODAY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE

Halfway through the 1970's, the Army General Staff decided that, for the armed forces to develop naturally, full mechanization would be necessary. Thus, while the basic fighting forces have been given tactical mobility and a capacity for manoeuvre in keeping with the times, the Bersaglieri have lost one of the characteristics that distinguished them from the rest of the infantry: superior mobility and speed of manoeuvre. Certain particular characteristics of the Corps have been preserved intact, but this potential has not been completely exploited owing to the lack of a suitable vehicle.

It must also be observed that the rationalization of the establishment, which has recently been implemented by the Army, will mean significant variations in the tasks of certain Brigades, and it has been envisaged that Bersaglieri units will be used for the same sort of roles as mechanized infantry. At the same time, the constant modifications to weapons systems and tactics together with developments in the international situation, have led to a general operational

requirements of the times. In this process, the adoption of a new means of transport has meant increased capacity for movement, use of arms and, in general, tactical action. In the period during and following the Second World War, a part

of the infantry was supplied with transport to allow it to cover ground swiftly. It was then that the Bersaglieri became mechanized infantry integrated with the tank divisions into the brigade-size units that had recently made their dramatic

context offering new prospects for employment. These prospects are expressed in the five operational missions laid down for the Armed Forces in the 1985 White Paper on Defence.

The need has also been felt for a rapid intervention force for national and international use (FIR). The characteristics of this force recall the basic elements of the concept and use of the Corps of Bersaglieri. This would seem to open up interesting possibilities in delineating a new role to meet the more general need for an intervention and manoeuvre force having greater rapidity and flexibility than other Units, albeit of high level, in order to undertake decisive actions.

La Marmora foresaw this 150 years ago, and Italy has been able to count on this force ever since. While some of the skills demanded explain why it is considered an elite corps, the profound ties with the people and the expression of sentiments deeply rooted in the popular spirit, from which it has drawn its distinguishing features have led to the forging of close bonds with the country, for which it has never spared energy and commitment. At present, the Corps is imbued with a renewed impulse and all its members are intent on preserving its original values and affirming its spiritual, physical and preparatory characteristics. At the same time, a climate of expectation is being created with regard to the prospects for the future of the role and possible operational employment of the Bersaglieri.

But what organization, means and equipment are to be given to the Bersaglieri to ensure that they can to meet the demands of the new situations?

There are many possible answers: heliborne units; the infantry made up entirely of Bersaglieri; transferring to the Corps all those belonging to Bersaglieri-type Brigades e.g., "Goito", "Garibaldi", and so on. As usual, it is best to bear in

mind the real situation and its conditioning effects, and to try to draw up and propose programmes that can be implemented and are capable of ensuring full exploitation of the particular characteristics of the Corps are maintained, without putting forward unfeasible plans for strengthening it.

Sticking closely to the actual operational situation and the context of possible uses at present and in the future, the most satisfactory solution and the most economical and most effective way of remaining true to tradition, but in a decidedly modern form, seems to be that of retaining the present 13 battalions (one of which is for the training of recruits) and arranging for them to be deployed as follows:

- in the framework of the "Goito" Brigade (3 battalions) or, alternatively, of the Armoured Brigades (one per Brigade) (1st combined-forces mission);
- in the framework of the light infantry Brigades employed on the operational defence of the territory (4th operational combined-forces mission): one per Brigade with the exception of the Brigade assigned to the FIR (5th operational combined-forces mission), all of whose infantry should consist of Bersaglieri.

In the framework of the "Goito" Brigade or the Armoured Brigades, given the tasks that can reliably be foreseen for such brigade-size units, the Bersaglieri would continue to serve as a multi-purpose infantry, suitable for use in the decisive stages of a battle and equipped for the most varied and heterogeneous actions (typical of the reserve). In such fluid situations, when moral steadfastness, physical endurance, spirit of initiative and psychological resolution are essential, it is necessary to operate rapidly on foot, in armoured vehicles, on and with tanks and, above all, by helicopter.

In the Brigades of light infantry (one battalion per

Brigade), the Bersaglieri would be provided with armoured cars armed with mounting guns and wheeled armoured vehicles, and also trained to operate by helicopter. They would thus enable the Commander to act immediately and decisively against any threat in any part of the territory under his command. Promptness, speed, striking force, initiative and determination are the essential elements, and these can be guaranteed by the battalion of Bersaglieri.

The same unit would be able to provide immediate aid for the victims of natural disasters, situations in which the intrinsic qualities of the Corps have always proved indispensable to ensure effective action.

Finally, in the Brigade assigned to the FIR, the use of Bersaglieri units as infantry requires no explanation or indication of motives. It is evident that the services required are exactly those offered by the Bersaglieri.

The implementation of this proposal is naturally to be seen in terms of the plan for the rationalization of the Army and the dates it has set.

At a time when the Bersaglieri are joyfully preparing to celebrate their anniversary, there are vital reasons and incentives to continue consistently and effectively.

This stirring celebration is intended to show our deep respect for the men with their plumed hats who have served Italy, often to the point of laying down their lives for her, together with our concern for the young men who today wear the plumes with the same enthusiasm. Together they represent a pledge to conserve and develop the operational capacity and spiritual heritage of the Corps in a future which will bring organic reorganization and new tasks suited to the characteristics which have distinguished the Bersaglieri for the last 150 years.

General Luigi Ramponi




SKYGUARD

Gun/Missile Air Defense

Skyguard is designed for various operational configurations, i.e. for the control of medium-calibre anti-aircraft guns and/or guided missiles. The usual Skyguard fire unit consists of the fire control system and two to three guns and/or missile launchers. The transmission of data and commands to the guns and/or launchers occurs via a standard 2-wire connection (twisted field telephone cable).


Skyguard, the miniaturized all-weather Fire Control System is designed for permanent surveillance as well as accurate control of medium-calibre AA-guns and surface-to-air missiles. Skyguard operates to a large extent fully automatically and provides effective protection against attacking aircraft and missiles.



This mobile and compact electronic system consists of the following main assemblies: ● Pulse doppler search radar with automatic target alarm ● Pulse doppler tracking radar ● Combat display system ● TV-tracking system ● Miniaturized and programmable digital computer ● Digital data transmission system ● Human-engineered lay-out of control console ● Integrated power supply unit ● Fire-resistant air-conditioned operator cabin.

Skyguard—the advanced electronic system for air defense—developed by Contraves

SKY 
GUARD




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THE WALLS AND FORTS OF ROME

MOENIA MUNDI



The ancient Romans used the term "moenia" not only for the walls, but for some dwelling places and every kind of permanent barrier or dividing line. The city of Rome, the "urbs" that became "orbis" as Latin civilisation spread (at the height of the Empire it could be described as "romana urbs et orbis"), had no need of surrounding walls. But this had not always been the case; in ancient times the "eternal city" had been no more than a four-sided village. The mythical square Rome founded by Romulus and defended by shepherds was built on the Palatine hill, and still today the remains can be seen of what was originally a fence and then became a sturdy 1,500 metre long wall that was to enclose the most ancient hill in Rome. Subsequently, a complete wall was erected, again by Romulus, on the nearby Capitoline hill, which was later to become the real city acropolis. As the population grew on the surrounding hills, a sizeable perimeter wall became necessary. Making use of the fortifications that already existed on the various hills, it was to form a bulwark against any invasion. This work was attributed to king Servius Tullius, and was carried out after the unification of all the villages on the left bank of the Tiber, including the legendary seven hills of Rome and, in part, the Gianiculum.

The great wall erected round the city by Servius varied in width from 2.30 to 4.50 metres; here and there earthworks made it even wider. The stretch to the east of the Viminal hill was called the "aggere", as it was protected by a ditch running alongside it. In all, the wall was about 14 kilometres long, and was reinforced at the points most vulnerable to attack from the neighbouring populations. Just a few remains of this cyclopean wall can be seen today; the tourist arriving in Rome is faced with them as he leaves Termini station. During the Empire the city expanded, taking in the new quarters on the right bank of the Tiber. But, as



we have seen, there was no need for a protecting wall until 271 A.D. It was then that the Emperor Aurelian decided to begin work on the walls that have gone down in history with his name, and which are still largely visible. Aurelian's rule was preceded by disturbances at home and abroad; the barbarians broke through the Danube frontier that Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Varus had defended, while competition between the Senate and the Army had led to a particularly critical situation in Italy. In 285 the Alemannic invasion had shown that Italy could only be defended south of the Alps, and a network of forts was built along the Milan-Verona-Aquileia line. A further invasion was launched during the rule of Aurelian, and this time the Alemannic forces got as far as Piacenza, where the Imperial Army was beaten. This spate of events showed how urgent it

was to protect the city; by now the invaders could reach the gates at any moment. The workers employed on building the walls were recruited from the civil corporations, as the Army had more than enough to do on the frontier. Military engineers drew up the plans for the 18 kilometres of wall and, to avoid annoying the inhabitants, many entrances were made in it for the consular roads. No civilians were allowed up onto the emplacements along the open battlements, reserved for soldiers working the catapults, or the covered ones, which were for the archers. Every thirty metres there stood a square tower where the "ballistrarii" artillerymen were stationed above with their catapults and great crossbows, and the archers below. The walls were 3.50 metres thick and 6 tall, while the towers rose 6 metres above the battlements.

This type of wall had to hold out against both sporadic and continuous assaults in which special siege machinery was not employed. The barbarian peoples were usually on the move, making forays here and there, and, given their nomadic character, were hardly likely to besiege the city for a long period of time. The only serious threats to the walls came from Roman generals: Severus and Valerius in 307,

and Constantine in 310. In 401-402 Honorius doubled the height of the towers and walls, and restructured the inner parts. It is worth noting that building methods similar to those we find in paleo-Christian architecture were employed here; in the stretches restored at that time crosses and symbols show that there were Christians among the workmen.

The walls, which stood up against the sieges of Alaric and Totila, thanks also to restorations carried out under Theodorich, were again strengthened in the Middle Ages, when Saracen invasions were feared. Particular attention was given to the part on the right of the Tiber, where the Popes began fortifying the Vatican by means of the Leonine wall. The sixteenth century saw some of the greatest geniuses of the time, Michelangelo and Sangallo among them, at work on projects to defend the Holy See.

In the XVIIth century Urban VIII decided to further reinforce the right bank of the Tiber with a triangle of turreted walls extending from Montorio down to the Capitoline and Gianicolense bridges. The task of substituting the dilapidated Aurelian wall with a more efficient one was entrusted to Maculano, who came up with the project of a wall bastioned with earthworks and buttresses, rising from Porta Portuense to Porta Cavalleggeri.

Castel Sant'Angelo has a story of its own. Standing on the foundations of the ancient mausoleum of Hadrian, it was transformed into a fortress in the Vth century, and in the XVIth century it was restored and extended with the addition of bastions.

The story of Rome's glorious walls ends with a fanfare; the breach at Porta Pia in 1870. The walls actually had to be breached as they were still perfectly functional.

So one chapter closed as a new one opened; the debate now turned to the need to defend the capital of the new Italian State.

Preceding page.

Born in ancient times as a small, square village, Rome through the various ages increased her walls and, in order to protect her roads of approach, built stately fortifications.

In the picture, a view of the Ardeatinus rampart merlons.

Above.

Front view of Ardeatinus rampart.

As ancient Rome expanded, so the walls had to be extended. The first wall was built by Romulus in the VIIIth century B.C. on the Palatine hill, around the new city he had founded; consequently it bears his name, or was called the "square wall" because its line more or less described a square.

Subsequently, with more time and means available, a sturdier wall of 1,500 metres was built. Three or four gateways were made in it. The ruins of this wall can still be seen at several points around the base of the Palatine hill. To reinforce the outer part of the north-west wall, Romulus had built an enclosure on the Capitoline hill.

Once the survival of Romulus' city had been ensured with civil and military works, and its fame increased as the news of its power under the first kings spread, the hills around the Palatine began to be populated. Probably a village was formed on each hill, with its own walls, linked to the next village by stretches of wall built across the valley lying between. Servius Tullius united all the villages and provided the city that evolved with a surrounding wall, making much use of the walls already erected on the individual hills. The Servian wall is in fact still known by the name of "the king's wall", being a combination of the constructions erected by Servius with pre-existing ones.


The massive wall varied between 2.30 to 4.50 metres in thickness according to the particular conditions of the

places it traversed. In parts, however, it became a double wall, or rather a wall with embankment. It was 14 kilometres long, three kilometers of which on the right bank of the Tiber, and formed a sort of vast military camp crossed by two great roads coming to a cross-roads below the Palatine. Along its whole length there were pomoeria, both within and without. The inner pomoerium was diverted below the Aventine, and had as reinforcement points: the Capitoline towards the Tiber, and then beyond in the direction of the Etruscans; the "agger" towards the Aniene and the Latins, Sabines, Equi and Ernici beyond; the Coelian hill and the Aventine in the direction of the Latins and the sea; the Gianiculum (on the right of the Tiber) in the direction of the Veienti; and finally, as a redoubt, the Palatine, where Romulus' sturdy walls still stood. The few remaining ruins of the Servian wall suffice to show the line it followed.

Although the Imperial city grew out of the area described by the Servian walls, they remained the official limits of the city almost until the third century A.D. In 271 Emperor Aurelian decided to extend the area embraced by walls as a precaution against possible raids of the barbarians, who were making threatening noises on the frontiers of the vacillating Empire. The great work Aurelian began was completed by his successors and so the third wall, most of which is still standing, is known

as the Aurelian Wall. This remained unchanged until the XVIIth century, when Pope Urban VIII decided to reinforce it on the right bank of the Tiber, where only a part of Trastevere was enclosed. A sort of triangle of turreted walls which ran down from the top of Montorio to the Capitoline and Gianicolense bridges. Not long before, the Pope had got Maculano to transform the sides of the bulwarks on the third wall of Castel Sant'Angelo with round outworks, the sides themselves sloping inwards. In 1642 and 1643 Maculano replaced the dilapidated Aurelian walls on the right of the Tiber with a new fortification. Maculano's walls climb the Gianiculum from Porta Cavalleggeri, coming down to Porta Portuense, and are bastioned with earthworks and buttresses. Twelve bulwarks with sloping sides were set at the most tactically important points, and the whole fitted in perfectly with the lie of the land.

When Rome was occupied in 1870 the question of fortifying the city was much debated; it was now the capital of the new State as well as the seat of the head of Christianity. Some wanted no fortification whatsoever, some a vast entrenched camp or fortified region, and yet others an entrenched camp of limited extent to defend the city against raids from enemy troops landing on the coast nearby. It was the last of these solutions that won the day, and within a few years the city was surrounded by a ring of forts.



THE FORTS OF ROME


The problem of the fortification of the city is an aspect of the historical development of Rome, especially from the XVth century onwards.

Since then project has followed project, and the general plan of the city has been progressively modified as various defensive constructions have been erected. From the ancient four-sided shape it passed to a plan that was symbolically star-shaped through the erection of independent defensive nuclei corresponding to the fortified villas. As we have already seen, XVth century Rome was a real testing ground for the contemporary geniuses of the art of fortification.



After the breach of Porta Pia, in 1880 steps were taken to restructure the city's defensive system so that the new capital could become "a great fortress, provided with the most powerful defences, free from any danger of bombardment, and so capable of the most unwavering and lasting resistance" according to the opinion of the permanent committee for the general defence of the State.

In 1880 Captain De Giorgis worked out the project of an extensive entrenched field with a double line of fire including 19 forts and 12 batteries. The polygonal forts were to be situated in the vicinity of the consular roads on the high ground surrounding the city. Names were assigned by royal decree according to where they were built. The ring of forts formed a perimeter of 40 kilometres, thus expanding the urban area of the city. The soaring population of the new capital was reflected in the spread of dwellings that came within the immediate vicinity of the military zones. The techniques employed and the strategic functions the constructions were to perform show that military thinking lagged behind the times, military art was inadequate to cope with the demands and changes of the industrial society that was then coming into being. They

THE GROWTH OF ROME IN COMPARISON



WITH THE LOCATION OF FORTS



were conceived of as small fortresses, and proved inadequate even for simple use as barracks. Tufa blocks were used almost everywhere for structural purposes, alternating with the sporadic use of stone or travertine. Construction was completed within five years at a cost of 25 million, against the 46 originally budgeted for. The forts did not play such a long functional rôle in the defence of Rome as the previous defensive constructions because of the rapid evolution of our industrial age.

All the forts of Rome still show today the same rectangular plan, including buildings and a central parade ground. At times the original plan was modified because of the need to put up new buildings inside the fort, to be used for archives or as depots. Only three of them are open to the public today.

Let us take them in order:


Forte Trionfale: This dominates via Trionfale north of Monte Mario; it is in a good state of repair and is used as the headquarters on the 10th Signals battalion.

Forte Monte Mario: It houses the quartermaster's stores and the signals centre of the Carabinieri and the Army. Overlooking the Tiber valley 2 kilometres north of the Vatican walls, it rises 146 metres above sea-level. The buildings are in good condition.

Forte Braschi: Situated near Pineta Sacchetti, four kilometres from Porta Cavalleggeri; the buildings, where various units of the army are quartered, are in good condition.

Forte Boccea: not far from via Aurelia Nuova, it extends for 7.3 square kilometres. It is used as a military prison; the buildings are well preserved.


Forte Aurelio: This is the headquarters of the 18th Legion of the Guardia di Finanza; the buildings cover 42,000 square metres and have recently been restored. It dominates via Aurelia Antica four kilometres from Porta S. Sebastiano.




Forte Trionfale




Forte Aurelio




Forte Monte Mario




Forte Bravetta




Forte Braschi



Forte Portuense



Forte Boccea



Forte Ostiense

Forte Bravetta: It is situated in a protected area and houses the Rome Artillery Directorate, with buildings in good condition covering an area of about 4,000 square metres; it dominates the Casetta Mattei road.

Forte Portuense: Situated in a heavily built-up area; the buildings, in poor condition, have partly been assigned to ACLI as a sports centre, and partly to the Municipal Registry Office. It is the last fort on the right bank of the Tiber and overlooks via Portuense.

Forte Ostiense: The buildings are in good condition and are to be used to house ONAO GAP, a religious organisation for aid to the handicapped. The fort dominates the Ostiense and Laurentina roads, and is near the Cristoforo Colombo road.


Forte Ardeatino: After having been returned to the municipal authorities by the Finance Ministry, it has fallen into a state of disrepair although it stands near a fine pine-wood and the church of the Annunziata on via Ardea; it is now threatened by an encroaching sprawl of unauthorized constructions.

Forte Appio: It houses the archives of the XIth Motor Transport Group and a depot for material from the first world war. It is situated four kilometres from the Appian Way, near the tomb of Cecilia Metella.


Forte Acquasanta: Here are the quarters of the control centre for Air Force supplies and the veterinary surgery of the 4th Regiment of Mounted Carabinieri; in a good state of repair, it stands near the via Appia Pignatelli.

Forte Casilino: Used as a store-house by the Air Force, it is near the airport of Centocelle; excavations in the vicinity have unearthed a Roman villa.


Forte Prenestino: With buildings in good condition, in part used by the Opera Don Bosco. In 1977 it was consigned to the municipal authorities, but



Forte Ardeatino




Forte Appio




Forte Acquasanta




Forte Casilino




Forte Prenestino



Forte Tiburtino



Forte Pietralata



Forte Antenne

is still basically unfit for use; it is at four kilometres from Porta Maggiore.

Forte Tiburtino: Quarters of the Second Battalion of Grenadiers, it is situated on the via Tiburtina, the ancient road leading to Tivoli; it has 80,000 square metres of buildings in good condition.

Forte Pietralata: It stands in a heavily populated area, and is quarters of the mechanised brigade "Granatieri di Sardegna". The buildings are in good condition, dominating a stretch of the river Aniene and the via Nomentana.

Forte Antenne: Occupied by unauthorised installations, it is in a state of total abandon; on this hill rose the Sabine settlement called Antenne because of its position "ante amnem", looking directly towards the Tiber. Shanty dwellings, water tanks and a general proliferation of squalor have made it practically unrecognisable.

This brief review of the forts shows that only those under the control of the Defence Administration have been kept in good condition.

Carlo Felici

THE WALLS AND FORTS OF ROME

KBA 25 mm Cannon



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The KBA cannon and its ammunition has been introduced in various NATO and other modern forces.




Technical data:

- Calibre
- Rate of fire
- Muzzle velocity v_0
- Mass of complete cannon ready for integration

25 mm
600 rounds/min
1100/1335 m/s

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MILITARY PRESS IN EUROPE



**TODAY'S EUROPEAN MILITARY PRESS IS SET
ON A COURSE TO GET RID OF THE
PRESENT PROVINCIALISM AND ACHIEVE
A EUROPEAN AWARENESS**

Military periodicals, which deal with subjects of a particularly technical nature, are finding an increasingly large readership among the general public. The White Paper of the Italian Ministry of Defence informs us that 30% of the readers of such publications do not belong to the armed forces.

As regards *Rivista Militare* in particular, a questionnaire survey carried out among habitual readers has furnished data differing significantly from the national average.

With regard to the readers' professions, it turned out that first place was occupied by students (22.5%). Then followed professional soldiers (21.9%) and office workers (21.2%). In fourth place was a group including professional people (8.4%), pensioners (6.5%), workers (5.2%) and other occupations (4.7%). In fifth place was another group: teachers (2.7%), shopkeepers (2.3%) and businessmen (2.1%). At the end we find manufacturers (0.7%) and diplomats (0.1%). 1.7% failed to answer the question.

The questionnaire also revealed that 42.6% of the habitual readers of *Rivista Militare* also read other Italian magazines dealing with problems of defence; 41.3% read only *Rivista Militare*; and 16.1% purchase other Italian and foreign publications besides *Rivista Militare*.

These data are of particular interest in the context of the complex relationship between the Armed Forces and public opinion. In short, the idea that the citizen receives of military institutions and his understanding of security and defence are above all the result of "messages" launched by the mass media. These "messages" are elements that influence the process whereby "public opinion" is formed. "Public opinion", in turn, is an element that influences the conduct and decisions of the authorities. Military institutions should therefore concern themselves with the sector of information on problems of security (a sector that can easily become a breeding-ground for pressure groups) in such a way as to provide the citizen with the "news" in a complete, reliable and impartial form. Neither is it sufficient for the "news" to reach only those directly involved or certain cultural elites: it must also reach "public opinion".


In a series of interviews published in *Rivista Militare* (n. 3/84), the editors of the Italian daily papers stressed two concepts that are fundamental to this issue.

Firstly: the Italian citizen is not sufficiently informed about defence problems.


Secondly: the mass media dealing with defence problems usually do so with evident prejudices. These are due to a lack of understanding of this specific field and to a priori ideological attitudes.

The interviews also brought out the fact that little has been done by the military world to escape from this, by no means positive, situation. The Armed


SURVEY PROFESSION OF READERS



INTERESTS OF THE READERS OF RIVISTA MILITARE



ROLE OF THE MILITARY PUBLIC INFORMATION SERVICE



Forces have started to make use of advanced technology, of computers, of telematics and the latest developments of industries in the forefront, if not in the avant-garde. They have begun an internal process to rid themselves of a certain provincialism and to tend increasingly towards what could be termed a culture "of exchange" on international lines. The effort to communicate military matters is, however, directed towards a "public opinion" that is not mature enough to take in certain problems. This is due to a traditional prejudice against military institutions and to the provincialism and lack of background knowledge that prevail as regards the understanding of defence problems.


It is therefore clear that the military publications in Italy, and especially *Rivista Militare*, must move along two operative lines. On the one hand, they carry out the essential function of informing "public opinion", making up to some extent for the scant attention usually paid by the mass media to defence problems. On the other, they contribute thoughts and ideas to the general amplification and modernisation of the preparation of the Cadres and to a broadening of their minds.

It would, however, be excessively limiting for us to confine our examination solely to Italian military publications while the world is shrinking daily thanks to modern systems of telecommunications and computer facilities that are capable of transmitting information in a matter of seconds.

Our investigation must include the whole of Western Europe, which has more than 50 publications dealing with military matters and intended for the information of the general public. These publications may be classified under

two general headings: those published by organs of the Armed Forces and those privately published and extraneous to the military structures.

As though moved by a natural instinct towards aggregation, the former have formed the European Military Press Agency (EMPA) and the latter the Mönch Publishing Group.



EMPA

EMPA came into being after a Congress organised by *Rivista Militare* in 1977 and attended by the representatives of 13 publications of the Armed Forces of Austria, Belgium, France, W. Germany, Great Britain, Holland and Switzerland. The purpose of the Congress was to define ways and means for carrying out a policy of increasing cultural and informative activity in the European sphere.

The periodical "**Nederlands Militair Geneeskundig Tijdschrift**" (NMGT), which deals with problems of medicine, is the official organ of the Health Service of the Dutch Armed Forces. Its tradition goes as far back as 1863, when the publication of the "Naval Medical Review" began.

Its purpose is to provide the Cadres of the Dutch Armed Forces with information. It makes use of the work of a team of medical officers specialised in various branches.










The NMGT is at present circulated among the military and civilian staff attached to the Health Service of the Dutch Armed Forces, the state health structures, including those abroad, the universities and libraries. The periodical may be requested by any health service interested in it.


Each article is accompanied by a short summary in English. For the articles of greatest interest, complete versions in English, French or German are supplied.

While the NMGT operates in the specific field of military medicine, it is also an effective means of spreading information as it is aimed at the general public and has a decidedly combined-forces character.

In his official report, General Dionisio Sepielli, then editor of *Rivista Militare*, re-affirmed the rôle played by the military publications in their formative and informative functions. He formulated a theme that still retains all of its topicality: "The place of the military press in society and in Europe". The first result was obtained in the course of the Congress itself, when the representative of *Rivista Militare* of the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland







"Soldier", the official periodical of the British Army, was first distributed in 1945 as the newspaper of the BLA (British Liberation Army) of the British troops who were about to attack the Rhine. Today, it has a large circulation throughout the world, and particularly in English-speaking countries.

"Soldier" is read by a wide section of the general public, above all in Great Britain, where it is an important means of communication between the British Army, which is based on voluntary service, and the civilian population.

One peculiarity that distinguishes the magazine is that it has an all-civilian staff.



The operators of the audio-visual services of formation and information are also associated with EMPA.

In W. Germany, the "Filmschau der Bundeswehr", a body that comes under the Combined-Forces Federal Centre of Information, produces a monthly film of approximately 30 minutes' duration aimed at bringing the military personnel of the 3 Armed Forces up-to-date on current affairs, especially those in the NATO countries.


Right: Herr Bralene, in charge of the production of "Filmschau". Left: Colonel Schuring, Head of the Combined-Forces Federal Centre of Information.



land presented the draft of a document aimed at setting up a European organisation to "take in" all of the military periodicals. This was the origin of EMPA, which was shortly afterwards to take on its present form as an association of the editors and editorial staff of the European military magazines and the military audio-visual means of formation and information. The purpose of the association is to broaden professional relations, to bring about a high level of exchange of experience and to promote knowledge of the European armies also in terms of general culture. At present, EMPA includes roughly thirty military magazines. These belong both to NATO countries (Belgium, France, W. Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Spain and Italy) and to neutral countries (Austria and Switzerland). A Congress of their representatives is held every two years.

Left.

The military publications represented at the 1977 Congress, at which the preliminary work for setting up the EMPA was done.



"Kampftruppen" is the "news" periodical of the W. German Army. It was founded in 1958 on the initiative of the then Commander of the fighting troops and deals freely with the tactical, technical and "basic" problems that can arise in the course of operations.

"Kampftruppen" thus pursues two objectives: to promote thought about the operational reality of the various arms and specialities so as to force people to look "over the fence"; and to observe and evaluate the connections between sectoral and combined forces problems.

A further objective is that of making the experience gained with new materials available to the home public, who are thus given access to useful suggestions and information.



These Congresses normally study strategies to increase co-operation and define the lines of development of the military magazines by distinguishing methods, information channels and levels achieved in the process towards the greater mutual understanding and the unification of the peoples of Western Europe.



THE MÖNCH GROUP

The Hönch Group was started in Koblenz in 1952 by the publisher Jupp Mönch, who was in charge of a publication for the French forces of occupation in Germany. At the end of the 1950s, some publications were also prepared for the re-constituted German Federal Army. These were initially for the brigade-size units, and subsequently for the Ministry of Defence. The publications took the names of "Heer", "Luftwaffe" and "Marine". In 1975 "Wehr und Wissen" was taken over. This publishing house had already embarked on a vast programme which included the publishing of year-books, training manuals and the periodical "Wehrtechnik". The latter was soon to become one of the leading German-language military publications.

In 1976, the Mönch Group was joined by the publishing house of "Bernard & Graefe" with their "Marine Rundschau International" and special issues on weapons. The same year also the Dutch publisher "Jules Perel" joined the group with its periodical "Nato's Sixteen Nations". At the end of the 1970s, the activity of the group was further extended by the publication of new periodicals: "Military Technology" in the English language, "Tecnologia Militar" in Spanish, "Naval Forces" and "Canadian Defence Quarterly" in English, "Rivista Italiana Difesa" in Italian and "Pti" in Greek.

All the publications of the Mönch Group make use of the services of civilian correspondents and military experts on defence problems.

The exchange of articles in Europe between the various magazines of the group ensures a constant and up-to-date flow of ideas and information regarding political and military problems and the development trends of




Right, from top.

Some military periodicals published by the Mönch Publishing Group.

Dr. Manfred Sadlowski (right) and Dr. Ezio Bonsignore (left), respectively Editor in Chief and Executive Director of the Mönch Group, in conversation with the Editor of Rivista Militare.





RIVISTA MILITARE RIVISTA MILITARE RIVISTA MILITARE RIVISTA MILITARE RIVISTA MILITARE RIVISTA MILITARE RIVISTA MILITARE RIVISTA MILITARE RIVISTA MILITARE DELLA SVIZZERA ITALIANA PUBBLICAZIONE BIMESTRALE

Anno LVIII Fascicolo 2 6806 Lugano, marzo-aprile 1985



modern technologies and defence industries. Moreover, what is offered is an effective vehicle for culture and information on the international level.

LINKS BETWEEN EMPA AND THE MÖNCH GROUP

There are two links connecting EMPA and the Mönch group.

The first is the fact that the "Marine Rundschau" magazine is associated with both the Mönch Group and EMPA. The second is the policy of exchange that has recently begun between Rivista Militare and the Mönch Group. The aim of this policy is to give a new impulse to Italian military thinking on the one hand, and to public information regarding military matters in Europe on the other. For the time being, these are to be seen as indicative of possible lines of development towards more incisive action. At the basis of these working hypotheses is still to be found the fundamental problem of European thinking: the need to create European awareness and understanding. The offering of public information services is the ideal means for the public to understand the structures of the Armed Forces. In any case, the latter have a history of co-operation and collaboration with other countries that makes them better suited than other organisations to go beyond provincialism and nationalism and approach the "European idea" without shock.

The policy of providing the public with information on military subjects has already demonstrated that it is a tangible reality by not stopping short at mere declarations of intent. It has, instead, gone on to lay the foundations for the "de-provincialization" that is necessary if we are to arrive at the formation of a European awareness. Progress in this direction can be achieved only by the introduction of fresh stimuli and by giving the sector a markedly super-national character.



"Marine Rundschau" was founded in 1980. It is a German-language bi-monthly dealing with the political, economic, strategic and technological problems facing all the world navies. The publication is served by civilian and military experts in this specific field and is decidedly "global" in its approach.

Apart from its historical treatment of both recent and not so recent events with the greatest effect on the development of the navies, the magazine also provides interesting news about new constructions and the technological development of the navies of the world, including the merchant marines.

It is distinguished from other European military publications by its decidedly world-wide approach as well as by one special feature that places it in the forefront of the ongoing process of co-operation and exchange in the field of military public information services in Europe.

"Marine Rundschau" is, in fact, associated with both EMPA and the Mönch Publishing Group. It therefore acts as a link between the two organisations that include the most important European military publications.



The Defence of Europe/Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine MP
Power in the Kremlin/Malcolm MacIntosh
The Lebanese Sea of Trouble/Col. Edgar O'Ballance
The Post War "Ten Year Rule"/Eric J. Grove
ASEAN and Regional Security/Sqn. Ldr. J. Clementson



THE ENGLISH EDITION OF RIVISTA MILITARE

Once the need to give greater vigour to the activities of European military public information has been recognised, it still remains to examine its possible future development in the

Some of the foreign military publications associated with EMPA.


light of present thinking and of programmes now under way. Rivista Militare has for some time been carrying out a programme designed to give Italian military thinking an international "dimension" and to bring the ideas of "the others" to the attention of the Italian public.

Our contacts and exchanges with foreign military magazines have enabled us in the last few years to devote these

pages to themes of considerable international significance with the help of highly-qualified contributors and using a "global" approach. The main achievements have been: "Guerre Stellari" ("Star Wars"), which offered an overall picture of the ideas of the most important international experts and the official positions of many different countries with regard to the strategic defence proposals of the President of

the United States; and the articles by the editor in chief of the American magazine "Armed Forces Journal International" on the American rapid deployment forces in the Persian Gulf area.

The copies of the English edition of Rivista Militare distributed to the Armed Forces throughout the world are a sort of "visiting card" that demonstrates the high level of military infor-



Above, from top.
The English edition of Rivista Militare distributed throughout the world; the EMPA newsletter which passes news of interest on to members.

Right.
A letter sent by the Chairman of EMPA, Colonel Müller, to the Editor of Rivista Militare on the occasion of the commencement of the publication of Rivista Militare Europea.



Il Direttore "Rivista Militare"
Colonello Giorgio Franzosi
Via di San Marco, 8
I - 00186 Roma



Sehr geehrter Herr Müller

mit großem Interesse habe ich Ihre Ausführungen zur Entwicklung einer neuen überregionalen, militärischen Fachzeitschrift zur Kenntnis genommen und mit noch größerem Interesse das mir vorliegende Muster studiert.

Als Präsident der European Military Press Association (EMPA) begrüße ich ausdrücklich das jüngste Kind in unserer internationalen Medienlandschaft die "RIVISTA MILITARE EUROPEA".

Die Idee fachlich bedeutende Informationen aus mehreren Publikationen in einer Zeitschrift zusammenzufassen und diese international anzubieten ist ein weiterer wichtiger Meilenstein am Wege der Weiterentwicklung unserer Vereinigung, wahrscheinlich ebenso gravierend, wie die Aktivitäten des Ehrenpräsidenten der EMPA - Herrn General D. Sepielli - als er den Anstoß zur Gründung der EMPA gab.

Damit wird die italienische Sektion der EMPA ein weiteres Mal zum Vorreiter von uns allen bei der Verfolgung unserer gemeinsamen Zielsetzung.

Herzlichen Dank dafür und viel Glück!

Erlauben Sie mir, noch auf zwei Dinge hinzuweisen.

Der Fahnenkranz, Symbol der EMPA wurde durch neue Mitglieder aktualisiert. Zu Ihrer Information lege ich eine Ausführung bei.

Im Interesse der Zielsetzung der EMPA, würde ich es sehr begrüßen, wenn Sie die "RIVISTA MILITARE EUROPEA" auch dem internationalen Mitgliedern zur Veröffentlichung wesentlicher Beiträge ihrer Zeitschriften öffnen würden.

Nochmals herzlichen Dank für die sehr schönen Bücher, übrigens auch im Namen meiner Frau. Sie können vergewissert sein, daß wir Buch und Bildband hoch in Ehren halten werden. Es ist nur schade, daß wir zu wenig Zeit füreinander hatten.

In einem Antiquariat habe ich ein Buch über Uniformen gefunden, daß Sie sicher interessieren wird; ein kleines Dankeschön.


"Stationen eines Soldatenlebens" findet hoffentlich auch Ihr Interesse.

Nochmals alles Gute, herzliche und kameradschaftliche Grüße

C.-A. Müller
C.-A. Müller
Oberstleutnant
Präsident der EMPA

mation offered by Italy and at the same time enhances the prestige of European efforts in this field.

Themes connected with the political rôle of Europe and the possibility of integrating its Armed Forces frequently recur in the media. This has the effect not only of reawakening the interest of those directly concerned, but also of reaching a part of public opinion. Some contribution in this field



can be made by "Rivista Militare Europea", which has been distributed since August 1985 as a supplement to the English edition of Rivista Militare.

This new periodical aims at increasing knowledge of the Armed Forces of Europe and their traditions. Its goal is a peaceful, free and united Europe. The magazine consists of studies on uniforms and short articles in three languages.





These publications are aimed at the international public and are the work of military journalists accustomed to co-operation by means of firmly established personal contacts. Their goal in the information sector is to examine the problems of a unitary European defence system in the belief






Above.

Rivista Militare Europea, a supplement to Rivista Militare in English, is aimed at increasing knowledge of the Armed Forces of Europe and their traditions. Its objective is a peaceful, free and united Europe. It is published in three languages: English, Italian and the language of the country to which the subjects dealt with refer.

Right.

Some of the foreign military publications associated with EMPA.





"Truppendienst" is the bimonthly periodical of professional instruction of the Austrian Army. It was founded 23 years ago to provide valid assistance to the commanders at the various levels in carrying out training activities.

Its European approach is shown clearly by the short summaries in French and English that accompany the articles.

"Truppendienst" also periodically brings out valuable pocket volumes dealing with the technical related to weapons, vehicles and equipment.

The ideas proposed by this military magazine from a neutral country all centre around the idea of a peaceful, free and united Europe.

"Marine Forum", the monthly published by the DMI (Deutsches Marine Institut), is the official periodical of the association of Naval officers.



It publishes articles on issues related to defence policy, security, the political and economic aspects of naval strategy and historical studies referring especially to the German Navy. It also includes information about events concerning navies in general, and the navies of Germany and the NATO countries in particular. "Marine Forum" makes its pages available for wide-ranging debates, which are usually conducted by officers in active service, in the reserve or retired. As regards the military public information services in Europe, the magazine shares the information "philosophy" of the DMI. This means addressing a wide public through a series of publications, meetings and seminars aimed at making public opinion aware of what is going on in this particular sector.

"Vox", the official organ of the Belgian Army, is a weekly publication. It is distributed free of charge to the units in two editions, French and Dutch.

"Vox" publishes articles on the activities of the operational units and the reserves and is principally aimed at the "home" public.

At present, the magazine is planning to enter the field of public information with a series of articles on the NATO member countries.

This project, which is to be backed up by photographic and descriptive materials provided by the other magazines of EMPA, is a great advance along the path towards the "de-provincialization" of the magazine. However, it is above all a tangible demonstration of the co-operation already existing in terms of military public information services in Europe.



Facing page, top and this page.

The Rivista Militare (with the edition in English and the Rivista Militare Europea) and the other Italian military publications belonging to EMPA.

that the European Armed Forces can represent a decisive factor of equilibrium between the two superpowers.

This vision of Europe as a common homeland does not involve the rejection of national traditions. Indeed it reinforces them in the wider international context that Rivista Militare operates in.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As long ago as 1856, the two brothers, Carlo and Luigi Mezzacapo, began the publication of Rivista Militare. At that time, Italy was still considered as a mere geographical expression. However, the magazine proved to be perhaps the most suitable means for filling the cultural void of the Sardinian-Piedmontese Army and provided a valid instrument, at least in military circles, to remake the fabric of a nation whose political unity was not backed up by any corresponding economic, social or cultural unity.



In 1985, Rivista Militare embarked on a similar project with regard to the problems of our times the creation of a European awareness. Compared to 130 years ago, the context is more favourable in that the concept "Europe = geographical expression" has already, despite all the obstacles, been completely superseded.

Rivista Militare is called upon to carry out two functions — formation and information — which also develop outside the institutional framework and reach beyond the narrow confines of the cultural "elite" to enter into a complex and articulated social reality.

Formation and information are also two "lines" that require careful gauging since they interact with many other factors in the sphere of the mechanisms of the formation of "public opinion". The European choice has imposed a third "line", one which develops both inside and outside the national context and is manifested also in the decision taken by the publications of different countries to work together.

On the threshold of the year 2000, military journalism has still a contribution to make towards the progress of the idea of a free, united Europe. However, underlying this assertion, which many could consider mere wishful thinking, there has been a constant effort over the years to provide a technical and philosophical background extending beyond the national boundaries and to work for those of the public who wish to be kept fully informed about the problems of defence and of the Armed Forces.

Mayor Claudio Magris



RASSEGNA DELL'ARMA DEI CARABINIERI



I
GENNAIO - MARZO
1985



ORGANO UFFICIALE DELL'ASSOCIAZIONE NAZIONALE GENIERI E TRASMETTITORI D'ITALIA

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Aperta 1985 n° 4
Costo corrente postale n° 1200/88 Periodico mensile

LA REALTÀ SUPERA LA FANTASCIENZA LE GUERRE STELLARI

TRIESTE ITALIANA

Solo nove anni dopo la fine del secondo conflitto mondiale l'italianissima città portuale era ancora in gran parte distrutta. Perché il 22 aprile d'ogni anno ha un'eco di quella città italiana della ex Jugoslavia.

Servizio a pagina 3


**L'Italia è terra sismica
TERREMOTI: PERCHÉ?**

Parlare di terremoti oggi, rappresenta per noi un tema molto attuale, come lo era per gli italiani nel 1908, quando la città di Messina fu distrutta. Ma oggi, con le nuove tecniche di indagine, si può dire che la sismologia è una scienza che si è sviluppata in modo esponenziale. E che, in Italia, ha trovato il suo campo di applicazione più fertile. Perché, in Italia, ci sono molte zone a rischio sismico. E, di conseguenza, molti problemi da risolvere. E, di conseguenza, molti problemi da risolvere.

Servizio a pag. 8 e 9

SABATO 21 - DOMENICA 22 SETTEMBRE 1985
XII RADUNO NAZIONALE ANGET
LA CITTÀ DI PISCARA CI ATTENDE LIETA DI OSPITARCI
NON DELUDIAMOLA





DISTANT HAMMER '86


REPORT ON AN INTERALLIED EXERCISE

This article is aimed at outlining the principal activities carried out by Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) during the latest exercise Distant Hammer 86. The periodical aspect of the exercises in this series may lead to underevaluating the importance they deserve, both for their size and for their operational difficulties. Without going into operational details, we shall give a general overview of the exercise, as well as some numerical reference data which may better give an idea of the challenges in coordination, command and control faced during planning and execution of Distant Hammer 86.

"DISTANT HAMMER 86" was a short, dynamic exercise, tailored to give front line forces a short training phase, a tense prewar rules of engagement test and an action-packed hostilities period. Competence, commitment and considerable tactical skill were displayed by all participants; the exercise met its objectives and was successful". This brief statement, made by an official AFSOUTH source summarizes the many, various, complex activities conducted during the 13 busy days of the exercise, from 4 to 16 May, in an operational theatre spanning 2,5 million square kilometers, the Mediterranean Sea.

Distant Hammer is an annual routine exercise, conducted each spring by NATO's Southern Command, AFSOUTH. However, the word routine shouldn't be misleading. Even if the overall scenario may not significantly differ from one year to the next, efforts are made each year to test some of the many aspects of modern warfare. Integrating a combined international force drawn from several countries, at sea, in the sky or on the land, will always

A U.S. Marine CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter approaches the USS Guadalcanal, operating near Sardinia, Italy, during phase 1 of NATO Exercise Distant Hammer '86.



U.S. Marines of the 26th Marine Amphibious unit ready to launch the final attack during the combined amphibious landing which opened Exercise Distant Hammer '86, in Sardinia (Italy). The Marine unit received fire support from 105 mm guns mounted on M60A1 tanks.

be a difficult "routine". In addition, this year's Distant Hammer was connected to two other Allied exercises, Damsel Fair and Deterrent Force.

Distant Hammer 86 was designed to train participating forces in three different environments: peace-time, international tension and hostilities. During the first phase four naval groups were formed. A group of nine US and Turkish combatants, led by the destroyer TGC Piyalepasa, exercised in the Eastern Mediterranean with aircraft

of the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force, based in Izmir, Turkey, (F4s, F104s, and F5s flew about 100 missions). A second group of ten units composed of Italian, French, British, Turkish and US ships, led by the ITS Doria, was in the Ionian Sea. The USS America Battle Group, joined by one French and one Turkish combatant a total of nine ships, operated in the Tyrrhenian Sea. The embarked aircraft flew about 500 missions during the exercise. These latter two formations had intensive training with Tornados, G91s, F104s, and PD808 aircraft which flew some 400 sorties under operational control of the Commander, Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force, based in Vicenza, Italy.

During the same period the maritime air forces in the

Mediterranean were also very busy, flying some 100 missions for anti-submarine warfare, surface search and targetting. The fourth naval group was a combined amphibious force comprising the U.S. Sixth Fleet amphibious task force, led by the USS Guadalcanal, the Italian Caorle and the French Ouragan, both amphibious transport ships. This force conducted an amphibious assault, launching a combined landing force of some 1,800 men from the US 26th Marine Amphibious Unit, the Italian Navy San Marco Tactical Group, the French 21st Marine Infantry Regiment with a platoon of the 4th "Spahis", and a company of Royal Netherlands Marines.

Before the amphibious force reached the training area, which was simulated to be mined, Allied minesweepers conducted a

On the coast of Capo Teulada, a San Marco soldier watches carefully for the aggressor while the other makes a communications check during the first phase of Exercise Distant Hammer '86.

separate mine-warfare exercise, Damsel Fair. After this Allied flotilla cleared the waters, the amphibious force approached the landing area, the training range of Capo Teulada, where four platoons of the Italian Army's Manin Armoured Brigade, acting as orange forces, were in charge of defending simulated port and airport facilities. The assault started during pre-dawn, on May 6, and lasted two days. Some 30 armoured vehicles, 20 helicopters and several landing craft were used, as well as several aircraft from the USS America and Decimomannu air base, where part of the ITAF 6th Wing was redeployed. After completing the two-day amphibious assault, cross-training was conducted so that personnel from the different nations could familiarize themselves with weapon systems from other forces.

The exercise activities then focused on the Ionian. The USS America and its task force moved into that sea, joining with the group of other allied ships already operating there. The "tension phase" lasted four days, during which particular attention was given to test pre-war rules of engagements as well as all NATO procedures.

The beginning of hostilities was simulated on May 12, when orange forces conducted a large scale attack against a convoy, composed by the ITS Vesuvio, TGC Derya and USNS Pawcatuck. Certainly not by chance, this convoy had left Augusta Bay escorted by an actual NATO formation, the four ships forming the Naval On Call Force Mediterranean, engaged in training for exercise Deterrent Force 1/86.

During the final phase of the exercise, while the convoy sailed toward Turkey, to reach Antalya, the Orange role was



played by 17 allied ships. An important role was also assigned to the NATO Multiservice Electronic Warfare Support Group (MEWSG), based at Yeovilton, South West England, to provide a hostile electromagnetic environment. On this occasion, two Transportable Radar and

Communications Simulator vans (TRACVAN) were aboard RFA Grey Rover and USS Vreeland. Jamming pods were flown by A7 aircraft, while electronic warfare was supported by Italian PD808, missile profiles flown by 5ATAF, and the U.K. Fleet Electronic Warfare Support Group.



Turkish ground crews controls a TUAF F-4E after a joint U.S.-Turkish mission during Exercise Distant Hammer '86.

The Turkish and Italian Air Force, along with USAF Reserve and Navy's Pilots from the USS America participated in the final phase of Distant Hammer. Operational control was exercised by the Commander, Sixth Tactical Allied Air Force, based in Izmir, Turkey.

Italian F104 aircraft from the 5th Wing, Rimini, deployed to Bandirma air base in Turkey on May 13, to conduct joint operations with the Turkish Air Force. A U.S. reserve unit, the 93rd Tactical Fighter Squadron from Homestead AFB near Miami, Florida, with 12 F4D aircraft, was the U.S. unit that redeployed to Turkey for the exercise. The Phantoms were accompanied in the flight over by four EC-135 Tactical Deployment Control Aircraft, and

supported by Strategic Air Command KC-135 tankers. Airlift was provided by six C-141 Starlifters. These units flew several hundred missions during the exercise.

The common invisible link for all the operations, on and over the Mediterranean, has once again been the NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft. Four E-3A provided fighter control, airborne early warning and surveillance to the air and naval commanders. "Real time" information is a force multiplier, particularly in the complex theatres of operations of the NATO's Southern Region. According to Rear Adm. Henry H. Mauz, Commander of the Carrier Battle Group including the USS America, air-naval coordination during an exercise like Distant Hammer is much more difficult than in wartime. In the Mediterranean there are more than 2500 ships on any given day. During Distant

Hammer "... everything on, below or flying over the sea within 360 kilometers from the battle group was to be identified..."; separating commercial traffic from exercise forces, was also a challenge for the Allied search and control systems.

A little known aspect of exercise like Distant Hammer is that part of the NATO's decisional chain is also activated. During Distant Hammer 86, operators, experts in communications, command and control and many other branches were at work, in some cases in uncomfortable wartime headquarters, to assist their Commanders in directing and conducting the exercise. AFSOUTH itself took the opportunity to activate its mobile war headquarters.

It is encouraging to note that all of it was termed "routine" by AFSOUTH.

Major Francesco Veltri



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UPDATING THE BOFORS 40 MM L/60

High quality weapons like the Bofors 40 mm L/60 have a functioning life that far exceeds their tactical life. The gun was produced in more than 100,000 units before, during, and after World War II, and many of these guns are still in use in many countries all over the world. These guns will be capable of firing and firing with accuracy, well into the next century.

Kits for updating the 40 mm L/60 gun have been designed, and the work can be carried out in the customers' military workshops.

In addition to the above kits a new range of ammunition greatly enhances the performance of the gun. The "update kit" range includes:



- power laying machinery;
- gyroscopic reticle sight;
- loader support and ammunition racks;
- a kit for increasing the rate of fire to 190 rounds per minute;

- a 20 round magazine.


In addition to the above kits a new range of ammunition greatly enhances the performance of the updated gun.

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The automotive test-rig of the Combat Vehicle 90 has been tested, in very heavy terrain, in the north of Sweden. Ready for his first test drive in December, 1985, the automotive test-rig has been extensively tested during the spring of 1986. The construction of 5 test vehicles has started in the summer of this year. These will be delivered during the autumn of 1988. A series order is planned for 1990/91 with the first series delivery in 1993/94.

It was in the summer of 1985 that the Swedish industry was commissioned to develop Combat Vehicle 90. Design and development of the chassis, transmission and track unit proceeds separately



from that of the turret, which also includes weapons, fire

control systems and ammunitions.

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
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


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THE 105/14 PACK HOWITZER



The Oto Melara 105 mm Pack Howitzer, manufactured in Italy, is a lightweight weapon, easily dismantled and transported, capable of prolonged firing at its maximum fire power with direct and indirect fire.

The weight of the howitzer in battery is 1250 kg, notably less than that of similar weapons of the same calibre.

The howitzer can be:

- towed by light vehicles like jeeps (on road and off-road tracks);
- towed by one of two draught animals;
- transported, assembled or disassembled, on light vehicles;
- air transported and parachute dropped in one unit;
- pack transported, disassembled into 11 loads;

TECHNICAL DATA

Calibre: 105 mm.
Length of bore: 14 calibres.
Life of barrel: 7500 round at full charge;
30000 rounds at 6th charge or less.
Maximum range: 10222 m.
Rate of fire:

- normal, 100 rounds per hour;
- maximum, 12 rounds in 3 minutes;

- transported in two or more loads by small helicopters or lifted and transported in one unit by a medium helicopter;
- transported in two or more loads on small boats.

It can be employed by special artillery units such as: field artillery, mountain artillery, parachute and airborne units, anti-guerilla warfare, or those operating within difficult areas such as jungles and deserts.

Besides Italy, the howitzer is in use in the following countries:

- exceptional (anti-tank fire only): 8 rounds per minute.
- Total weight, in battery: 1250 kg.
- Type of ammunition: semifixed.
- Propelling charges: up to nine.
- Ammunition: NATO standard (105/22 USA Howitzer). —
- Including the new Rocket Assisted Projectile (range, with Rocket Assisted Projectile: 13000 m).


Abu-Dhabi, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Philippines, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Irak, Malaysia, Nigeria, New Zealand, Pakistan, Rhodesia, Spain, Venezuela and Zambia.

Ammunition fired by the howitzer is of NATO standard precisely that of the 105/22 USA HOWITZER. This ammunition can easily be obtained from competitive sources all over the world.

40 YEARS EXPERIENCE



SMA is a flexible company founded in 1943. Since 1948 is active in design, development and production of electronic equipments for defence. Main activities are radars for ground, shipborne, airborne, missile applications and related display systems. The company broad spectrum permits the supply of turnkey systems tailored to the end-user needs.



SMA

SEGNALAMENTO MARITTIMO ED AEREO

SMA's basic product lines and business sectors include: High definition and discrimination **coastal radar control stations**, both for maritime traffic management systems and military application (anti intrusion, coastal defence, mine splash detection); **Shipborne navigation / search radars** devoted to low, very-low air coverage (anti sea skimmers); **Missile active homing heads**, provided with a variety of ECM devices, for SSM (OTOMAT MK2) and ASM (Marte MK2) applications; **360° coverage search and navigation airborne radars** for helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft; **Standard Pod contained search radars** for fixed wing aircraft to be employed in conjunction with ASM; **Integrated search and tracking radars for A/A defence** to be employed both on specialized trucks (OTOMATIC) or on semi-mobile/fixed station for point defence; applied research aimed toward millimetric waves (up to 100 GHz) in **active and passive sensors** (radiometer); **Duct analysis** and electromagnetic propagation forecast.

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M58

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
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TUTTOSTORIA - Servizio vendite speciali - Casella Postale 995 - 41100 PARMA (Italy)

Ermanno Albertelli (editor), "Tuttostoria notizie", trimestral catalogue and bibliographical guide, Parma, 188 pp. (by subscription).

The catalogue offers a complete, up-to-date bibliographical guide to international publications regarding the following subjects: military reviews, firearms and bladed weapons, military vehicles, tanks, military automobiles and engines, aviation, navy, railroads and transports, military history, uniforms and insignia, war games, models and survival techniques.

What is striking is the volume of international publications regarding military matters. Unfortunately we must acknowledge our country's shortfall in this area: Italian publications are far fewer than those of other European countries and the United States.

The catalogue should be consulted for a realistic appraisal of the situation in our country - one in which military print is given little importance. It is time to face the problem and follow the example of those other countries: our country, in fact, can boast of a proud heritage in matters of military thought and tradition, of culture and of historical research.

This catalogue has the virtue of being factual and of illustrating objectively the disparity in the number of publications on military matters published in Italy compared with other countries. Most important, it shows that in order to have a voice in cultural matters at the international level it is necessary to translate the publications into English and disseminate them through wide distribution networks.

LA CARTOLINA D'EPOCA

di LUIGI MALPELI - 41010 PARMA - VIA STENDHAL, 6 - TEL. 0521/44206

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Luigi Malpeli (editor), "La cartolina d'Epoca", ("The Period Postcard"), bimonthly illustrated catalogue, Via Stendhal 6, Parma, 168 pp., six issue subscription, Lit. 15,000.

Illustrated postcards have offered interesting images of the Italian condition, its customs and its artistic taste.

La cartolina d'Epoca, a bimonthly illustrated catalogue, shows how to interpret, evaluate and catalogue the postcards according to subject matter (advertising, sporting events, shows, political propaganda, landscapes, armed forces, etc.) and thus offers a handy reference for organizing various types of collections.

The postcards regarding military matters in the catalogue are especially interesting and significant for the messages they were meant to convey to the public over many years. They recount through simple images great and small events in Italian military history like glorious regiments, the style of the uniforms and significant military events.

The catalogue contains fine works by famous designers like Mario Sironi and Marcello Dudovich whose postcards are much in demand by collectors. There are postcards from the "liberty" period, the flowery style that dominated production from the early nineteenth hundreds; and there are images that mark the transition from "liberty" to the new "deco" style, a trend which became established after the decorative arts shows in Paris which favored images with simple designs, geometric lines and a great variety of colors.

There are also some postcards designed by renowned exponents of

"realism" which propagandize ideas or products in a clear and effective style particularly suited to captivate the public. The leader of this school of design was Enrico Sacchetti, who produced some fine figurative sketches. During the period between the wars even the famous Achille Beltrame designed postcards: he was well known to entire generations for his fascinating vignettes published in the *Domenica del Corriere*.

Among the many specimens reproduced in the catalogue, special mention should be made of the regimental postcards that appeared at the end of the last century. It appears that the originator of these postcards was Quinto Cenni with a design evoking an episode in the battle of S. Martino. It was the spark: in no time every regiment and military institute had its own postcard, and to this day they are actively traded. What was perhaps the first catalogue, with 2,500 postcards, was published in 1904, in Verona. Numerous others followed that are interesting for the testimony they bear to our military traditions. The fascination with postcards and catalogues persists to this day, as the catalogue reviewed demonstrates.

Sebastiano Vassalli Sangue e suolo

Viaggio fra gli Italiani trasparenti



Sebastiano Vassalli, "Sangue e suolo", ("Blood and Soil"), Einaudi, 200 pp., Lit. 9,000.

This book contains impressions and notes concerning travel to Alto Adige and Germany, where the author stayed between February 1983 and August 1984 to study bilingualism in a period of relative calm in Italo-German relations. Subsequently events precipitated, with the anti-Italian march in Innsbruck, the statements of the Italian foreign minister on the division of the two Germanies, the accusation by the publisher of *Dolomiten* of President Sandro Pertini



of not having honored the memory of German soldiers of the "SS Bozen" battalion fallen in Via Rasella, the pardon granted to the Nazi Reder, the welcome given to him at the airport of Graz by the Austrian minister of defense and yet other facts up to the electoral victory of the party of the right in the Bolzano communal elections.

The writer interviewed government administrators, politicians, journalists, businessmen, union leaders, famous athletes such as Messner and ordinary persons encountered in his travels in the region. He duly recorded the answers given, compiling in this way a very disturbing overview of the Alto Adige problem.


The Italian minority of 120,000 residents, which is compared with the "dead souls" of Gogol, is shown to be shunted aside in a practically *apartheid* system which was, paradoxically, created during the very years when Italians were holding vigils in the squares for Vietnam, for Greece and for Chile. "Meanwhile in Bolzano there was ripening what could subsequently be appreciated as being absolutely against the interests of everyone – a race count, *apartheid* – as though it were happening on another planet".

The author states that his book was not written from the German point of view, but from the point of view of whoever has no other country than his own labor.

He remarks that in the region Austrian and German television programs are rebroadcast and that the youth of the two language groups enter the schools through different entrances, are separated by metal screens or by walls, and have recess at different times to avoid intermingling.

In academies, the dormitories are divided and television rooms are separate; in church, first communions are arranged in two distinct ceremonies; in hospitals there are separate wards. In sports and in housing projects there is the same disconcerting separation situation. We are presented with "the absurdity of a majority which governs itself as a majority and looks after its interests as a minority, which claims for itself at the same time all the privileges of the stronger and all the rights of the weaker".

In the end, in reading this book one has the feeling that in Alto Adige the mountains close off the horizons from a society already closed in on itself in which the ancient fears of the mountaineer of new and different things flourish anew. The argument about the two fatherlands which can coexist is a smoke screen, says the author, since the real problem is the contrast between those in power and those who have been shunted aside and accept remaining in a subordinate state.



P. Ravenna (editor), "Le mura di Ferrara - immagini e storia", ("The Walls of Ferrara – Illustrations and History"), Panini, Modena, 1985, 141 pp., Lit. 25,000.

As is well known, the ancient walled boundaries of the larger Italian cities rarely survived the explosive building expansion of the 19th century. In this way the demolition pick did away with monuments of great value to the architectonic, urbanistic and military history of our country.

Among the few noteworthy exceptions, an outstanding one is Ferrara, whose walls, although preserved almost intact, have remained up to the present almost unknown to the Italian public, to scholars and even to the Ferrarese. And yet this is one of the most outstanding examples of Italian fortification architecture, since it is, in certain respects, even unique. For the walls of this Po Valley city in their very long perimeter (more than 9 km) show in sharp outline the appearance of what was one of the most splendid capitals of the Italian Renaissance, the first city in Europe developed by following a true development plan *ante litteram*, of which the walls constituted an essential element. With the various "additions" made over time, the Este dukes and a brilliant architect, Biagio Rossetti, used the walls to enclose ever newer areas around the original medieval nucleus, and in these the new buildings and new sections of the ducal city evidently arose. Subsequently, after 1600, the papal government, which succeeded the Este dynasty,

brought the entire imposing mass of construction up to par with the new military technical advances.

Precisely because of this progressive build-up, the walls of Ferrara now constitute a sort of organic compendium of the fortification techniques in use in Italy between the 14th and 18th centuries. Round towers, merled parapets, bastions of every kind, earthworks, passageways and moats, all now wrapped in silence and greenery, constitute a fascinating complex, a historical and yet natural park, which surrounds the whole city and joins it to the adjacent countryside.

It is, in sum, a cultural possession of extraordinary importance which it was necessary to rescue from oblivion and abandonment and to entrust to the work of scholars and of restoration. To this praiseworthy work of sensitization the Ferrara section of the Italia Nostra association has been dedicated for some time. Having conducted a ten-year program of photographic research on the construction, carried out by its president, who is also the editor of the book (this was a necessary undertaking since even now the precise configuration of the monumental complex is in great part inadequately known), it assembled the results first in an exposition and then in the volume being reviewed here. This is the first systematic and detailed work published on the subject, and it fills in a very unusual void.

The goal of the authors also seems now to have been realized, for a prestigious commission has recently been installed with responsibility for overseeing future restoration work. Its members include distinguished historians, urbanologists and Lieutenant General Pietro Giannattasio as authoritative expert on fortification architecture.

This book, to which scholars in a wide variety of fields contributed, in its first part informs the reader – in a plain and easily followed style – concerning the "state of the art" of historical and architectonic research conducted in recent times on this monument. Among other things there is a very useful synthesis of the historical evolution of fortification and siege techniques with reference to the walls of Ferrara, by Sergio Masini and Gianrodolfo Rotasso of the *Rivista Militare* staff.


In the second, and richly illustrated, part the reader is brought step by step through a fascinating tour of the walled enclosure by use of a continual comparison between the depiction of today and that of the past, between prints and frescoes four centuries old and modern photographs, which often reveal a profoundly moving and totally unchanged landscape. Outstanding among the illustrations are the photographic mosaic taken several months ago specifically for the exposition and the book



by reconnaissance fighter-bombers of the 8th Wing of the Air Force and the photographs taken from military dirigibles in the first years of the century. The Historical Institute of the Army Engineer Corps also contributed to the work with very valuable pictorial evidence.

We do not have here therefore just a volume of splendid illustrations, an urbanistic text outstanding in its clarity and completeness, but rather a kind of richly furnished guidebook for the intelligent tourist who wants to discover a treasure of Italian civil and military history unrecognized up to the present. Let us add that it is also an important example of cooperation between military institutions and the world of culture.

Alberto Ficuciello



A. Rasero, "L'eroica 'Cuneense'", ("The Heroic Cuneense"), Mursia, Milan, 580 pp., Lit. 35,000.

Aldo Rasero, soldier in the alpine forces, combatant, commandant of partisan forces, decorated with the Silver Medal for Military Valor, journalist, writer and very knowledgeable historian of the alpine troops, is the author of *L'eroica "Cuneense"*, which complements his other two works, *Alpini della "Julia"* and *"Tridentina" avanti!*. The book, which contains many valuable out of text photographs and maps, recounts the fortunes in war and in peace of the "Cuneense" alpine Division during various significant moments of the country's history, pointing out the salient characteristics and the more and less known facts that contributed to making the

Division a protagonist on the various fronts.

The narration unfolds not only through an exposition of the events that took place on the western-alpine, Greek-Albanian and Yugoslav fronts, but, more important, on the Russian front, a real calvary for the "Cuneense", so much so that it earned a sad first place for casualties among all the Divisions of the Italian Army in Russia.

The author begins the narrative with the constitution of the alpine troops back in 1872 and traces the glorious and difficult evolution of the detachments that later formed the "Cuneense" during the Eritrean and Libyan campaigns of the first world war. In so doing he gives due importance to the incalculable moral heritage that the detachments of the Division revived and enriched with new honors on the various fronts of the second world war.

The story dwells on the fortunes of the "Cuneense" detachments from the mountains of the western alpine front to the snow and mud of the Greek-Albanian front, from the valleys of the Yugoslav front to the frozen Russian steppe, where the Division suffered what can be called real martyrdom, sacrificing itself to the limit of human endurance.

We are then reminded of the trials and tribulations of Russian imprisonment, the tragic events of 8 September 1943 and the infamous German "lager".

Overcome by these tragic events the "Cuneense" was disbanded by the Army and was not reformed; its history trails off with the reporting of events concerning the few detachments that were reconstituted after the war, which have preserved its tradition up to the present.

Despite the fact that the historical character of the narrative compelled the author to refer to official sources like historical diaries, papers, memoirs and even a few recollections by survivors, Mr. Rasero deserves credit for having been able to elicit from the cold "official language" a measure of human warmth that cannot fail to involve the reader.


In his conclusion to the Preface Rasero comments bitterly that "the name 'Cuneense' does not figure among the present alpine units".

Happily, since 11 January 1986 the name "Cuneense" has been proudly displayed among the alpine units".

On that date, in fact, at Cuneo, before Defense Minister Spadolini, the Army Chief of Staff General Poli and the survivors of the Division, the name "Cuneense" was given to the Italian AMF(L) contingent: the Allied Command mobile land force in Europe. The contingent, formed by detachments of the "Taurinense" alpine Brigade (the "Susa" battalion, an airtransported medical de-

tachment, an engineers platoon, anti-tank and communications companies and a helicopter squadron) whose duty is rapid deployment in NATO countries where military action may be necessary to ward off aggression, is now called "Cuneense". A name, as Minister Spadolini stated, that "is tied to a glorious past even in misfortune to look to the future with pride".

Massimiliano Angelini



Ferruccio Botti and Virgilio Ilari, "Il pensiero militare italiano dal primo al secondo dopoguerra", ("Italian Military Thought from the First to the Second Postwar Period"), History Office of the Army General Staff, Rome, 1985, 792 pp., Lit. 18,000.

This volume consists of two parts concerned, respectively, with the twenty years preceding the second conflict and the period from the war of liberation to the accession of Italy to the Atlantic Treaty.

In the foreword the authors define their work as a "pioneering" attempt at analysis of the vast Italian military literature produced between 1919 and 1949.

The sources, selected with great discernment, help to fill in the historical hiatus which was a consequence of the defeat in the second world war and bring out the links between the military ideas of the period between the two



wars and those of the immediate postwar period.

In this work purely technical aspects are combined with and complemented by those concerning the politico-military, strategic and cultural context of the period under consideration. It does not seem out of order therefore to define the book as the first work in its category to aim at – and succeed in – providing a global overview of military thought with a measured consideration of inter-force viewpoints, detached objectivity and absence of partiality.

This work is the fruit of a felicitous collaboration between two cultural approaches – one, that of Lieutenant Colonel Botti, of a prevalently military history character; the other, that of Professor Ilari, of a definitely political history nature. The two directions, carefully integrated, have had the capacity of providing a finished product of surprising homogeneity and completeness.

Among the subjects treated, all of which are worthy of attention, those which we found particularly interesting – because they are less well known – concerned fascist policy toward the military ambience, the judgments of Benedetto Croce and Antonio Gramsci on Clausewitz and on the philosophical and literary tradition of the Italian military, the varying fortunes of the armed forces' apolitical principle from fascism to democracy, and the influence of the resistance on postwar military thought. These subjects, treated with painstaking discernment, round out and enrich the broad panorama of other more specifically technical problems discussed in the text, such as the technical debate concerning the high command, the defense model, the importance of new weapons (especially aircraft and tanks) on the doctrine of the three armed services, recruitment, and the organization of the army and its model relative to its progressive future demands.


The reader will search in vain in this work for a concluding chapter in which the scattered results of the research are summarized. The authors have not provided one deliberately because they consider the results they have obtained provisional, and in this connection they express the wish that future more detailed studies based on convergent and perhaps even interfaced multidisciplinary research may validate them more thoroughly.

The perusal of this volume also furnishes the reader with a large number of tools suitable for uprooting solidified prejudices. Italian military thought is shown to have been, even in the period between the two wars, effervescent, active and receptive to new impulses coming even from abroad. It is shown to have been the same way during the difficult years of the second postwar

period – even in the climate of general disavowal of military values and traditions brought about by defeat: spirited and open-minded, unshackled from the restraints imposed by the preceding regime, and ready to make a valid contribution to the none too easy reconstruction of the armed forces.

This book, which is published in an elegant typographical style, can be purchased through payment to postal account No. 29599008, payable to Ufficio Pubblicazioni Militari – Via Lepanto, 5, 00192 Rome. The price is Lit. 18,000 – discounted to Lit. 12,000 for Defense personnel – plus Lit. 1,500 for mailing costs.

Piero Petrilli



Giulio Bedeschi, "Fronte jugoslavo-balcanico: c'ero anch'io", ("Yugoslav-Balkan Front: I Was There Too"), Mursia, 790 pp., Lit. 38,000.

This volume, which belongs to the series entitled "Chronical-Historical Recollections of Italian Veterans of the Second World War", is the sixth of the series, there having already appeared by the same author *Nikolajewka: I Was There Too*, *Greco-Albanese Front: I Was There Too*, *African Front: I Was There Too*, and *Russian Front: I Was There Too* (first and second volumes).

This most recent work of Bedeschi assembles the recollections of Italian soldiers who were in Yugoslav territory in the last world war – in Dalmatia, Montenegro, Albania, Greece and the Aegean islands. Through this very detail-

ed collection the author succeeds in giving us a complete and very touching picture of the operations conducted from the beginning of the campaign up to 8 September and on its consequences up to the end of 1943. Among the succession of events several fundamental facts emerge, among them the iron determination with which the soldiers of the Yugoslav people's army succeeded in opposing the occupation while paying a very heavy price in the cause of liberty. The guerilla technique caused many deaths due, beyond the combat action, to mean reactions which took place in an atmosphere of revenge and hatred. In so complex and sometimes horrifying a picture, the facts confirm the character of invaders which we had in that period, reinforcing however that reputation for generosity and humanity which the Italian soldier has well merited since the postwar period and which emerges from the important testimony of Greek authorities and civilians even in this volume. Truth to tell, episodes are also documented, such as destruction, burnings and violence, which contrast with the usual behavior of Italians in that territory. These occurrences which, as the author rightly hopes, ought not to be seized upon and distorted, are the bitter fruit of impetuous individual actions and of badly coordinated and directed military orders. After 8 September, in addition to those repatriated or put into concentration camps, very many Italian soldiers chose to fight for the cause of freedom by joining the Yugoslav liberation army, and 20,000 of them lost their lives.

In contrast to other books, in this one the description of sufferings undergone is accompanied by a bitter protest against the shortcomings of certain commanders or high commands, as well as a clear repudiation of the outrages committed in the guerrilla war period.

We can say that this latest work of Bedeschi reconfirms a refined cultural direction developed through small-scale but authentic history which springs still fresh from the live voices of the protagonists. It is thus history which is not rhetorical, to the contrary, it would be better called antirhetorical, which is opposed to facile propaganda or ideological twists and which is tied to facts and to vigorous documentation. This is so much the case that the words of the protagonists do not seem a distant echo to us but rather a breath of something present and still alive with a warning addressed to the future.

The series will continue with volumes now being prepared – *The Italian Front: I Was There Too* and *Imprisonment: I Was There Too*.

Carlo Felici

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
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November-December

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


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EUROPE AND

OPENING
UP TO THE FUTURE



CULTURE



"The Fatherland of Petrarch and Machiavelli, of Leonardo and Manzoni, will step up its commitment to ensuring the revival of our common values of art, history and thought".



11 May 1986. The Changing of the Guard has become a public attraction, as it is at Buckingham Palace. These are the "Granatieri di Sardegna", wearing their historical uniform.



I am delighted and profoundly moved to be here at this ancient and justly renowned University of Louvain, which, in the second half of the millennium which is now drawing to its close, has made such a great and valuable contribution to the civilization and culture of this noble land, and to our Europe.

Louvain's contributions are too numerous to mention: it is a centre of learning and spiritual life, that has established the great values which are shared by your people and mine. One only needs to recall that it was within these walls that the word, *Europaeus* coined by Enea Silvio Piccolomini rang out with its own, original tone, and that it is a term which unites us all today in a living community of history and culture.

There are so many names, some well and some less well known, which I should like to recall today: from the many

Italian scholars who came to Louvain to deepen their knowledge of law and, as they called them in those days, "the arts", to the equally numerous teachers who exhibited their profound scholarship and genius after having refined their learning – as so often happened in those days – in the Italian universities, such as the ancient universities of Bologna and Padua.

For the sake of brevity I will merely quote two names. The first, which is particularly dear to me for so many reasons, is the first edition of Thomas More's "Utopia" which was printed in this city at the end of 1516. It is not, and cannot be, a coincidence that such an important book began its wonderful adventure here. For me, this is the emblematic testimony of the centuries' old cultural humus of Louvain, which miraculously survived so many barbarian attacks and

continually renewed itself in the name of faith science.

The second name is that of an intimate friend of Thomas More, Erasmus of Rotterdam, the champion of humanism and tolerance, who left a major mark on this city (and his most important works were also published at Louvain).

You certainly know Erasmus' work better than I do, and so I will say no more. All I should like to do is to emphasize the fact that the ever-topical lesson to be learned from the *doctor universalis*, who lived in an age that was terribly difficult for nations and for people's consciences, is his unstinting quest for peace: a brilliant quest, which is often ill-understood, but one which is essential, and which no nation or man must ever weaken or abandon. A complex quest, which the world of culture must set above all others. "War is dear only to those who do not know



it", warned Erasmus. And we echo those words with all our tragic memories and with all our strength.

Following these two great men, my thoughts now go out in admiration to other important ages at Louvain. I am thinking of the importance given to neo-Scholastic philosophy and the extraordinary contribution made in general terms to the revival of Catholic culture in a period of isolation, uniting the sense of tradition, the search for truth and openness to the modern world. And I am also thinking of the flourishing of social studies and activities. It was from this land at the beginning of the last century that, urged on by the teaching of the Gospel and Christian solidarity, a current of thought and action spread far and wide, bringing together in freedom huge workers' movements, leading to advanced legislation which has brought about major

social achievements. It is no coincidence that Leo XIII, the Pope of "Rerum Novarum", was once the Nuncio to this country.

During my visit to Belgium, and during these few hours spent here at Louvain, I have been happy to see how much cooperation and joint endeavour is taking place in every area of cultural life, at Community, multilateral and bilateral level. It is my hope that these relationships, and this research and dialogue will grow in quality and quantity, and that the Universities will play a primary role in this development. Both Europe and the university are an opening-up towards the future.

Both of these – Europe and the university – must be able to make better use of the common institutions, rapid communications systems and modern technologies, to break down the barriers that still exist within European culture. There are now six million students in

the Community's universities: let us ensure that they are the craftsmen and protagonists of an authentic European rebirth.

There is no shortage of favourable opportunities. I am thinking, for example, of the "Erasmus" programme which will make it possible for 10,000 undergraduates and 350 lecturers to take part in exchange plans between 1987 and 1989. I am also thinking of the activities of the European University in Florence, at which more and more young researchers from all the Community's countries are studying, and to which the Italian Government recently gave a new building (in a villa near Fiesole Abbey, the Community's archives are currently being set up).

I am sure that during the year in which Florence has been given the honour of being the "capital of European culture", the Fatherland of Petrarch and



Machiavelli, of Leonardo and Manzoni will not only play its full part but will step up its commitment to ensuring the revival of our common values of art, history and thought.

Culture is the sign and the cipher of our civilization – a resource that has perhaps not been fully exploited, even though all of us are aware that an “underground culture” has often sustained us when other beams of the European construction were not in a healthy condition. It has sustained us in the past, it sustains us now, and will continue to sustain us in the future.

We have a vast, priceless common cultural heritage. Louvain knows this very well, because it has been the crossroads and the melting pot of European culture. But life goes on, and we cannot live on our past or our memories. Europe cannot stop producing


culture, and must never miss a beat in a creative process which has to be continuous and constant, in conjunction with the culture laboratories and workshops throughout the world. It is when a man believes he is on the peak of the mountain of knowledge that he begins his descent to the valley below.

According to the great Italian historian, Federico Chabod, who conducted a thorough inquiry into the way the concept of Europe took shape, and the identity and sentiment that stems from it, cultural and moral factors have had “absolute, even exclusive preeminence” in this process. As Europe consolidates itself and smoothes over the various crises, it cannot do without these factors, which are inextricably intertwined.

Another distinguished scholar, Fernand Braudel, was

clearly aware of this, and declared that “Europe will only come about if the idea of Europe gets through to the living depth of our history, down to its deepest waters, and to its ultimate depths”. Such a penetrating action cannot be left to what Braudel called “surface phenomena”. Only cultural and moral factors can have any decisive effect.

This is why I have chosen Louvain, a frontier city and epitome of coherence and mediation, this prestigious cultural and spiritual centre which has such a far-reaching sphere of influence, and which unites a noble tradition with modern scientific activity, in which to make an appeal to European culture, to European intelligence, to European imagination, urging them not to become inward-looking, never faltering in their courageous and generous commitment to



research, ever combining the reasons of freedom and progress, human dignity, justice and peace.

Difficulties abound, of course. Institutions and the people are asking contemporary European culture to fuel a project and a hope: the rebirth of a new European culture, the foundation of a new common Fatherland: Europe.

This is the last chance I shall have to address you before leaving your magnificent country in a few hours' time to return home. I should like to take this opportunity to thank all the Belgian institutions and people for the friendship with which they have hosted me, the representatives of the Italian government who have accompanied me, and all the members of my mission.

I should like to make special mention of the warmth and friendship with which Their

Majesties, the King and Queen, have welcomed me, with what I would call a "spirit of Christian fraternity, not only officially but also privately in their own home, setting me an example that I shall never forget of simplicity and profound Christian spirit.


This has been an official visit, with all the necessary formal trappings – not here in Louvain, but on previous days – which all official visits entail. But I shall not leave this country, even though I have come here in an official capacity, with that chilliness and – let us admit it – that boredom that one always feels after officialdom has had its way. I shall leave here with my heart warmed by so many memories of this land, in which the traditions of freedom and Christianity, unity and pluralism live together so remarkably, and which ideally link this noble land to ancient Europe, making it a

bridge leading to the Europe of tomorrow. I shall leave here even more convinced that Europe is not a Utopia, or a memory of some ancient, noble legacy that has been lost. I shall leave here even more convinced that I have done my duty as Head of a European State in defending together with all the other Europeans, the cause of our cultural identity, our progress, our life, our civilization, in the certitude that Europe is alive, and that Europe can and must make a great contribution to progress and freedom, and to the freedom of the world.

Francesco Cossiga

Text of the address of the President of the of Italy Republic at Louvain University. 22 February 1986.

What Kind



In a previous issue of Rivista Militare, I drew attention to the basic objectives to be pursued if the Army, on the threshold of the nineties, is to achieve greater efficiency. Certain anomalies in development need

to be ironed out and some attempt made to make up for lost time. The structural and organizational shortcomings due to the widening gap between available funds and the financial outlay essential to strengthen, maintain and renovate the Ground Forces in their present form must be made good.

OF army

SYSTEM STAGES



It is now clear that a comprehensive reorganization and rationalization of the structures of the Armed Forces can no longer be deferred, above all as regards the organization of logistic support and the territorial and training sectors.

The system standard – an indispensable element of long-term reference on which particular and contingent choices must be organically and

consistently based – envisages a highly mobile and operationally flexible structure which optimizes the overall effectiveness and the efficiency of the individual components in view of the requirements to be met and the foreseeable availability of human and financial resources.

The above trends in national defence do not appear to differ from those found in European defence policy, which increasingly calls for integration of forces on the international level. This may appear utopian when considered realistically in the overall context, but seems

easier to achieve through the creation of special, rapid-deployment forces which would also be suitable for integrated, multinational missions.

The methodological approach to the optimum model is the outcome of both detailed analyses and a realistic appraisal of available resources.

Having established the "system standard" as a pragmatic compromise between tasks, requirements and resources, it is now time to deal with the "system stages", i.e. the concrete planning – largely under way or already carried out – through which the reference model is to be gradually approached.



Priority is given to the operational component, on which the configuration and dimensions of the supporting units are strictly dependent.

From this standpoint, a critical appraisal has been made of:

— the operational structure in its basic elements:

- number and type of basic operational modules,
- chain of command,

— the territorial, logistic and training organizations.

The analysis, carried out with the support of the upper echelons and utilizing EDP systems, has led to the identification of the basic criteria and the measures to be implemented for the reorganization of the structure.

The process of functional overhauling and, in various cases, resizing, begun on the basis of this planning, will inevitably entail considerable sacrifice, also on the social level, but will allow us to economize on the balanced force and give investment priority over running costs. The result should be technological and operational

improvements in the military field as well as positive spin-offs for the national industry.

The **first system stage** must be implemented within the next four years and will involve a series of measures defined on the basis of a concrete evaluation of the real situation and its effects on the various sectors.

OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE

The present 24 Brigades have proved insufficient as regards hypothetical deployment in the case of "combined services operational missions" provided for in the 1985 White Paper.

The Army is particularly concerned in the first (defence in the north east) and the fourth (territorial defence) missions. These involve operations on a vast scale which, together with the traditional deployment in the north east (of primary importance not only for national defence but also in terms of NATO policy and strategy), call for greater readiness, mobility and versatility

to deal with threats in any part of the country.

The minimum number of "Brigade modules" necessary to carry out the combined service mission is 27 Brigade-size units.

The above factors point to the need to establish, in time of peace, another 3 light infantry brigades (North, Centre and South) through the existing

Above and right.

"Mangusta" A-129 anti-tank helicopter. Can be armed with 8 TOW missiles or 52 high-performance free-flight rockets. Top speed 250 Km/h, fully armed. Equipped with night flying and aiming device. The "Mangusta" has a ballistic resistance up to 12.7 mm, a reduced thermal footprint and shock-proof fuel tank. It is also equipped with radar and laser alarm systems, anti-radar and anti-missile disturbance/decoy devices with heat-seeking guidance system.



training schools (Alpine Military School, Infantry and Cavalry School, Armoured Troop School), to be brought up to strength by mobilization in an emergency. The ground forces component of the Rapid Deployment Force (FIR) has already been set up, and should enhance capacity for quick reaction in emergency situations.

In this overall framework – bearing in mind also the duties of the Civil Defence in providing field support – it is clear that the possibility of reducing the composition and quantity of the operational forces and of improving their quality is very limited. However, certain areas have been distinguished where substantial cuts can be made. It is, in fact, both possible and expedient to streamline the present chain of command by reducing the principal levels from 4 to 3 (battalion, brigade and corps), eliminating the divisional level.

This streamlining presupposes the introduction – already under way – of computerized command and control systems. Such systems would obviously be useful also

in peacetime emergencies. Divisional support at battalion level will therefore be reorganized and reduced.

Provision has also been made for the quantitative and qualitative balancing of the three Corps, each of which will include from 5 to 7 “brigade modules”, for the reorganization of the Arm Commands and of the Corps support units, as well as for the areal organization of the logistic support of the units not subordinate to Brigades.

Because of the far-reaching implications, special reference must be made to Brigade **typology**.

The renewed interest in “light infantry” – i.e. highly mobile infantry equipped with light but modern weapons effective also against sophisticated vehicles and craft, with emphasis on anti-tank capability, and with the maximum degree of tactical and logistic autonomy – corresponds to an up-to-date evaluation based on the territorial and environmental conditions in which our Army is required to operate.

In fact, leaving aside all questions of budget, it must be

acknowledged that the mass deployment of mechanized and armoured units – the only ones capable of dynamic reactions, of blocking enemy penetrations and of providing flexibility in defence – will encounter increasingly severe limitations in the future. This is due both to the growing urbanization of the territory and to improvements in target acquisition systems.

Rural areas gradually shrink as farm and industrial buildings continue to be constructed. In many critical areas, the various built-up areas have now run together to form one continuous line.

There is also the problem – in the event of an emergency in peninsular Italy – of having rapidly to move considerable forces over long distances. For these movements to be effected with the necessary speed and efficacy, less heavily equipped units with greater strategic mobility, which are easier to support logistically, are necessary. Within the Brigade the balance of forces must therefore be shifted in favour of the light infantry vis-à-vis armoured and mechanized units.



LOGISTICAL AND TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION

This is the area where the most work remains to be done. It is also the area where most can be achieved in terms of reorganization and rationalization.

The 1975 reorganization almost exclusively affected the operational component, leaving the numerous and long-standing problems involving territorial and support organization basically unsolved. It is therefore obvious that the present reorganization should aim at restoring the necessary equilibrium. This accounts for the importance given to actions in this sector, where considerable rationalization can be achieved with the aid of computers and, consequently, a considerable increase in efficiency.

Priority is given to the sector of **national service, recruitment and mobilization**, also because of its social importance. Here, reorganization takes the form of streamlining and rationalizing all procedures, especially selection and medical examination, and of ensuring

that the citizen benefits from a more prompt and efficient information and certification service.

All the activities related to recruitment, mobilization and registration are therefore to be concentrated in the hands of a small number of organizations, the Regional Districts, while information and certification are to be the exclusive tasks of the Provincial Districts.

The national service and selection organizations are also to be cut down and will collaborate with the medico-legal branches in order to serve a large number of users more efficiently. This can only be achieved by continuing with the existing programme of extending automatic data processing to all the component elements.

The new structure will facilitate the process of integration between the citizen and the Armed Forces, especially at the moment of the young recruit's first impact with military life.

Another sector of priority for the Army is the medical services. The reorganization of

the **medical services** will entail separating the medico-legal activities, available to all state employees, from the hospitalization and treatment of serving military personnel and the training of medical and paramedical staff over a wider range of diseases.

In this framework, the hospitals of Milan, Padua, Rome and Bari are to act as "Polyclinics" on behalf of the civilian and military personnel attached to the Ministry of Defence and their families. These hospitals will cater for a wider range of diseases and specializations, and will also carry out university-level teaching and training of medical and paramedical staff.

MLRS Artillery rocket-launcher, one of the most advanced fire-control systems. A salvo of its twelve rockets is enough to saturate an area of 250×100 m with 7,728 HE submunitions, an area of 1,000×400 m with 168 anti-tank submunitions or 336 mines.



The remaining hospitals will carry out separate functions of hospitalization, treatment and forensic medicine. The latter will be functionally "linked" to the compulsory national service and recruitment organization. Finally, it is planned to build a hospital for long-term patients in Anzio and a highly specialized centre for airborne troops in Leghorn.

The programme will allow existing shortcomings in the health services to be made good, also by means of close collaboration between the military "Polyclinics" and their university counterparts.

The Conference on Military Health Services held in Florence on 29-30 January this year was

a useful opportunity to begin a process of comparison and clarification as regards the future configuration of the functions of the hospital structures outlined above, the technical and professional level of the personnel and of the way collaboration with civilian organization will be implemented in the framework of the National Health Service. The participation of many illustrious university professors, expressing the viewpoint of the Italian University, and the presence of highly qualified military experts ensured that satisfactory results were achieved. The atmosphere of close co-operation was confirmation of the authentic national interest in the subject.

As regards the overhauling of **logistic support and the technical and administrative area**, the Army intends to rationalize the whole system by the full implementation of the 1980 logistic model and by grouping the different organs by user area. Here too, reorganization is to take place through the introduction, already under way, of automated supply

and spare parts systems and mechanized checking systems for repairs. Greater emphasis is to be placed on preventive maintenance and the replacement of component parts, which is to be programmed in accordance with a modern policy of motor pool management.

As part of this programme, the number of Army Repair Workshops is to be decreased. In the sectors of supply, transport and services, it is planned to merge a number of stores currently scattered over many different places. This will be followed, in the medium/long term, by the creation of multi-purpose regional centres. This new support structure will afford an approximately 30% reduction in the number of Army 4th degree material depots and stores and allow their functions to be transferred to 3rd level supply organs. There will be a further reduction in mobilization material stores, the aim being to eliminate roughly 50% of the existing ones.

Moreover, all territorial depots will be closed and their

Launch of anti-aircraft missile "Aspide", capable of target acquisition at a distance of approx. 20 km. The missile can be launched using the following systems: "Skyguard" (Army), "Albatros" (Navy) and "Spada" (Air Force).



registration functions handed over to the registration centres of the Military Regions.

TEACHING AND TRAINING ORGANIZATION

In this area, due consideration must be given to the evident continuous overall improvement in the educational level of the Italian people. The training of military personnel can now be simplified and at the same time – particularly for career personnel – made more selective and thorough as regards the professional and technical aspects.

A thorough appraisal must be made of the functions of the Recruit Training Battalions. The number and duration of specialist courses can easily be reduced. Further qualitative improvement must also be made in the training schools, possibly by using civilian staff more extensively.

The most significant measures identified so far involve the concentration of cadre and specialist training and

qualification, at present spread over 28 schools, in a smaller number of Training Schools.

In particular, courses for armoured troop personnel, for signals experts, and for those concerned with maintenance and repair of materials are to take place in combined Training Schools in Lecce, Caserta-San Giorgio a Cremano and Roma-Cecchignola.

The proposed measures will permit an overall gain of approximately 1,500 Officers, 900 NCOs and 16,200 other ranks.

The reorganization will also affect a limited number of civilian personnel, who will be employed in their permanent residences.

Plans are also being drawn up for the redeployment of Officer and NCO cadres, in which the preferences of those concerned are taken into account.

As regards conscripts reduction will mean a decrease in established strength in favour of investments in the modernization of materials and infrastructures. This is the only policy of

Above.

Scale model of the Italian-produced "AHV 8x8/105" armoured vehicle. The vehicle is capable of producing a high volume of fire with its 105 mm cannon and has great mobility even over broken ground thanks to its 8-wheel drive and its 520 hp engine.


Right.

"Apilas" anti-tank missile system. Its effectiveness lies in two essential features: accuracy and its powerful terminal effect. The "Apilas" uses a rocket with a double-base propellant. The rocket has an initial velocity of 293 metres per second and can perforate homogeneous armour-plating over 700 mm thick.

expenditure capable of opening up concrete prospects for development and increased efficiency in the Army of the 1990's.

Once implemented, the proposed reduction in the number of conscripts contained in this first system stage will mean an overall saving of 111 billion lire a year, at current costs.

A certain amount of restructuring will, however, be



What Kind of Army?

- the up-dating of the law regarding the sale of military premises;
- the revision of the military personnel pay scale.

The challenge facing the Army in the last years of this century is extremely complex. It is not only a question of finding short and medium-term remedies for known shortcomings and delays standing in the way of the optimal employment of men and means. It is also necessary to implement an adequate economic policy and proceed with renewed vigour towards the "system standard", which represents the optimal structure for the Army of the year 2000 vis-à-vis the tasks it has to perform and the social context in which it has to operate.

The period facing us is certainly challenging, but also stimulating from the professional and social point of view. The final goal is an increase in the operational capacity of the ground forces which will make the Armed Forces better suited to meet the demands of national security.

In this sense, we are greatly comforted by the commitment of Cadres at all levels, the declared interest of the political authorities and the close and enlightened participation of the nation in the basic problems of the Army.


Luigi Poli

indispensable, above all in the field of infrastructures. The overall cost will be approximately 320 billion lire.

The whole programme is based on the assumption that certain legal provisions will ultimately be approved by Parliament, for instance:

- the proposal to increase the established strength of NCOs by 7,000;
- the redefinition of the transfer allowance;

EVOLUTION OF THE IMPERIALISM



CONCEPT OF

FROM THE 19TH CENTURY TO THIS DAY


The phenomenon of imperialism, as a multifaceted manifestation of a country's will to extend its political and territorial domination over peoples, is known since the dawn of civilization.

As a general and abstract concept, the fundamental tendency of the primitive social embryo is certainly that of gaining an economic and military prevalence on its competitors in attaining the material goods that will satisfy its primary needs.

In more advanced, protohistoric and historic times, this characteristic of mankind – which follows the dynamics of progress, through a Hegelian process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis – is realized in the involvement of entire nations and great crowds.

Thus the Empires, in the full meaning of the word, arise and follow each other, in an uninterrupted series marked by famous names, from Semiramis to Alexander the Great, from Caesar to Napoleon, from Charles V to Genghis Khan who, as the greatest conqueror of all times, can be considered the embodiment of imperialism.

Temucin, known as Genghis Khan, spread his domination from China to Yugoslavia, producing a real philosophy about the imperialistic system and planning a surprisingly modern administrative organization, which was doubtlessly at the root of the sharing of powers theorized by Montesquieu.





Left.

The painting shows French troops entering Constantine in 1837 – through a breach opened by the artillery in the external fortifications – to put down the revolt of some Algerian tribes.

Right.

In 1830, France invaded Algeria and conquered it in a few weeks, but had to fight a long war against some tribes which, under the leadership of Abd-el-Kader, held the French troops in check for more than fifteen years. The print portrays a moment of the fierce clashes in the streets of Constantine (October 13, 1837), during which 1200 French died and more than 2000 were wounded. The Arabs lost about 5000 men.

as those in central-southern Africa, but it is also a fact that the ensuing impetuous process of cultural advancement of the subjected develops in a context of substantial, skillfully disguised exploitation.

This is the price that mankind pays to progress, a progress often made through difficulties and pains, but always victorious and bearer of new ethnical and social conquests.

This moral and philosophical foundation of colonialism can be traced back to the expansionist policy promoted by the commonly acknowledged founder of modern imperialism, Joseph Chamberlain.

Chamberlain, in view of the difficulties encountered by the English free-trade policy, due to the presence of products from competing countries, establishes very close bonds with the British colonies, which obtain preferential prices for the national wares. At the same time, duties are laid on foreign products that could damage the market of the colonial raw materials.

As a result, the general theory of free exchange is completely upset, due to the technical implications and hindrances that invalidate its traditional principles.

The intervention of political decisions compulsorily bends towards the desired directions the autonomous choices and the natural fluctuations of demand and supply.

The guidelines set by the great Mongolian leader can still be considered a valuable model up to the threshold of our era.

But modern imperialism draws its vitality from very different and innovative motivations, because it does not rely on individual or dynastic standing to consolidate in a national policy, as collective hegemonic will of a given people.

The most representative expression of this evolutive form of the imperialistic phenomenon is colonialism, which is born out of reasons not always sufficiently justified by the

camouflage of assumed "civilizing" missions, being mainly grounded on economic requirements.

The main protagonists are the European nations, which, in the availability of new territories try also to find an outlet for the unbearable, very composite, internal pressures which threaten the stability of the social order.

It is a fact that the colonial expansion acts as an historic catalyst for the evolution of peoples that are still underdeveloped or who are still at the lowest levels of life, such



A new economic area is born, not only for the British Empire, but for all the colonialist countries.

The regime of trade established by Chamberlain becomes in fact an almost general rule, which has deep reverberations in every field.

The consolidation of the economic bonds between the mother country and its colonial territories leads to a strengthening of the political ties and demands common defensive lines and "strategies".

Other European powers follow the British in this

direction: such as France, which is also encouraged by the enormous development of the technology of the 19th century, which translates into a progressive erosion of the agricultural economy by the newly born industrial system.

France indeed finds in its colonies the necessary outlets for the impelling needs of its transformation enterprises and favourable fields of employment for the large private capitals.

One cannot omit the trend of the United States which, with the Cuban war of 1895, starts its expansionist policy, supported

and strengthened by President Theodore Roosevelt.

The German penetration in Africa and Oceania starts in 1882, under the impulse of the industrial leadership as well as of political motivations and reasons of prestige which hide urgent demographic problems.

This latter aspect – shared by many overpopulated nations, and particularly by Italy, Germany and Japan – is one of the main causes of colonial penetration, producing the phenomenon of emigration and the "poor people's imperialism", as Giovanni Pascoli defined it.



This hard truth surpasses all other human motivations and cannot be hidden by ideologies thought up in order to justify the conquest of socially and ethically underdeveloped countries.

The attempts to find noble and historically acceptable reasons for campaigns made against populations of evident inferior standing are manifold and sometimes degenerate into an exasperated nationalism, when they do not become inhuman and degrading racism.

A most evident example is given by Hitler's conception of psychophysical supremacy of the German race, destined by natural law to excel in all fields.

But this is the sunset of the typically colonial imperialism, which already in the precedent conceptual experimentation by Marx and Engels has discovered the critical foundations of a deep transformation.

The Communist theory, in

fact, refuses imperialism as a product of the capitalist bourgeoisie and sees it as destined to certain ruin when, having taken advantage of the last occasion of conquest, it will be unable to overcome the consequent inevitable crisis.

Apart from these catastrophic conclusions, it is evident that the phenomenon's colonialist aspect is gradually overcome in the first half of the 20th century.

The first World War destroys the German Empire and promotes, within the League of Nations, the "mandate" concept, which presupposes the possibility of a gradual evolution toward self-government of the subjected peoples.

The second World War gives the coup de grace to all forms of actual subjugation of peoples less developed than the "colonizers".

The idea that the white man is superior to the coloured

man has waned. The latter has assimilated from the civilization of his dominators all he needs in order to understand in full his right to independence; in many instances he has attended universities in Paris or Oxford, has lived in the ferment of the European metropolises, has brought his country's dramatic reality to the political attention of the world through credited representatives, such as Pandit Nehru, Ho Chi Minh, Sukarno and many others.

Britain, always endowed with fine political sensitiveness, is the first to understand this grandiose evolutionary process of the peoples and to realize that imperialism must modernize if it wants to survive.

This gives birth to economic imperialism, with its exciting and dramatic aspects. Exciting, because it is a direct vehicle of civilization, and dramatic owing to the related and understandable human and social implications.

Left.

In the second half of the 18th century, Great Britain expanded its domination to almost all of the Indian subcontinent. But in the 19th century was confronted by Russia, which was pressing on the Afghan border. To prevent Russia's expansionism, the British waged two wars against Afghanistan, winning both of them. The painting shows a British unit attacked by Afghan rebels, near the town of Gandamak (summer 1839).

Right.

After conquering Algeria, France wanted to expand further along the North African coast. Tunisia was occupied without difficulties in 1891, but with Morocco things became involved, due to the rebellion of some nomad tribes and the opposition of Germany, with fears of a possible Franco-German war. Only in 1911 Berlin and Paris signed an agreement which legitimated the French protectorate over Morocco. The illustration from "Le Petit Journal" portrays an episode of the resistance in the Sahara: a clash between Tuareg warriors and a French patrol.


Great Britain is in fact the first to carry out in practice this evolutionary dynamism, making a series of concessions to its Dominions, helping them along their spontaneous ascent.

In 1931, the Westminster Statute lays down the foundations of new relations between Britain and its subordinate countries, affirming that the laws promulgated by the British Parliament cannot concern the Dominions that do not accept them.

Meanwhile, the Governors become simple representatives of the Crown and assume the function of advisers to the free governments.

In 1948, as a consequence of the new blow dealt by the second World War to old-style colonialism, the Commonwealth includes India and Pakistan among its members, emphasizing its character of association of free nations.

A similar transformation



occurs within the American and Dutch "empires" (independence of the Philippines, United States of Indonesia).

France is a different case because, intending to exploit the resources of its colonies and having perhaps overevaluated the bonds established with some subjected countries, it has sometimes delayed the inevitable concessions to the emergent nationalist currents.

The entry of the non-European free peoples in

international politics is a grandiose phenomenon in modern civilization, but also a problem that demands vigilant caution.

As a matter of fact, not all peoples are mature for forms of self-government and there is always the danger that, incited by an opportunistic propaganda, they fall under a new different sort of yoke.

This is the democratic powers' main worry, and particularly the United States'.



Beginning in 1652, thousands of Dutch went to settle in South Africa, where they founded a new country: the Boers' nation. When Great Britain took possession of the colony, the Boers preferred to emigrate rather than suffer a foreign domination, and moved to Transvaal and Orange, where they discovered many gold and diamond mines. The British threatened them again and they, to defend themselves, declared war on Great Britain in 1899. Against all odds, the Boers obtained some successes, but were unable to exploit them and surrendered in 1902. The illustration shows British prisoners after the battle of Nicholson's Neck, where the Boers captured more than thousand British officers and soldiers.

whose policy has at present a characteristic function of control over the international situation, with the aim of defending both the principles of democracy and the American economy.

The contrast with the Soviet position is evident; the USSR's policy goes clearly against history, because it tends to obtain a real ideological, political and economic supremacy over countries of ancient civilization, at times when history records the emancipation of less civilized peoples.

But most of all the present era records the replacement of sovereignty by a cooperation aimed at defending common interests.

It is not fortuitous that the "San Francisco Charter" perorates the promotion of the political, social and economic progress of the less advanced countries subjected to the international mandate system, in the interest of a superior justice and in view of gradual emancipation.

Considering this reality, submitted to uncontrollable, evolutionary, and in some ways disturbing dynamics, the only possible form of imperialism is – as we have already said – the economic one.

The remarkable improvement of the Third World countries' living standard and the ensuing increased demand of consumer goods is not matched by an adequate development of the local technologies and industries. The unbalance between demand and

supply renders the emerging nations subject to the great international markets.

The producing countries, in constant quest of outlets for the surplus of their consumer goods, unabsorbed and unabsorbable by the internal markets, find it easy to introduce their wares to extremely receptive populations that need almost everything.

No matter if, at this stage, the subject Nations' economy is unable to offer an advantageous compensation, for the producers envisage the future development of their working and marketing capabilities, which suggest the conquest of a position of privileged partners on the market.

In view of this, the weaker populations are implicitly blackmailed by the industrial powers, which impose a given type of products, and, consequently, a social custom formed by new habits, sometimes alien to the native traditions of the territories.

Economic imperialism therefore deeply influences the continuity of the ethnical components and, from this point of view, it can be seen as an inhumane and subverting phenomenon.

But, besides the ethic and social aspects, the willingness to bring the developing countries under industrial subjugation inevitably causes attritions and dissensions among the producing nations, which quite often lead to deep contrasts, bordering sometimes on open conflicts.

These are, in any case, clear manifestations of a constant eagerness for supremacy that embodies the modern form of creeping imperialism, which is as concrete as the past one.

Armaments have been replaced by products, the tools of oppression are now being substituted by coercive means, disguised as unselfish offers in the name of a pacifism, perhaps sincere, but certainly proclaimed in view of concrete advantages.

In this kind of subjugation of the emerging countries, the big powers include also the friendly countries, which in theory should be on an equal standing.

The planning of certain products deeply modifies the character of the markets, increasing consumption as an indispensable tool for guiding and adapting demand to the nature and extent of supply.

Power relations take part in this psychological game, which can deeply affect the very ganglions of the social organization of the countries less prepared to resist the pressures of the more efficient foreign economies. The progressive adaptation of the population to the fictitious tastes, habits and needs imposed by the "aggressor" country is certainly a more or less felt form of subjugation.

Nevertheless, also the phenomenon of economic imperialism shows signs of decline, because the cultural and social rise of the emerging nations tends to promote a more marked growth of the national industries and products.


The ensuing drop in the outward demand of the less developed countries sooner or later will bring about a slackening of the existing bonds of "subjection", until new balances are reached, which presumably will revive free exchange.

Thus a century-old cycle will be concluded, which has been of real historical importance and has had an enormous civil significance.

But the foundations of a new type of imperialism – which, without being rhetoric can be defined as "space imperialism" – are already being laid down.

The superpowers are already directing their efforts towards the conquest of outer space, for a number of scientific, economic, strategic and prestige reasons, that can all be traced back to a common denominator: the pursuit of supremacy.

The environment of the competition and conquest changes, as do the tools and



Left.

As it was with the conflict against Turkey for the conquest of Lybia, also the war against Ethiopia – started on October 3, 1935 – was, for Italy, more difficult than expected. Officially the Ethiopian campaign ended on May 3, 1936, when the Italian troops from Somalia joined the forces from Eritrea. The tableau by Beltrame, of October 20, 1935, depicts an assault of Italian troops against an Ethiopian position.

Right.

The superpowers are now pursuing the conquest of outer space with many different motivations: science, economy, strategy, prestige. Nevertheless all can be traced back to a common denominator: the quest for supremacy. The photo shows an astronaut near the space Shuttle in orbit around the Earth.

At this point, also the financial aspects come into play, because the enormous amounts of money appropriated for the experimentation cannot go wasted.

In concrete terms, the space undertaking tends, first of all, to prove a technological supremacy which has "terrestrial" goals besides the evident "space" objectives.

As a matter of fact, the "sideral conflict" is still closely linked to traditional interests, but presumably, in a not so distant future, it will mostly concern new factors which, at the moment, are still hard to foresee.

At the present time, therefore, we must limit ourselves to the evidence, i.e. to a rapidly and vehemently evolving scientific component, apparently devoted to the exploration of our solar system but having, indirectly, practical application and psychological effects of high political value.

The U.S. experiments have registered from this standpoint an unquestionable technological supremacy over the Soviet Union; this is a fact that demands immediate responses at different levels.

The USSR, on its part, has shown the ability to keep pace with the New Continent, but only as far as space is

prospects, but the hegemonic objective remains unchanged and everlasting.

The possibilities to control space, which only a few decades ago belonged to science fiction, seem today more realistic and concrete in the light of the recent positive tests, and not obscured by episodic and, unfortunately, sometimes dramatic failures, such as the explosion of the Shuttle and its launcher, last January, at Cape Canaveral.

The American and Soviet

repeated and ever more onerous tests of endurance in space clearly show the intention of establishing there a human working presence; this is due not only to scientific motivations, but also to strategic and tactical reasons.

One can easily predict that such efforts will be increased both qualitatively and quantitatively, because none of the two superpowers can at the present stage disregard the substantial interests involved, and withdraw from the contest.

concerned, while it shows undeniable symptoms of inadequate industrial productive capability as regards social needs.

On the contrary, the two superpowers are equivalent as far as nuclear weaponry is concerned, and this is a sector in which it is difficult by now to reach a clear superiority.

It is therefore natural that also in the military field the imperialist attempt is made in space, where there are still "virgin" possibilities to be verified and experimented.


This is the real truth of "Star Wars", and of the enticing and terrible plans that have already introduced us into the future.

The "military" race in outer space appears almost an episode of the Hegelian "shrewdness of reason"; i.e. the artifices that the universal Spirit devises in order to enable mankind to proceed along the path of progress and write its dramatic and very exciting history.

According to Hegel's epic theory, today we are certainly living in a period of thesis-antithesis of a superior level, albeit necessarily interspersed with human tragedies.

Nevertheless we are certain that, beyond the imperialistic intentions and the yearning for hegemony and power, all Nations share the wish for a synthesis that will give birth to peace, the indispensable condition for real progress in the wonderful vicissitudes of civilization and history.


Lt. Gen. Ciro Di Martino



EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF IMPERIALISM

FROM THE 19TH CENTURY TO THIS DAY

INDUSTRY



FACES THE FUTURE



Twenty years ago, the American economist Galbraith wrote that the difference between a novel and a piece of economic analysis is that it is preferable not to know the plot of the novel beforehand, while in economics it is useful and even necessary to try to predict how things will go.

All entrepreneurs know the truth of this statement: choices regarding investments, products and markets are all made on the basis of more or less reliable forecasts. The greater the reliability of these forecasts, the greater the probability of success. But it is not always easy to predict the future. The current trends do not always foreshadow sudden or uncontrollable changes.

When Galbraith wrote the phrase I have just quoted, the economy of the industrialized countries seemed to be proceeding along firm and unchangable tracks. The balance of trade and payments was ensured by a system of fixed international exchange rates. The low and stable price of oil and raw materials made cost forecasting reliable. Technological supremacy ensured wide margins of competitiveness. High rates of economic growth made it possible to programme the regular and continuous expansion of production.

The development of our country benefited greatly from this favourable combination of circumstances. Of crucial importance here was the choice made immediately after the war in favour of the free trade area and against isolationism.

Thus, in under twenty years, the gap separating us from the advanced industrialized countries was bridged.

Extraordinary economic growth was achieved, an average annual rate of 5%, and centuries of cultural and economic provincialism were cast off.

We also, unfortunately, cherished the illusion that the favourable trends would continue indefinitely and that development would allow us to give second place to – or even to reject – the values of efficiency and productivity.

In fact, until the late sixties only a few people realized that these ideal conditions would disappear one after the other in the short space of a few years.

The system of fixed exchange rates was abolished in 1971. The dollar could no longer be converted into gold and the Bretton Woods agreements were abandoned.

In 1973, oil prices suddenly increased fourfold and went completely haywire after the 1979 crisis.


In western countries, economic growth rates dwindled to near zero, and their technological supremacy was eroded by the emergence of new economic powers on the other side of the globe.

The result of all these dramatic events was the recession of the early 1980's.

Even with the beginning of a new growth cycle which opened in late 1984, the old points of reference had definitively vanished and the new were still fragile and uncertain.

Uncertainty is thus the primary characteristic dominating the future of the industrial system. The second is instability: we are forced with incessant technological change and continual market variability.

The rate of technological innovation is constantly



increasing and the lead time for industrial inventions is growing shorter and shorter. It took thirty-five years for the radio to become an industrial product; the transistor took less than five and has already been overtaken by integrated circuits.

But the most striking aspect is the capacity of the innovative process to penetrate all products and all production systems, from the simplest to the most sophisticated.

Today, electronics is used in the building of space craft, but also in century-old manufacturing processes, such as textiles or paper-making. The computer is used for complicated scientific calculations but also, for example, to design motor vehicle components.

Even the Military Academy, which has been training men and building their characters for over a century, has now become a place in which high-technology experts are produced.

Markets are characterized by progressive, world-wide interdependence and by a rapid increase in the number of countries flooding the world with their industrial products.

Ten years ago, Japan accounted for 10% of world exports; the figure has now risen to 20%. The contribution of South East Asian countries has risen from 8% to 15%. Europe and America, the traditional industrialized countries, are still stationary at 45%.

Demand for consumer goods, but also for industrial products, is continually changing in an unending quest for

innovation, for higher quality and better performance.

The average market life of a product such as a car is now no more than five years. This necessitates constant modernization, improvement and changing of models. Some high-technology products actually become obsolete in less than two years.

A simple example of what I mean is the watch. Watches used to be expensive items that lasted more than a lifetime and were handed on from father to son. Today, for the most part, it is a consumer product that is changed as often as fashion changes. After remaining practically unchanged for three hundred years, both its appearance and functioning have been transformed by electronics.

Japan now dominates a large part of the world market for this item, i.e. a country that was still considered "exotic" thirty years ago. Industry has therefore now to cope with conditions of uncertainty and instability and a state of constant change, i.e. a complete reversal of past conditions.

If I may suggest another image, it is as though we were no longer running along rails, but forced to sail the open sea, where it is necessary to plot one's course and take into account every wave and gust of wind.

Competition is stiffer. Strategies for success have changed radically.

In the past, the relative slowness of technological change made it possible to plan long-term investments. The problem was how to obtain funds, rather than how much they cost or how to use them efficiently. Today, a product or production process can be knocked out of the market in a few years. It is necessary to programme investments which offer quick returns. Choices have become critical: there is virtually no way a mistaken investment can be corrected once it has been made.

In the past, the relative stability of the market meant that production could be organized in terms of large volumes and long runs. Today, the market obliges one to be constantly ready to modify the product, even to change the model at the drop of a hat on the production line itself.

In the past, a large company needed extensive bureaucratic structures. Today, it is especially the large company that needs the flexible and decentralized structures required for rapid decision-making.

In the past, overheads were considered an inevitable burden. Today, a low break-even point is essential if sudden drops in demand and sudden price swings are to be withstood with minimal damage.

In the past, a position of relative competitiveness allowed

even non-essential costs to be borne. Today, competition is so tough that an inflexible control must be exercised over production costs, efficiency and quality.

This, in a nutshell, is the sense of the transformations that have taken place in industry in the last few years. As a concrete example, let us see how Fiat has experienced these transformations.

Like most other Italian companies, Fiat had to face up to these changes with structures, plant and mentality that it had inherited from the preceding decades. The lag between company action and change in external conditions created a situation of great risk calling for urgent action.

A determined and incisive process of decentralization of company organization was begun with a view to speeding up operational decision-making. Today, the Fiat Group has been divided up into a number of self-contained sectors which operate with a considerable degree of autonomy within the framework of overall group strategy. The production sector has been reorganized completely.

Difficult and important decisions have been taken, even at the cost of serious disagreement, such as those regarding surplus labour. These were considered indispensable if we were to ward off the risks threatening the company and, consequently, the jobs it provided.

However, the greatest attention was paid to the introduction of innovative techniques throughout the whole company.

This process of renewal has been under way for some years now and will continue in the years to come. Three main areas are affected.

As regards the first of these, production, the factory can be said to have been transformed overnight. More than 1,000 robots are now operating at Fiat. In 1981, there were just

over 200. We estimate that there will be over 1,700 by 1990.

The Termoli plant is run by over 100 computers, for the entire course of the operational cycle, including bench tests. Moreover, the engine produced at that factory was also designed by computer, just as the plant itself is the result of computer-aided design.

The second area of innovation concerns office work. So far we have installed about 2,500 terminals to carry out a vast range of operations, for office work alone (i.e. excluding process computers).

An integrated system of terminals installed in the branch offices enables us to transmit orders to the headquarters in a matter of seconds so that they can be included in the production schedules.

Our ultimate goal is the creation of an integrated logistic system enabling us to regulate the flow of materials from the purchasing of the basic components up to the moment when the finished product leaves the factory.


In this way, manufacturing becomes an intermediate stage in a continuous process going from the initial supplier to the end customer.

This process enables us to keep stocks, which represent a financial and economic burden incompatible with present requirements, to a minimum.

The third area of innovation is design and R & D. We have over 100 CAD/CAM designers and about 50 EDP analysis and testing systems. Design and testing time can thus be reduced and high standards maintained.

In recent years, these systems have enabled us to bring out a new model each year, introduce innovative solutions and constantly improve quality and performance. Computerized systems have been used to carry out simulated tests and to develop optimal manufacturing solutions that would have taken years of work using traditional methods.

Our research and innovation efforts have been very costly in



terms of human and financial resources: 3,000 billion lire spent on research between 1983 and 1985, 6,000 budgeted for the next three years, 10,000 Group employees involved in research.

Fiat is just one of many possible examples of what is involved when a company has to change tack to cope with changing international competition. I could have chosen from a large number of other Italian companies.

What emerges from the results of the last two years is that the effort made by Italian industry is paying off in terms of achievements and future prospects. It must be added that these positive results cannot simply be taken for granted.

World competition is relentless and growing stiffer all the time. Industry cannot let

up for a moment in its quest for flexibility, efficiency and innovation.

It is certainly in the interests of the country that its industrial system should maintain and strengthen its competitive position. Industry will long continue to be the driving force behind the economy.

However, it is becoming increasingly clear that commitment to innovation of the industrial system is not enough to guarantee adequate development prospects unless the economic system as a whole is overhauled at the same time.

It is at this stage, i.e. when recovery is finally beginning after years of crisis, that the shortcomings in the measures of economic policy become glaringly obvious.

Italy's trade balance is expected to show a deficit of 23,000 billion lire as against 19,000 in 1984 and 12,000 billion in 1983. This means that today approximately 3% of our gross domestic product, i.e. the work of the country as a whole, will be used to pay the difference between what we import and what we manage to export.

This means that we are getting deeper into debt with the rest of the world. It also means that we are giving jobs away to other countries so that they can produce what we import from them.

Employment is often said to be the main problem for the future. I am convinced that this is true, especially when I see that our rate of unemployment among young people is far



Fantasia a Camello
 Cavalleria regolare
 Gendarme Europeo
 Fantasia regolare
 Guardia del Ministero degli Esteri
 Gendarme indigeno a Mustafaze
 Ufficiale del seguito di Baker
 Cavalieri e Guardie del vicere
 da altri Ministri
 Ufficiale di Fantasia
 Generale Baker
 Generale
 Cavalleria
 Ajutante
 Monarca
 Soldato di Fantasia

higher than that of other industrialized countries.

But this problem is certainly not going to be solved by actions running counter to the requirements of efficiency and productivity, such as the reduction of working hours or the invention of non-productive jobs.

The problem of future employment can be tackled seriously only by speeding up the rate of development. It is a problem that must be tackled at its roots, by reducing the obstacles to our economic freedom.

Until a few months ago, our level of inflation was steady at 8.5%; some countries have already dropped below 2% and others are slightly above 3%.

This means that, all things being equal, internal costs in

Italy tend to grow more quickly and reduce our international competitiveness, in spite of the efforts made to increase productivity.

It used to be said that inflation was caused by the pressure of international prices.

Today's plummeting oil prices give us ample margin for an all-out attack on internal inflation. But wages continue to rise in real terms, boosting consumption and depleting resources that could be used for investment.

It should be made clear that arguments over wages can no longer be viewed as a return to the old conflict between wages and profits; it is now a question of the choice between development and non-development, of income for the employed and investments to

provide jobs for the unemployed.

I should also like to make a brief comment on another crucial theme, public spending.

Today, public spending accounts for nearly 65% of the gross national product. This is a considerable sum but not, in itself, anything scandalous.

What is unacceptable is that this enormous amount of resources still cannot be used to make a positive contribution to satisfying the development needs of the country, especially at the present time.

It has always been the accepted practice to consider the inefficiency of the public services and the time-consuming red-tape in which the state indulges in its dealings with both private individuals and companies as being an inevitable

part of the system. I am by no means convinced that this is so.

Apart from anything else, it can hardly be considered gratifying for those – the majority – who carry out their work in the civil service with honesty, dedication and professionalism.

There is talk today of resorting to large-scale public works as a means of giving the economy and employment a shot in the arm, with the added advantage that this would require little in the way of imports and would not be a burden on the balance of payments.

All these things are true and desirable. But they all presuppose a decisive shifting of public resources away from consumption towards investment, and a brake on the soaring national debt, which has grown twice as fast as inflation in recent years. This is where the problem lies, despite all the high-sounding but often vacuous declarations on the subject.

Unreliable basic public services are a burden for the system and widen the gap between us and our competitors. Useless and costly organisms mean subtraction of funds from necessary and inadequate ones.

For years now, there has been talk of reforming the civil service. In my opinion, the best way to start would to improve its efficiency. This reform could possibly be effected simply by applying the same criteria as those used in running a private company: cost effectiveness and product quality, rewarding merit and cutting away the deadwood. I am convinced that not only would the services run better, but new employment opportunities would be created.

I should not, however, like my criticisms of the civil service to be misinterpreted. The criticisms I am often led to make are intended as an appeal to the responsibility of each and every one of us, whether

employed by the state or by private companies, whether a member of the government or simply a private citizen, to contribute towards the improvement of our common lot.

Soldiers are subject to military discipline, they are subject to strict regulations. However, I think they will agree with me when I say that following rules is necessary but not sufficient. Respect for the rules must be accompanied by one's personal commitment. Each of us is called upon to do his job with the will to do it as well as possible, to develop and increase his own professionalism, and to conscientiously gauge the efficiency with which the goals assigned are pursued.

A good society is based on good laws. But it can improve only if all the citizens take their share of responsibility for its development.

Cadets are, above all, young people. And it is to them, to the young, that I should like to address these final remarks.

I have spoken of the future: the future belongs to them; it is the time when they will make their fullest and most complete contribution to the growth of the country.

Each time I come into contact with the world of the young, I realize how great this contribution can be. I realize that today young people have a seriousness, the training and a will to understand and to act that is far greater than in our day, or even fifteen years ago.

Our generation has the duty and the responsibility to remove all the obstacles preventing this great resource from being used, above all through an economic policy aimed at development rather than conservation.

Cesare Romiti



Modena, 21st February 1986.

General Giovanni Brugnola presents Dr. Cesare Romiti, the managing director of Fiat, with a commemorative plaque at the end of his lecture delivered at the Military Academy.



SKYGUARD

Gun/Missile Air Defense

Skyguard is designed for various operational configurations, i.e. for the control of medium-calibre anti-aircraft guns and/or guided missiles. The usual Skyguard fire unit consists of the fire control system and two to three guns and/or missile launchers. The transmission of data and commands to the guns and/or launchers occurs via a standard 2-wire connection (twisted field telephone cable).

Skyguard, the miniaturized all-weather Fire Control System is designed for permanent surveillance as well as accurate control of medium-calibre AA-guns and surface-to-air missiles. Skyguard operates to a large extent fully automatically and provides effective protection against attacking aircraft and missiles.



This mobile and compact electronic system consists of the following main assemblies: ● Pulse doppler search radar with automatic target alarm ● Pulse doppler tracking radar ● Combat display system ● TV-tracking system ● Miniaturized and programmable digital computer ● Digital data transmission system ● Human-engineered lay-out of control console ● Integrated power supply unit ● Fire-resistant air-conditioned operator cabin.

Skyguard—the advanced electronic system for air defense—developed by Contraves

SKY 
GUARD




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DELTA FORCE



The moment of the special force



On April 25, 1980, while the humiliation and the frustrating impotence of the five-month occupation of the American Embassy in Teheran were still present and burning, the news went out that a U.S. Special Force's attempt to free the hostages failed miserably in the Iranian desert. Photos illustrated the event, showing pitilessly the charred remains of eight victims strewn among the burned down wreckage of airplanes and helicopters. Various explanations were given about this failure; some, rather fantastic, went as far as attributing it to the Soviet Union, which having "zoomed" everything through its satellites,

within the framework of the by now usual "cosmic voyeurism", had hastened to broadcast, through nonofficial channels, the customary message "yankee go home". The only solid fact known was that a certain "**Delta Force**" was involved in this action; a force nobody had ever heard of before.

The aborted raid in the land of Zarathustra and Firdausi is certainly not the only negative experience concerning "rescue operations" carried out by the U.S. Special Forces in the last decade. As a matter of fact, on November 21, 1970, after over 6 months of tests and political hesitations, a Special Force's heliborne unit landed

at Sontay in North Vietnam, in an effort to free the American prisoners held there or, better, who had been there until July 14, date in which they had been transferred to Dong Hoi, a few miles to the east. In that period, the numerous intelligence agencies of the United States were probably enjoying their well-deserved summer vacations. Everything is carried out as planned, except, of course, the hostages' liberation. And again on May 15, 1975, eleven helicopters with a force of 227 marines on

U.S. Army soldiers on patrol.



Olophernes, biblical general of Nabucodonosor's troops, was killed in his sleep by Judith.

board take off heading towards the island of Koh Tang to rescue the crew of the U.S. merchant ship "Mayaguez" captured on May 12, in international waters, by units of the Cambodian revolutionary government. The planned and not carried out diverting air intervention, and the by now customary inconsistencies of the intelligence bodies, enable the 48 marines who board the "Mayaguez" to make a peaceful entry in a dimly empty ship but, as a counterbalance, the

marines who land on the island are faced by an unforeseen and very strong resistance. At the end, 38 dead and 50 wounded lie on the ground; four helicopters are destroyed, including one lost in an air accident at the beginning of the operation. These not too brilliant results were then ascribed to the inadequacies of the intelligence framework, the reluctance to develop concurrent supporting actions, the excessive centralization of the operations, scarce autonomy of the Commanders on the field. In short, all that must not be done when special operations are to be carried out. These incidents

have been mentioned not with the less than noble purpose to underline inefficiency, by because – with their common goal of rescuing hostages and prisoners, a very unpleasant job, even in peacetime – they deservedly place themselves in the genesis of the **Delta Force**.

Nevertheless, to broach the **Delta Force** subject without a preliminary anamnesis of the Special Forces could produce an incomplete picture, and possibly wrong conjectures on the conceptual plane. In fact, the copious literature on the Special Forces usually stresses the romantic, the phantastic, the hypothetical and the improbable, in that, rather than to inform, they want to produce a superficial enjoyment of the mass media. A short historical outline, completed by an impartial comment, can therefore help reframe the subject within more realistic and acceptable dimensions.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

First of all, let us make it clear that special operations do not necessarily require Special Forces. These operations carry the "special" label not because they derive it from the performs, but because they often obtain unsuspected and productive results of great politico-military importance, especially if compared with the type and size of the forces employed. Judith, no member of any Special Force herself, depriving Olophernes of his upper extremity, carried out, without even knowing it, a special operation. And to remain within the inappropriately called "weaker sex", the same can be said about Charlotte Corday who, stabbing to death Marat – descendant of Sardinian emigrants – intent on his sulphureous ablutions, exerted great influence on the Convention, depriving it of its most active and ardent Jacobin. And what shall we say of the Achaeans who, packed



The Jacobin Jean Paul Marat was killed by Charlotte Corday in 1793.

inside the ligneous belly of the famous equine, led Troy's long siege to the celebrated and dramatic epilogue? Or, a few centuries later, in May 1940, those 78 Paratrooper Engineers who, jumping on the Eben Emsel Fort, keystone of the Belgian defensive system on the Canal Albert, with the loss of only six men, cleared the way for the German armoured troops' penetration in depth, which was the prelude to the collapse of the entire Western front. And again in May 1978 the airborne raid on Kolwezi. As some will remember, following the tumultuous events after Zaire's newly acquired independence, a large contingent

of Katangese gendarmes, opposed to the central government, had invaded the very rich Shaba region, occupying Kolwezi and capturing about 2000 Europeans, mostly Belgians.

A combined action of Belgian, French and Congolese airborne forces, decided and organized in a very short time, brought, after only five days, the first paratroopers to the north of Kolwezi, with insignificant losses and the full success of the operation. From the examples mentioned above, fished at random in our memory, we can deduce that one can do special things without being necessarily very special.

The idea of constituting "élite" corps is fairly recent. Historically it is traced back, as a specific trend, to the increasingly technical character and stabilization of military operations. The first signs appeared in WWI when, on the Italian front, the in-depth infiltration of small and tough operational ad-hoc groups (Rommel made himself a name in this occasion), created the preconditions for the Caporetto rout. In the second World War, the situation allows further

The training of the British Special Air Service pursues the main objective of preparing its members to tackle critical situations in any environment.



the British Special Forces in the Iranian Embassy in London. At this point, it is perhaps convenient to draw up, as a reminder, a synthetic identity card of the main Special Forces currently in service, omitting, of course, as is the host's duty, our brave Army and Navy commandos. We shall therefore mention:

● **Great Britain: SAS (Special Air Service)**, created in 1940, they made themselves a name in North Africa, in the Aegean (two SAS members, were reportedly the first to enter Athens in 1944... on a bike), then in Rhodesia, Malaysia, Annam, Borneo and Northern Ireland. They are unanimously considered the best in the field, due both to the wide experience acquired along the years and for the possibilities they have had to operate and train themselves in the most varied and tormented operational scenarios, at home and abroad.

● **Federal Republic of Germany: GSG 9 (Grenz Schutz Gruppe 9)**, is a paramilitary unit (border police). It has been constituted after the slaughter of the Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympic Games (August 1972). Clearly, in that event the police forces, although formed by selected men, proved totally inadequate to tackle the situation, mostly for lack of both training in instinctive, selective shooting and determination in using their arms. **GSG 9** is an extremely efficient unit and is often requested to provide advice as well as direct and indirect support in the training and employment of other Special Forces.

● **Israel:** the country does not have units specifically labelled

space for the élite Corps and here, next to the airborne forces, the Special Force units proper make their first appearance. Let us recall our own glorious early creatures: the Navy Commandos, who forced their way inside the superprotected bases of Suda, Alexandria and Gibraltar, the 10th "Arditi", constituted at S. Severa in May 1941 and, in the same period, the British long range patrols, the German "Brandenburg" Division, and finally the first U.S. Ranger Companies established in Great Britain and immediately put to test in the bloody and unfortunate raid at Dieppe. Historical precedents, fully in line with evolution and ethology, provide a "humus" for the Special Forces, favourable to those historical and cultural situations which require individual initiative and free enterprise, besides imagination and sportsmanship. Nothing is in fact more negative and obscuring in the genesis and development of these élite Corps than having to submit to the paralyzing


schemes of ideologies, policies or bureaucratic control with a sectorial verticality lacking an ultimate synthesis at the top, or to situations where objections are bureaucratic excuses for avoiding responsibilities at all levels. A close scrutiny of the few successes and the many failures witnessed in these last years provides material for a clear illustration. Let's recall, for information's sake, among the failures: the Egyptian commandos' massacre in Cyprus in February 1978, with 15 dead and 22 wounded, the raid against the Colombian rebels in November 1985 with over 100 dead, and finally the disastrous Egyptian raid in Malta, in the same month, which cost 60 lives. Among the successes: in 1977, year to be considered lucky in the history of the Special Forces, the model Israeli raid at Entebbe, the Dutch intervention against the Moluccan terrorists at Borensmitde and that of the German Special Forces at Mogadishu; in 1980, the action of

The Grenz Schutz Gruppe 9 is an extremely efficient unit, often employed in support of the training and employment of other Special Forces.

as "Special Forces". The Entebbe raid was actually carried out by elements chosen mostly from paratroop units. In each of these units a group at company level is selected, subjected to a more intense training, especially for urgent interventions, with a wide range of arms and equipment, in order to cover any foreseeable scenario of employment. To these companies, that could be defined as Special Forces, we can add the commandos of the Navy. Several operations carried out in Lebanon and Syria during the long Arab-Israeli conflict have been credited to these forces. It should be remarked that Israel, with the particular multinational and multiracial character of a population already undergone a selection during two thousand years of Diaspora and forty years of war, represents the ideal environment in which to pick something "special" in any sector.

● **United States:** the rangers, constituted in 1941, have been flanked by the **Special Forces** (Green Berets) at the beginning of the '50s, established at first for employment in the European theatre and subsequently in the Vietnam war. Next to these – which belong to the Army but are under joint command and control – there are the Navy Special Forces i.e. **SEAL (Sea Air Land)**, the **UDT (Underwater Demolition Team)**, the **Marines' (Force Recon)** and the Air Force's (**Air Commandos**), which include pilots and ground maintenance teams that take part in special actions.

● **Soviet Union:** the Special Forces, whose genesis is traced back to the World War in the context of the partisan warfare,



are organized in the **Spetsnaz Brigades**, which reportedly are 20 for the Army and 4 for the Navy. To give an idea of their size, let us remember that each Brigade consists of 1200 men who can split into 100 operational detachments. For our peace of mind, not all of

them are complete; furthermore they are mainly manned by conscripts, although it is also a fact that Igor's service lasts three times as much as ours. It is common knowledge that these Brigades, being subordinate to the politico-military leadership through the

The U.S. has several Special Force units, from the Army's Rangers and Green Berets to the Navy's SEAL and UDT, from the Air Force's Air Commandos to the Marines' Force Recon.




GRU (Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces) have at their disposal all-purpose personnel, with ample possibilities to survey at ease, in time of peace, the objectives to be attained in an emergency. The

Spetsnaz have been employed openly, for the first time, in 1968, in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. At present several groups of **Spetsnaz** operate in Afghanistan, apparently with success.

● **France:** there is information that Special Forces were employed in Indochina, at the beginning of the '50s: they were the **GCMA (Groupements de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés)**, later called **GMI (Groupements Mixtes d'Intervention)**. Their tasks, as regards military objectives, have been transferred to airborne units of the Foreign Legion, in Corsica, while the antiterrorism duties have been taken over by a special unit of the Gendarmerie: the **GIGN (Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale)**.

Before considering the **Delta Force** and also in order to divest these notes of the anthological atmosphere produced by the abundant mention of data and events, it does not seem idle to make a few considerations on the Special Forces in the contingencies of peace or in a possible emergency of war, more or less localized. There seems to be no doubt in this connection; on the contrary, it appears that the function of the Special Forces, as well as the élite units (also the Falklands' conflict teaches us something about this) is to be considered on the increase, due to the:



- improbability of widespread conflicts, because they are against the interests of the superpowers; this puts the emphasis on the local conflictuality, where the special units can perhaps obtain decisive results with limited involvement of men and equipment and therefore with limited risks of politico-military escalation;

- progressive and unrestrainable sophistication of weapon and command and control systems, also in the armies of the small countries, with subsequent increase of the management's complexity, especially in the technological-logistic field. This inevitably brings out the fighter who, equipped with the suitable armament and properly trained, can be the famous grain of sand that jams the complicated machinery of the opposing forces. The examples, from Vietnam to Algeria, from Angola to Afghanistan, just to mention the main ones, are under everybody's eyes;

- growing support given by technological advancements to the improvement of the individual's operational capabilities. Suffice it to think what can be accomplished by a well trained operator equipped with a personal ground-to-air missile, with a remote-control device or with a jammer of electronic circuits, not to mention the extremely dangerous panoply of non-conventional weapons, which today can be miniaturized in every way.

But the discussion must not be limited to the mere open and conventional conflictuality. There is at present another conflictuality, whose genesis and structure are hidden, at least officially, but which appears in the most disruptive way both in its actions and in its impact on public opinion, as well as on the governments' stability itself (remember the "Achille Lauro" hijacking). One can imagine, and without great effort, what would happen if, for instance, terrorism carried

Special Forces are very important both in peacetime emergencies and in war.

out a rapid series of actions aimed at the most sensitive objectives touching public opinion's emotional stability. In this instance, to avoid a political collapse, a massive reaction – and therefore indiscriminate – would be necessary against the presumed sanctuaries of terrorism, which are generally covered by the direct or indirect protection of one of the opposing great powers. Therefore terrorism seems to provide a further motivation, perhaps a determinant one, for strengthening the Special Forces component, for these are apparently the only ones capable of making rapid and selective interventions. But is it really true? The Egyptian Special Forces' big failure in Malta last December, the serious crisis in the internal and international relations following

the "Achille Lauro" affair, only to recall the most recent events, suggest a closer reconsideration of the problem. As a matter of fact, an element of the Special Forces is rightly trained to operate in a scenario in which he faces a clear and well definable hostile presence, which he will have to eliminate or, if things go wrong, to neutralize. The scenario of antiterrorism is on the contrary more complicated and requires selective and distinguishing interventions, with very swift decision processes under direct responsibility. Everything occurs in circumstances in which a failure largely exceeds the immediate operational consequences, for it could eventually undermine the credibility, if not the stability of the political body that ordered the operation. From here stems the necessity to have also a Special Force that should be the quintessence of the traditional ones, further refining and improving the typical techniques of terrorism's scenario. And it is at this point that we can at last introduce the **Delta Force**, not so much because it is being considered an emblematic unit – the **SAS** would be perhaps more suitable in this regard – but because in its genesis, organization and employment it embodies – and permits to illustrate – the whole range of difficulties, errors and lessons on the subject.

DELTA FORCE

The idea of creating a special force moulded on the British **SAS**, fit to carry out special operations in any type of emergency, also in peacetime, starts to take shape in 1968. In 1971, after a labourious conceptual elaboration, General Rogers, then U.S. Army Chief of Staff, gives the green light for the organizational developments. These, after alternate events and great difficulties determined, besides the bureaucratic verticality

of the U.S. military structure, also by the open hostility of the special units already in existence, obtain in 1977 the official "go ahead" from the **JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff)** spurred mainly by the German **GSG 9's** success in Mogadishu. The recruiting is done following a severe selective screening. The tests are in fact very hard. In order to be admitted to the psychological selection, the candidates must pass difficult physical tests; for instance: 35 m backstroke in 25 seconds, swimming 100 m in freshwater wearing fatigues and boots and, moreover, 37 knee bends and 33 push-ups in one minute, a devilish obstacle course and a 3 km jogging in less than 16 minutes. To further prove their agility: 16 miles on the double, followed by a march with full equipment on rugged terrain strewn with all sorts of obstacles: woods, rocks, rivers, to successive points, for an undetermined distance but lasting at least one day and one night. The lucky and exhausted chosen ones are then admitted to the evaluation of psychological fitness based on absolutely unfathomable tests, having apparently nothing to do with the pursued goals and protracted also through the successive training cycle. This cannot be considered a period in which one can rest upon one's oars because, besides the normal and hard physical training and the training to instinctive and selective shooting (3-4 hours daily) with target shooting specifications of 100% from 500 m and 90% from 900 m, it requires the ability to:

- make use of any type of optical aid for sighting and shooting;
- be able to drive any basic type of wheeled and tracked vehicle, including locomotives;
- open all basic types of locks, padlocks and fasteners in general;
- apply all techniques for removing and overcoming obstacles on rugged land, high mountains and in an aquatic


environment, as well as the hand-to-hand fighting techniques;

- provide first aid to the injured; emotionally stabilize hostages for at least 30 minutes;
- finally, employ every basic system of communication.

For the development of the abovementioned programme all the necessary structures and training areas were of course provided, with every kind of typical situation and, moreover, typical zones were selected for getting the men acquainted with the environment (mountain, desert, jungle, swamps). No surprise therefore if in 1978 only 53 trainees were engaged, with foreseen operational employment within two years; but it is in November 1979 that, following the occupation of the American Embassy, the emergency in Iran explodes. At this point a short survey of the operation that was destined to misfire in the Iranian desert appears particularly useful for a concrete illustration of the operation's complexity and for providing a more complete and specific picture of the **Delta Force**.

The problems that are apparently more difficult to solve immediately are: the unavailability of a precise, detailed and updated information picture and the definition of a system of infiltration. As regards information, the availability of a detailed map of the Embassy grounds turns out to be most useful: local agents and, above all, a close scrutiny of the Iranian TV broadcasts permit to acquire and update all other necessary elements. As for infiltration, having discarded rather fantastic proposals and hypotheses and excluded an airlanding as absolutely unsuitable, the option is for the introduction via air- and land- craft, of the operational group, evacuation by helicopter of the hostages to a preestablished assembly point, exit with transport planes. In short the operation is envisaged as follows:

- infiltration by night of 6 airplanes "C 130", 3 of which



The emergency caused by the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Iran in 1979 prompted the first operation in which the men of the Delta Force acted as protagonists.

tankers, and an operational force of 132 men, including a **Delta Force** assault group, drivers, interpreters and rangers for the security of the landing areas. Landing at "Desert One", where eight helicopters "RH 53D", departed from aircraft carriers cruising in the Gulf of Oman, were to fly in at the same time;

- refueling, and embarking on the same helicopters of the task force, arrival in the concealed bivouac area, about 65 miles south of Teheran. Return of the six "C 130s" to their base;

- the following night, transport of the assault group to Teheran, with local trucks provided by secret agents. Attack on the Embassy and the Foreign Ministry (where some of the hostages had been moved) and

liberation of the hostages. Estimated duration of the operation: 45 minutes;

- landing of the 8 helicopters, embarking at the Embassy and the near sports' ground of hostages and task force, flight to the established zone, embarkation on the "C 141s", exfiltration.

All along the phases of assault and boarding of the helicopters in Teheran, two C 130 "Gunship" aircraft were to cruise at short distance. The airplanes were well armed with machineguns and 105 mm guns for on-call intervention in case Iranian tanks entered the scene. The "ZSU", armed with four-barrel 23 mm anti-aircraft guns, seen in the area, were particularly feared. Every detail had been accurately taken care of: from communication systems to weaponry (including portable anti-tank weapons), to a specific training along a similar pattern, with infiltrations carried out with the equipment, times, distances and flight

outline envisaged by the plan of employment.

The operation starts on April 20 (more than 5 months after the Embassy's occupation) with the redeployment in Egypt of the operational force. On April 24, at 10 p.m., the force is on site at "Desert One". At this point a sequence of contingencies starts. Immediately after the aircraft's landing an Iranian truck drives by. Hit by an anti-tank rocket it bursts into flames and lights up the zone. The drivers manage to get away. Before the rangers get to their places around the area, a bus with 45 unwitting passengers drives in, probably attracted by the unusual light show. The bus is stopped somehow and, while awaiting for a decision, the passengers are let off the bus and kept under control. But the helicopters, caught in a sandstorm, are reduced to six (instead of the planned eight) and arrive with a 90-minute delay.

Six is the minimum number required for the operation. It

will be learnt later that of the two missing craft, one was left in the desert, due to rotor troubles (sand in the turbine) and the other, having picked up the crew of the first, was forced to return to the aircraft carrier, due to a malfunction of the navigation instruments.

Time is running short, winter is past and it dawns early. The decision is taken to start refuelling; during this phase another helicopter breaks down. Five helicopters are a number below the safety minimum. Feverish consultations start, on the spot and by radio, in the deafening roar of the rotors and the flares of the still burning tanker truck. At this point, the decision is reached to discontinue the operation. The helicopters' crews, all Marines, are still benumbed by hours and hours of flight in an environment and with techniques different from the usual scenario of employment. It is still dark and the sand lifted by the rotors further worsens the visibility. A helicopter, while moving away, hits a "C 130" with its blades. In the following explosion and fire 8 crew members die. The surviving crews and the task force (many abandon their arms and equipment) jump aboard the "C 130s" with understandable excitement and leave the area. They leave behind two aircraft, burning together with the Iranian tanker truck, eight dead, five intact helicopters and 45 rather puzzled and confused Iranian bus passengers. In the cause of the disaster enter all the roots of the failure of every complex operation. The men were trained, the communications worked perfectly, arms and equipment were adequate, the organization on location was satisfactory. There had been the possibility to survey in advance and equip the "Desert One" landing area with a "STOL" aircraft which, in the night of March 31, had landed and delimited the strip with luminescent markers visible only by night and at low altitude. Well, the

reasons of the failure can be detected in the **Delta Force's** genesis itself. A force born laboriously, through successive approximations, i.e. without a precise strategy, and subsequently developed among all sorts of bureaucratic and environmental problems, among mistrust and resistances from the similar formations and the inborn sluggishness of the horizontal exchange between the four Services of the United States (the **JCS** has only coordination tasks). The traditional rivalry of the four Services, each jealous of its share of participation, had led to put together, rather precariously, Army men (**Delta Force**, rangers and drivers), Air Force aircraft, Navy helicopters (the only ones, fit for aircraft carriers, owing to their folding rotor blades) with Marine crews. The same apportionment occurred on the field, where an Army colonel was responsible for the operation on the ground, on an equal standing with the Commanders of the winged and rotor-craft sections. In such a condition, though allowing for the pressure of events and contingencies, obviously one had to expect consultations rather than orders. The lesson has been very beneficial anyway. Today the **Delta Force** is commanded by a General and has at its disposal all the vehicles necessary for any type of action ("C 130s" for transport, supply, electronic warfare and other heavy loads).

The Commander, moreover, can avail himself, for his movements, of a special plane, equipped for secure communications with the White House from any part of the world. Furthermore, the **Delta Force** is empowered to directly request the support of all naval forces and, if necessary, the integration with other Special Forces, particularly **SEAL**, in case of sea operations. What we have just described has been officially put to test during the "Achille Lauro" crisis. On that occasion a force of about 400 men, perfectly

armed and equipped for any kind of land or sea operation, was flown to Cyprus within a very short time. The force was completely self-sufficient, having at its disposal a group for processing information data as well as a direct link with a "crisis management group" consisting of politicians and civilian and military experts. It must be pointed out that no operation could be started against the "Achille Lauro", especially while the ship was sailing, without the technical support, at least, of the **Delta Force**. The infiltration by night at low altitude, on the sea, actually requires a special and specific training, which only dedicated pilots, constantly integrated with the employment force, can have.

CONCLUSION

In short, the above remarks lead us to conclude that:

- the unrelenting and inevitable increase in sophistication of armaments and equipment, as well as the increment of technology and informatics in the conduct of operations, by emphasizing the vulnerability of the system also emphasize the operational capability of élite units and especially of Special Forces conveniently recruited, equipped and trained;
- the bureaucratic verticality, the lack of coordination between the various components of the Armed Forces (and even of the various armed Corps) produce decidedly negative effects which, if they do not forebode failure, certainly make the available instrument scarcely profitable and efficient;
- Special Force units cannot be established on the spot, for they require a careful basic strategy, long term preparation, constant verification and improvement in a dialectical relationship with the similar units, full integration with the envisaged auxiliary and support forces. These seem to be obvious considerations, in that they can be applicable also to



other units, but it is appropriate to observe that special operations do not allow to make adjustments "along the way", and link the possibilities of success essentially to the accuracy and soundness of the organizational phase;

- the scenarios of employment in peacetime, which witness a more and more organized terrorism, virulent and dangerous for the quality and quantity of the objectives pursued, make these forces even more precious, indeed indispensable. One must nevertheless remark that their employment in

peacetime occurs always in a political scenario which is not always foreseeable but always very delicate, especially if it is influenced by the moods and emotionality of the mass media. Therefore it is a matter of extracting, from the general forces, operational units in which a particular stress is laid on aspects connected with the ability to select and discriminate as regards break-in techniques, arms employment, and psychological management of terrorists and hostages.

In conclusion, it must be said that even the most

Even the most expert and efficient operational unit is of little or no use unless it is guided by a knowledgeable "crisis management centre".

experienced and efficient operational unit is of little or no use if the lack of a "crisis management centre" – with the necessary prerequisites of authority, technical know-how and immediacy of access to all sources of information – prevents its employment in the appropriate conditions of time and place.


Lucio Innecco

DELTA FORCE

The moment of the special force

THE PORTUGUESE

IN THE SERVICE OF NATO



ARMED FORCES



In a previous article published in this magazine, we have presented a very characteristic component of the U.S. Armed Forces: the "National Guard". Our aim was not only to make it known as such, but to invite the reader's attention to the American military contribution to the European defence on the Italian soil.

Having done this, we deem it equally fair to speak about the Armed Forces of another nation – this time part of our Continent – which has placed its men in the service of the Atlantic Alliance, giving priority to the Southern Region (of which Italy is part) with an option of employment: we refer to the Portuguese Armed Forces and especially to the Portuguese Army and Paratroopers (who, as we shall see, are members of the Air Force).

We certainly do not have the pretension of saying anything new: our press has repeatedly dealt with these brilliant soldiers during the entire series of the early NATO training exercises "Display Determination", starting from 1980; and precisely "Rivista Militare" (Italian Edition) in 1981 has devoted to them a significant "pearl" of the "string" "Conosciamo i Nostri Eserciti" (Meet our Armies). Nevertheless, there are always readers that are a little ... absentminded, and, moreover, there are the recruits i.e. those who have started to read us ... yesterday; finally, we can provide fresh and firsthand news obtained from a very authoritative "observation post", LANDSOUTH, which has permitted us to observe at short distance the Portuguese soldiers, and to appreciate and admire them.



"M 113 A2" VTC, armed with an antitank "TOW" missile system.

RECENT HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

We are not willing to tackle "History" in the real sense, both because it would be too long and too complicated a job and because it would be outside the purpose of our writing. Therefore, we are going to retrace the events of the recent years, regarding which it would be more correct to speak about chronicle rather than history.

During WWII, Portugal, thanks to its eccentric position in the European continent, was able to remain essentially neutral, so that its Armed Forces were not touched by the great conflict, which was not "lived" – and this may well be said – not even psychologically, by the Portuguese. The nation

continued to consider itself – militarily and commercially speaking – mainly a maritime power, heir to the splendours of the Seventeenth Century, of which, on the other hand, from the economic point of view, only the ... debts remained. As regards the military, they were, so to speak, "confined" to duties of territorial defence: but who from they had to defend themselves remained a remarkable question mark, considering that the Moors' raids had stopped long before and, thank God, also neighbouring Spain, never excessively loved, had ceased to be a threat, after a Friendship Treaty signed in 1939. The Air Force was a modest thing, since its activity was reduced in practice to sea patrols. All this did not prevent Portugal from joining the Atlantic Alliance in 1949, as soon as it was established. It was obviously a political choice, intended to


underline the Portuguese will to be an integrant part of the Western World, sharing its historical, cultural and ideological traditions. This participation necessarily entailed, at least on paper, the assumption of military commitments which took concrete form with the earmarking of a Major Unit of low operational readiness, the 3rd Infantry Division, and of part of the fleet, placed under the operational command of a NATO organization, COMIBERLANT, on its turn subordinate to SACLANT. A possible general employment of the 3rd Division was envisaged within the Strategic Reserve of SACEUR; the naval forces were of course assigned the task of taking part in the defence of the ocean lines of communication.

On the military plane, everything seemed to run smoothly, following a quiet



20 mm two-barrel anti-aircraft gun.

garrison routine, interrupted at most by an occasional exercise on the national territory or in Central Europe. This lasted until 1961, when Portugal (that is, Salazar first, and then the Caetano regime) embarked on a devastating counter guerrilla war in its faraway overseas possession of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, in the hopeless attempt to stop the course of events, which were gradually condemning most colonial empires to death. In this huge and vain effort, which lasted as many as thirteen years, the Portuguese government engaged almost its entire war potential and a good size of the economic one, bringing the country's internal tension (and among the armed forces, above all, which were



literally exhausted) to such levels, that in April 1974 it broke into a sort of military "pronunciamento", not devoid of Communist interferences. From the bloodless "revolution of carnations", at it was called, Portugal got through a series of tormented political and structural adjustments, and emerged showing the world a clean, democratic and modern face, but still bearing the stigmata of the painful past vicissitudes. Portugal has perhaps paid, later than the rest of Europe, the scot that it had precedently evaded by keeping out of the World War!

THE RENOVATION PROCESS

In the physical and moral African jungle, the Portuguese soldiers had left behind thousands of dead, and many survivors had left there the delusions of their youth. The ties with NATO had become so thin that they could be considered inexistent. In substance the Armed Forces emerged from the long colonial conflict with a formidable experience in counter guerrilla warfare, but with empty ranks and consciences and, moreover, isolated from the Atlantic military contest, due both to the obsolescence of materials, organization and structures and, especially for the land forces, to the lack of theoretical and practical links with the operational conceptions and the defence plans in the European contest. There were moreover two other important elements: a considerable and generalized economic crisis, together with a widespread indifference, if not hatred, felt by the people towards everything that smelt of war. But in the storm of political events, not quite subsided yet, the Portuguese Armed Forces have had the luck of having on their side and within their ranks enlightened leaders, who have fully understood that defence is an essential vehicle for foreign policy, and extremely vigorous

top Cadres, who have been capable of giving an incessant impulse to reconstruction. Moreover one must acknowledge that the Country's youth – who, owing to conscription, are the suppliers of the military units' force – have not lost their ancient and famed Lusitanian pride, the innate sense of duty and discipline and the rigorous respect for the legal authority. All these factors, combined together, have promoted, on the one hand, a clear policy of rapprochement, indeed of full reentry into NATO, and on the other the beginning and carrying out without delay of a radical process of reorganization, modernization and strengthening of the Armed Forces as a whole, which are today a solid and reliable bulwark in the defence of the land, sea and air frontiers, both their own and those of other countries of the Alliance (and especially those of the Southern Region of ACE). Unquestionably Portugal needs financial help, particularly in the military sector: and it makes no mystery of it, on the contrary, it says it loud and clear, appealing for support to the other NATO countries, of which it asks to go beyond the declarations of intentions, i.e. the mere payment of fair compensations for the facilities accorded to some nations at bilateral level in terms of bases and access into Portuguese territory. These requests have been openly reiterated also recently by Minister of Defence Machete, during the 31st Annual Assembly of ATA (Atlantic Treaty Association) (1), held at Oporto in September 1985. Without this help – it has been said – the effort to give a qualified contribution to the common defence will risk to become useless in a short time.

In the following paragraphs we shall give a synthetic picture of the three Services' present structure (according to the most updated data) and describe, within the limits of the permitted divulgement, the tasks assigned to each service,

both nationally and within NATO.

THE ARMY

The Army consists of about 46,000 men (2), 40,000 of which are draftees whose service lasts 16 months, and is organized as follows:


- 1 Independent mixed Brigade;
- 1 "Commandos" Regiment (raisable to Brigade level);
- 2 Cavalry Regiments;
- 1 Armoured Regiment;
- 14 Infantry Regiments, plus an autonomous battalion;
- 5 Artillery Regiments (3 field artillery, 1 anti-aircraft artillery and 1 coast artillery), plus 2 autonomous battalions;
- 2 Engineer Regiments;
- 1 Signal Regiment;
- 1 Military Police Regiment.

The main combat equipment includes:

- Armoured vehicles: sixty-six "M-48" A5 tanks; 125 "Saladin" "AML-60/90" and "Ferret" MK4 reconnaissance vehicles; 222 VTCs of the "M-113", "M-577" A2 and "Chaimite" types;
- Artillery: twenty-four 140 mm guns; twenty "M-101" 105 mm towed howitzers; six 155 mm "M-109" A2 self-propelled howitzers; twenty 107 mm mortars; 35 coastal pieces of different calibers;
- Antitank: forty-five 90 mm and 106 mm recoilless guns; 35 "TOW" missile systems;
- Anti-aircraft: eighteen "Rh-202" 20 mm guns; 20 "Bofors" 40 mm guns; 16 "Blowpipe" individual missile systems.

The units are deployed within four Regional Military Commands (3) and two Insular Zone Commands (Azores and Madeira). Their general task is the defence of the national territory (including interventions in case of natural disasters)

Moments of the intense training activity of the Portuguese "Commandos" Regiment.





as well as cooperation with the other Armed Forces in the defence of the coast and airspace. The only conventional Major Unit (the already mentioned mixed Brigade, on which we shall dwell later in detail) is assigned to NATO and, more precisely, it would become a component of SACEUR's strategic reserve, to be employed – as we said – in the Southern Region of ACE.

THE NAVY

The Navy counts about 14,000 men, including 2000 marines (3 battalions); the conscripts – in this case a minority – are approximately 4,500, with a term of 24 months' service. The fleet includes 7 frigates, 10 corvettes, 10 gunboats, 4 minesweepers, 3 submarines, 13 amphibious craft, 4 support ships. The main bases are in Lisbon and Faro (on the southern coast).

Excluding the direct defence of the coastal areas and ports inside the territorial waters – which is a preeminently national task – the other traditional and fundamental duty of the Navy, i.e. the protection of the sea lines of communication, has a bivalent character, meaning that both the interests of the nation as such (Portugal draws from the sea 96% of its imported produce) and those of the Alliance converge on it. This protection consists mostly of antisubmarine warfare and mine countermeasures. In this regard it must be emphasized that the so-called "strategic triangle", formed by continental Portugal and the Azores and Madeira archipelagos, actually delimits an area, the control of which would be of determinant importance for the support of possible war operations in the European theatre. Nevertheless we witness a rather anomalous situation – and the Portuguese authorities

insist it should be rectified – in which the zone entrusted to CINCIBERLANT (one of the three Major Subordinate Commands of the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic of Norfolk, which share that ocean) does not include the Azores! Officially, approximately one third of the naval units is assigned to NATO. Moreover we must mention the participation, to a limited degree, in STANAVFORLANT, a multinational maritime task force, with prevailingly deterrent tasks in periods of crisis, which can operate anywhere in the Atlantic.

Above.

Portuguese air-naval formation during a NATO exercise in the Atlantic.

Right.

A7 "Corsair".

The aircraft, which can reach a maximum speed of 1125 Km/h, is armed with a 20 mm "Vulcan" gun with 6 rotating barrels, and can carry bombs or external loads up to 6804 Kg.



THE AIR FORCE

With a strength of 14,000 men, only 5,000 of whom conscripts (for 21-24 months), the Air Force has in its establishment 13 combat squadrons, divided into the various specialities, for a total of approximately 140 airplanes and 50 helicopters. The fixed wing aircraft are A-7P "Corsairs", "G91s", R3/T3s and R4/T3s, "T-38s", "C-212s", "C-130s"; the helicopters are "Pumas" and "Alouettes".

Paratroops are members of the Air Force. As we have said before, this is one of the characteristics of the Portuguese military organization. The paratroops are now operationally organized into a light Brigade of about 3,000 men, with three battalions, similar in structure to our "Folgore" Brigade. Regarding the Service's tasks, there is no need to linger much on the subject, knowing that they are connected

with the aircraft's intrinsic flexibility as well as the specific qualities of the mentioned craft. Let us say that to the good capability of tactical/strategic transport one can add the excellent performance of the multirole "Corsair", which can be refueled in flight and is able to intervene in any area, both within the strictly Portuguese jurisdiction and within ACE. This flexibility, combined with the already achieved standardization of the procedures, permits moreover to "transfer" without problems the aircraft assigned to NATO to the operational control of any ATAF.

As far as the paratroops are concerned, taking for granted, on the one hand, the scarce likelihood of their employment on the national territory and, on the other, the frequent participation of their units in NATO exercises, also in Italy, it does not seem unreasonable to foresee that in the short

term, also the Brigade as a whole (which is currently undergoing organizational adjustments) could be made available for international operational employment.

THE 1ST INDEPENDENT MIXED BRIGADE

We deem it most appropriate to consider with particular attention this excellent Major Unit – to which we have already referred a couple of times, albeit without naming it precisely. It should be kept in mind, first of all, that the Brigade represents the "spearhead" of the Army, is directly subordinate to the Army General Staff, and major efforts and attention are devoted to it. As a matter of fact this Brigade is – let us repeat it – the only Portuguese elementary "conventional" Major Unit, and is also the only one assigned to NATO. It is the direct descendant of the 3rd Infantry



The "M 48 A5" combat tank is in service with the armoured battalion of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade.

Division (which was, as we have seen, earmarked for the Alliance since its very constitution); the Division ceased to exist as such after the upheavals of 1974, and the new unit was not officially established until 1978.

Nevertheless, contrary to its mother-unit, which was always kept at rather low operational readiness, the heir was created with the declared intention of establishing a constantly updated and effective instrument. At present the Brigade has almost completed its organization as regards personnel and equipment – although it has not yet reached the optimum – and, above all, it maintains a high standard of efficiency and combat capability. It has been termed "mixed"

owing to its intermediate characteristics, between those of a motorized unit and those of an armoured unit. It is in fact organized as follows:

- 2 motorized battalions;
- 1 tank battalion ("M-48" A5);
- 1 mechanized battalion (armed with TOW missiles);
- 1 field artillery battalion (105 mm, part towed and part self-propelled);
- 1 reconnaissance company;
- 1 Engineer company;
- 1 Signal company;
- 1 Logistic battalion.

Its strength is about 5,000 men stationed in the north-central sector of the country; its centre is Santa Margarida Base, an imposing infrastructure that can lodge several units and permits any type of training, even for the whole Brigade. Certainly the Portuguese authorities lay a lot of stress on training. The author of these lines has had the opportunity

to see Commanders and soldiers at work, in non-demonstration activities, both at their locations at home and on the field here in Italy, in the Friuli, and he can assuredly say that leaders and subordinates have acquired an outstanding technical and professional preparation.

Another sector that deserves high praise is the materials' maintenance: the very low rate of inefficiency is, at the same time, a distinction and a point of honour of the entire Brigade.

A feature common to all units must moreover be underlined: the remarkable *esprit de corps* and discipline.

Referring specifically to Italy's North-Eastern Operational Theatre, we can say that the Brigade started to "show its face" in our country with some observers in 1978. With time the Major Unit's presence has become increasingly regular and substantial: starting from the first massive participation in the NATO exercise "Display



Determination" '80, the Brigade has placed alternatively under the operational control of COMLANDSOUTH, Command Posts and Troops of various size and nature, obtaining an excellent level of "interoperability" with other NATO forces, Italian and others, both on the operational doctrines and conceptions plane and on the equally important plane of human relations. With this unit Portugal not only shows its flag but, above all, affirms with concrete facts its determination to fulfill the obligations taken within the Atlantic Alliance.

In concluding these notes on the 1st Mixed Brigade we wish to mention briefly the other Portuguese soldiers whom we have seen in action here in Italy: we refer to the paratroops of the recently established Brigade (recent at organizational level, of course) who, as we said before, are integrant part of the Air Force. We do not want to

paraphrase a famous comparison attributed to a well-known German Marshal of the '40s, also because comparisons can be unpleasant; nevertheless it is not inappropriate to say that the Portuguese paratroops have amazed the Italian paratroopers for their excellent level of training, their grit and their versatility, which has permitted them to operate, without problems, even on the Dolomites, side by side with the Alpini paratroopers.

THE PROSPECTS

The Portuguese Armed Forces strive – and in this striving there is also a remarkable moral tension – to perfect their reorganization as well as update and increase their infrastructure and materials: Portugal considers these prerequisites indispensable in order to keep pace with the times and offer Europe a worthy

The field artillery battalion of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade is armed with 155 mm guns, both in the towed version and on "M 109 A1" self-propelled hulls.

military cooperation.

Referring again to the words said by the Portuguese Minister of Defence, the main short-term goals can be listed, in order of priority, as follows:

- construction of three frigates suitable for antisubmarine warfare;
- completion of the equipment of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade (especially antiaircraft weapons and battlefield surveillance equipment);
- operational establishment of an airborne light Brigade;
- acquisition of new aircraft for maritime patrol;
- improvement of the transport air fleet;
- introduction of interceptors (air defence).



Left, from top.

"MPDR 45" antiaircraft field radar system. Class "60" floating drawbridge.

it of its allies: in substance, it promises solidarity in exchange for solidarity. Is the Alliance going to show confidence in this very worthy member, not forgetting that the common liberty, for which the Portuguese soldiers are more than ready to fight, is of priceless value and deserves therefore a few pecuniary sacrifices?

We would like to have a crystal ball and see in it the answer that logic alone seems unable to give. For our part, we can only express to the Lusitanian soldiers our best wishes!

Col. Giovanni De Simone



This is understandably a financial effort of great dimensions, which Portugal finds very difficult to bear with its sole resources; it should be remembered, in this connection,

that Portugal's GNP currently does not exceed 3,000 billion Escudos (4), 3% of which is allotted to defence. The country has an impelling need of financial assistance, and asks

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
NOTES

- (1) ATA is a non-governmental international body which integrates private international organizations representing NATO countries.
- (2) The country's population is a little more than 10 million.
- (3) For territorial operations, the Lisbon Command takes on the role of an Army Corps Hqs., and the other three that of Brigade Hqs.
- (4) 1 Escudo = 10 Lit. = U.S. \$ 0.006. The inflation rate is approximately 15% per year.


OF 40 Mk2 OTO MAIN BATTLE TANK

Crew: 4 men
Weight: 43 tons

Armament:
main gun: 105/52
fire control system: stabilized
7.62 MGs: one coaxial, one AA
smoke grenade launchers: 8 cal 66 mm
Road speed: 60 km/h
Range: 600 km



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FINANZIARIA
E. BREDA

THE AUXILIARY UNITS

IN THE WAR OF LIBERATION



AUXILIARY UNITS?


The auxiliary units, which were constituted by the SMRE (Stato Maggiore del Regio Esercito) at the end of 1943, were widely employed by the Allies during the entire Italian campaign but, to this day, their activity is scarcely or only superficially known. Their denomination of "Auxiliary units", appropriate according to some, not very appropriate according to others, has been the subject of contrasts and discussions. In fact, among the many problems that, in that distant year, confronted the Italian military leadership regarding these units, whose establishment was urged by the Allies, one, perhaps the first, was precisely what to call them: "labouring"?, "workers"?,

"logistic"?, "auxiliary"?. The most appropriate name should have been "logistic units" mostly due to the wide range of tasks, mainly logistic, entrusted to and carried out by them. Instead, the name was changed from the initial "labouring" to the final denomination of "auxiliary units".

"Rivista Militare", in the immediate post-war period, reappearing after a period of interruption, among the first four articles on the Campaign of Liberation and the units that took part in it, devoted as many as three articles to the 210th Infantry Division, an auxiliary Major Unit of the American 5th Army, and the first book on the Italian Campaign, published by Rizzoli in 1945, titled "Dalle Puglie alla Valle Padana" was also devoted to this Division (1).

Later, after 1945, the auxiliary Divisions fell into oblivion, perhaps due to the tasks carried out – unappropriately called also by the official military press "Second level duties" (2) – or for lack of supporters at the higher levels of the reconstituted Italian Army, to the point of being ignored altogether and, only in some instances, barely mentioned. Moreover even when they were mentioned – in writings, commemorations and meetings – they were neither given the merit they deserved, nor was there an acknowledgment of their real weight in the Campaign of

Auxiliary Divisions personnel engaged in the recovery of materials.



Liberation, and the Anglo-American appreciations for their contribution was never made known. Above all, the just emphasis has never been given to the way they influenced (when the Armistice clauses were enforced by the Allies) the improvement of conditions in favour of Italy, owing to the work of 200,000 men belonging to these divisions. It is a fact that the History Office of the Army General Staff in 1977 published a volume entitled "The Auxiliary Units of the Italian Army in the War of Liberation", but it is also a fact that for years the book's data were never studied, through a comparison between the so-called operational units and the auxiliary units, within the

"I believe that only few fully realize how well the Italian Army behaved. With our assistance, an Army of over 300,000 men has been organized from chaos, with personnel recovered from disbandment, with ex POW Generals brought back from England, etc.

The Italian Liberation Corps has fought well and suffered many losses.

The logistic and auxiliary units have carried out a huge task repairing roads, working in ports, etc., thus permitting us to spare Allied personnel. The Italian Army has loyally cooperated as cobelligerent, in a practical way, silently, without any attrition. I would like that all realize that, and that the Italian Army be given the just and deserved acknowledgement, both in the press and in the Allies' minds, for the precious contribution given to the Allied cause".

From a letter by General Langley Browning, Head of the Army Subcommittee of the Allied Control Commission, dated August 24, 1944.

general framework of the Campaign and the Liberation Army, in order to objectively ascertain the respective rôle played by them. Moreover, speaking of the "Liberation Army" and in order to evaluate the importance that the Italian

Army as a whole had in the country's liberation, we most not forget the auxiliary units: the Italian Army, in the War of Liberation, was formed – it must be underlined – by combat units (1st Motorized Group, Italian Liberation Corps, Combat

Table A
STRENGTH AND LOSSES OF THE ITALIAN UNITS DURING THE LIBERATION CAMPAIGN
AUTUMN 1943-SUMMER 1945

UNITS	Deployment on front line or start of employment	End of operational activity or employment	Time in front line or in employment	Strength	Losses		
					D	W	M
1st Motorized Regt. { • at Montelungo • after reorganization	6.XII.'43 5.II.'44	20.XII.'43 17.IV.'44	4 months	5500	57 14	132 50	159 9
I.L.C.	18.IV.'44	24.IX.'44	5 months	24000	377	880	105
"Cremona" Combat Group	24.I.'45	8.V.'45	4 months	10500	178	605	80
"Friuli" Combat Group	9.II.'45	8.V.'45	3 months	10500	245	657	61
"Folgore" Combat Group	3.III.'45	8.V.'45	2 months	10500	164	244	14
"Legnano" Combat Group	23.III.'45	8.V.'45	1 month ½	10500	55	279	—
Total Losses Combat Units					1090	2847	428
Auxiliary Divisions: 205th, 209th, 210th, 227th, 228th, 230th, 231st, Italian Hqs. 212th	Various dates from autumn '43 to 20.XI.'44	Summer '45	from a minimum of 4 months for the 231st Div. to a max. of 16 months for the 210th	160000	744	2202	109
210th Division	8.X.'43 15.IV.'44	15.VIII.'45	16 months	from 9,000 to 24,000	260	640	132

Groups) and by the Auxiliary Divisions (as many as eight). The combat units (table A) during the Campaign of Liberation were represented on the front line by about 5,000 men (1st Motorized Group) in the period December 1943 – April 1944, by no more than 24,000 men (Italian Liberation Corps) in the period April – September 1944, and, in the period January – April 1945, by a minimum of 10,000 at the end of January to a maximum of 40,000 men at the end of April (Combat Groups). On the contrary, the auxiliary units in April 1945 numbered as many as 200,000 men. But there is more to say. At the end of 1944 the only Italian units in the operations zone were the 210th and the 228th Division, both auxiliary divisions, respectively cooperating with the American 5th Army since December 1943, the former, and with the 8th British Army, since March 15, 1944, the latter. Moreover we must add the 231st Division established only in December 1944, in order to lighten the 210th Division by absorbing all the Italian units cooperating with the British units of the 5th Army (3). Strangely enough, for as many as four months, from September 24, 1944 – date in which the Italian Corps of Liberation ceased its activity and was disbanded – to January 24, 1945 – date in which the “Cremona”, first employed of the four Combat Groups, went to the line (4) – the Italian Army was represented in the operations zone only by three auxiliary Divisions (over 50,000 men).

The auxiliary Divisions rightly deserve therefore to be presented in the light and with the importance due to them, considering that their contribution was determinant for the development of the operations and for the favourable outcome of the Campaign, but, above all, their intervention was decisive, due to the positive influence that they exerted on the Allies' attitude towards Italy, when the time

came to enforce the clauses of the armistice.

GENESIS

On September 8 Marshal Badoglio broadcast the announcement of the armistice, signed at Cassibile a few days before (September 3) by General Castellano. The armistice conditions were at the time only military; the political, economic and financial ones were to be made known later. The Allies, moreover, assured General Castellano that for Italy the Memorandum of Quebec (August 15, 1943) would be applied, meaning that the conditions would be liable to be modified in favour of Italy, to the extent of the contribution given by the Italian government and the Italian people to the Allied Nations in the rest of the war against Germany.

After the armistice's conclusion, when the time of cobelligerency came, there was from the very beginning a certain divergence between the intentions of the Italians and those of the Allies: the Italians wanted to participate immediately and directly, with their own forces, in the war against the Germans; the Allies

were firmly determined to limit this type of participation as much as possible. The SMRE, on September 18, forwarded to General McFarlane, Head of the Allied Military Mission (5) the proposal to start the cooperation in battle of the Italian forces with the Allies against the Germans. The proposal was rejected. General McFarlane let it be known that, according to the needs of the moment, Italy should supply transportations and labour forces to the Taranto port, in order to speed up the Allied unloadings. On September 29, during a meeting in Malta between Marshal Badoglio (6) and General Eisenhower, the Italian side again insisted in proposing a direct participation in the war, side by side with the Allies. General Eisenhower, although appreciative of the Italian aspirations, said that at the time it was impossible to supply adequate armament and equipment, and consequently the SMRE should just set up a few particularly selected units, which would be employed later directly by the Anglo-Americans. After the declaration of war on Germany (October 13, 1943), Italy, again through Marshal Badoglio, persisted in requesting a direct participation of Italian

ADDRESS OF H.E. MARSHAL MESSE TO THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

May 28, 1944

While the troops of the Italian Liberation Corps participate together with the comrades of the Allied Nations in the great battle fought in the name of Rome, my Commander's heart does not forget all the Italian soldiers, sailors and airmen who, along the combat lines, immediately behind the front, in ports and airports, as well as along the maritime and air communication lines, give, silently, their contribution to the battle in progress.

A grateful thought goes, above all, to the mule-train units and porter units who, in the most tormented zones of the front, carry to the advanced units, both ours and Allied, the supplies indispensable for the battle. These troops, mingled with the most advanced units, have often spontaneously taken up arms and gallantly fought, and have already given to the Country, in doing their hard work, numerous dead and wounded. This new Italian blood is generously shed to redeem the new Italy's right to live.

Let these real fighters know that their silent sacrifice is known and appreciated by all Italians; they must draw new strength from this certainty, continuing to carry out tenaciously, till victory, their fruitful work.

Giovanni Messe
Marshal of Italy
Chief of the General Staff

units with the Allied forces. Also this proposal was turned down. Moreover, precisely in those days, General McFarlane received instructions from the Mediterranean Command (7) that limited the Italian contingent, to be employed in combat side by side with the Allies, to a single unit at Brigade level (8).

These instructions moreover provided that the Italian troops were to be employed mainly

as labour force in ports, in the defence of rear areas, naval bases and roads, in repairing the destructions made by the Germans and in the delivery of supplies to the Allied units on the front-line.

The Italian Supreme Command, though continuing with its repeated requests, finally acknowledged that the cooperation with the Anglo-Americans unfortunately could not be achieved in

accordance with the Italian wishes, but, as a consequence of the needs and requests of the Allies, to the extent and in the way required by them. As a consequence the SMRE, having decided, on September 22, the establishment of the 1st Motorized Group, on September 23 decided the constitution of the auxiliary Divisions, by transforming the already existing coastal divisions. On December 24 the "Labourers' Inspectorate"

MAJOR AUXILIARY UNITS
SEPTEMBER 1943-MAY 1945

Table B

Major Units	Commander	Category (1)	Strength	Tasks	Losses (2)		
					D	W	M
205th Div.	Gen. Casula	US ITI	5000 I.45	Auxiliary duties in airports for the USAAF.	(3)	(3)	(3)
209th Div.	Gen. Properzi Gen. Olmi	BR ITI	16000 I.45 19000 II-III.45 22000 IV.45	Rear line duties for the British Major Units. In 1945, also duties on the front line.	46	113	—
210th Div.	Gen. Colonna Gen. Cortese	US ITI	13000 I.45 24000 XII.45 18000 IV.45	Front and rear line duties for the U.S. 5th Army.	260	640	132
227th Div.	Gen. Chatrian Gen. Silvio Rossi	BR ITI ITI ITI	10000 I.45 30000 VII.45	Services for British Hqs. west of the Apennines, from Calabria to Rome.	29	55	—
228th Div.	Gen. Tomaselli	BR ITI	14000 III.45 16000 V.45	Front and rear line duties for the British 8th Army.	62	202 (4)	13
230th Div.	Gen. Vivalda	BR ITI ITI ITI	15000 I.IV.45 16000	Territorial duties (Puglia, Lucania, Molise).	(3)	(3)	(3)
231st Div.	Gen. Nannei	BR ITI	14000 I.45 20000 IV.45	Front and rear line duties for the British units of the 5th U.S. Army (13th British Corps).	40	73	29
Italian Hqs. 212th Div.	Gen. Reisoli Gen. Ferone Gen. La Ferla	US ITI	50000 I.IV.45	Rear line duties for the bases of Naples, Anzio, Civitavecchia, Piombino and Leghorn.	128	237	—

(1) The units of the "Regio Esercito", during the War of Liberation, were divided into the following categories: U.S. ITI (direct cooperation with the U.S. Forces), BR ITI (direct cooperation with the British forces), ITI ITI (indirect cooperation with the Allied forces). Furthermore, there were units with no special denomination, which performed territorial duties.

(2) The data on losses are mainly from the volume published by the Army General Staff - History Office. For all units - with the exception of the 210th Div. - data for 1943 are not available.

(3) Unknown.

(4) Only for 1944. Data for 1945 are not available.

was created, which became successively the "Inspectorate of Auxiliary Troops".

EMPLOYMENT


There were eight divisions that participated directly in the Italian Campaign (table B), with a force fluctuating between 150,000 and 160,000 men (9) in the 1945, equivalent to about 25% of the effectives of the XV Army Group. Some of the units were subordinate to the Americans (US ITI units), other to the British (BR ITI units). Some were employed on the front and behind the front-lines, others only in the rear areas, others still were employed in territorial services. Some were stationed at air bases, some others at naval bases. Their establishment (table C), contrary to what had happened with the operational units, neither was decided beforehand by the SMRE – as had been the case with the Combat Units – nor did it have a character of uniformity. Each auxiliary Division was constituted according to the specific tasks that were assigned to it, and underwent frequent transformations. This was done so that it could fulfill its tasks in connection with the evolutions of the situation and the development of the operations. The employment was undoubtedly massive and decidedly a varied one: guard to depots, military police, traffic control, escort to rail and road convoys, workshop activity, transportation of supplies to the front-line and the rear areas (mule and motor transportations), construction and repair of road and railway bridges, setting up of oil pipelines, construction and maintenance of telephone lines, minefield clearance, setting up of waterworks,

The Allied military successes would not have been achieved so soon without the cooperation of the Italian soldiers, operating behind the lines of the 5th and 8th Army. The Allied Commanders confirm their highest appreciation to these units, which have ceaselessly ensured the supply of ammunition and victuals to the Allied fighting men, repairing military bridges and keeping the vital lines constantly open.

Today, on the high-mountain fronts, the Italian soldiers with their mules carry munitions for the artilleries, provisions, water and medicines to the Allied soldiers. It has been impossible to estimate the tons transported by these units. It was thanks to them that the supply lines were kept open.

They have dearly paid for doing their duty. The losses in battle of these units have not been light.

From «Basic News» (Allied Nations News Service), October 24, 1944.



A soldier of the auxiliary Divisions on MP and traffic control duty.

ORGANIZATION OF THE JANUARY

Divisions	Date	 Infantry	 Artillery	 Labour Engineers	 Guard	 Mule Rgt (combat)	 Eng-ineer Rgt (combat)	 Air Force Group	 Infantry	 Artillery	 Engineers	 Railway Engineers	 Labour Engineers
205	1. I.45							5 (1)					
209	1. I.45 IV.45			3 4							2 2	2	1 2
210	1. IV.45	3			1	1	1						
227	1. I.45	1	1	2					1 (2)				
228	9. III.45			2								1	2
230	1. I.45	1		3					1	1			1
231	1. I.45 30. II.45 30. III.45			3 4 4									
Italian Hqs. 212th Div. (4)	1. I.45				1								

Notes: (1) Regt. level; (2) Grenadiers; (3) Clubs, messes, shops, warehouses;

electric installations, loading and unloading of ships, trains and airplanes, camouflage work, medical evacuations. Particularly outstanding was the contribution given by the Engineers in their various specializations, and by the mule-train units. Suffice it to think that, in April 1945, as many as 5 Battalions of Railway Engineers, 83 Companies of Engineers and 31 mule-train units operated for the Allies in the auxiliary Divisions.

The losses suffered (table A), besides the work done and the operations carried out, are the most convincing witness of the Auxiliary Divisions' commitment in the whole Campaign. The 210th Division, for instance, as regards losses, is second only to the Liberation Corps. On the whole the auxiliary Divisions suffered 774 dead, 2202 wounded, 109 missing (10). There has been no

lack of acknowledgments for the work done by these divisions, from Italian civil and military leaders and from the Allies. General Langley Browning, Head of the Army Subcommittee of the Allied Control Commission, already on August 24, 1944 had declared: "I think that few people fully realize how well the Italian Army behaved ... The logistic and auxiliary units carried out a huge task, repairing roads, working in ports ... thus enabling us to spare Allied personnel. The Italian Army has loyally cooperated as cobelligerent, in a practical way, silently and without any attrition. I would like that all realize that, and the Italian Army be given the just and deserved acknowledgment, both in the press and in the Allies' mind, for the precious contribution given to the Allied cause". These words actually took on a particular significance, due to

the position of the man who said them. Among the Allies, General Browning was, in fact, the man who best knew what the Italian Army as a whole, and the auxiliary units in particular, had done in those months. Not only that. At the time of his statement, the operations on the Gothic Line had not yet started and the auxiliary Divisions, which had already distinguished themselves on the Garigliano, at Anzio and in the battle of Rome, had still not done the best part of their job. It is actually on the Gothic Line that the 20th Mule Train Group and the 210th Engineer Group - both belonging to the 210th Auxiliary Division, a unit of the 5th Army - were awarded the "Combat" denomination, exactly equivalent to that given to the Groups that were then being established. With only a difference: the "Combat" denomination was not awarded

AUXILIARY DIVISIONS

APRIL 1945

 Mule Trains	 Security and Guard	 Port units	 Technical Engineers	 Transpor- tation	 MP	 Services	 Quar- termas- ter (3)	Clearing station	Reserve Joining station	Reorga- nization & Transit station	Mule Tng. Center	 Engineers	 Smoke Unit	 "Folgora" Squadron
2	3 4							1 1	1 1		1			
								1			1			
	1								1					
1	2													
	5	4								2		8		
1 1 1	3 4							1		1			2	1 1
	4	3	3	5	5	38	3							

(4) Organized on: 4 Zone Commands, 10 Regt. Hqs., 10 Bn. Groups, 4 logistic bases.

to these units as a consequence of a decision taken by the General Staff in drawing up tables of establishment and in assigning tasks, but after a trying operational employment in the decisive hours of the Campaign.

CONCLUSIVE CONSIDERATIONS

The "cobelligerent" quality, mentioned by General Browning, was given to the Army, and therefore to Italy, mainly thanks to the auxiliary units. The Italian people, first of all, cooperated with the Allies, because on the one hand, the diffused hostility towards the Germans in the North, and particularly the partisans' guerrilla war, forced the German Command to withdraw a number of combat units from the front-line while, on the other, in the South, due to the

REGIO ESERCITO GENERAL STAFF

February 10, 1945

Order of the Day to the Army

I assume today the office of Chief of the Army General Staff. I am aware that the responsibility entrusted to me is heavy. I am confident I shall be able to build for Italy, for I feel around me a reborn willingness to act.


From the painful experience of the recent events each of us has derived a more conscious desire to help our Country rise again: first in the war against our traditional enemy, then in a fruitful peace.

On the firing line, the Combat Groups, which revive a never extinguished tradition of heroism; on the other side of the front, the patriots reaffirm with their blood their generous will of liberation; **on this side of the front, the auxiliary troops, who silently confirm a deep attachment to their duty;** we are all an Army, on its way, consumed by one fire: our love for Italy. In front of us - to show us the way - are all our dead.

Just because we are ready to make any sacrifice for our Country, we are sure that our Country will resurge.

Long live Italy

General Ercole Ronco
Chief of Staff



Soldiers of the auxiliary Divisions engaged in the handling of supplies.

widespread popularity of the Anglo-Americans, the Allies did not have to take a similar measure. In the military field, especially, the cobelligerency was expressed by the 5,000 men of the 1st Motorized Group at the end of 1943, the 23,000 of the Liberation Corps in 1944 and the 40,000 men of the Combat Groups in 1945.

Nevertheless we can irrefutably affirm that the most important contribution given by the Italian Army to the Allies is the substantial cooperation of the 200,000 men of the auxiliary Divisions, in accordance, moreover, to the Allies' needs and expectations at that particular time. The supply of such a remarkable bulk of auxiliary units was undoubtedly a fundamental aspect of our participation in the War of Liberation. The cooperation given by these units to the Allies, though rather unobscure and brought about excellent results. We do not deem it superfluous, therefore, to stress once more that, thanks to these forces – made up by a substantial number of specialists, among others – the Allies were able to withdraw

from their logistic organization in Italy a large contingent of troops, that were sent either to other operational theatres or to the advanced zone of the Italian Peninsula itself (11); the Italian political leaders, at the end of the war, could rightly claim better armistice conditions and insist that Italy be reinstated in its role as a free and independent country in the assembly of the nations of the world.

Enrico Boscardi

NOTES

(1) The book was ready on September 1, 1945 and could have been published even two months earlier if Rizzoli, the only publisher of a certain level working at that time in Milan, had not given precedence – upon American request – to the 5th Army's book "Finito". The three articles on "Rivista Militare", as well as the book, were written by an officer of the "Regia Marina", who attended the War College in Turin in 1935 and 1936.

(2) Article from the book "L'Esercito Italiano nella Guerra di Liberazione" by Luciano Lollio, from "Guerra di Liberazione - Scritti nel Trentennale" - Army General Staff, History Office, 1979, 145 pages.

(3) The 210th Division in December 1944 had in fact reached the level of almost 24,000 men.

(4) There were six Combat Groups. "Mantova" was not employed. "Piceno" operated as Training Center. The other four arrived on the front line at the following dates: "Cremona", 24 Jan. 1945; "Friuli", 9 Feb. 1945; "Folgore",

3 March 1945; "Legnano", 23 March 1945 (table A).

(5) The Allied Military Mission (A.M.M.) attached to the Italian Supreme Command, had the task of implementing the armistice clauses and coordinating the action of the Italian Armed Forces and people with the Allied operations.

(6) Also General Ambrosio participated in the meeting.

(7) It was Gen. Eisenhower's Headquarters, located in Algiers.

(8) The First Motorized Group, which was being constituted under the command of General Vincenzo Cesare Dapino (Chief of Staff was the Major of the Alpini Luigi Vismara).

(9) To reach the number of approximately 200,000 men (196,086 to be exact; this figure is given at page 143 of the volume on the auxiliary units, published by the Army General Staff, History Office) we must consider also the units of the Internal Security Divisions "Sabaudia" and "Aosta" in Sicily, of the "Calabria" Division in Sardinia, plus the 25 "alien" companies in Corsica.

(10) General Mario Puddu, in his book "Tra due invasioni" – note (1), page 66 – puts the losses of the auxiliary Divisions at 897 dead, 2283 wounded and 109 missing.

(11) "Le unità ausiliarie dell'Esercito Italiano nella Guerra di Liberazione". Army General Staff, History Office, ed. 1977, page 219.



Gen. Enrico Boscardi has attended the Reserve Officer School, the Armoured Cavalry School, the Service Branch School, the War College and the British Army Staff College at Camberley. He has been a unit Commander in the "Lancieri di Montebello" and "Genova Cavalieria", Commander of the "Lancieri di Aosta", and Deputy Commander of the "Aosta" Motorized Brigade.

As Staff Officer, Gen. Boscardi has served in the Headquarters of the "Mantova" Division, the Northwestern Military Region Command and the Army General Staff.


Gen. Boscardi has been Assistant Military Attaché at the Italian Embassy in Washington – accredited also in Mexico City – and has held the positions of Chief, International Logistic Plans Section and Chief, Logistic Plans Branch at the Defence General Staff. He has also been Italian Representative to EUROLOG and to the NATO Senior Logisticians' Conference.

Gen. Boscardi is at present the Director of the War College Centre for the Analysis of Conflicts and Situations of Crisis, and holds a Degree in Political Science.

INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT by Vitroselenia the winning card

electronic defence systems require an integrated logistic support that will ensure their efficiency and complete availability under the most stringent operational and environmental conditions. To ignore or pay marginal importance to this problem represents a grave strategic error, as any system is only as good as its logistic support. An adequate logistic support is the winning card of the game.

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An eighteenth century Italian print

In 1778 the Paris Mondharre printing works, in 4, Rue Saint Jacques, published a copperplate engraving, printed in black and white and coloured by hand, entitled "French and foreign Cavalry uniforms according to the latest 1778 regulations" (size of the cavalymen 7×9 cm).

The uniforms reproduced in this plate were in fact those prescribed by the regulations of 31 May 1776.

The Mondharre printers specialized in large format prints depicting the uniforms of French and foreign troops according to the various regulations and thus the prints were brought up to date at regular intervals.

Thus in 1789 the printers, now called Mondharre and Jean, with new premises at 4, Rue Saint Jean de Beauvais, published a similar engraving

entitled "French and foreign infantry uniform as it is today according to the latest 1789 regulations" (size of print 80×60 cm).

The uniforms depicted in this second plate are those of the 1786 regulations: the plate shows a grenadier from each line infantry regiment and a "chasseur" from each battalion.

Both these prints are now in the International Museum of Images at Epinal (France).

This particular kind of plate, apart from its artistic value, was very practical and useful for consultation purposes and was widely circulated. It was soon imitated abroad by various printers – in England it was called Schematic chart.

There are three of these large plates today in the Collection of H.M. the Queen of England, in the Royal Library: they relate to the Prussian Army,

the Austro-Hungarian Army and the Sardinian Army, respectively.

We will dwell briefly on the latter, which is reproduced here for the first time in Italy.

It bears the following title in French "State of the Officers of H.M. the King of Sardinia according to the new regulations and uniforms" of 1774 (added in pen): it includes 61 uniform sketches of the whole of King Vittorio Amedeo III's Army.

The date 1774, also quoted in some English publications, is not exact in that, looking carefully at the plate, the last sketch in the fourth row, i.e. the "Town Guard" can be clearly seen to bear the date 1782. And in fact the Turin "Town Guards" were established with "Instructions" from the Royal Secretary of War on 11 March 1782. They were drawn from the "Invalids Battalion" and the 15

"District Captains" each had 4 men under his command.

In the English catalogue the plate is stated to be by "Artist unknown" and in fact it contains no signature, initials or symbol from which the artist who drew the sketches could be identified.

However, given the style of these sketches, the overall layout of the plate and other details, the author may be assumed to be Antonio Stagnon (or Stagnone) who published in Turin, on September 15, 1789, a collection of plates of uniforms, title of "Etat général des

title of "Etat general des uniformes des troupes de S.M. le roi de Sardaigne".

The book is now in the Library of the Royal Armoury of Turin and is available for consultations.

Alessandro Gasparinetti

Antonio Maria Stagnon

court engraver

Antonio Maria Stagnon (in some books Stagnone) was born in Mondelli, a hamlet of Prequarero in Valle Anzasca (Novara), on the 2nd July 1751, only child of Pietro Antonio Stagnon and Giovanna Dalla Longa.

His father, also a native of Mondelli and whose family can be traced back to 1435, moved to Milan and then, in about 1735, to Turin where he opened an engravers' and sigillography workshop, obtaining commissions first from private customers and later also from public offices as well as from the court of Savoy.

Antonio Maria, after a period of apprenticeship in the family workshop, was sent by his father to Paris to improve his knowledge. At the end of 1772 he returned to Turin and his father made over the workshop to him, retiring to Mondelli.

Stagnon depicted numerous subjects in his engravings: heraldry, geography, insignia, costumes and uniforms. With the royal patent of 4 April 1774 he obtained the title of "graveur des sceaux" (engraver of seals).

Although he worked very hard, business did not go very well because he also had to maintain a rather large family: he married twice, in fact, the first time to Marianna Ferroni and the second time to Teresa Antonino.

The most important of his works are: an image of Clotilde of France, Queen of Sardinia, married to Carlo Emanuele IV in 1775, an engraving which he signed "M.A. Stagnon de Travellone", many ex-libris, two plates of mythological subjects and, above all, the already cited "Etat général des uniformes des troupes de S.M. le Roi de Sardaigne", comprising 88 colour plates and published in Turin on the 15th September 1789.

This publication, although without great artistic merit, is the most complete and detailed representation of the uniforms of the Army of the Kingdom of Sardinia at that time.

Other works by Stagnon worth mentioning are: a "Recueil général des modes d'habillements des femmes des

Etats de S.M. le Roi de Sardaigne", presumably printed in 1780, which consists in 43 colour plates, and an "Acknowledgement", i.e. a kind of patent of honour for the Turin Voluntary Militia, published in 1796. The Voluntary Militia had been established in Piedmont on 26 April 1793 to fight the French and were disbanded on 11 May 1796. The Turin Militia distinguished itself in particular: in a very troubled period it provided all the city's military services and bore the title of "Royal Corps". It was disbanded on 27 June 1796 but its members had the right to wear the uniform.

Antonio Maria Stagnon died in Turin in 1805 and his work was carried on by his son Giuseppe, born in Turin on 13 December 1777.

Giuseppe is the author, amongst other works, of a collection "Uniforms of the troops of S.S.R.M. executed by Giuseppe Stagnon engraver of royal seals and of S.A.S. Prince of Carignano", published in 1821 and made up of 90 colour plates.

ETAT DES OFFICIERS DE S. M. LE ROI DE SARDAIGNE




GARDES Créé 1559 Colonel	SAVOIE Créé 1600 Lieutenant Colonel	MONTFERRAT Créé 1661 Major d'Brigade	PIEMONTE Créé 1664 Major Général	SALUCES Créé 1672 Capitaine des Grenadiers	AOUSTE Créé 1690 Capitaine Major	Corps R. d'Artillerie Créé 1602 Capitaine	REALLEMAND Créé 1697 Capitaine Lieutenant
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LEGION Création 1774	CAMPEMENTS Création 1774	ARTILLERIE L.B. Création 1774	INVALIDES Création 1785	Corps R. d'Ingénieurs Création 1734	Compagnie FRANCHE Création 1758	GENEVOIS Création 1715	MAURIENNE Création 1715	IVREE Création 1715
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GARDES du CORPS Créé 1609 Capitaine	Dragons du ROI Créé 1685 Colonel	CAVALERIE LEGERE Création 1679 Lieutenant Colonel	Dragons de PIEMONTE Créé 1691 Major	PIEMONTE ROYAL Création 1691 Capitaine Lieutenant	SAVOIE Cavalerie Création 1699 Capitaine	Dragons de SARDAIGNE Créé 1726 Lieutenant Colonel
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


GENERAL	LIEUTENANT General	MAJOR General	BRIGADIER	GOUVERNEUR Brigadier	COMMANDANT de Fort Colonel	GARDE Colonel
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SUIVANT LE NOUVEL ETABLISSEMENT ET UNIFORMES dur 74



MARINE Cré. 1761 Général de Division	CHABLAIS Cré. 1765 Lieutenant	COURTEN Suisse Vaudoise Création 1766 Sous-lieutenant	TSCHARNER Cré. 1763 Sous-lieutenant	REINE Cré. 1734 Sous-lieutenant	GRISONS Cré. 1742 Adjudant-major de Bataillon	SARDAIGNE Cré. 1744 Aide de Camp	FREGATE Création 1749
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TURIN Création 1715	NICE Création 1715	MONDOVI Création 1715	VERCEIL Création 1715	AST Création 1715	PIGNEROL Création 1715	CASAL Création 1715	NOVARE Création 1752	TORTONE Création 1752
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Drag. de la REINE Création 1730 Lieutenant	Drag. de CHABLAIS Création 1774 Aide Major	AOSTE Cavalerie Création 1774 Cornet de Cavalerie	Drag. de la LEGION Création 1774 Cornet	CAMPENET Cavalerie Création 1774 Aide d. Camp	Drag. de CHASSE Création 1796	OFFICIER Milicien
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PIED 1795	OFFICIER Affecté à la Suite des Armées	OFFICIER Milicien	ADIUDANT	GARDE SUISSE Création 1797	INGENIEUR Topographie Création 1794 Directeur	GARDE URBAINE Création 1782
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PORTABLE VHF/FM RADIO SET

The Defence Administration has recently decided to acquire several thousand portable VHF/FM radio sets for communications at platoon/company level; in the years 1987 - 1989 they will replace the CPRC 26 sets, which are still in service. The new set has been designed according to the Army General Staff's specifications, and built employing modern technologies, therefore it places itself at the forefront of the equipment of its class.

The equipment features:

- long operating life;
- ease of operation;
- high reliability;
- easy maintenance.

An important novelty is the development, along with the basic set, of a complete range of add-on subsystems (universal battery-charger, microprocessor-controlled test stands for repairs of 2nd and 3rd level), which, together, constitute the complete "system" for the new RV-2 radio set.

Above.

CBU 825 universal battery-charger, with lid for transport.

Below.

RV 2/400 transceiver, with BCA 400/2 automatic test stand.



SPECIFICATIONS

Mode of operation:

Voice (FM), simplex.

Frequency:

Standard pre-set frequencies in the 47-57 MHz band, or any 10 MHz within the 30-80 MHz band.

Channels:

400 (25 kHz spacing).

Power supply:

10-cell NI-CD rechargeable 0.8 Ah batteries.

Operating life:


Approx 24h with Tx/Rx 1.1:8 ratio at +20°C.

Output:

400mW.

Weight and dimensions:

- 1.5 Kg, with batteries, antenna and head-set-microphone
- 24 cm × 10 cm × 4 cm.





"MAF" ANTI-TANK MISSILE SYSTEM

The "MAF" system has been developed by a consortium of Italian firms, starting from a critical study of the present weapon systems.

The basic criteria for its design have been dictated by the need to find a solution that would conciliate various parameters, such as weight of the weapon, range and cruise speed, paying special attention to the need of maximizing the system's performance at distances between 500m and 2,500 m.

The missile is subsonic and is launched by a propellant booster which ends its action before leaving the launcher tube, thus affording maximum safety to the operator; a rocket-engine propels the missile at a maximum velocity of 260m/sec.

Its effective range depends on visibility, conditions of transmission and speed; the 3,500m maximum range is determined by the minimum of the manoeuvre capability.

The evolution of the threat will bring about a massive employment of helicopters on the battlefield, for combined actions with tanks. The design of the "MAF" system has taken into account the possibility of engaging these targets, in case of attack against one's own or nearby positions.

Two operators can hand-carry the missile. The system can be mounted on a vehicle.



SPECIFICATIONS

Concept of the system:

Optical beam, with transmitter on the launcher and receiver on the missile.

Primary target:

Tank.

Fire--no fire control:

Automatic in the firing sequence.

Traverse:

360°.

Elevation:

— 5° + 15° (present)

— 10° + 25° (under study).

Firing from around with 10% gradient:

No correction by the operator.

NEW 40mm L/60 AMMUNITION

The Swedish industry has designed and introduced a new type of 40mm ammunition. It can use:

- the "PFHE" (Pre Fragmented High Explosive) round, whose minimum engagement distance is 6.5m against aircraft and 4.5m against missiles, with a highly impact-sensitive device in the fuze, a self-destroying mechanism, reduction circuits for very low altitudes, and a double-walled container holding hundreds of heavy-metal pellets and an extremely powerful explosive;
- the APHC-T (Armour Piercing High Capacity Tracer), with a penetration 25-30% greater than that of the normal AP-T rounds.





CAHIERS D'ÉTUDES STRATÉGIQUES

9

La dissuasion par les embargos*Les embargos américains contre l'URSS
et leurs conséquences sur les relations
transatlantiques*

YVES PEREZ



CIRPES

CENTRE INTERDISCIPLINAIRE DE RECHERCHE EN POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE ET STRATÉGIE
UNIVERSITÉ DE PARIS - SORBONNE UNIVERSITÉ
100, rue de la Harpe - 75005 PARIS - FRANCE

Yves Perez, "La dissuasion par les embargos" ("Dissuasion by Embargo"); Cirpes, Paris 1985, 134 pages, F. 50.

This volume examines the recent U.S. embargoes against the U.S.S.R. – the grain embargo following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the embargo on the trans-Ural gas pipeline following the events in Poland – in order to arrive at general considerations on the effectiveness and limitations of using trade as a political-strategic weapon. The inquiry dwells into the problem of East-West relations and relations between Europe and the United States in the context of NATO and into the debate over restrictions on exporting "critical" technologies to Soviet-block countries.

It is an extremely important problem. It involves fundamental interests and can cause divergence and tension throughout the West which are in turn exacerbated by the existing imbalance and by the different interests and perceptions on the two sides of the Atlantic. In practice, use of the economic weapon as an instrument of defense policy could do more damage to the West, namely the countries and the cohesiveness itself of NATO, than to the Soviet Union.

The author attempts to sketch a strategic theory of embargoes. He makes a fundamental distinction between the "rupture embargo", or a sudden and total ban on exportation of particular products such as cereals, and the "con-

tainment embargo", consisting in trade controls and limitations on critical technologies in particular, but extendable to credit systems, to a ceiling on the level of dependency, to systematic reduction of trade which would consolidate the economy of the Soviet bloc, and so on.

As for rupture embargoes, the strategic calculation to measure its impact should be based on the "trade ratio" between importer and exporter. The damage suffered by the exporter is measured by multiplying the direct cost by a Keynesian multiplier of income or activities. The cost to the importer is measured with the aid of intersectorial interdependency matrices, by the reduction in supply or internal production that follows the embargo and with socio-economic models that measure the consequences of a reduction in consumption and the level of prosperity.

As always, psychological factors and the inevitable approximation of the models distort the real picture. Embargoes often produce results that are quite different from those intended, especially in the context of NATO. An embargo must be multilateral to be effective. But cohesive action presupposes either a consensus, and hence similar interests, or an overriding authority that imposes the embargo. Neither one exists in the West. There is no economic NATO. It can be shown that U.S. embargoes have been essentially failures and that at times they have been counterproductive, as in the case of the Yamal gas pipeline.

As for the containment embargo, the author believes with reference to transfers of critical military technologies that the measures can only be effective if the embargoes are highly selective. If they are not, there is the danger that restrictive measures proposed by the Americans will be disputed by the Europeans, as has happened, because they are seen as an attempt to subjugate the European export system rather than as a means of containing Soviet military aggression. The problem of transferring technologies to the Soviet bloc arose at the beginning of the fifties, during the cold war. It became crucial with the qualitative and quantitative transformation of the Soviet threat – still in progress. American efforts to induce the Allies to take a hard line by stricter and tighter controls have doubtless added to Europe's awareness that it is of fundamental importance to the West's security to maintain a technological advantage over the U.S.S.R. No state disputes the principle that tighter controls are needed even if differences remain over the extent of such controls and limitations, due in part to the fact that trade in much of such strategically critical technology is indispensable to Europe's trade balance with the Soviet bloc. The author suggests a very interesting methodological approach to

examining this delicate problem: he suggests coupling dissuasion models with reciprocal vulnerability models derived from the interdependence established between importer and exporter.

Edward N. Luttwak**IL PENTAGONO
E L'ARTE
DELLA GUERRA***Gli Stati Uniti hanno
un sistema militare che funziona?*

E. Luttwak, "Il Pentagono e l'Arte della Guerra" ("The Pentagon and the Art of War"), Rizzoli, Milan 1986.

This volume analyzes the present structure of the U.S. Armed Forces for the purpose of suggesting ways to make them more efficient through optimal use of the financial and human resources at their disposal.

The author, a strategic expert, attempts to identify the reasons why the U.S. Armed Forces have not been able to express their full operative potential in spite of the money and effort expended to that end.

The author believes that the areas of greatest concern, requiring prompt intervention, are: the lack of inter-service integration and corporatism of the individual services of the military forces; the "materialistic" mentality that automatically transposes managerial and economic approaches to the military sphere; the absolute preeminence given to technology; and a cumbersome organization that drains resources in support structures at the expense of the operative sectors.

The lack of inter-service integration is wasteful in effort and resources by



duplication in some sectors and deficiency in others. In particular, there is no organic operative concept for each of the strategic missions assigned to the U.S. Armed Forces. The services are in competition with one another. Instead of integrated planning in terms of "mission effectiveness", weapon systems are evaluated in terms of "platforms". It is thus practically impossible to define sector tactical subconcepts or to define the optimal mix of military forces and weapon systems to effect them and, under operative conditions, achieve inter-service unity. The matter is complicated by the effect of true industrial lobbies associated with each branch of the military, which are capable of influencing, if not determining, procurement planning. Distorsions are thus created that are further amplified by the intervention of congressional financing committees that reexamine each program in detail thus divesting the military leadership of responsibility and

authority. The remedy to this problem, according to Luttwak, is to constitute an inter-service "corps" of officers which the best officers of the military forces would join at a certain point in their careers.

The second problem identified concerns the "materialistic prejudice," which ignores the "intangible" factors of war. It takes into account only quantifiable elements at the expense of the global view. The problem is particularly serious in the research and development and procurement sectors. The enormous increase in the cost of weapon systems stems in great part from a perfectionist mentality that neglects the overall operative output that can be achieved by full use of mature technology and which favors constant research on new systems and the use of innovative technologies still at the developmental stage instead of innovations in production, with the result that production is not serialized enough and logistical support

is more burdensome.

Third, the command organization is cumbersome and bureaucratic. It attends to details. It weakens the lower ranks by removing all discretion. It has transformed a living, dynamic organism capable of reacting to the unforeseen and making immediate decisions into an inanimate bureaucratic body with marginal decision-making capacity and adaptability to the necessarily unforeseeable real operative conditions. Only a "deregulation" which puts a premium on inventiveness and personal qualities and which finds the right measure in the balance between authority and responsibility can restore this essential component of operative capacity.

These are not problems unique to the United States, but common to all military forces influenced to some degree, even culturally, by the U.S. This is why the considerations set out by Luttwak are of current, great interest even for our own military institutions.

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UMBERTO CURI

PENSARE LA GUERRA
 PER UNA CULTURA DELLA PACE

Piccola Biblioteca Dedalo

EDIZIONI DEDALO



Umberto Curi, "Pensare la guerra, per una cultura della pace" ("Studying War as a Way to Peace"), edited by Dedalo, Bari 1985, 117 pages, L. 8,000.

There has always been a relation of continuity and a good deal of intermingling between politics and war. The "Clausewitzian" concept of war as an instrument to pursue political objectives has been known since ancient times and many Greek philosophers had already laid down more or less explicitly the ideas of Karl Schmitt to the effect that conflict and war are the foundation and essence of the "political". Even in Marxist tradition – in spite of certain superficial assertions to the contrary – a pacifist interpretation is not envisaged: in fact, the military basis of every political struggle is constantly underscored.

Every pacifist movement must take into account the predominance of the "political" lest its objectives remain theoretical or romantic aspiration to good sentiments instead of translating into political and operative reality and prospects. Only the existence of weapons of mass destruction can lend validity to the contemporary pacifist movement, since their effects far surpass any political objective a state might set for itself. Their effective, massive use would spell the death of the "political". A solution of continuity with respect to the past has therefore developed that has modified the relation between war and politics and that prevents the reversibility and translation of one to the other. This produces an unprecedented situation. Where until the present war has always shaped politics, helping to

make it dynamic and creating the conditions for needed transformations, now military force blocks politics and solidifies the existing situation. There is a convergence of results between nuclear threat and pacifist submissiveness. Even pacifism must be political to be effective. It cannot limit itself to an ethical imperative. By becoming apolitical – by association with various ecological movements, etc. – it risks increasing the rigidity of the system and creating the conditions for a disaster. It is essential, therefore, that pacifism acquire greater awareness of reality and, in particular, that it recognize the constructive as well as the degenerative nature of conflict, with a full understanding of its historical political and technological dimensions.

This volume does not set out to reach conclusions or proposals. It attempts to uncover underlying problems. It formulates questions rather than give answers. Yet it is a very useful contribution to defining concretely the terms of the problems, the world being what it is and not what one would wish it to be. It also constitutes a stimulus for further analysis of these fundamental problems and an implicit invitation to the pacifist movement to study the problems of war to identify, to use an expression of Norberto Bobbio, the ways to peace.

 XXX
 COLLANA DOCUMENTI

**INIZIATIVA
 DI DIFESA
 STRATEGICA**

 VALUTAZIONI POLITICHE
 E NEGOZIATO DI GINEVRA

 CICLO DI TAVOLE ROTONDE SU TEMI STRATEGICI
 PATROCINATO DALL'ONLE PRESIDENTE DELLA
 COMMISSIONE DIFESA DELLA CAMERA DEI DEPUTATI

ROMA - APRILE - GIUGNO 1985


 Società Italiana
 per la Organizzazione
 Internazionale
 S.I.O.I.

 Istituto Studi
 e Ricerche Difesa
 ISTRID

"Iniziativa di difesa strategica" ("Strategic Defense Initiative"), edited by SIOI (International Society for International Organization) - ISTRID (Institute for Studies and Research on Defense), Rome 1985, 399 pages, L. 30,000.

This volume is the first result of a very interesting initiative promoted by

SIOI and ISTRID, two of the most prestigious institutes concerned with security problems in Italy, with the support of the Defense Commission of the Chamber of Deputies. The initiative consists in an organic collection of the most significant documentation concerning the principal themes of current strategic interest. The undertaking is carefully prefaced by an essay that sets out the principal aspects that characterize it and furnishes a key to reading the documents, an explanation of the terms used and a synopsis of the principal positions and opinions on a given subject by the various protagonists and political and strategic experts.

The strategic defense initiative of the United States constitutes one of the greatest efforts ever undertaken to coordinate scientific and technological research, some of which is already under way in the various U.S. military research and development facilities, and others which are wholly new, especially with regard to the general architecture of a strategic antimissile system and certain specific sectors of technology.


The introductory essay by Virgilio Ilary sets out the problems of active strategic defenses in politico-strategic evolution as they affect bipolar relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., multilateral transatlantic relations and with regard to the impact of SDI on arms control and disarmament negotiations. Of particular interest is the chronology of facts and events from which one can see order and legibility in apparently disorganized material according to recognizable patterns. The strategic defenses underwent positive and negative judgements during their development with regard to technological evolution, global relations between the superpowers and transformations in the global strategic status.

Of course, there are no value judgments or definitive judgments concerning the concrete prospects for SDI and its impact on the geopolitical and geostrategic situation, on security and on international balance. It is limited to recording the facts and it is done with commendable discernment and efficacy. The documentation collected is comprehensive. This volume, therefore, is intended as a valuable reference source for those interested in an in-depth study of a very important contemporary issue which may be determinant in settling future international equilibriums and for the success of the arms control and disarmament negotiations.

Carlo Bess



1946-1955



"Life 1946-1955, Ten Years in Photographs", edited by New York Graphic Society, 200 pages.

The 200 black and white photographs presented in the book were taken by 74 photographers during the 1946-1955 decade for the magazines *Time*, *Life* and *Fortune* to illustrate the most important historical events and famous people of that period.

Two years of work went into studying 156,000 images to select the ones published. The result is a collection of photos that constitute an excellent means of communicating at a glance the most important events that took place around the world. It is a well thought-out selection of the most surprising, irresistible and enchanting images of that period.

The images attest to the fact that they were happy years throughout most of the world. And even if one cannot define as joyous a decade that saw the cold war, the Korean war and the beginning of racial wars, they are still years that one remembers with fondness.

One learns a good deal from examining these photos: the pleasure of looking "inside", the feelings and stimuli transmitted by the images which elicit opposite reactions from different people and the integration of the image by each observer who brings to it his own experiences and sensibilities. Doris C. O'Neil, director of photography for *Time*, presents them by saying: "Some photographs in this collection are charged with individual emotion, others are of a universal character, some are of great beauty, others are terrifying. But they all share certain qualities and there is

a certain harmony between them. I am asked at times how I choose a photograph. It is difficult to answer that question because many values are personal and subjective in photography. I have often tried to analyze myself as I rummage through a drawerful of pictures to understand how I come to set aside four or five — and only those. There is no hesitation in my reaction to a photo: my response is as immediate as that of the float on a fisherman's line when the bait is taken".

The photographers are transformed into narrators through these images in *Life*; they are the true precursors of television reporters, with much of the editorial freedom enjoyed by writers.

During the period in question we see the homecoming of American soldiers in 1946 with visible and invisible wounds from the war in Europe, the Berlin airlift, the beginning of the war between Arabs and Jews when the British withdrew from Palestine in April 1948, the signing of the Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the Korean war and the situation created by hydrogen bomb testing and atomic bomb shelters.

This is a book with unforgettable images that show how much a magazine can mean in everyday life, in reporting on a period, in the history of an era.

ALFONSO BARTOLINI

PER LA PATRIA E LA LIBERTÀ!

I soldati italiani nella Resistenza all'estero dopo l'8 settembre

MURSIA



Alfonso Bartolini, "Per la Patria e la libertà! I soldati italiani nella Resistenza all'estero dopo l'8 settembre" ("For Country and Liberty! Italian Soldiers in the Resistance Abroad after 8 September"), edited by U. Mursia, Milan 1986, 372 pages, L. 20,000.

Captain in the *Bersaglieri* combatant on the Greek-Albanian front

and in the Greek resistance, decorated with the Silver Medal for Military Valor, journalist editor of the bimonthly *Patria Indipendente*: this is a brief biographical sketch of Alfonso Bartolini, the author of this book which describes the tragedy of hundreds of thousands of Italian soldiers surprised by the armistice of 8 September 1943 in France, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, in the Aegean islands and in Corsica.

Bartolini states that "young students who are totally detached from those events and who have not lived them as protagonists or contemporaries will be able to look at that period with greater dispassion and equanimity. We who lived in that era have a duty only to record all the information we can: testimony, impressions, reflections".

And the book is rich in testimony, impressions and reflections, a gold mine of facts and judgements to reconstruct the truth about the conduct of Italian soldiers abroad and about the resistance against the Germans by Italian Army units dislocated outside the country.

We gather from the abundant facts and testimony reported that the resistance against the demands of the enemy was spontaneous and immediate, even if fragmentary and episodic, and was characterized by countless acts of valor and sacrifice that met with misfortune. And it is significant that following the armistice the immediate reaction against the Germans took place especially outside the country.

In some cases the struggle began on 9 September when Italian units joined with partisan detachments in their respective areas and were able to give substantial help and support in personnel and material.

Bartolini writes: "The history of our Armed Forces, particularly abroad, is filled with exceptional deeds and great sacrifice for the student who wants and knows how to interpret them in light of a judgement that should be preserved and transmitted as part of the historical memory and moral and patriotic heritage of Italy". And the author adds: "the long sojourn of the Italian soldier in this or that village in contact with people whom he did not consider different generated a sense of human solidarity toward the suffering of others. Since racial superiority complexes were alien to him, no order could prohibit him from fraternizing with those from whom he should have kept his distance. He did not commit acts of savagery: he could be harsh at times, but never cruel, and tried to communicate with a smile or a modest gift that he was not an enemy but only a soldier who found himself at war through no wish of his own and that war had its inexorable laws".

The study of the conduct of Italian detachments begins with the vicissitudes of the "Acqui" Division at Cefalonia, with particular references to the know-



ing choice of the soldiers and officers, to the sad end of the desperate battle and to the massacre of the prisoners.

The author examines the courageous resistance of the Italian garrisons in the Aegean islands, the heroic conduct of the naval batteries and of the "Regina" infantrymen, the defense of Lero, the disputes between the Allies and the collapse of the entire defense system. He also examines the "many lost opportunities" in Greece, the collapse of the 11th Army, the struggle of the "Pinerolo" Division at Thessaly, the sad Neraida Camp and the welcome extended by the Greek population to thousands of clandestine guest.

With regard to the military collapse in Albania we are reminded of the conduct of the Command of the Eastern Army Group and of the 9th Army, the Italian Command of the Mountain Troops, the first agreements between Italians and Albanians, the "Firenze" Division that redeemed the surrender of the High Commands, the fighting at Kruja, the *Osvado Conti* naval battery and the *Pilo* torpedo-boat.

The reevocation continues with the tragic fate of the "Perugia" Division, the march toward the sea amid desperate fighting punctuated by episodes of heroism, the shooting of 120 officers at Cape Luminione, the massacre at Kuci, the conduct of an extraordinary group of officers in the Italian Army's last feats of resistance, the "Mosconi", "Zignani" and "Nuova Italia" battalions, the great number of Italian soldiers who joined the partisan formations, the deeds of the "Cotta" and "Menegazzi" batteries and the Italian contribution to the Albanian struggle for liberation. We are also reminded of the 170 men of the "Gramsci" battalion who were able to resist the Germans for five hours, the long journey of that unit from battalion to Division through increasing commitments and the precious contribution of the Italian Air Force.

The author then examines the situation that developed in Yugoslavia with the total paralysis of the Italian Major Units checked by the perfectly organized German forces, the first heroic resistance actions, the conduct of the "Bergamo", "Marche" and "Emilia" Divisions, the massacres at the Furnaces of Sigma and Trilji, the soldiers shot at Ombla and the failed attempt to defend Cattaro. We are reminded of the Italian partisan "Garibaldi" Division with interesting considerations on the transformation of the partisan units into regular units, the massacre of the *Guardie di Finanza* the role of the Italian artillery and the birth of the "Italia" Brigade from the "Garibaldi" and "Matteotti" battalions. Bartolini writes beautiful passages on the Italian presence in Yugoslavia in the *Risorgimento* tradition, remembering the "Matteotti", "Mameli" and "Fratelli Bandiera" battalions, the

Italian participation in the liberation of Belgrade and in the Zagreb offensive, pointing out the message of peace of the Italian partisans. In particular the author examines the strong Italian presence in the Yugoslav resistance with the proliferation of small units, the partisan formations near the border, the influx of volunteers from the ports of Puglia and the partisan flotillas in the Adriatic Sea.

The author examines the resistance of Italian soldiers on French territory, which was different in character from the resistance in the Balkans, with the painful disbandment of the 4th Army and the admirable show of courage of the detachment left in Corsica. The Italian partisans operated in numerous formations throughout Europe; two Italian companies operated in the Red Army.

Finally, we are reminded in moving detail of the Italian soldiers who by the hundreds of thousands ended up being deported with brutality and contempt to German concentration camps distributed throughout half of Europe. Their great show of dignity and courage in resisting threats by the Germans and the allure of the fascist emissaries of Salò are remembered in particular, together with the moral action conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Pietro Testa, the old commandant of the "Zara" Bersaglieri battalion.

This book deserves careful consideration. It communicates two fundamental messages to the professional military man: the importance of thorough training to allow the rational transformation of a regular unit into a partisan unit on account of enemy superiority in occupied territory, and the need to coordinate the planning efforts to deploy forces spread over vast territories. A stinging memory lingers of the episodic resistance of our units, without guidance or coordination from a central command, overwhelmed one by one by the Germans for lack of an efficient, unified direction of the operations.

For these reasons this book should be required reading for members of the Armed Forces, especially the younger ones, so as not to lose the spiritual heritage of the conduct of our soldiers in such tragic circumstances.

The preface to the volume by General Andrea Viglione is apropos in that it synthesizes the work with an authoritative judgement: "a true odyssey that Bartolini retraces with painful recall and the rigor of intense personal experience: an in-depth critical study of the events; a patient and detailed research of unknown or forgotten episodes".

STATO MAGGIORE DELL'ESERCITO
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FILIPPO STEFANI

LA STORIA DELLA DOTTRINA
E DEGLI ORDINAMENTI
DELL'ESERCITO ITALIANO

VOLUME II

TOMO 2°

LA 2ª GUERRA MONDIALE
(1940-1943)

ROMA 1986

Filippo Stefani, "La storia della dottrina e degli ordinamenti dell'Esercito italiano" ("The History of the Doctrine and Organization of the Italian Army"), Vol. II, Book 2, Historical Office of the Army General Staff, Rome 1986, 998 pages, 86 cartographic sketches, L. 25,000.

This second book of volume II is somewhat different than the preceding ones. In fact, the author interrupts the analysis of the doctrinal and organizational evolution of the Italian Army after the first chapter and devotes the remaining nine hundred pages of text to a description of the operations conducted by the Army from June 1940 to September 1943 in the general context of the war. The author's motive for the long digression is that "only by examining the various campaigns conducted by the Italian Army, autonomously or in cooperation with the German forces, is it possible to discover where, how and why official tactical doctrine proved inadequate before the reality of war and to mention the remedial measures adopted during the conflict by high-ranking commanders to adapt doctrine and organization to changing conditions". Following this scheme, General Stefani has divided the book into three substantive parts: the operations conducted by the Italian forces autonomously (the campaign in the western Alps, the operation in Libya from June 1940 to February 1941, the Greek-Albanian campaign and the operations in East Africa); those conducted together with the German troops (the second phase of operations in North Africa, the participation in the Russian campaign and the defense of Sicily and Calabria); and, finally, the struggle against the Germans immediately following the 8



September 1943 armistice. The analyses of operations in individual campaigns are precise and rigorous and are concluded in each case with a persuasive paragraph setting out final considerations, rich in pertinent critical notes dictated by independent judgement and intellectual honesty.

Numerous cartographic sketches of admirable clarity are of considerable aid in grasping the operative plans and maneuvers.


The author's motivation is, of course, controversial; at a distance of forty years from the events we can assume that the progress of the operations is well known; we must recognize, however, that the collection in one volume of the essential contents of the many individual monographs regarding the various campaigns has been an undertaking of great utility and scope. In fact, the author briefly analyzes – but not in summary fashion – even the operative campaigns in which the Italian Army was not involved; the recounting of the military operations, therefore, is adequately placed in a world politico-military contexts. Of course, a reconstruction of events which is so concerned with the overall strategic picture mercilessly exposes the serious deficiencies of our country's leadership. The author states in this regard: "Of the three powers of the Tripartite (Alliance) Italy was the least prepared when it went to war, not only at the level of numerical and qualitative deficiencies, but even at the conceptual level of tactics and strategy and in the organization of the forces and command. The lack of an up-to-date vision of modern warfare, the absence of adequate operative planning to guarantee the security of maritime and aerial communications with the "fourth shore", the lack of understanding of the interdependence between ground, sea and air as if each had a separate existence, the superficial manner in which the problem of Malta was dealt with, the absence of a Supreme Command during the initial phase of the war – all these negative factors weighed on the first phase of the war more than the quantitative and qualitative inferiority in means and materials". We are therefore quite far from the comfortable defensive explanations often adopted by the military protagonists of the era who tend to blame only the political leadership for the lack of preparedness for war.

General Stefani also underlines the Chiefs of Staff's failure during the war to update with all possible speed the doctrine of employment and the organization, as was called for by the setbacks on the battlefield. Especially in North Africa the initiative of the various commanders, spurred by hard lessons inflicted by the enemy and by the unhappy comparison with the ally, led to an autonomous reelaboration of defensive

doctrine, substituting the concept of position defense to that of continuous line defense, which constituted a qualitative leap in the evolution of Italian military strategy. Even the new attack procedures adopted, which were rapidly assimilated by the units, improved operative efficiency, but, as the author notes, new materials would have been needed to modify substantially such a hopeless situation.

It is, in sum, a volume of great interest, rich in facts and judgements; it is a successful attempt to offer even the inexpert reader a global, undistorted view of the 1940-1943 conflict analyzed with deep yet fair critical rigor.

Oreste Bovio



Mario Montanari, "Le operazioni in Africa Settentrionale - Tobruk: marzo 1941 - gennaio 1942" ("Operations in North Africa - Tobruk: March 1941 - January 1942"), Volume II, Historical Office of the Army General Staff, Rome 1985, 992 pages, 81 sketches in the text and 8 separate maps, L. 40,000.

This is the second of four volumes that the Historical Office of the Army General has decided to dedicate to a structural analysis of the operations in North Africa during the second world war.

This monograph – based on Italian documentation stored in the archives of the Historical Office, on English, New Zealander, South African, Indian, Australian and German documents – has "the charm of detached objectivity", as the Chief of the Office states in the presentation "because of a settling over time, of knowledge, and cross-checking of facts, of quality of the research methods, and of the technical-operative developments by both contenders".

These are weighty words, but reading the volume amply vindicates them. Even in this work General Mario Montanari, in fact, confirms his reputation as a careful and scrupulous historian who is very knowledgeable about the subject under examination and who is, therefore, a wise and evenhanded critic.

The operative cycle analyzed marks the end of the "parallel war" inasmuch as it begins with the influx of German units in Libya to bolster our units, which were inadequately mechanized to withstand the pressure of the British Commonwealth, and with the almost contemporaneous, vigorous resumption of the initiative of the now Italo-German troops. The narration continues with the careful and balanced description of the British offensive maneuvers, called "Brevity", "Battleaxe" and "Crusader", and the Italo-German counter-maneuvers.


As is well known, it was possible to pursue an adequate containment action with regard to the first two offensives, while the third at last succeeded against the battle-ready Axis troops, forcing us, in the month of December, after a year of uninterrupted successes, to abandon again the Cyrenaic region and fall back to the starting position of March, though a lesser price was paid in men and materials than the one paid in the previous retreat – a sign of the greater solidity of the operative sector and of the higher level of training among troops and cadres.

The volume is not limited to describing the forces, the operative plans or the actual unfolding of the operations by both protagonists in the fighting; it also takes into careful account the strategic situation, the functioning of the High Commands, the problem of supplies and Italo-German relations, and for each of these ponderous arguments the author is generous with pertinent judgements.

It is, in fact, a text of military history properly set out in which the narration is always accompanied and brought to life by critical judgement, and which also has the virtue of giving due credit for the many sacrifices endured by our units, which were always asked to deliver a bit more than they could.

We note, finally, that the text is complemented by the following: 20 photographs; an appendix of 32 historical documents; 81 topographic sketches in black and white and in color included in the text and 8 large maps attached; accurate indexes of names of persons and places and of the Commands and units mentioned in the text; a handy glossary of the most common topographic terms in the Cyrenaic region; and an accurate bibliography with notations on sources and publications consulted.

Oreste Bovio



John Laffin, "Brassey's Battles. 3500 Years of Conflict, Campaigns and Wars from A-Z", Brassey Defence Publishers Ltd., London 1986.

To prepare a compendium of the principal battles which were fought

throughout the history of the world might seem a relatively easy task. The old criteria adopted by the *histoire-bataille* for the compilation of its chronologies could easily be transposed to a work of this kind. But the author has preferred a methodological, complex and problematic approach attempting to define battle by means of a theory of conflict.

A battle itself may have different importance in the eyes of the various contenders. The battle of Lepanto, for instance, was considered a historical victory by Christianity while the Sublime Porte perceived it as indeed a serious setback, but without serious consequences. Moreover a battle may not be the central event that decades of ultra-Clausewitzian thought have led us to believe. Various skirmishes and maneuver campaigns (Turenne, Marshal of Saxony) achieved important political objectives through a series of minor clashes, at times without combat.

The result of this careful methodological approach combined with a succinct exposition and careful documentation is felicitous. The reference value of the work is enhanced by the lists of battles considered and their sometimes double names (Edirne -

Adrianople), the principal airlandings, the code names of the most important operations of the second world war and by a vast selection of maps.

It is inevitable that in a book that required twenty years of work and a dispassionate selection among military actions there would be minor - but easily corrected - lapses. We mention with regard to double names the missing designation of "maneuver of Tolmino" for the battle of Caporetto currently used in non-Italian literature. We also think that the battle of Tanga should have been mentioned in the von Lettow-Vorbeck campaign (East Africa 1914-1918). And finally we note that "Rösselsprung" is the German code name both for the attack on the convoys on the Murmansk-Arkhangelsk route as well as the "blitz" against Tito's command headquarters.


The value and utility of the book, however, are undisputed, because it is an excellent reference source for the military historian (and everyone else) inasmuch as it leads him to consider more carefully the historical events that took place outside Europe.

Alessandro Politi

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A circular collage of ten photographs arranged in a 2x5 grid, separated by a dark brown border. The collage is framed by a circular border with eight colored triangular segments: red, orange, yellow, light blue, dark blue, purple, and two shades of blue. The photographs depict various stages of the Space Shuttle program: 1. Top-left: A close-up of a Space Shuttle Main Engine on the ground. 2. Top-middle: A Space Shuttle in orbit, viewed from below. 3. Top-right: A large yellow Space Shuttle orbiter on the ground, being mated to the External Tank and Solid Rocket Boosters. 4. Middle-right: A close-up of the Shuttle's avionics bay, showing various electronic components and displays. 5. Middle-left: A close-up of the Shuttle's nose and cockpit area. 6. Bottom-right: A Space Shuttle in orbit, viewed from the side. 7. Bottom-middle: A close-up of the Shuttle's nose and cockpit area. 8. Bottom-left: A close-up of the Shuttle's nose and cockpit area. 9. Middle-left: A close-up of the Shuttle's nose and cockpit area. 10. Bottom-left: A close-up of the Shuttle's nose and cockpit area.

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